HARIKRISHNA OGARE vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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CGHC010253992024 2026:CGHC:45687
Digitally signed by
YOGESH TIWARI
Date: 2026.10.29
17:43:56 +0530
YOGESH
TIWARI
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order Reserved on : 21.09.2026
Order Delivered on : 29.10.2026
WPC No. 3805 of 2024
Harikrishna Ogare S/o Late Shri Ganesh Ram Ogare Aged About 32
Years R/o Village Devri, Police Station and Tahsil Mungeli, District
Mungeli, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Transport,
Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, Distt. Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - State Transport Appellate Tribunal (In Short STAT) Raipur, Distt.
Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Regional Transport Authority Of Chhattisgarh Atal Nagar, Sector-27,
Third Floor, Nawa Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 - Renbow Travelers Through Proprietor Anurag Shukla S/o Late
Suresh Chand Shukla, R/o Shukla Colony, Raipur, Distt. Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Shailendra Kumar Bajpai, Advocate
For State : Mr. Vivek Verma, Government Advocate
For Respondent No.4 : Mr. Subodh Pandey, Advocate (through
Video Conferencing)

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Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
CAV Order
1. By filing the present petition, the petitioner assails the order dated
12.07.2024 passed by the learned State Transport Appellate
Tribunal, Raipur (for short, “the STAT”), in Appeal Memo No. A-
68/2023, whereby the STAT, without affording an effective
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, allowed the revision
preferred by respondent No.4 and set aside the order dated
23.08.2023 passed by the Regional Transport Authority, whereby a
permanent stage carriage permit was granted in favour of the
petitioner. The petitioner has sought for following reliefs:-
“ 10.1 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to allow this writ petition and be
pleased to quash the impugned order dated
12.07.2024 (Annexure P/1) passed by learned
STAT Raipur or if the Hon'ble Court may deem
fit and affirm the order passed by RTA Raipur
dated 23.08.2023 (Annexure P/3).
10.2 That, if the Hon'ble Court may deem fit
and proper call the records pertaining to
petitioner's case.
10.3 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to pass any other order which may be
deed fit and proper in favour of the petitioner. ”
2. The facts, as canvassed by the petitioner, are that by order dated
23.08.2023, the Regional Transport Authority, Chhattisgarh, Raipur
(for short, “the RTA”), granted a permanent stage carriage permit

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bearing No. CG2023-SC-0481A in favour of the petitioner for
operating his bus on the route Mungeli to Kodwagodan via
Bodhapara, Khamhi and Ramhepur, with three return trips daily.
The petitioner is a bus operator and is operating stage carriage
buses on the strength of permits granted by the competent
transport authorities.
3. The grant of permit was objected to by certain existing operators,
including respondent No.4, Renbow Travels. After considering the
objections and the material placed before it, the RTA passed the
order dated 23.08.2023 granting the aforesaid permanent permit
in favour of the petitioner.
4. Aggrieved by the order dated 23.08.2023, respondent No.4
preferred a revision/appeal before the STAT, registered as Appeal
Memo No. A-68/2023. According to the petitioner, although he was
the principal beneficiary of the order under challenge and was
directly affected by the proceedings before the STAT, he was not
effectively heard in the matter. The petitioner states that, after
coming to know of the proceedings, he appeared before the STAT
on 08.01.2024. The matter was thereafter adjourned on several
dates and was ultimately reserved for orders on 10.07.2024.
5. On 12.07.2024, the STAT passed the impugned order allowing the
revision/appeal preferred by respondent No.4 and setting aside
the order dated 23.08.2023 passed by the RTA. The petitioner has
consequently filed the present petition questioning the said order,

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principally on the ground that the same has been passed without
affording him an effective opportunity of hearing, apart from
challenging the findings recorded by the STAT with regard to the
requisite documents and the alleged conflict/cross-timing of the
permit granted in his favour.
6. Mr. Shailendra Kumar Bajpai, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner, submits that the impugned order passed by the STAT is
vitiated for violation of the fundamental principles of natural justice,
particularly the rule of audi alteram partem . The petitioner was the
holder of the permanent stage carriage permit granted by the RTA
on 23.08.2023 and was, therefore, the principal party whose rights
were directly and substantially affected by the revision preferred
by respondent No.4. Despite this, the petitioner was not afforded
an effective opportunity to place his defence before the STAT.
Learned counsel submits that an order setting aside a permit
already granted in favour of the petitioner, having serious civil and
financial consequences, could not have been passed without
ensuring a meaningful opportunity of hearing.
7. Learned counsel further submits that the proceedings before the
STAT themselves demonstrate that the matter was adjourned on
several occasions and, after the matter was reserved for orders,
the impugned order came to be passed on 12.07.2024. It is
submitted that, after resumption of charge by the learned
Presiding Officer, the parties ought to have been duly informed

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and afforded an effective opportunity to participate in the
proceedings. The petitioner cannot be deprived of his valuable
right under the permit on the basis of a proceeding in which he
was not effectively heard. According to learned counsel, the mere
fact that the petitioner had subsequently come to know about the
proceedings or had appeared on one of the dates cannot
substitute the requirement of an effective opportunity to meet the
case of the contesting respondent.
8. Learned counsel next submits that the finding of the STAT that the
petitioner had failed to furnish the requisite particulars/documents
is contrary to the record. The petitioner had submitted the requisite
documents and relevant information before the RTA, which, after
considering the material available on record and the objections
raised by the existing operators, had granted the permit by order
dated 23.08.2023. Merely because certain columns in the
prescribed application form were not filled up, it could not be
concluded that the petitioner had failed to furnish the requisite
information, particularly when the relevant documents had been
separately submitted before the RTA. At the highest, any
deficiency in the application could have been directed to be
rectified, rather than treating the same as a ground for setting
aside the permit already granted.
9. Learned counsel also submits that the objections regarding
alleged non-payment of tax or non-furnishing of requisite

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documents were not raised before the RTA at the appropriate
stage. Respondent No.4, having participated in the proceedings
before the RTA, did not raise such objections at the time when the
application for permit was considered. Such objections were
sought to be raised subsequently before the STAT. The STAT,
therefore, ought to have examined the matter in the proper factual
and procedural context instead of interfering with the reasoned
order passed by the RTA on grounds which had not been
effectively raised before the original authority.
10. Lastly, learned counsel submits that the finding regarding “cross
timing” is factually unsustainable. The route for which the
petitioner has been granted permit is Mungeli to Kodwagodan via
Bodhapara, Khamhi and Ramhepur, whereas the route of
respondent No.4 is different, and therefore there is no basis to
hold that the petitioner has been granted a permit involving any
impermissible cross timing. Learned counsel places reliance upon
the decision of this Court in Manish Travels and Another v.
Regional Transport Authority and Another, 2018 SCC OnLine
Chh 684 , wherein the scope of the RTA's power in relation to
timing of stage carriage permits under Section 72 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988, has been considered. It is, therefore,
submitted that the impugned order, having been passed without
effective hearing and on findings which are contrary to the material
on record, deserves to be quashed and the order dated
23.08.2023 passed by the RTA granting permit in favour of the

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petitioner deserves to be restored.
11. On the other hand, Mr. Vivek Verma, learned Government
Advocate appearing for the State, opposes the submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that
the impugned order has been passed by the STAT, a quasi-judicial
authority, after considering the material available on record and
after affording adequate opportunity of hearing to the concerned
parties. He submits that the plea of the petitioner that the
impugned order was passed ex parte or in violation of the
principles of natural justice is contrary to the order-sheets, which
demonstrate that the petitioner had appeared and participated in
the proceedings before the STAT. Therefore, no prejudice can be
said to have been caused to the petitioner on account of denial of
opportunity of hearing.
12. Learned Government Advocate further submits that the petitioner
had applied for grant of permanent stage carriage permit under
Section 70 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and was under an
obligation to furnish the documents and particulars prescribed
under Rule 72 of the Chhattisgarh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994. In
particular, Rule 72(3)(b) requires the requisite certificate from the
Registering Authority containing the particulars of the vehicle,
including its make, model and seating capacity. According to him,
the said requirement is mandatory and the STAT, upon examining
the record, rightly found that the petitioner had not completed the

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application in the prescribed manner and had failed to comply with
the mandatory requirements. Consequently, the RTA's order
granting permit was rightly interfered with by the STAT. It is further
submitted that the STAT has passed a reasoned and speaking
order after considering the rival contentions and the documents
available on record and has recorded a specific finding regarding
non-compliance with the statutory requirements by the petitioner.
The order dated 23.08.2023 granting permit could not have been
sustained when the petitioner had failed to fulfil the prescribed
requirements for grant of such permit. It is, therefore, submitted
that the impugned order dated 12.07.2024 suffers from neither any
illegality nor jurisdictional error warranting interference under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and the writ petition
deserves to be dismissed.
13. Mr. Subodh Pandey, learned counsel appearing for respondent
No.4 through video conferencing, opposes the submissions
advanced on behalf of the petitioner and submits that the order
dated 23.08.2023 passed by the RTA granting permanent stage
carriage permit in favour of the petitioner was contrary to the
statutory requirements prescribed under Section 70 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 and Rule 72(3) of the Chhattisgarh Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1994. He submits that the petitioner had failed to
furnish the requisite documents along with the application and,
therefore, the application itself was incomplete and could not have
been entertained for grant of permit. The STAT, after examining

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the record of the RTA, rightly found such non-compliance and,
consequently, rightly set aside the order dated 23.08.2023.
14. Learned counsel further submits that the timings granted in favour
of the petitioner were overlapping and conflicted with the timings
of the existing operators and that the RTA, while granting the
permit, failed to properly consider the existing timings and the
relevant provisions of the Rules. He submits that the RTA also
failed to adhere to Rules 70(k) and 70(kh) of the Chhattisgarh
Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 while fixing the timings. The STAT,
upon consideration of the entire record and the competing timings,
has recorded a categorical finding regarding the clash in timings
as well as the petitioner's failure to furnish the mandatory
documents. The impugned order, therefore, is based upon proper
appreciation of the record and does not warrant interference in
exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the
pleadings and documents placed on record.
16. Before examining the rival submissions on their respective merits,
it would be apposite to notice the relevant statutory framework
governing the grant of a stage carriage permit. Section 70 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with the application for a stage
carriage permit and contemplates furnishing of the particulars and
information prescribed therein. Section 72 deals with the grant of
stage carriage permits and empowers the Regional Transport

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Authority to grant such permit subject to such conditions as may
be prescribed and as may be specified in the permit. The statutory
scheme thus entrusts the Regional Transport Authority with the
initial consideration of the application, the objections, the relevant
documents and the conditions governing operation of the vehicle,
including the route and timings. At the same time, the exercise of
such statutory power is necessarily required to conform to the
applicable Rules and the principles of fairness governing quasi-
judicial proceedings.
17. The Rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act prescribe the
manner in which an application for a stage carriage permit is to be
submitted and the documents and particulars which are required
to accompany such application. The respondents have particularly
relied upon Rule 72 of the Chhattisgarh Motor Vehicles Rules,
1994 and have contended that the documents contemplated
therein are mandatory in character. The petitioner, on the other
hand, disputes the finding that there was complete non-
compliance and submits that the requisite documents and
particulars had in fact been furnished before the RTA, though
certain columns of the prescribed application may not have been
filled up in the manner expected by the respondents. Thus, the
controversy regarding compliance with Rule 72 is essentially a
matter which requires examination on the basis of the original
record of the RTA and the documents actually submitted by the
petitioner.

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18. At this stage, this Court is not required to finally adjudicate whether
every requirement contained in Rule 72 is mandatory or directory,
nor is it necessary to record any final finding as to whether the
petitioner had, in fact, complied with each and every requirement
prescribed under the Rules. The reason is that the impugned order
has resulted in setting aside the permit already granted to the
petitioner by the competent RTA and the petitioner specifically
asserts that the documents relied upon by him before the RTA
were not properly considered by the STAT. Once the petitioner
disputes the factual basis on which the permit has been annulled,
it becomes necessary that the petitioner be afforded a meaningful
opportunity to place the relevant documents and explain the
alleged deficiencies before the authority competent to decide the
revision.
19. The principle of audi alteram partem is not confined to a formal
issuance of notice. The opportunity contemplated by the principles
of natural justice must be real, reasonable and effective. The
authority exercising quasi-judicial power is required to provide a
party whose rights are likely to be adversely affected with a
reasonable opportunity to know the case against him, place the
relevant material, explain the alleged deficiencies and meet the
objections raised by the opposite party. The requirement assumes
greater significance where the proceedings are directed against
an order under which a right or benefit has already been conferred
by a competent statutory authority. The aforesaid principle finds

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reaffirmation in the recent pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
(2025) 7 SCC 545 , wherein the Supreme Court reiterated that the
principle of audi alteram partem is a facet of fair procedure and
that the requirement of natural justice cannot be reduced to a
mere technical formality. The Court emphasized that the question
whether denial or breach of natural justice has caused prejudice
has to be examined from the facts and circumstances of each
case and that the prejudice exception cannot be invoked merely
on the basis of conjecture or assumption. The Court further
reiterated that the core of audi alteram partem encompasses
reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to meet the case
against the affected person. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has
further held that where there is a complete denial of opportunity at
the initial stage, such defect cannot be cured merely by providing
an opportunity at a subsequent stage, by observing as under :-
“16. Judicial review of administrative actions
are permissible on the grounds of illegality,
unreasonableness or irrationality and
procedural irregularity. Lord Diplock succinctly
described each of the aforementioned
grounds for judicial review as under: (Council
of Civil Service Unions Case, AC pp.410-11)
“By “illegality” as a ground for judicial review I
mean that the decision-maker must
understand correctly the law that regulates his
decision-making power and must give effect to

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it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a
justiciable question to be decided, in the event
of dispute, by those persons, the Judges, by
whom the judicial power of the State is
exercisable.
By “irrationality” I mean what can by now be
succinctly referred to as “Wednesbury
[Associated Provincial Picture Houses v.
Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)]
unreasonableness”. It applies to a decision
which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic
or of accepted moral standards that no
sensible person who had applied his mind to
the question to be decided could have arrived
at it. Whether a decision falls within this
category is a question that Judges by their
training and experience should be well
equipped to answer, or else there would be
something badly wrong with our judicial
system. To justify the court's exercise of this
role, resort I think is today no longer needed
to Viscount Radcliffe's ingenious explanation
in Edwards v. Bairstow [Edwards v. Bairstow,
1956 AC 14 : (1955) 3 WLR 410 (HL)] , of
irrationality as a ground for a court's reversal
of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred
though unidentifiable mistake of law by the
decision-maker. “Irrationality” by now can
stand on its own feet as an accepted ground
on which a decision may be attacked by
judicial review.

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I have described the third head as “procedural
impropriety” rather than failure to observe
basic rules of natural justice or failure to act
with procedural fairness towards the person
who will be affected by the decision. This is
because susceptibility to judicial review under
this head covers also failure by an
Administrative Tribunal to observe procedural
rules that are expressly laid down in the
legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction
is conferred, even where such failure does not
involve any denial of natural justice. But the
instant case is not concerned with the
proceedings of an Administrative Tribunal at
all.”
17. It is equally well-settled that courts under
its writ jurisdiction do not interfere with
selections made by expert bodies by
reassessing the comparative merits of the
candidates. Interference with selections is
limited to decisions vitiated by bias, malafides
and violation of statutory provisions.
Additionally, this Court has also held that
administrative action can be reviewed on the
ground of proportionality if it affects
fundamental rights guaranteed under Article
19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
18. In this case, our primary focus is on
procedural impropriety and in particular, the
breach of the principles of natural justice. The
process for arriving at a decision is equally
significant as the decision itself. If the

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procedure is not ‘fair’, the decision cannot be
possibly endorsed. The principles of natural
justice as derived from common law which
guarantee ‘fair play in action’9, has two facets
which include rule against bias and the rule of
fair hearing. Additionally, a reasoned order
has also been regarded as a third facet of the
principles of natural justice10 and holds
utmost significance in ensuring fairness of the
process. ”
20. The aforesaid principles assume greater significance in the facts of
the present case. Here, the petitioner was not a stranger to the
proceedings but was the person in whose favour the RTA had
already granted the permanent stage carriage permit. The revision
before the STAT directly challenged the said grant and ultimately
resulted in the permit being set aside. Therefore, the petitioner
was not merely required to be put to notice of the pendency of the
proceedings; he was required to be afforded a reasonable and
effective opportunity to meet the objections relating to the
documents allegedly not furnished by him, the alleged non-
compliance with the statutory requirements and the alleged
conflict or cross-timing.
21. Since the impugned order has adverse civil and commercial
consequences upon the petitioner and the petitioner disputes the
very factual basis on which the permit has been set aside, the
requirement of an effective hearing assumes substantive
significance.

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22. Reverting to the facts of present case in the light of above-stated
judicial precedents, it is quite vivid that the order dated 23.08.2023
passed by the RTA had culminated in grant of a permanent stage
carriage permit in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner
consequently acquired a right, subject of course to the applicable
statutory conditions, to operate the vehicle in accordance with the
permit. The revision preferred by respondent No.4 directly
questioned the validity of such grant. The ultimate consequence of
the revision was not merely correction of an incidental procedural
irregularity but setting aside of the very permit granted in favour of
the petitioner. Such an order undoubtedly carries civil and
commercial consequences for the permit-holder. Therefore, before
arriving at a conclusion which would deprive the petitioner of the
benefit of the permit, the STAT was required to ensure that the
petitioner had an effective opportunity to meet the objections and
findings which ultimately formed the basis for interference with the
RTA's order.
23. The respondents have contended that the petitioner had notice of
the proceedings and had also appeared before the STAT and,
therefore, there was no violation of natural justice. The said
submission cannot be rejected merely because the respondents
rely upon the order-sheets. At the same time, the mere presence
or appearance of a party on one or more dates does not, by itself,
conclude the question whether an effective opportunity to meet the
case on merits was actually available to such party. What is

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material is whether the petitioner was given a reasonable
opportunity to place his complete defence in relation to the specific
grounds on which the permit was ultimately set aside. The
distinction between notice and effective opportunity of hearing
assumes significance in the facts of the present case.
24. The record, as placed before this Court, indicates that the
proceedings before the STAT travelled through several dates and
that the matter was ultimately reserved for orders. The petitioner
asserts that, after the change/resumption of the functioning of the
Tribunal, he was required to be afforded an effective opportunity to
participate in the proceedings. Whether the petitioner had, in fact,
been given adequate opportunity to address the final submissions,
produce the relevant documents and meet the objections relating
to the permit is a matter which can more appropriately be
examined by the STAT itself upon restoration of the revision. This
Court, exercising writ jurisdiction, would not ordinarily undertake a
factual exercise for the first time when the statutory
appellate/revisional authority is available and the matter can be
effectively decided by it after hearing all concerned.
25. The other important aspect relates to the alleged non-furnishing of
documents. The STAT has proceeded on the premise that the
petitioner had not completely filled the prescribed application and
had not complied with the requirements of Rule 72. The petitioner,
however, asserts that the documents and requisite information

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were separately furnished before the RTA and that the RTA, after
considering the same and the objections of the existing operators,
consciously granted the permit. Thus, there is a direct dispute
between the parties as to what documents were actually submitted
before the RTA and whether those documents satisfied the
statutory requirements.
26. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that
the controversy ought not to be concluded merely on the basis of
an alleged omission in the application form without examining the
entire original record of the RTA. The substance of the
requirement and the purpose for which the document is prescribed
cannot be lost sight of. If the requisite information was otherwise
available on record or was furnished through separate documents,
the effect thereof would necessarily require consideration by the
competent authority. Conversely, if a document expressly required
by the statutory Rules was never furnished and its absence goes
to the root of the eligibility for grant of permit, the same would
have to be considered in accordance with law. These are matters
which the STAT can determine upon examination of the complete
record and after hearing the parties.
27. Equally, the objection concerning the alleged non-payment of tax
or non-production of other documents has been disputed by the
petitioner on the ground that such objections were not raised
before the RTA when the application for permit was considered.

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This Court does not propose to record any final finding on that
issue. However, where such objections are relied upon as a
ground for setting aside an existing permit, fairness demands that
the permit-holder be given a clear opportunity to explain whether
the alleged liability existed, whether the requisite document had
been furnished, whether the same was available on the record of
the RTA and whether the alleged defect was capable of
rectification.
28. The dispute relating to timing also assumes significance. The
petitioner has specifically contended that there was no cross-
timing between his route and the route operated by respondent
No.4, whereas the respondents assert that the timings granted by
the RTA were overlapping and prejudicial to the existing operators.
The question whether there is, in fact, any conflict or cross-timing
cannot be decided merely on an abstract assertion. It requires
examination of the respective routes, timings, stages, scheduled
arrival and departure, and the relevant conditions prescribed by
the competent transport authority. Since the petitioner has
disputed the very factual foundation of the finding recorded by the
STAT, the issue deserves fresh consideration after examining the
relevant timing charts and the record of the RTA.
29. The decision relied upon by the petitioner in Manish Travels
(supra) has also been pressed into service in relation to the power
and jurisdiction concerning timings. This Court is conscious that

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the applicability and effect of the said decision would depend upon
the precise statutory provision involved, the factual circumstances
and the nature of the timing dispute in the present case.
Therefore, without expressing any final opinion on the applicability
of the said decision, it would be appropriate to leave the said
question also open for consideration by the STAT after hearing the
parties and examining the applicable statutory provisions and the
relevant judicial precedents.
30. Another significant circumstance which cannot be completely
ignored is that the permit granted by the RTA has already been
acted upon and, during the pendency of the present proceedings,
this Court has granted interim protection to the petitioner. The
petitioner asserts that on the strength of the permit and the interim
protection granted by this Court, he has been operating the
vehicle. This circumstance, by itself, does not create any
indefeasible right in favour of the petitioner to continue operating
the vehicle contrary to law. Equally, however, it is a relevant
circumstance while considering whether the dispute should be
finally concluded on the basis of a procedural or curable deficiency
without affording the permit-holder an effective opportunity to
explain the same.
31. This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that the
controversy between the parties ought to be adjudicated by the
statutory authority after providing a full and effective opportunity to

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all concerned parties. The remand is necessitated not because
this Court has concluded that the petitioner is necessarily entitled
to the permit, nor because the objections raised by respondent
No.4 are devoid of merit, but because the issues raised by the
parties involve disputed questions concerning compliance with the
statutory requirements, production of documents, validity of the
application, timing of the respective operators and the effect of the
material available before the RTA. All these questions deserve
consideration by the competent statutory forum upon a complete
appreciation of the record and after following the principles of
natural justice.
32. It is made clear that this Court has deliberately refrained from
expressing any final opinion on the merits of the rival claims.
Nothing contained in this order shall be construed as a finding that
the petitioner has complied with all the requirements of Section 70
of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 or Rule 72 of the Chhattisgarh
Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994, or that the timings granted in favour
of the petitioner do not conflict with those of the existing operators.
Likewise, no final opinion is being expressed regarding the
correctness of the objections raised by respondent No.4. All such
questions are left open for determination by the STAT in
accordance with law.
33. Consequently, the impugned order dated 12.07.2024 passed by
the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Chhattisgarh, Raipur, in

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Appeal No. A-68/2023, is hereby quashed and set aside. The
matter is remitted to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal,
Chhattisgarh, Raipur, for fresh consideration of the revision/appeal
preferred by respondent No.4 against the order dated 23.08.2023
passed by the Regional Transport Authority granting permanent
stage carriage permit No. CG2023-SC-0481A in favour of the
petitioner.
34. On remand, the learned State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall
restore the proceedings to their original number and shall issue
appropriate notice to the petitioner and all other necessary and
affected parties. The petitioner shall be afforded a reasonable,
effective and meaningful opportunity of hearing, including an
opportunity to file his reply, produce the relevant documents and
specifically meet the objections concerning compliance with
Section 70 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Rule 72 of the
Chhattisgarh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994, the alleged non-
furnishing of requisite documents, tax liability, if any, and the
alleged overlapping or cross-timing.
35. The private respondent shall also be afforded full opportunity to
place on record the documents and material in support of the
objections raised by him. The STAT shall thereafter consider the
original record of the RTA, the application submitted by the
petitioner, the documents accompanying the application, the
documents subsequently placed on record, the objections raised

23
before the RTA, the permit and timing chart, as well as the
material produced by the contesting respondents. The STAT shall
thereafter determine, in accordance with law, whether the
petitioner fulfilled the statutory requirements for grant of the permit
and whether the permit granted by the RTA could legally be
sustained.
36. The STAT shall also specifically examine the question of timings
after considering the respective routes and timings of the
petitioner and the contesting operators. If any objection regarding
cross-timing or overlapping timing is found to arise, the same shall
be dealt with by a reasoned finding based upon the relevant timing
charts and the applicable statutory provisions. It is further directed
that the STAT shall not reject the petitioner's case merely on the
ground of an omission in any particular column of the application
form without examining whether the information/document
required under the Rules was otherwise furnished before the RTA
and formed part of the record. At the same time, this direction shall
not be construed as dispensing with any mandatory statutory
requirement. The STAT shall determine the legal consequence of
any deficiency, if found, strictly in accordance with the applicable
provisions and the binding precedents.
37. The parties shall be at liberty to place before the STAT all relevant
documents which were part of the proceedings before the RTA.
The STAT shall also be at liberty to call for and examine the

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complete original record of the RTA, if necessary for proper
adjudication of the dispute. After considering the entire material
and hearing all concerned parties, the STAT shall pass a fresh,
reasoned and speaking order, uninfluenced by any observation
contained in the present order touching upon the merits of the rival
claims.
38. It has been noticed that vide order dated 01.08.2024, the co-
ordinate Bench of this Court, as an interim measure, stayed the
effect and operation of the impugned order dated 12.07.2024
passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Raipur, C.G., till
the next date of hearing.
39. In view of the fact that the permit had already been granted by the
RTA and the petitioner has been operating the vehicle under the
interim protection granted by this Court, it is directed that the
interim order passed by this Court shall continue to operate until
the matter is considered by the STAT and an appropriate order is
passed, subject to the condition that the petitioner shall strictly
comply with the terms and conditions of the existing permit and all
applicable statutory requirements.
40. It is clarified that continuation of the interim protection shall not be
treated as an expression of opinion by this Court regarding the
ultimate entitlement of the petitioner to the permit. The petitioner
shall appear before the learned State Transport Appellate Tribunal,
Chhattisgarh, Raipur, within 30 days from the date of receipt of

25
certified copy of this order. Upon such appearance, the STAT shall
proceed with the matter and, considering the nature and age of
the dispute, shall endeavour to decide the revision/appeal
expeditiously, preferably within a period of 60 days from the date
of appearance of the parties, without granting unnecessary
adjournments to either side.
41. Needless to observe, if any party seeks an adjournment, the STAT
shall consider such request only for sufficient cause and shall
endeavour to ensure that the remanded proceedings do not
remain pending for an unduly long period. The parties shall
cooperate in the expeditious disposal of the proceedings and shall
not seek unnecessary adjournments.
42. It is also clarified that the present order shall not revive or restore
the findings recorded by the STAT in the impugned order dated
12.07.2024. The said order having been quashed, the
revision/appeal shall be treated as pending before the STAT and
shall be decided afresh in accordance with law. The order dated
23.08.2023 passed by the RTA shall remain subject to the fresh
decision to be rendered by the STAT.
43. In view of the aforesaid directions, the writ petition is allowed. The
impugned order dated 12.07.2024 passed by the State Transport
Appellate Tribunal, Chhattisgarh, Raipur, is quashed and set
aside. The matter is remanded to the State Transport Appellate
Tribunal, Chhattisgarh, Raipur, for fresh adjudication in

26
accordance with law and in the light of the observations and
directions contained herein.
44. It is made abundantly clear that this Court has not adjudicated the
petitioner's ultimate entitlement to the permanent stage carriage
permit nor has it finally determined the validity of the objections
raised by respondent No.4. The entire controversy is left open for
consideration by the STAT. The Tribunal shall decide the matter
independently, on the basis of the material available before it and
after affording adequate opportunity of hearing to all concerned
parties.
45. There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh

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