DR. ANJALI JOSHI vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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2026:CGHC:21935

NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally
signed by
AMARDEEP
CHOUBEY
Date:
2026.05.13
11:16:23
+0530
WPS No. 4032 of 2026
AMARDEEP
CHOUBEY
Dr. Anjali Joshi W/o Tijau Aged About 41 Years R/o Quarter No. 2/a,
Street No. 33, Sector-11, Zone-02, Khursipar, P.O.- Khursipar, Bhilai,
District- Durg (C.G.)
... Petitioner
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- The Secretary, Department Of
Higher Education Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Distt.- Raipur
(C.G.)
2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- The Secretary, Department Of
General Administration, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Distt.-
Raipur (C.G.)
3 - The Commissioner Higher Education- Directorate, New Raipur,
Distt.- Raipur (C.G.)
4 - The Principal Mohan Lal Jain (Mohan Bhaiya) Govt. College
Khursipar, District- Durg (C.G.)
... Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. Shubham Tiwari, Advocate.
For Respondents/State : Mr. Suyashdhar Badgaiyan, G.A.

Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge
Order on Board
11/05/2026

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1. By way of the present petition, the petitioner is challenging the
impugned action dated 11/08/2025 Annexure P-1 of the
respondent No.4., whereby the petitioner has been deprived
the monetary benefit of maternity leave on the basis of Clause
11.2 of the Circular dated 20/06/2024.
2.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is
working since 25/08 /2018 as a Guest Lecturer in the
respondent’s College. During her pregnancy, the petitioner
applied for maternity leave on 11.08.2025 under the Maternity
Benefit Act, 1961, which was duly sanctioned. She rejoined
duty on 09.02.2026 after availing leave. Upon resumption, the
Petitioner claimed monetary benefits under Section 5 of the
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. However, Respondent No. 4
denied the said claim pursuant to clause 11.2 of circular dated
20.06.2024, which states that guest lecturers are entitled only
to maternity leave and not to monetary benefits. Aggrieved by
the denial and inaction of the Respondents, the petitioner
submitted several representations to the Respondent
authorities, but her grievance has not been redressed. To
buttress his submissions, learned counsel has relied upon the
judgments of this Court in WPS No. 3764 of 2019 decided on
30.11.2022 and WPS No.1648 of 2025 decided on 10.03.2025.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submits that
since the petitioner was not a regular employee she cannot
claim benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, as such,

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she is not entitled to get monetary benefit.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
pleadings and documents appended thereto.
5. Before proceeding further it would be noteworthy to mention
here that a woman employee, at the time of advanced
pregnancy cannot be compelled to undertake hard labour as it
would be detrimental to her health and also to the health of the
foetus. It is for this reason that it is provided in the Maternity
Benefit Act. 1961 that she would be entitled to maternity leave
for certain periods prior to and after delivery. I have gone
through the different provisions of the Act, but I do not find
anything contained in the Act which entitles only regular
women employees to the benefit of maternity leave and not to
those who are engaged on casual basis or on muster roll on
daily wage basis or the employees engaged as guest.
6. In fact, the Act, 1961 was enacted to secure women's right to
pregnancy and maternity leave and to afford women with as
much flexibility as possible to live an autonomous life, both as
a mother and as a worker, if they so desire.
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dr. Kavita Yadav
vs. Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
Department and others reported in (2024) 1 SCC 421 held
in paras 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14 and 15 as under:
“"6. The main question which falls for determination

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in this appeal is as to whether the maternity
benefits, as contemplated in the 1961 Act, would
apply to a lady employee appointed on contract if
the period for which she claims such benefits
overshoots the contractual period.
7. Ms. Rachita Garg, learned counsel appearing for
the respondentemployer, sought to defend the
reasoning given in the judgment under appeal. Her
main argument is that once the term or tenure of
the contract ends, there cannot be a notional
extension of the same by giving the employee the
benefits of the 1961 Act in full, as contemplated in
Section 5(2) thereof. It is her submission that any
benefits that the appellant would be entitled to
ought to be within the contractual period.
8. We have reproduced earlier in this judgment the
provisions of Section 12(2)(a) of the 1961 Act. The
aforesaid provision contemplates entitlement to the
benefits under the 1961 Act even for an employee
who is dismissed or discharged at any time during
her pregnancy if the woman, but for such discharge
or dismissal, would have been entitled to maternity
benefits or medical bonus. Thus, continuation of
maternity benefits is in built in the statute itself,
where the benefits would survive and continue

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despite the cessation of employment. In our
opinion, what this legislation envisages is
entitlement to maternity benefits, which accrues on
fulfillment of the conditions specified in Section 5(2)
thereof, and such benefits can travel beyond the
term of employment also. It is not co-terminus with
the employment tenure.
9. A two Judge Bench of this Court in the case of
Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Female Workers
(Muster Roll) & Anr. [(2000) 3 SCC 224], while
dealing with a similar claim by female muster roll
workers who were employed on daily wages,
opined that the provisions relating to maternity
benefits in the 1961 Act would be applicable in their
cases as well. That dispute had reached this Court
through the Industrial Tribunal and the High Court.
Before both these fora, the Union espousing the
cause of the female workers was successful. In that
case, point of discrimination was highlighted as
regular women employees were extended the
benefits of the said Act but not those who were
employed on casual basis or on muster roll on daily
wage basis. This Court observed, in paragraph 27
of the said judgment:
"27. The provisions of the Act which have

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been set out above would indicate that they
are wholly in consonance with the Directive
Principles of State Policy, as set out in
Article 39 and in other articles, specially
Article 42. A woman employee, at the time
of advanced pregnancy cannot be
compelled to undertake hard labour as it
would be detrimental to her health and also
to the health of the foetus. It is for this
reason that it is provided in the Act that she
would be entitled to maternity leave for
certain periods prior to and after delivery.
We have scanned the different provisions of
the Act, but we do not find anything
contained in the Act which entitles only
regular women employees to the benefit of
maternity leave and not to those who are
engaged on casual basis or on muster roll
on dailywage basis."
10. Broadly, a similar view is reflected in a more
recent judgment of this Court in the case of
Deepika Singh vs Central Administrative Tribunal
And Others [(2022) 7 SCR 557]. Though this
decision dealt with Central Civil Services (Leave)
Rules, 1972, in relation to maternity leave and the

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1961 Act was not directly applicable in that case,
this Court analysed certain provisions of this Act to
derive some guidance on a cognate legislation.
11. This Court observed in the case of Deepika
Singh (supra):
“19. Subsection (1) of Section 5 confers an
entitlement on a woman to the payment of
maternity benefits at a stipulated rate for the
period of her actual absence beginning from
the period immediately preceding the day of
her delivery, the actual day of her delivery
and any period immediately following that
day. Sub-section (3) specifies the maximum
period for which any woman shall be
entitled to maternity benefit. These
provisions have been made by Parliament
to ensure that the absence of a woman
away from the place of work occasioned by
the delivery of a child does not hinder her
entitlement to receive wages for that period
or for that matter for the period during which
she should be granted leave in order to look
after her child after the birth takes place.
20. The Act of 1961 was enacted to secure

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women's right to pregnancy and maternity
leave and to afford women with as much
flexibility as possible to live an autonomous
life, both as a mother and as a worker, if
they so desire. In Municipal Corporation of
Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll), a
twojudge Bench of this Court placed
reliance on the obligations under Articles 14,
15, 39, 42 and 43 of the Constitution, and
India's international obligations under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
1948 and Article 11 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women to extend benefits under
the Act of 1961 to workers engaged on a
casual basis or on muster roll on daily
wages by the Municipal Corporation of
Delhi. The Central Civil Services (Leave)
Rules 1972, it is well to bear in mind, are
also formulated to entrench and enhance
the objects of Article 15 of the Constitution
and other relevant constitutional rights and
protections."
14. Our independent analysis of the provisions of
the 1961 Act does not lead to an interpretation that

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the maternity benefits cannot survive or go beyond
the duration of employment of the applicant thereof.
The expression employed in the legislation is
maternity benefits [in Section 2(h)] and not leave.
Section 5(2) of the statute, which we have quoted
above, stipulates the conditions on the fulfilment of
which such benefits would accrue. Section 5(3)
lays down the maximum period for which such
benefits could be granted. The last proviso to
Section 5(3) makes the benefits applicable even in
a case where the applicant woman dies after
delivery of the child, for the entire period she would
have been otherwise entitled to. Further, there is an
embargo on the employer from dismissing or
discharging a woman who absents herself from
work in accordance with the provisions of the Act
during her absence. This embargo has been
imposed under Section 12(2)(a) of the Act. The
expression "discharge" is of wide import, and it
would include "discharge on conclusion of the
contractual period". Further, by virtue of operation
of Section 27, the Act overrides any agreement or
contract of service found inconsistent with the 1961
Act.
15. In our opinion, a combined reading of these

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provisions in the factual context of this case would
lead to the conclusion that once the appellant
fulfilled the entitlement criteria specified in Section
5(2) of the Act, she would be eligible for full
maternity benefits even if such benefits exceed the
duration of her contract. Any attempt to enforce the
contract duration term within such period by the
employer would constitute "discharge" and attract
the embargo specified in Section 12(2)(a) of the
1961 Act. The law creates a fiction in such a case
by treating her to be in employment for the sole
purpose of availing maternity benefits under the
1961 Act."
8. It is not the case of the respondents herein that the job of the
petitioner is not similar to that of a regular Lecturers or that she
is unable to perform the duties of a regular Lecturer. It is
claimed that the petitioner though is appointed as Guest
Lecturer, she is performing same duties and responsibilities
undertaken by a regular Lecturers. Therefore, the respondent
authorities are not justified in holding that the petitioner who is
working as Guest Lecturer is not entitled for monetary benefit.
9. Considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter in the light of
orders passed by the Supreme Court, it is abundantly clear
that the salary for the period when the petitioner had gone to
maternity leave cannot be denied on the ground that she was

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serving as a Guest Lecturer. Further considering the case that
once the petitioner was granted maternity leave, the
respondents are under obligation to release the salary of the
petitioner forthwith in respect of the period when she had gone
for maternity leave.
10.
Accordingly, the respondents are directed that to take an
appropriate decision in accordance with rules and guidelines,
as the petitioner is entitled for maternity leave and pass an
appropriate orders in respect of petitioner's claim for unpaid
salary for the period she had gone for maternity, at the earliest
preferably within a period of three months from the date of
receipt of copy of this order.
SD/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
Gowri/
Amardeep