THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER vs C D METI

Court
Karnataka High Court

- 1 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:18685-DB
WA No. 100491 of 2024


CNR: KAHC020150912024


IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD

TH
DATED THIS THE 16 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

AND

THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

WRIT APPEAL NO.100491 OF 2024 (L-KSRTC)


BETWEEN:

THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER,
NWKRTC, BELAGAVI DIVISION,
BELAGAVI,
R/BY CHIEF LAW OFFICER,
CENTRAL OFFICE, GOKUL ROAD,
HUBBALLI – 580 030.





…APPELLANT
(BY SRI. PRASHANT HOSMANI, ADVOCATE)


AND:

C.D. METI,
AGE: 69 YEARS, OCC: EX-DRIVER,
R/O: HARALAKATTI, TQ: SAVADATTI,
DIST: BELAGAVI – 590 001.






Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench
…RESPONDENT

THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S. 4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE INTERIM ORDER
DATED 14-07-2017 IN WP NO.60272/2010 (L-KSRTC) PASSED BY
THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON’BLE COURT AND ALLOW
THE SAID WRIT APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY
AND ETC.

THIS WRIT APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:


CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

- 2 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:18685-DB
WA No. 100491 of 2024


CNR: KAHC020150912024

ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )

The appellant, NWKRTC, is before the Court calling in
question an order of the learned Single Judge dated
14.07.2017. The order of the learned Single Judge is as
follows:
“5. Therefore, in that circumstance, when the
Labour Court has referred to the documents available
before it and has recorded a positive finding, in that
regard, re-appreciation of the evidence in any event would
not be possible in a writ petition of the present nature.
Therefore, the direction issued for re-instatement into
service cannot be considered as erroneous. However, a
further perusal of the award would indicate that though
the Labour Court was justified in holding that the reference
made in the year 2005 cannot bar the remedy to the
respondent herein, the said aspect and the consideration
with regard to the backwages ought to have been properly
done. Though it is seen that the Labour Court has awarded
50% backwages, no consideration in that regard is made.
One other aspect which is also to be kept in view is that
due to the said accident, not only damage has been
caused to the bus, but the petitioner is also made liable to
pay the compensation to the claimants in respect of the
said accident.

6. Though, the Labour Court has arrived at the
conclusion that the allegation of the negligent driving
against the respondent was not established as the
appropriate witness has not been examined, the fact that
the respondent should have exercised caution and taken
care while driving cannot be ruled out. Therefore, in a
normal circumstance, when public money is to be paid, it
would be appropriate to deny the entire backwages.
However, what is necessary to be taken into consideration
is that, as on today the respondent has reached his age of
superannuation. If that be the position, the relief of
reinstatement would not be possible. The said benefit no

- 3 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:18685-DB
WA No. 100491 of 2024


CNR: KAHC020150912024

doubt would entitle him to have continuity of service till
the date of superannuation for the purpose of
consequential benefits and terminal benefits. In that
circumstance, since the respondent would not have the
benefit of continuing in the employment for earning his
future salary, instead of denying the entire backwages, I
find it appropriate that the respondent, apart from being
entitled to continuity of service and consequential benefits,
for the purpose of payment of terminal benefits, the
backwages in monetary terms will be 25% of such
backwages. The award dated 12.06.2009 shall, therefore,
stand modified to that extent.

The petition stands disposed of accordingly.”




2. The NWKRTC, the appellant has challenged the said
order of the learned Single Judge by filing the petition on
29.08.2024, as observed after a delay of seven long years.


3. The learned counsel Sri. Prashant Hosmani would
vehemently contend that the order of the learned Single Judge
is erroneous in granting back wages as the workman himself
had challenged the order of dismissal before the Labour Court
after a delay of four years.


4. If the delay of the workman is pitted against the
delay by the Corporation in filing the appeal, the delay of the
workman, the solitary contention would pale into insignificance.

- 4 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:18685-DB
WA No. 100491 of 2024


CNR: KAHC020150912024

For the reason that the delay of the Corporation filing the
subject appeal is seven years.


5. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF ODISHA
v. MANAGING COMMITTEE OF NAMATARA GIRLS HIGH
1
SCHOOL , rejected the appeal filed by the State of Odisha on
the score that there was a delay of 291 days totally in filing the
appeal. The Apex Court holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
12. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has
been shown for exercise of discretion in favour of
the State of Odisha. The nature of explanation in
the application for condonation of delay is such that
with much ado, the proceedings could be closed.

13. However, since there is a long line of decisions
of this Court propounding the law that the expression
‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature in Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable
the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which
subserves the ends of justice and in view of the
submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it
appropriate to consider the matter in some depth.

14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji , a coordinate Bench
noting that the justifiably liberal approach which this
Court has been adopting in matters instituted before it is
not being followed by the courts lower in the hierarchy,
mandated that a justice-oriented approach is indeed
called for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as
distinguished from ‘a private party’.

1

2026 SCC OnLine SC 191

- 5 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:18685-DB
WA No. 100491 of 2024


CNR: KAHC020150912024


15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon'ble
Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate
Bench in G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer had
referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14 and quoted the
following passage therefrom:

“When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have
vested right in injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay …

It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to legalise
injustice on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected to
do so.”

Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it
was held as under:

15. In litigations to which Government is a
party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps,
cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by
Government are lost for such defaults, no person
is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate
analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions
of Government are collective and institutional
decisions and do not share the characteristics of
decisions of private individuals.

16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the
same for a private citizen as for governmental
authorities. Government, like any other litigant
must take responsibility for the acts or omissions
of its officers. But a somewhat different
complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public
interest was shown to have suffered owing to
acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its
officers or agents and where the officers were
clearly at cross-purposes with it.

17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a
particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for
purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be
somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the

- 6 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:18685-DB
WA No. 100491 of 2024


CNR: KAHC020150912024

considerations that go into the judicial verdict,
these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the
government. Governmental decisions are
proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the
process of their making. A certain amount of
latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is
rightly said that those who bear responsibility of
Government must have “a little play at the
joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on
governmental functioning — of course, within
reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial
approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It
would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
government and private parties on the same
footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in
the very nature of governmental functioning is
procedural delay incidental to the decision-
making process. In the opinion of the High Court,
the conduct of the law officers of the Government
placed the Government in a predicament and that
it was one of those cases where the mala fides of
the officers should not be imputed to
Government. It relied upon and trusted its law
officers. …

16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra)
were consistently followed by this Court until
adoption of a different and seemingly strict
approach while dealing with applications for
condonation of delay during the last decade and a
half became discernible starting with the decision in
Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited ,
where a delay of 427 days in filing the relevant
special leave petition was not condoned. University
of Delhi v. Union of India is another decision (of a
three-Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of
916 days was not condoned. While upholding the
decision of the relevant high court under challenge
refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in
presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a
deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in
Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA) very
recently reiterated that the law of limitation is
founded on public policy, the object is that a legal
remedy is put to an end so that no litigation

- 7 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:18685-DB
WA No. 100491 of 2024


CNR: KAHC020150912024

remains pending for an indefinite period. It was
also held, departing from the earlier view, that the
merits of the case cannot be considered at the
stage of considering the application for condonation
of delay.

17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in
Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India authoring the
judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view
taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a
host of other decisions following the same while not
interfering with an order of condonation of delay
passed by the relevant high court. However, it was
observed that a distinction ought to be drawn
between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is
proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was
also emphasized that a different approach has to be
adopted while this Court is considering an
application for condonation of delay in presentation
of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal
over a discretionary order of the high court
granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the
case of the former, whether to condone or not
would be the only question whereas in the latter,
whether there has been proper exercise of
discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for
condonation has to be examined.

18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in
any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda
(supra) adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation
and consequent lament expressed by none other than
Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a
brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v.
Amateur Riders Club, Bombay and admonishing officers of
the “revenue” in not acting with promptitude. This order
was made within six years of the decision in Ramegowda
(supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its
entirety hereunder:

1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda,
learned senior counsel for the Revenue.

2. This special leave petition filed on
November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264
days. For quite some time in the past, this

- 8 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:18685-DB
WA No. 100491 of 2024


CNR: KAHC020150912024

Court has been making observations as to
the grave prejudice caused to public
interest by appeals brought on behalf of
the Government being lost on the point of
limitation. Such observations have been
made for over a few years in the past. But
there seems to be no conspicuous
improvement as is apparent in the present
petition which is filed in November 1993.
The explanation for the delay, had better
be set out in petitioner's own words:

“( g ) The Advocate-on-Record got the
special leave petition drafted from the drafting
Advocate and sent the same for approval to
the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the
case file. ( h ) The Board returned the case file
to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993
who re-sent the same to the Board on
September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP
was not approved by the Board. The Board
after approving the draft SLP sent this file to
CAS on October 1, 1993.”

3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing
a judicially acceptable ground for
condonation of delay. After the earlier
observations of this Court made in several
cases in the past, we hoped that the
matters might improve. There seems to
be no visible support for this optimism.
There is a point beyond which even the
courts cannot help a litigant even if the
litigant is Government which is itself under
the shackles of bureaucratic indifference.
Having regard to the law of limitation
which binds everybody, we cannot find
any way of granting relief. It is true that
Government should not be treated as any
other private litigant as, indeed, in the
case of the former the decisions to
present and prosecute appeals are not
individual but are institutional decisions
necessarily bogged down by the proverbial
red-tape. But there are limits to this also.
Even with all this latitude, the explanation
offered for the delay in this case merely
serves to aggravate the attitude of
indifference of the Revenue in protecting
its common interests. The affidavit is
again one of the stereotyped affidavits

- 9 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:18685-DB
WA No. 100491 of 2024


CNR: KAHC020150912024

making it susceptible to the criticism that
the Revenue does not seem to attach any
importance to the need for promptitude
even where it affects its own interest.

4. The application for condonation of delay
is, accordingly, dismissed. The special
leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as
barred by time.

(emphasis ours)

19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur
Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt
that it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope.
It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in
Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much
optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships,
however, found no visible support for such optimism and
the Court's patience having been tested to the extreme
limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the
courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring
under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the
Government.

20. We have found the State of Odisha to be
utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before
the High Court but also before this Court.
Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as
time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been
approached by the State of Odisha four months
after expiry of the period of limitation.

21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed
as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of
the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite
all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of
the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown
here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation
but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of
discretion has been set up.

22. The applications for condonation of delay in
filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay
in re-filing the same, thus, stand rejected, with the result

- 10 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:18685-DB
WA No. 100491 of 2024


CNR: KAHC020150912024

that the special leave petition stands dismissed as time-
barred.”

The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment holds that the
State of Odisha was utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent in
filing the appeal. The Apex Court further holds that condonation
of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right, it is entirely the
discretion of the Court whether or not to condone the delay.
The Apex Court rejected the appeal filed on the score that the
cause sought to be shown by the State is not an explanation
but a lame excuse.

In the light of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court
and the inordinate delay of seven years in invoking the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court, we do not find any merit in
the challenge. The appeal stands dismissed .

Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE


Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE
RSH/CT: ASC
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 6