Dr. V. Shivanand, vs V. Hara Gopal,
- Court
- High Court for the State of Telangana
*THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
+ CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos. 2487, 2509 & 3913 of 2023
Between:
Dr. V. Shivanand ….
Petitioner
AND
V. Hara Gopal and others ….
Respondents
COMMON ORDER PRONOUNCED ON : 27.04.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
1. Whether Reporters of Local
newspapers may be allowed to see
the Judgment ?
: Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of judgment may
be marked to Law Reports/Journals
: Yes/No
3. Whether Their Lordship/Ladyship
wish to see the fair copy of judgment
: Yes/No
___________________________________
VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J
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CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos. 2487, 2509 and 3913 of 2023
% 27.04.2026
:
Between
# Dr. V. Shivanand …. Petitioner
And
$ V. Hara Gopal and others …. Respondents
! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri T. Bala Mohan Reddy
^ Counsel for Respondents : Sri Eranki Phani Kumar
< GIST :
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred:
1. (2005) 12 SCC 1
2. (1968) 3 SCR 163
3. 2022 SCC Online SC 1234
4. (1982) 2 SCC 596
5. 2011 SCC Online Mad 2161
6. (2010) 9 SCC 496
7. (1976) 2 SCC 981
8. (2010) 4 SCC 785
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CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos. 2487, 2509 and 3913 of 2023
Date: 27.04.2026
Between:
Dr. V. Shivanand …. Petitioner
AND
V. Hara Gopal and others …. Respondents
COMMON ORDER :
Heard Sri T. Bala Mohan Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for
the Petitioner and Sri. Eranki Phani Kumar, learned Counsel appearing
for the Respondents. Perused the material available on the record.
C.R.P.No.2487 of 2023
2. This Civil Revision Petition is preferred by the petitioner,
aggrieved by the order dated 10.07.2023 passed by the Senior Civil
Judge, at Shadnagar, Ranga Reddy District in I.A.No.274 of 2023
in O.S.No.59 of 2016. By the said Order, the learned Trial Court
allowed the application filed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 under
Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (for short
‘CPC’) permitting amendment of the prayer portion of the plaint by
substituting the existing sub-para-No.1 and incorporating the
following as sub-para-No.1:
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CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
“That the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 are each
entitled to 1/4th share, and the plaintiff and defendants are
further entitled to equal shares out of the remaining 1/4th
share in Item Nos. 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties.”
C.R.P.No.2509 of 2023
3. This Civil Revision Petition is preferred by the petitioner
aggrieved by the order dated 10.07.2023 passed by the Senior Civil
Judge, at Shadnagar, Ranga Reddy District in I.A.No.275 of 2023
in O.S.No.59 of 2016. By the said order, dated 10.07.2023, the
learned Trial Court allowed the application filed by the respondent
Nos.1 and 2, under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC R/w. Section 28 of
Civil Rules of Practice (for short ‘CRP’) seeking impleadment of the
proposed respondent as a party to the suit by adding her as
respondent No.3/defendant No.3 along with consequential
amendment of the plaint, including incorporation of a claim for
share, as may be entitled in law, in her favour.
C.R.P.No.3913 of 2023
4. This Civil Revision Petition is preferred by the petitioner,
aggrieved by the order dated 06.11.2023 (hereinafter referred to as
“the Docket order”) in O.S.No.59 of 2016 passed by the Senior Civil
Judge, at Shadnagar, Ranga Reddy District. By the impugned
Docket Order dated 06.11.2023, the learned Trial Court dismissed
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the suit for default for not carrying out the amendment in the
plaint.
5. Since all the Civil Revision Petitions arise out of the same
Original Suit bearing O.S. No. 59 of 2016 and the parties therein
are one and the same, these Petitions are heard analogously and
are being disposed of by this common Order.
6. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per
their status before the learned Trial Court.
I. BRIEF FACTS:
7. The factual matrix leading to the present Civil Revision
Petitions is set out hereunder:
(a) The petitioner/plaintiff herein instituted O.S. No. 59 of 2016
on the file of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Shadnagar, Ranga
Reddy District, seeking partition and separate possession of the
suit schedule property bearing Municipal No. 11-123, admeasuring
277 square yards, situated at Shadnagar, claiming 1/3rd share
therein.
(b) The respondent Nos. 1 and 2/defendants herein entered
appearance and filed their written statement. The suit proceeded to
trial, wherein the petitioner/plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1
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and another witness as P.W.2, and the matter had reached the
stage of defendants’ evidence.
(c) Prior to the institution of the said suit, there were earlier
litigations between the parties, namely:
(i) O.S. No. 41 of 2014 filed by respondent No.1 before the
learned Junior Civil Judge, Shadnagar, seeking permanent
injunction in respect of properties bearing H. Nos. 11-122 and 11-
123 admeasuring about 685 square yards, wherein a categorical
stand was taken that the parents of the parties had renounced
worldly affairs and were leading a religious life.
(ii) O.S. No. 5 of 2017 filed by the Petitioner before the learned
Senior Civil Judge, Shadnagar, seeking declaration of title, recovery
of possession, and rectification of municipal records in respect of
properties bearing H. Nos. 11-122 and 11-124 admeasuring 468
square yards, wherein pleadings were made regarding such
renunciation by Respondent No.3.
(d) It is stated that the said suits were clubbed and trial
commenced, and in all such proceedings, Respondent No.3 was not
impleaded, consistent with the stand taken by the Defendants.
(e) In the present suit also, from the year 2016 onwards, the
Defendants contested the matter but did not file any counter-claim
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CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
nor seek impleadment of any additional party or inclusion of
additional properties at the appropriate stage.
(f) However, after commencement of trial, completion of
evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2, and after lapse of several years, the
Defendants filed:
(i) I.A. No. 274 of 2023 under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC
seeking amendment of the plaint by introducing paragraph 5-A,
adding two additional properties bearing H. Nos. 11-122 and 11-
124 admeasuring 468 square yards as Item No.2, and modifying
the prayer relating to shares in the suit schedule properties;
(ii) I.A. No. 275 of 2023 under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC
seeking impleadment of the mother of the parties as Defendant
No.3.
(g) By separate but contemporaneous orders dated 10.07.2023,
the learned Trial Court allowed both the applications, observing
that the rights of the parents cannot be denied on the ground of
alleged renunciation of worldly affairs and that they are necessary
parties for effective adjudication, and further held that no prejudice
would be caused to the Petitioner.
(h) Consequent to allowing the applications, the learned Trial
Court directed the Petitioner / Plaintiff to carry out necessary
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amendments within a stipulated time, failing which the suit would
be liable to be dismissed.
(i) Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioner preferred C.R.P. No. 2487 of
2023 against the order in I.A. No. 274 of 2023; and C.R.P. No.
2509 of 2023 against the order in I.A. No. 275 of 2023,
(j) It is the specific case of the Petitioner that he filed a detailed
memo dated 23.08.2023 before the learned Trial Court raising
objections inter alia that the amendment applications were filed by
the defendants; the plaintiff cannot be compelled to amend his own
plaint at the instance of the defendants; the provisions of Order VI
Rule 18 of the CPC, including the time limit of fourteen days, apply
only to the party seeking amendment; and non-compliance thereof
cannot entail dismissal of the suit.
(k) It is further stated that no orders were passed on the said
memo, and without considering the objections raised therein, the
learned Trial Court proceeded to pass a docket order.
(l) Thereafter, by docket order dated 06.11.2023, the learned
Trial Court dismissed O.S. No. 59 of 2016 for default on the ground
that the Petitioner failed to carry out the amendments.
(m) Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the Petitioner preferred
C.R.P. No. 3913 of 2023 contending that the dismissal of the suit
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during the pendency of the earlier revision petitions and without
adjudicating the objections raised is illegal and unsustainable.
(n) Thus, the present Civil Revision Petitions arise out of a
composite set of proceedings, namely, allowance of amendment,
impleadment of a Respondent No.3 and consequential dismissal of
the suit for non-compliance.
8. In the above factual backdrop, particularly in light of the
objections raised by the Petitioner regarding the applicability of
Order VI Rule 17 and Rule 18 of the CPC and the legality of the
consequential directions, issued by the learned Trial Court, the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the Petitioner and the
respondents advanced their respective submissions, which are set
out hereunder.
II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES:
(a) Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner/Plaintiff:
9. The submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the
Petitioner may be summarised as follows:
(A) Challenge to Docket Order dated 06.11.2023:
(a) The learned counsel contends that the learned Trial Court
committed a grave error in dismissing the suit for default by docket
order dated 06.11.2023, particularly when the very orders
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permitting amendment and impleadment were under challenge
before this Court.
(b) It is submitted that passing such a consequential order
during the pendency of the revision petitions is contrary to settled
subjudice
principles governing matters and amounts to procedural
impropriety.
(c) It is further contended that the Petitioner had filed a detailed
memo dated 23.08.2023 raising specific objections to the
enforceability of the directions issued by the learned Trial Court;
however, the said objections were not considered and the Court
acted in a mechanical manner.
(d) It is further contended that the application for amendment
was filed by the Defendants, and therefore, the Plaintiff cannot be
compelled to carry out amendments in the plaint at their instance.
(e) The learned counsel submits that the provisions of Order VI
Rule 18 of the CPC, including the stipulation of carrying out
amendments within 14 days, apply only to the party who has
sought and obtained leave to amend, and not to the opposite party.
(f) In the present case, the learned Trial Court erroneously
fastened the obligation upon the Plaintiff and, on alleged non-
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CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
compliance, proceeded to dismiss the suit, which is contrary to the
statutory scheme.
(g) It is further contended that the petitioner had expressly
raised this objection in the memo dated 23.08.2023; however, the
Trial Court failed to consider the same before passing the
impugned docket order.
(h) In support of the above contention, reliance is placed on the
judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Union of India v.
1
Pramod Gupta , wherein it was held that amendments are required
to be carried out by the party who has obtained leave to amend.
Reliance is also placed on Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C.
2
Alexander , wherein it was held that the Court has the power to
extend time for carrying out amendments and that procedural
provisions should not be applied in a manner resulting in injustice.
(i) It is therefore contended that the dismissal of the suit on the
ground of non-compliance with a direction which itself is legally
unsustainable is without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside.
(B) Challenge to Amendment (Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC):
(a) It is contended that the application filed by the defendants
under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC is not maintainable, as the
1
(2005) 12 SCC 1
2
(1968) 3 SCR 163
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CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
provision permits a party to amend his own pleadings and does not
enable one party to alter the pleadings of another.
(b) The Defendants, not being the authors of the plaint, have no
locus to seek amendment thereof, and if they had any independent
claim, the proper remedy was to file a counter-claim. It is further
contended that the application was filed belatedly after
commencement of trial and completion of evidence, without
satisfying the requirement of due diligence. The Trial Court,
without examining the issue of maintainability or recording
reasons, mechanically allowed the application.
(C) Challenge to Impleadment (Order I Rule 10 of the CPC):
(a) The learned counsel submits that the Plaintiff, being
dominus litis , cannot be compelled to implead a party against
whom no relief is sought. In support of the said contention,
3
reliance is placed on Sudhamayee Pattnaik v. Bibhu Prasad Sahoo ,
wherein it was held that unless the Court deems a party necessary
for effective adjudication, no party can be forced upon the Plaintiff.
(b) It is further contended that the application for impleadment
was filed only at the instance of the Defendants and not by the
proposed party, and therefore, the order is unsustainable.
3
2022 SCC Online SC 1234
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(D) Inconsistency in Defendants’ Stand:
(a) It is contended that the Defendants had earlier taken a
categorical stand in prior proceedings that the mother had
renounced worldly affairs and were leading a religious life. Having
taken such a stand, the Defendants cannot now seek impleadment
of the said person as a necessary party, and the present attempt is
inconsistent and untenable.
(b) In view of the above submissions, it is contended that the
impugned orders suffer from patent illegality, non-application of
mind, and misapplication of statutory provisions, and are therefore
liable to be set aside.
(b) Submissions on behalf of the Respondents/Defendants:
10. The submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the
respondents/defendants, may be summarised as follows:
(a) The learned counsel appearing for the
respondents/defendants submits that the interlocutory
applications filed under Order I Rule 10 and Order VI Rule 17 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 were necessitated by the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the case. It is contended that the
respondents were constrained to seek impleadment of their mother
as defendant No.3, as well as amendment of the plaint, schedule,
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and prayer, in order to include all the properties which are the
subject matter of the dispute.
(b) It is further submitted that unless such amendments are
permitted, there cannot be a comprehensive and effective
adjudication of the disputes between the parties. According to the
respondents, the nature of a suit for partition requires that all joint
family properties and all necessary parties be brought on record so
as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting decisions. It
is therefore contended that the amendments sought were essential
for determining the real questions in controversy.
(c) The learned counsel would further contend that no prejudice
whatsoever would be caused to the plaintiff by allowing such
amendments. On the contrary, it is urged that the proposed
amendments would facilitate final adjudication of all disputes
between the parties in a single proceeding and would obviate the
necessity of future litigation.
(d) It is also submitted that the learned Trial Court has rightly
exercised its jurisdiction in allowing the applications filed under
Order I Rule 10 and Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC. According to the
respondents, the proposed party, being the mother of the parties,
is not only a proper party but also a necessary party for the
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purpose of effective and complete adjudication of the dispute in a
suit for partition.
(e) The respondents further contend that, pursuant to the
orders allowing the said applications, the learned Trial Court had
granted sufficient opportunity to the petitioner/plaintiff and had
specifically directed the plaintiff to carry out the consequential
amendments within the stipulated time. It is submitted that
despite such opportunity, the petitioner failed to comply with the
directions of the Court.
(f) In view of such non-compliance, it is contended that the
learned Trial Court was justified in proceeding further with the
matter and in dismissing the suit for default in accordance with
law. According to the respondents, the dismissal was a natural
consequence of the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the
directions issued by the Court.
(g) The learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance
4
upon the decision in Rani Choudhury v. Suraj Jit Choudhury , to
contend that once an appeal against an ex parte decree has been
disposed of on any ground other than withdrawal, an application
under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC would not be maintainable. By
placing reliance on the said judgment, it is sought to be contended
4
(1982) 2 SCC 596
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that procedural defaults have definite consequences and cannot be
lightly ignored.
(h) Reliance is also placed on Solavaiamal v. Ezhumalai
5
Gounder , to contend that though, ordinarily, under Order VI Rule
17 of the CPC, only a party to the pleadings may seek amendment,
such principle is not to be applied rigidly in suits for partition. It is
submitted that in partition proceedings, both the plaintiff and the
defendant stand on an equal footing and are entitled to seek
appropriate reliefs. Therefore, a liberal and pragmatic approach is
required while considering amendment applications in such suits,
so as to ensure complete and effective adjudication of the disputes
between the parties.
(i) The learned counsel would emphasize that, having regard to
the special nature of partition suits, the scope of amendment
under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC must be construed broadly so
as to ensure complete adjudication of rights of the parties. It is
therefore contended that the orders allowing amendment and
impleadment were passed in furtherance of justice and do not
suffer from any legal infirmity.
(j) In conclusion, it is submitted that the impugned orders do
not suffer from any illegality, material irregularity, or jurisdictional
5
2011 SCC Online Mad 2161
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error warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction. The respondents accordingly pray that the
Civil Revision Petitions be dismissed.
III. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION:
11. In light of the rival submissions and the material on record,
the following points arise for determination:
(i) Whether the docket order dated 06.11.2023 dismissing O.S.
No. 59 of 2016 for non-compliance is sustainable in law,
particularly in the context of the applicability of Order VI Rule 18
of the CPC?
(ii) Whether the orders dated 10.07.2023 passed in I.A. No. 274
of 2023 (under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC), and I.A. No. 275 of
2023 (under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC), are legally valid and in
accordance with the statutory requirements governing amendment
of pleadings and impleadment of parties?
(iii) Whether the impugned orders suffer from jurisdictional
error, material irregularity, or non-application of mind warranting
interference under Section 115 of the CPC?
V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:
A. Scope & Consequence under Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC:
12. The principal controversy in the present case revolves
around the interpretation and application of Order VI Rule 18 of
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the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Since the impugned dismissal of
the suit is founded upon alleged non-compliance with a direction
traceable to this provision, it becomes necessary to examine its
scope and ambit. For ready reference, the text of the order VI Rule
18 of the CPC is extracted hereunder:
18. Failure to amend after order:
“If a party who has obtained an order for leave to
amend does not amend accordingly within the time
limited for that purpose by the order, or if no time is
thereby limited, then within fourteen days from the date
of the order, he shall not be permitted to amend after the
expiration of such limited time as aforesaid or of such
fourteen days, as the case may be, unless the time is
extended by the Court”
13. A plain and purposive reading of the above provision makes
it manifest that the statutory obligation to carry out an amendment
is cast exclusively upon the party who has sought and obtained
leave to amend. The provision neither contemplates nor permits
the imposition of such obligation upon an adversarial party.
14. Equally significant is the nature of the consequence
prescribed under the Rule. The embargo contained therein is
confined to forfeiture of the right to amend upon expiry of the
stipulated time. The provision does not envisage, either expressly
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or by necessary implication, dismissal of the suit as a consequence
of non-compliance.
15. The aforesaid interpretation stands fortified by the decision
of the Honourable Supreme Court in Pramod Gupta’s case (supra) ,
wherein it was held that the obligation to carry out amendment lies
upon the party seeking such amendment and that failure to do so
within the time stipulated would only result in the party being
precluded from carrying out such amendment thereafter, without
entailing penal consequences affecting the lis itself. Accordingly, it
would be apposite to extract the relevant portion of the aforesaid
judgment, which reads as under:
“75. It may be true that not only the memorandum of
appeal but also the reference was amended. Mr. Rao pointed out that
the necessary amendments have been carried out in the application
for reference or memorandum of appeal. In terms of Order VI Rule 18
of the Code of Civil Procedure, such amendments are required to be
carried out in the pleadings by a party who has obtained leave to
amend his pleadings within the time granted therefore and if no time
was specified then within fourteen days from the date of passing of
the order. The consequence of failure to amend the pleadings within
the period specified therein as laid down in Order VI Rule 18 of the
Code is that the party shall not be permitted to amend his pleadings
thereafter unless the time is extended by the court. It is not in dispute
that such an order extending the time specified in Order VI Rule 18
has not been passed.”
16. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the application
for amendment was filed by the defendants. However, the learned
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Trial Court while allowing the said application, directed the
plaintiff to carry out such amendments and, upon failure to do so,
proceeded to dismiss the suit. This course adopted by the learned
Trial Court is clearly inconsistent with the statutory scheme
underlying Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC. The said provision, on a
plain and purposive reading casts the obligation upon the party,
who has sought and obtained leave of the Court. The consequence
of non-compliance, as contemplated therein, is confined to
disabling such party from effecting the amendment after stipulated
period, unless time is extended by the Court. The provision does
not, either expressly or by necessary implication, contemplate the
drastic consequences of dismissal of the suit itself, particularly at
the instance of a party, who was not the applicant for amendment.
The learned Trial Court, therefore, has clearly misconstrued the
scope and ambit of Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC and has imposed a
consequence wholly alien to the statutory framework. Such an
approach amounts to a jurisdictional error, inasmuch as a power
not vested by law has been exercised, resulting in grave prejudice
to the petitioner. Consequently, the dismissal of the suit on this
ground cannot be sustained in law.
17. Viewed from another perspective, even assuming that there
was non-compliance with the direction to carry out amendment,
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the consequence in law could only be that the party seeking
amendment would be precluded from incorporating such
amendment beyond the stipulated time, unless the court, in
exercise of its discretion, extended time. The provision does not,
either expressly or by necessary implication, authorise dismissal of
the suit. The action of the learned Trial Court in terminating the
lis on this ground is therefore, wholly alien to the statutory
framework.
18. More importantly, the dismissal has been ordered on the
ground of non-compliance not attributable to the plaintiff. The
burden under Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC having been wrongly
shifted, the impugned order results in penalising a party for a
default committed by another, such an approach is contrary to
fundamental principles of procedural fairness and cannot be
countenanced.
19. Viewed thus, the impugned order suffers from a clear
misapplication of statutory provisions, failure to exercise
jurisdiction in accordance with law and material irregularity in the
exercise of jurisdiction. The dismissal of the suit on such ground
is therefore, liable to be set aside.
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B. Procedural Law and Substantive Justice:
20. The misdirection becomes more apparent when vieed in light
of the broader principle governing procedural laws. It is a settled
principle that procedural law is intended to advance the cause of
justice and not to defeat it. Procedural prescriptions must therefore
be applied in a manner that facilitates adjudication on merits
rather than results in denial of justice on technical grounds.
21. In Nair Service Society Limited’s case (supra) , the Honourable
Supreme Court held that procedural laws are designed to facilitate
justice and that the Court possesses sufficient power to extend
time in appropriate cases to avoid injustice. The relevant
paragraph is extracted hereunder:
“11. In our view, the contention that the appellant
should not be permitted to carry out the amendment allowed
by the Supreme Court after the expiry of fourteen days from
the date of its judgment, unless the time is extended by that
court, is based on a wrong understanding of that judgment.
Under Rule 17 of Order VIC.P.C., a party may be allowed to
amend his pleading at any stage of the proceedings; it may be
even at the stage of appeal or revision. An appellate or
revisional court may grant leave to amend the pleading in that
court itself, or to amend it in the Court to which the case is
remitted for trial or any other further proceeding in the light of
the amendment allowed to be made. In both these cases, it is
open for the appellate or revisional court, as the case may be,
to fix a time within which the amendment is to be carried out.
And if any such time is fixed, it can be extended under Order
VI Rule 18 only by that court. But if no time is fixed, and the
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CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
case is remitted to a subordinate court for carrying out the
amendment and proceeding further with the suit, the court
which has jurisdiction to extend the time for carrying out the
amendment is that subordinate court, to which the case has
been remitted for that purpose. In a case where leave to amend
was wrongly refused by a subordinate court, an appellate or
revisional court may remit the case to any subordinate court
directing that court to allow the amendment and proceed
further with the trial of the suit. Then the Subordinate Court
has to grant the leave to amend and the party obtaining the
leave has to carry out the amendment accordingly. In such a
case, the subordinate court may fix a time for carrying out the
amendment; or it may not do so. If it does not fix a time, the
amendment has to be carried out within fourteen days of
obtaining the leave to amend from that court. In either case, the
court which has got the power under Rule 18 to extend the time
is the court in which the amendment has to be carried out. The
fact that leave was originally refused by the Subordinate court,
and it was subsequently granted by it as directed by the
appellate or revisional court, as the case may be, does not
affect the position. In other words, the court which has got the
power to extend the time under Order VI Rule 18 C.P.C. to
carry out an amendment is the court, which has fixed a time
for that purpose; and if no time has been fixed, it is the court in
which the amendment has to be carried out.”
22. Applying the above principles, the present case, even
assuming that there was non-compliance with the direction to
carry out amendment, the learned Trial Court was required to
examine whether sufficient cause existed or whether the time
granted could be extended. The impugned order does not reflect
any such consideration, nor any finding of wilful default,
particularly on the part of petitioner.
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23. The dismissal of the suit, without examining the nature of
the default or the possibility of granting further time, is
disproportionate and contrary to settled principles governing
procedural law. The consequence imposed by the learned Trial
Court is not only severe but also unsupported by the statutory
framework. Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC does not authorise
dismissal of the suit, it merely restricts the right to amend.
24. The respondents, however, seek to sustain the impugned
orders on the ground that the amendment and impleadment were
necessary for effective adjudication of the dispute. It therefore
becomes necessary to examine the validity of the orders permitting
such amendment and impleadment.
C. Amendment and Impleadment — Statutory
Requirements
(i) Amendment under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC:
25. Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC enables amendment of
pleadings for determining the real questions in controversy.
However, the proviso to the Rule imposes a restriction that after
commencement of trial, amendment shall not be allowed unless
the Court is satisfied that despite due diligence, the matter could
not have been raised earlier.
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26. In the present case, the application for amendment were filed
after commencement of trial and completion of the plaintiff’s
evidence. The impugned order does not record any finding as to
due diligence nor does it indicate satisfaction of the statutory
requirement under the proviso.
27. The absence of such a finding renders the order legally
infirm, notwithstanding the liberal approach generally adopted in
partition suits.
(ii) Impleadment under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC
28. Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC empowers the Court to add a
party whose presence is necessary or proper for effective
adjudication of the questions involved. The provisions reads as
under:
Order I Rule 10 (2): Court may strike out or add parties:
“…the Court may… add any person… whose
presence before the Court may be necessary in order to
enable the Court effectively and completely to adjudicate
upon and settle all the questions involved…”
29. The plaintiff being dominus litis, is ordinarily entitled to
choose the parties against whom relief is sought and cannot be
compelled to implead a person against his will. This principle,
however, yields where the Court is satisfied that the presence of
such person is necessary or proper for complete and effective
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CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
adjudication. The determinative test is whether in the absence of
such party, the Court would be unable to effectively and completely
adjudicate upon the issues involved.
30. In Sudhamayee Pattnaik’s case (supra) , the Honourable
Supreme Court held that a party cannot be added merely for
convenience and that the test is whether such party is necessary
for effective adjudication. A “necessary party” is one without whom
no effective decree can be passed, while a “proper party” is one
whose presence enables the Court to completely and affectively
adjudicate upon the disputes.
31. In the context of partition suits, courts have consistently
recognized that all co-sharers or persons having a direct interest in
the joint property are necessary parties. A liberal approach is
generally adopted in such matters to ensure that the entire dispute
is resolved in a single proceeding. However, even while adopting
such an approach, the Court is required to examine the nature of
the interest of the proposed party and to record a clear finding as
to whether such party is necessary or property for adjudication.
32. In the present case, the respondents sought impleadment of
their mother as defendant No.3. While it may be that such party
could have a bearing on the adjudication of the dispute, the
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CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
impugned order does not disclose any examination of the nature of
her interest or the necessity of her presence in the proceedings,
particularly in view of the stand taken by the respondents in their
earlier proceedings. There is no finding as to whether she is a
necessary party without whom no effective decree can be passed,
or merely a proper party whose presence would facilitate
adjudication.
33. The order proceeds on a general assumption that
impleadment of the proposed defendant is necessary merely on the
ground that she is the mother of the parties, without recording the
satisfaction required under law. Such an approach reflects a
failure to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with statutory
parameters governing order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
34. Apart from the statutory deficiencies noted above, it is also
necessary to consider whether the impugned orders satisfy the
requirement of being reasoned judicial determinations
D. Absence of Adequate Reasons:
35. A careful perusal of the impugned orders reveals that
substantially similar reasoning has been employed while dealing
with distinct applications invoking different provisions of law. The
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CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
orders do not advert to the specific statutory requirements
governing each application, nor do they reflect consideration of the
objections raised by the petitioner.
36. It is a settled principle that recording of reasons constitutes
an essential component of judicial decision-making. A reasoned
order demonstrates application of mind and enables effective
appellate or revisional scrutiny.
6
Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan
37. In , the
Honourable Supreme Court held that reasons are the heartbeat of
every conclusion and that absence of reasons renders the order
unsustainable.
38. Similarly, in Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. v.
7
Union of India , it was held that every quasi-judicial order must be
supported by reasons, as this requirement is a basic principle of
natural justice.
39. In Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax v. Shukla &
8
Brothers , the Honourable Supreme Court reiterated that reason is
the soul of justice and that a reasoned order is indispensable for
proper administration of justice.
6
(2010) 9 SCC 496
7
(1976) 2 SCC 981
8
(2010) 4 SCC 785
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CRP Nos.2487, 2509 & 3913_2023
40. In the present case, the impugned orders do not disclose any
independent evaluation of statutory requirements, nor do they
reflect consideration of the petitioner’s objections. The absence of
adequate reasons renders the orders incapable of effective judicial
scrutiny.
41. The impugned orders, therefore, suffer from insufficiency of
reasons and lack of reasoned consideration, thereby vitiating the
exercise of judicial discretion.
42. Having regard to the above discussion, it remains to be
considered whether the learned Trial Court was justified in
proceeding to dismiss the suit during the pendency of the revision
petitions before this Court.
E. Effect of Pendency of Revision Petitions:
43. It is not in dispute that the orders permitting amendment
and impleadment were under challenge before this Court at the
relevant point of time.
44. In such circumstances, judicial propriety required the
learned Trial Court to exercise restraint and refrain from passing
consequential orders which would render the pending revision
petitions infructuous.
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45. The dismissal of the suit during the pendency of such
challenge undermines the revisional process and results in
avoidable multiplicity of proceedings. Such a course cannot be
sustained.
VI. FINAL FINDINGS:
46. For the reasons set out above, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the impugned docket order dismissing the suit is
vitiated by misapplication of Order VI Rule 18 of the CPC and by
failure to exercise judicial discretion in accordance with law.
47. The interlocutory orders passed under Order VI Rule 17 and
Order I Rule 10 of the CPC, are equally unsustainable, having been
passed without satisfying the statutory requirements and without
recording adequate reasons.
48. The learned Trial Court has thus acted with material
irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction, warranting
interference under Section 115 of the CPC.
VII. RESULT:
49. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petitions are allowed.
50. The docket order dated 06.11.2023 passed in O.S. No. 59 of
2016 is hereby set aside, and the suit is restored to file.
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51. The orders dated 10.07.2023 passed in I.A. Nos. 274 and
275 of 2023 are also set aside.
52. The said interlocutory applications i.e., I.A. Nos. 274 and
275 of 2023 are remitted to the learned Trial Court for fresh
consideration. The learned Trial Court shall independently examine
each application, apply the statutory requirements under Order VI
Rule 17 and Order I Rule 10 of the CPC, consider the objections
raised by the parties, and pass reasoned orders in accordance with
law.
53. The learned Trial Court shall thereafter proceed with the suit
expeditiously and dispose of the same on merits, uninfluenced by
any observations made herein.
54. There shall be no order as to costs.
55. Pending miscellaneous petitions if any, shall stands closed.
___________________________________
VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J
Date: 27.04.2026
Note: LR copy to be marked.
B/o. AS
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