ODYSSEY LEISURE PVT. LIMITED, CUTTACK vs STATE OF ODISHA

Court
Odisha High Court

WP(C)/31370/2026
ODHC010746952026
2026:OHC:314

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

W.P.(C). No. 31370 of 2026
CNR No. ODHC010746952026
(An application under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution
of India)


AFR Odyssey Leisure Pvt. Ltd., Cuttack ..... Petitioner

- Versus-

State of Odisha & others ..... Opposite Parties

_______________________________________________________
For Petitioner : Mr. U.K. Samal, Sr. Advocate
With M/s. M. Mohapatra, S.P. Patra
N. Samal, Advocates

For Opp. Parties : Mr. S.N Patnaik, AGA


CORAM:
JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA
JUDGMENT
20.11.2026

SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J. The petitioner seeks to challenge the
order dated 09.09.2026 passed by the Authorised Officer-
cum-Assistant Conservator of Forests, Puri Wildlife Division,
Puri, whereby his prayer for release of the Dozer Machine
bearing Chassis No.14303 and Engine No.25233213, seized
by the Forest Officials on 21.06.2026, was rejected on the
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ground that confiscation proceedings in respect of the
machine has been initiated under Section 56 of the Odisha
Forest Act, 1972. He also seeks a direction for release of the
Dozer Machine and to declare the initiation of the
confiscation proceeding as illegal.
2. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that the
petitioner claims to be the owner in possession of certain
parcels of Rayati land situated in Mouza Batali-Bhuan,
Tahasil Gop, District Puri, under Khata Nos.134/113,
134/112, 134/152, 134/154, 134/107, 134/106 and
134/105. For undertaking road levelling work on the said
land, he had engaged a Dozer Machine belonging to M/s
Samal Builders on hire under an arrangement dated
04.06.2026. On 21.06.2026, while the machine was being
used for the said purpose, the Forest Officials seized it and
initiated a case being O.R. Case No.10BK of 2026-27
registered at Balukhand Wildlife Range for commission of
offence under Section 27(1) of the Odisha Forest Act, 1972,
on the allegation of fresh clearing and destruction of forest
habitat, besides recovery of approximately five quintals of
Casuarina firewood and one cubic metre of excavated sand.
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The petitioner disputes the allegations and states that the
seizure was effected from his private Rayati land and not
from any forest area, stating that, although the land was
included in the notification dated 15.11.1978 issued under
Section 4 of the Act, no final notification under Section 21
declaring it as Reserved Forest has yet been issued. Having
approached the Forest Authorities seeking the seizure
documents and release of the machine without any
favourable response, the petitioner filed W.P.(C) No.25099 of
2026, which was disposed of on 10.08.2026 with a direction
to the Authorised Officer-cum-Assistant Conservator of
Forests, Puri Wildlife Division, to consider his representation
dated 22.07.2026 and to pass a speaking and reasoned
order in accordance with law. Pursuant thereto, the
petitioner submitted the certified copy of the order and
relevant documents, and, in response to the Authorised
Officer's letter dated 21.08.2026, clarified by his reply dated
31.08.2026 that the machine belonged to M/s.Samal
Builders and had been engaged on hire, enclosing the
supporting documents. However, by the order dated
09.09.2026, the prayer for release was rejected on the
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ground that confiscation proceedings under Section 56 of
the Act had been initiated and the question of release could
be considered on its conclusion. Said order is impugned in
the present writ petition.
3. Counter affidavit is filed by opposite party Nos.1
to 3 stating that the writ petition is not maintainable on the
grounds of disputed questions of fact. It is stated that the
Dozer Vehicle was seized on 21.06.2026 from inside Balighai
Proposed Reserve Forest (PRF), along with approximately five
quintals of Casuarina firewood and one cubic metre of
excavated sand and O.R. Case No.10BK of 2026-27 was
registered for commission of forest offence under Section
27(1) of the Odisha Forest Act, 1972. It is stated that
Balighai PRF was notified under Section 4 of the Act by
notification dated 15.11.1978 and was subsequently re-
notified on 18.05.2026 following a DGPS survey duly ratified
by the Forest and Revenue Authorities. Placing reliance on
Section 5 of the Act, they dispute the petitioner's claim that
the place of seizure formed part of his private Rayati land
and justify the initiation of confiscation proceeding under
Section 56 of the Act. It is also stated that the Assistant
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Conservator of Forests, was appointed as the Authorised
Officer by order dated 25.06.2026 and on receipt of the
ownership documents establishing M/s Samal Builders as
the owner of the Dozer, a show-cause notice dated
02.09.2026 was issued to the owner under Section 56(2-b) of
the Act. It is further stated that the impugned order dated
09.09.2026 was passed in compliance with the direction of
this Court in W.P.(C) No.25099 of 2026 and the confiscation
proceedings are being conducted in accordance with law.
They also contend that the Dozer is a vehicle within the
meaning of Section 56(1) of the Act.

4. Heard Mr. U.K Samal, learned Senior counsel
with Mr. M. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioner
and Mr. S.N. Patnaik, learned Addl. Government Advocate
for the State.
5. Mr. Samal would argue that the impugned order
has been passed without considering the nature and legal
status of the land in question. The petitioner claims to be
the recorded owner in possession of the Rayati land and has
been regularly paying rent and cess to the Government, as
evident from the ROR and rent receipts. Although the land
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was included in the notification dated 15.11.1978 issued
under Section 4 of the Odisha Forest Act, 1972, no final
notification under Section 21 of the Act has been issued
declaring it as Reserved Forest. He argues that a notification
under Section 4 is only preliminary in nature and cannot, by
itself, extinguish existing private rights or confer the status
of Reserved Forest without completion of the statutory
process. Referring to Sections 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17,
19 and 21 of the Act, Mr. Samal submits that the statutory
scheme provides inquiry and settlement of existing rights
and acquisition of private land, wherever required. However,
neither has the petitioner's land been acquired nor has
compensation been paid and no final notification under
Section 21 has been issued despite lapse of several decades.
He further submits that the notifications dated 15.11.1978
and 18.05.2026 do not specifically identify the petitioner's
Khata numbers, plot numbers, area or Mouza to establish
that the land where the Dozer was operating falls within
Balighai PRF. He also relies on the notification dated
31.01.1989 issued under Section 3(1) of the Odisha
Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation
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of Land Act, 1972, and the Consolidation ROR issued in
1999 to argue that the Consolidation Authorities recognised
the petitioner's rights over the land. He further contends
that deprivation of the petitioner's use and enjoyment of the
land without authority of law violates Article 300-A of the
Constitution. He relies on the judgment of this Court passed
1
in the case of Raj Kishore Deo v. State of Odisha , to
submit that a notification under Section 4 does not, by itself,
divest a person of rights over land recorded as Rayati in the
absence of a final notification under Section 21. He also
places reliance on the case of Vidya Devi v. State of
2
Haryana , in support of the requirement of authority of law
for deprivation of property.
6. Per contra, Mr. S.N. Patnaik submits that the
Dozer was seized from within Balighai PRF notified under
Section 4 of the Odisha Forest Act, 1972, vide notification
dated 15.11.1978 and subsequently re-notified on
18.05.2026 following a DGPS survey ratified by the Forest
and Revenue Authorities. He argues that the petitioner's
claim of the seizure having been made on private Rayati land

1
2022 (II) OLR 415
2
(2020) 2 SCC 569
7 24
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is baseless. Referring to Section 5 of the Act, he submits that
the restrictions thereunder operate upon issuance of a
notification under Section 4 and a final notification under
Section 21 is not necessary to attract the provisions relating
to forest offences under Section 27(1)(a). He also submits
that the seized Dozer is a vehicle within the meaning of
Section 56(1) of the Act, having wheels, a blade, chassis and
an engine, and its description as a ‘machine’ in the
impugned order is only a typographical error. He points out
that, upon receipt of the ownership documents and vehicle
invoice, a show-cause notice dated 02.09.2026 under
Section 56(2-b) was issued to M/s Samal Builders, the
owner of the Dozer, along with the seizure list, but no reply
was received. He also submits that the owner has not been
impleaded in the present writ petition. According to him, the
impugned order dated 09.09.2026 was passed in compliance
with the direction of this Court in W.P.(C) No.25099 of 2026
and the confiscation proceedings are being conducted in
accordance with law.
7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at
length, this Court finds that much has been argued with
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regard to the nature and legal status of the land in question.
While the petitioner claims that the land is his private Rayati
land and the Dozer was being used for levelling the same,
the opposite parties have contended that the land forms part
of Balighai PRF. The petitioner further contends that,
although the land was included in the notification issued
under Section 4 of the Odisha Forest Act, 1972, no final
notification under Section 21 of the Act has yet been issued
declaring it as Reserved Forest. The opposite parties, on the
other hand, contend that the restrictions under Section 5 of
the Act operate upon issuance of notification under Section
4 and a final notification under Section 21 is not a
prerequisite for attracting the provisions relating to forest
offences. However, on consideration of the materials
available on record and the statutory provisions, this Court
finds that there is a more fundamental issue going to the
root of the matter, namely, the jurisdiction of the authority
to initiate confiscation proceedings in respect of the seized
Dozer.
8. In order to appreciate the aforesaid issue, it
would be appropriate to refer to Sections 56 and 61 of the
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Odisha Forest Act, 1972, which provide for two distinct
mechanisms for confiscation of property involved in the
commission of a forest offence. The relevant provisions are
reproduced below:
56. Seizure of property liable to confiscation
“ –
(1) When there is reason to believe that a forest offence
has been committed in respect of any forest produce, such
produce, together with all tools ropes chains boats,
vehicles or cattle used in committing any such offence may
be seized by any Forest Officer or Police Officer
(2) Every officer seizing any property under this Section
shall place on such property a mark indicating that the
same has been so seized and shall, as soon as may be,
except where the offender agrees in writing to get the
offence compounded under Section 72 either produce the
property seized before an officer not below the rank of an
Assistant Conservator of Forests authorised by the State
Government in this behalf by notification (hereinafter
referred to as the authorised officer) or make a report of
such seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the
offence on account of which the seizure has been made
Provided that when the forest produce with respect to
which such offence is believed to have been committed is
the property of Government and the offender is unknown it
shall be sufficient if the officer make as soon as may be a
report of the circumstances to his official superior and the
Divisional Forest Officer
(2-a) When an authorised officer seizes any forest produce
under Sub-section (1) or where any such forest produce is
produced before him under Sub-section (2) and he is
satisfied that a forest offence has been committed in
respect thereof, he shall order confiscation of the forest
produce so seized or produced together with all tools,
ropes chains boats, vehicles or cattle used in committing
such offence.
61. Procedure when offender not known, or cannot
be found –
Where a Magistrate is of opinion that a forest
offence was committed but the offender is not known or
cannot be found, he may on an application made in this
behalf order the property in respect of which the offence
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was committed and which was seized to be confiscated
and taken possession of by or under the authority of the
Divisional Forest Officer or to be made over to any person
whom the Magistrate considers to be entitled to the same
Provided that before making any such order the
Magistrate shall cause a notice of any application made
under this section to be served upon any person who, he
has reason to believe is interested in the property seized,
or shall publish such notice in such manner as he thinks fit
Provided further that no such order shall be made
until the expiration of one month from the date of seizing
such property or without hearing the person, if any
claiming any right thereto, and the vehicle if any which he
may produce in support of his claim”
[Emphasis added]

9. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions
shows that the Act provides two distinct statutory
mechanisms for confiscation of property involved in the
commission of a forest offence: one under Section 56(2-a), by
the Authorised Officer and the other under Section 61, by
the jurisdictional Magistrate.
10. Section 56(2-a) confers power upon the
Authorised Officer to order confiscation of seized property
under Section 56(1) or produced before him under Section
56(2), together with the tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles
or cattle used in committing the offence. Thus, the exercise
of jurisdiction under the provision is provided in either of
two situations: first, where the Authorised Officer himself
seizes the forest produce under Section 56(1); and secondly,
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where the property seized by another Forest Officer is
produced before him in accordance with Section 56(2). The
provision does not make the identification of the offender a
condition precedent for exercise of such jurisdiction.
However, seizure by the Authorised Officer himself or
production of the seized property before him, as
contemplated under the provision, remains essential for
attracting the jurisdiction conferred thereunder.
11. Section 61, on the other hand, provides a
separate mechanism for confiscation by the Magistrate
where he is of the opinion that a forest offence has been
committed, but the offender is not known or cannot be
found. Upon an application being made in that behalf, the
Magistrate may order confiscation of the property in respect
of which the offence was committed, subject to compliance
with the safeguards prescribed therein. These include
service or publication of notice upon persons interested in
the property, expiry of one month from the date of seizure
and affording an opportunity of hearing to any person
claiming a right over the property, including production of
evidence in support of such claim. It is, therefore, evident
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that Section 61 provides a distinct statutory procedure for
consideration of confiscation where the offender is unknown
or cannot be found. However, the only fact that the offender
is unknown does not, by itself, result in automatic
invocation of Section 61. The opinion of the Magistrate and
an application in that behalf are also necessary before the
jurisdiction thereunder can be exercised.

12. The proviso to Section 56(2) also assumes
significance in this regard. It provides a particular situation
where the forest produce in respect of which an offence is
believed to have been committed is the property of the
Government and the offender is unknown. In such a
situation, the Forest Officer effecting the seizure is required
to report the circumstances thereof to his official superior
and the Divisional Forest Officer. The proviso, therefore,
dispenses with the requirement of producing the seized
property before the Magistrate in the circumstances
specified therein and permits reporting of the seizure to the
superior authorities. However, such reporting cannot, by
itself, be treated as equivalent to production of the seized
forest produce before the Authorised Officer for the purpose
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of Section 56(2-a). The two statutory requirements are
distinct and operate in different circumstances.
Consequently, mere receipt of an intimation by the
Divisional Forest Officer or the Authorised Officer cannot, by
itself, confer jurisdiction upon the latter to exercise the
power of confiscation under Section 56(2-a).
13. It is true that the proviso to Section 56(2) does
not expressly prohibit subsequent production of the seized
property before the Authorised Officer. However, unless such
production actually takes place, the second limb of Section
56(2-a) cannot be invoked. In other words, where the seizure
is effected by an Forest Officer and the seized forest produce
is not produced before the Authorised Officer, the latter
cannot assume jurisdiction under Section 56(2-a) merely on
the basis of an intimation or report regarding the seizure.
The statutory requirement of production cannot be
dispensed with or substituted by an administrative report.
In such circumstances, where the offender is also unknown
or cannot be found, the mechanism contemplated under
Section 61 may be considered by the jurisdictional
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Magistrate, subject to fulfilment of the conditions prescribed
therein.

14. The aforesaid position also needs to be
examined in the light of the principle laid down by the
Supreme Court in the case of Devinder Singh v. State of
3
Punjab . In that case, the Supreme Court held that where
an action is taken without jurisdiction, even an order which
is conclusive under the statute may be subjected to judicial
review. The Court recognised two broad categories of
jurisdictional errors, namely, an action taken wholly without
jurisdiction and an error committed while exercising an
otherwise existing jurisdiction. The Court also emphasised
that the formation of the requisite opinion must precede the
exercise of statutory power, such opinion must be founded
upon materials available on record and the statutory
authority must act within the four corners of the statute.
The principle emerging therefrom is that the existence of
statutory power alone is not sufficient; the authority must
also satisfy the conditions prescribed for its exercise.
Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case, the

3
(2008) 1 SCC 728
15 24
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exercise of power of confiscation by the Authorised Officer
must necessarily be tested with reference to the
jurisdictional requirements prescribed under Section 56(2-a)
of the Act. For better appreciation, the observations made by
the Supreme Court in Devinder Singh (supra) are
reproduced below:
30. We would proceed on the said assumption but it
“
is a well-settled principle of law that where an action
taken is without jurisdiction, even an order which is
conclusive may be subject to judicial review.
Jurisdictional errors, as is well known, are divided in
two broad categories — (i) an order passed which is
wholly without jurisdiction; and (ii) although the
action is not ultra vires, the jurisdictional error has
been committed while exercising jurisdiction. (See
John v. Rees [(1969) 2 All ER 274].)
xx xx xx
33. When an order is passed without jurisdiction, it
amounts to colourable exercise of power. Formation of
opinion must precede application of mind. Such
application of mind must be on the materials brought
on record. The materials should be such which are
required to be collected by the authorities entitled
therefor. The authorities must act within the four
corners of the statute. An opinion formed even on the
basis of an advice by an authority which is not
contemplated under the statute renders the decision
bad in law. A statutory authority is bound by the
procedure laid down in the statute and must act
within the four corners thereof.”

15. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is
evident from the report of the Forester, Balighai Section, as
well as from the impugned order, that the Dozer was seized
by the forest staff and, according to their version recorded in
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the report, the person allegedly involved in the offence fled
from the spot upon seeing the forest officials. Thus, the
identity of the alleged offender was not ascertained at the
time of seizure. It is also borne out from the materials placed
on record that the Forester, Balighai Section, did not
produce the seized Dozer or the seized forest produce,
namely, the Casuarina firewood and excavated sand, before
the Authorised Officer. He only intimated the seizure to the
Divisional Forest Officer. Even in the said intimation, there
is no specific request seeking initiation of confiscation
proceedings on the ground that a forest offence had been
committed. Although the photocopy of the intimation
addressed to the Magistrate, enclosed with the materials,
contains an endorsement that ‘the matter has been
intimated to DFO-cum-Authorised Officer, Puri Wildlife
Division, Puri, for initiation of confiscation proceeding’, such
an endorsement cannot, by itself, establish actual
production of the seized property before the Authorised
Officer. Further, the intimation addressed to the Magistrate
does not show that the seized Dozer or the forest produce
was produced before him. No material has been placed
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before this Court to demonstrate that the seized Dozer and
forest produce were subsequently produced before the
Authorised Officer.
16. There is yet another aspect which assumes
significance. The opposite parties themselves have stated in
their counter affidavit that the Assistant Conservator of
Forests was appointed as the Authorised Officer by order
dated 25.06.2026, whereas the seizure of the Dozer and the
forest produce had taken place on 21.06.2026. Thus, on the
date of seizure, the officer concerned had not yet been
appointed as the Authorised Officer under the Act.
Consequently, the first situation contemplated under
Section 56(2-a), namely, seizure of the forest produce by the
Authorised Officer himself, is not attracted in the present
case. The jurisdiction of the Authorised Officer, therefore,
could have been invoked under the second limb of the said
provision only upon production of the seized forest produce
before him in accordance with Section 56(2). As already
discussed, no material has been placed before this Court to
establish that such production had taken place.
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17. In such circumstances, when the alleged
offender was not known or could not be found at the time of
seizure, the matter ought to have been placed before the
jurisdictional Magistrate for consideration in accordance
with Section 61 of the Act, subject to an application being
made in that behalf and the Magistrate forming the requisite
opinion as contemplated under the said provision.
Alternatively, if the competent authority intended to proceed
under Section 56(2-a), the seized property was required to be
produced before the Authorised Officer in the manner
contemplated under Section 56(2).

18. The aforesaid position also finds support from
the decision of this Court in Narendra Beura v. State of
4
Odisha and Others . In that case, while considering the
confiscation of a JCB machine allegedly used in commission
of a forest offence under Section 27(3)(c) of the Odisha
Forest Act, 1972, this Court held that, in the absence of
forest produce being seized by or produced before the
Authorised Officer, the confiscation proceedings against the
machinery were misconceived. The said principle is

4
2017 (I) OLR 568
19 24
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applicable to the present case. Though the opposite parties
claim that approximately five quintals of Casuarina firewood
and one cubic metre of excavated sand were recovered along
with the Dozer, the materials on record disclose only
intimation of the seizure by the Forest Officials to the
Divisional Forest Officer, and not actual production of the
seized forest produce before the Authorised Officer as
contemplated under Section 56(2) of the Act. It is also
relevant that the Assistant Conservator of Forests was
appointed as the Authorised Officer only on 25.06.2026,
whereas the seizure was effected on 21.06.2026. In these
circumstances, mere recovery of forest produce at the spot,
without its subsequent production before the Authorised
Officer in accordance with the Act, does not satisfy the
statutory requirement for assumption of confiscation
jurisdiction. For better appreciation, the observations made
in Narendra Beura (Supra) are reproduced below:
“In the above premises, it appears to this Court that
since in this case no forest produce was seized or
produced before the Authorized Officer, the initiation
of the confiscation proceeding on the allegation that
the JCB in question was used for commission of a
forest offence under Section 27 (3) (c) of the Act and,
the ultimate order holding the same liable for
confiscation, appears to this Court to be misconceived.
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The Authorised Officer could not have passed the
order of confiscation at Annexure-2. The learned
District Judge, Dhenkanal also remained oblivious of
the same and passed the judgment and order at
Annexure-3 confirming the order of confiscation.”

19. This Court also finds that, although the identity
of the alleged offender was not ascertained at the time of
seizure, the petitioner had, immediately thereafter, come
forward claiming his interest in the seized Dozer on the
basis that he had hired the same from its owner on monthly
rent. In fact, the petitioner submitted a representation on
23.06.2026, seeking release of the seized vehicle. In such
circumstances, the Authorised Officer, upon receipt of the
said representation, ought to have informed the petitioner
about the seizure and furnished him with the relevant
particulars, including a copy of the seizure list, so as to
enable him to take appropriate steps.
20. Even otherwise, this Court finds that the
incident occurred on 21.06.2026, whereas the petitioner
repeatedly approached the authorities seeking release of the
seized vehicle and disclosed the circumstances under which
he had possession of the same. Despite such
representations, no show-cause notice appears to have been
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issued either to the petitioner, who had claimed an interest
in the vehicle, or to its actual owner, M/s Samal Builders,
for a considerable period. It was only after this Court, by
order dated 10.08.2026 passed in W.P.(C) No.25099 of 2026,
directed the Authorised Officer to consider and dispose of
the petitioner's representation by passing a reasoned order,
that a show-cause notice dated 02.09.2026 came to be
issued to M/s Samal Builders, the actual owner of the
Dozer, in connection with the proposed confiscation
proceedings. The sequence of events is significant. It gives
rise to a serious doubt as to whether the statutory
proceedings were initiated upon an independent application
of mind to the materials available on record or whether the
same were set in motion belatedly, only after the petitioner
approached this Court and obtained a direction for
consideration of his representation. The authorities, while
exercising statutory powers which may result in deprivation
of a citizen's property, are expected to act with due diligence
and strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law. An order of confiscation entails serious civil
consequences and may result in deprivation of property.
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Article 300-A of the Constitution of India mandates that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of
law. Therefore, the power of confiscation must be exercised
strictly within the bounds of the statute. The authorities
cannot remain inactive despite being apprised of the claim of
an interested person and thereafter seek to justify the
continued detention of the property merely by initiating
confiscation proceedings at a belated stage.
21. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is
of the considered view that the exercise of confiscation
jurisdiction under Section 56(2-a) of the Odisha Forest Act,
1972, in the present case is not in conformity with the
statutory mandate. The Authorised Officer was appointed
after the date of seizure, and as already stated, there is no
material to show that the seized forest produce was
subsequently produced before him. Mere intimation of the
seizure to the Divisional Forest Officer or subsequent
issuance of a show-cause notice to the owner of the Dozer
cannot, by itself, establish fulfilment of the statutory
conditions necessary for assumption of confiscation
jurisdiction. Thus, in the absence of fulfilment of the
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jurisdictional requirements prescribed under Section 56(2-
a), the Authorised Officer lacked the jurisdiction to initiate
confiscation proceedings in respect of the seized property.
The impugned action, being contrary to the statutory
scheme, therefore warrants interference by this Court.
22. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The
order dated 09.09.2026 passed by the Authorised Officer-
cum-Assistant Conservator of Forests, Puri Wildlife Division,
Puri, and the confiscation proceedings initiated against the
seized Dozer under Section 56(2-a) of the Odisha Forest Act,
1972, are hereby quashed. The opposite parties are directed
to release the Dozer Machine bearing Chassis No.14303 and
Engine No.25233213, upon due verification of its ownership,
in favour of its lawful owner, namely, M/s Samal Builders,
or its duly authorised representative, within a period of
fifteen days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
judgment.


.…..……….…………….
Sashikanta Mishra,
Judge

Orissa High Court, Cuttack
th
The 20 November, 2026/ A.K. Rana, P.A.

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: AJAYA KUMAR RANA
Designation: P.A.
Reason: Authentication
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
Date: 20-Nov-2026 14:30:30
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