Kamlesh Prasad And Another vs Prescribed Authority Celing/Addl.Collector Admin.Lko.Andors.

A.F.R.
Reserved on : 29.7.2026
Delivered on : 2.9.2026
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-
LKO:61848
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - C No. - 2780 of 2019
Kamlesh Prasad and another
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Prescribed Authority Celing/Addl.Collector Admin.Lko.Andors.
…..Respondent(s)
Along with :
Writ - C No. 3000016 of 2010:  
Kamlesh Prasad and another
1.
Versus
Prescribed Authority Ceiling / Additional Collector Lko.
Writ - C No. 3000061 of 2010:  
Rajesh Chand S/o Late Amir Chand Lal and Ors.
2.
Versus
Prescribed Authority Ceiling/Additional Collector
Administr
Writ - C No. 3000062 of 2010:  
Satish Chandra Srivastaa S/o Gokaran Nath Srivastava
3.
Versus
Prescribed Authority Ceiling/Additional Collector
Administr
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Nirmal Kumar Tewari, Deepak
Tewari, Shobhit Mohan Shukla
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., Ashok Shukla, Atulesh Kr.
Singh, Girish Chandra Verma,
Rakesh Pal, V.k. Pandey
Court No. - 4
HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
1. Heard Sri Jaideep Mathur, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri
Shobhit Mohan Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Vivek Raj
Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Shantanu Sharma,
learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri U.S. Sahai, learned counsel for
the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondent Nos.1
to 3 and 7, Ms. Radhika Singh and Ms. Richa Singh, learned counsel for
respondent No.4 and Sri G.C. Verma, learned Senior Advocate assisted
by Sri Rakesh Pal, learned counsel for respondent No.5.
2. At the very outset, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents raised the following preliminary objections:-
(i) The petitioners are not "persons aggrieved" by the impugned orders
dated 28.11.2018 and 13.12.2018 . The said orders have been passed
upon the application moved by Opposite Party Nos. 5 and 6 regarding
the exercise of their statutory right of choice under Section 10(2) of the
U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act in respect of the land
purchased by the answering Opposite Party No. 4. The impugned orders
neither determine nor adversely affect any legal right of the petitioners.
In the absence of any infringement of a legally protected right, the
petitioners cannot maintain the present writ petition merely because they
disagree with the decision of the Prescribed Authority. The present writ
petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed for want of locus standi as
well as for absence of any legal injury.
(ii) The order dated 28.11.2018 passed by Prescribed Authority is an
appealable order under Section 13 of the UP Imposition of Ceiling on
Land Holdings Act. The petitioners have invoked an extraordinary writ
jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court without exhausting the statutory
remedy available to them under the Act. In the absence of any
exceptional circumstances warranting interference under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, the present writ petition is liable to be
dismissed on the ground of availability of an efficacious alternative
statutory remedy.

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
(iii) The present writ petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground
that the principal relief sought by the petitioners is, in substance, directed
against the respondent No. 4, who is admittedly private individual. The
petitioners seek to question the rights flowing from the registered sale
deed executed in favour of the respondent No. 4 and the consequential
recognition accorded thereto by the prescribed authority. The
controversy, therefore, essentially pertains to private rights relating to
title, succession and transfer of immovable property and does not
involve the enforcement of any public duty or statutory obligation owed
by the respondent No. 4. It is a settled principle of law that although the
jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is
wide, the same is essentially intended to enforce public law remedies
and cannot ordinarily be invoked for adjudication of disputes of a purely
private character. The petitioners have failed to demonstrate the
existence of any public law element or any statutory duty allegedly
breached by the respondent No. 4.
3. In reply to the first preliminary objection, counsel for the
petitioners submits that prior to the commencement of ceiling
proceedings, Smt. Noorjahan, the original tenure holder sold 4.584
hectare land to the petitioners and the name of petitioners was duly
recorded. However, no notice was served to the petitioners and without
providing a proper opportunity of hearing the land has been declared as
surplus land. Reliance has been placed on the Full Bench judgment of
this Court in the case of Shantanu Kumar vs State of UP & Ors. (1979
SCC Online All 557) wherein it was held that it is mandatory to serve
the notice to the recorded tenure holders at the time of initiation of
ceiling proceedings.
Therefore, the petitioners are aggrieved by the said impugned
orders as the orders have been passed in violation of principle pf natural
justice, without providing an adequate opportunity of hearing to the
petitioners in respect of land the part of which has also been held by the
petitioners as recorded tenure holders.

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
4. Replying to the preliminary objection (2), it is submitted that the
Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) i.e., respondent No. 1 has no jurisdiction
to validate the transaction hit by Section 5(8) of the Ceiling Act. The
Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) has failed to consider that alleged sale
made during continuance of proceedings for determination of surplus
land in relation to respondent Nos.5 and 6, the transfer made in
contravention of sub-section 8 of section 5 of Ceiling Act is void ab-
initio and it cannot be made good. The starting of sub section 8 of
section 5 of the Act is that "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub
section (6) and (7), no tenure holder shall transfer any land held by
him....." and the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) has held that a transfer
has been proved to the satisfaction of prescribed authority to be in good
faith and for adequate consideration and under irrevocable instrument
not being a benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of
the tenure holder or other members of his family as contemplated under
sub-section 6 proviso (b) of section 5, whereas sub section 8 provides
that this provision would not apply to alleged sale which is void ab-
initio. Therefore, there arise no question of availing the alternative
remedy against an ultra vires order. Reliance has been placed upon the
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool
Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 and
Kuntesh Gupta Vs. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, (1987) 4 SCC 525 .
Relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under :-
Kuntesh Gupta (Supra)"12.  The next question that
falls for our consideration is whether the High
Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition of
the appellant on the ground of availability of an
alternative remedy. It is true that there was an
alternative remedy for challenging the impugned
order by referring the question to the Chancellor
under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act.
It is well established that an alternative remedy is
not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ
petition. When an authority has acted wholly
without jurisdiction, the High Court should not

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution on the ground of existence of an
alternative remedy. In the instant case, the Vice-
Chancellor had no power of review and the exercise
of such a power by her was absolutely without
jurisdiction. Indeed, the order passed by the Vice-
Chancellor on review was a nullity; such an order
could surely be challenged before the High Court by
a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and,
in our opinion, the High Court was not justified in
dismissing the writ petition on the ground that an
alternative remedy was available to the appellant
under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act"
5. Replying to the preliminary objection (3), counsel for the
petitioners submits that the present writ petition is challenging order
dated 28.11.2018/13.12.2018 passed by Prescribed Authority (Ceiling)
and the impugned order dated 19.09.2016 passed by Tehsildar
Mohanlalganj as well as the order dated 02.3.2010/06.3.2010 , which are
the orders passed by public authorities. In the present case, the dispute
mainly pertains to the rights arising out of a void sale deed and its
subsequent recognition by the prescribed authority. Respondent No.4 has
been impleaded not because any independent relief is sought against
him, but because he is the beneficiary of the impugned orders and any
adjudication regarding the legality of orders is likely to affect his
interest.
6. So far as the first question raised by respondent regarding
maintainability of writ petition on the ground that Petitioners are not the
"Persons Aggrieved". It is a settled law that the writ petition under
Article 226 is maintainable only at the instance of person whose legal
right has been infringed or who demonstrate that an order has civil
consequences affecting him. Mere dissatisfaction with an administrative
order does not confer locus standi.
7. In the present case, the petitioner contend that they are the
recorded tenure holder who purchased the land before the

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
commencement of ceiling proceedings and that no notice whatsoever
was issued to them despite their names being reflected in the revenue
records. Their grievance is not merely against recognition of Respondent
No. 4's rights but against the continuation of ceiling proceedings without
complying with the mandatory requirement of notice. The Full Bench
decision in the case of Shantanu Kumar (supra) holds that where land
standing in the name of another recorded tenure holder is included in
CLH Form 3, service of notice upon such recorded tenure holder is
mandatory and non compliance goes to the root of jurisdiction. The Full
Bench further held that absence of such notice renders the proceedings
void and incapable of being validated by subsequent participation or
availability of alternative remedies. Relevant paragraph of the judgment
in the case of Shantanu Kumar (supra) is as follows ;
"7. Rule 8 provides for service of notice on every
tenure-holder to show cause within fifteen days why
the aforesaid statement prepared by the Prescribed
Authority be not taken as correct. Proviso to this
rule then provides:
'Provided that where the statement in C.L.H. Form 3
also includes land ostensibly held in the name of
any other person, the prescribed authority shall
cause to be served upon such other person a notice
in C.L.H. Form 4 together with a copy of the
statement in C.L.H. Form 3 calling upon him to
show cause within a period of 15 days from the date
of service of the notice why the aforesaid statement
be not taken as correct.'
8. It is thus evident that the notice requiring the
tenure-holder to show cause why the statement
prepared by the Prescribed Authority be not taken
as correct is to be issued to the tenure-holder in
respect of whose holding the statement has been
prepared. Under the proviso, the Prescribed
Authority shall cause to be served a notice to the
person in whose name the land included in C.L.H.
Form 3 is ostensibly held. The Prescribed Authority
prepares the statement on the basis of revenue
records. If from the revenue records or other
information, the Prescribed Authority comes to
know that the land included in the statement in
C.L.H. Form 3 includes land ostensibly held in the
name of any other person, the Prescribed Authority
is bound to serve notice on such person. The phrase
used is 'shall cause to be served."
9. The petitioner claimed under a sale deed. It is not
disputed that the petitioner's I name was recorded in
the revenue papers lover the land which was

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
transferred to him. It is admitted that the statement
in C.L.H. Form 3 included the land held by the
petitioner. He was hence a person in whose name
some part of the land mentioned in the statement
was believed by the Prescribed Authority to be
ostensibly held. In this situation, it was incumbent
upon the Prescribed Authority to serve upon the
petitioner the requisite notice together with a copy
of the statement In this cause why that statement be
not taken as correct. copy of the statement and call
upon him to show held cause why that statement be
not taken as correct.
10. It is obvious that service of such a notice is
preliminary to the acquisition of jurisdiction to
proceed in the matter and decide whether the land
ostensibly held in the name of the petitioner could
be declared as surplus land in the hands of
Bhupendra Singh. In the premises, the proceedings
were without jurisdiction and void. Learned
Standing Counsel submitted that the petitioner had
knowledge and he should have filed an objection
under Section 11(2) of the Act as has been held by a
Division Bench of this Court in Dilbagh Singh v.
State of U.P. (1978 All LJ 717). The existence of
another remedy under the Act cannot validate the
proceedings which are void for lack of jurisdiction
and which have resulted in the declaration as
surplus land of an area which a person other than
the tenure-holder who has been heard, claims. The
fact that the petitioner could have filed an objection
under Section 11(2) will not breathe life into or
validate these dead proceedings.
11. It was urged that since the petitioner knew of
these proceedings he kept silent all this while, this
Court need not interfere in exercise of its
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. It is well settled that an objection to
lack of jurisdiction can be taken at any stage of the
proceedings and even in collateral proceedings (See
Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (AIR 1954 SC
340)). Consent or waiver cannot be be a ground for
refusing to entertain such an objection. We hence
cannot deny relief to the petitioner on the ground of
alternative remedy. It is equally settled that
existence of jurisdiction cannot be conferred by
consent or waiver. This plea is only relevant to the
exercise of jurisdiction. Here there was lack of
jurisdiction by reason of non-compliance of the first
proviso to Rule 8.
12. It was also urged that the petitioner's father took
all possible pleas and the petitioner has no bona
fide case. The petitioner has alleged that the sale
deed in his favour was bona fide and for adequate
consideration. It was not a Benami transaction and
was not for the immediate or deferred benefit of the
tenure-holder or other members of his family. No
such plea was taken by the petitioner's father. If the

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
petitioner is successful in establishing this plea his
land may be liable to be exempted. The proviso to
sub-section (6) of Section 5 exempts land covered
by-
'a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the
prescribed authority to be in good faith and for
adequate consideration and under an irrevocable
instrument not being a benami transaction or for the
immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holders
or other members of his family.' "
Therefore, the court is of the view that since the recorded holdings
of the petitioners were included without the issuance of notice, they
cannot be denied standing merely on the ground that the respondent No.
4 claims under the different sale deed. The preliminary objection
regarding locus standi, therefore, cannot be accepted as an absolute bar
at the threshold and deserves to be rejected.
8. The respondent further argued that an appeal under Section 13 of
the Ceiling Act was available and therefore this Court ought not to
exercise the writ jurisdiction. Undoubtedly, the Courts consistently
decline to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction when an equally efficacious
statutory remedy exists. However, an exception exists when the
impugned order is passed without jurisdiction; or there is violation of
natural justice; or there is infringement of fundamental rights.
9. In the present case, the petitioners have specifically pleaded that
the prescribed authority acted wholly without jurisdiction by validating a
transfer prohibited under Section 5(8) and that mandatory notice under
Section 10(2) was never served upon them. Such allegations squarely
attract the recognised exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy.
10. Also in view of the decision relied upon by the petitioners in
Whirlpool Corporation (supra) and Kuntesh Gupta (supra) which
reiterates that where the authority acts wholly without jurisdiction,
existence of an alternative remedy cannot operate as a bar to exercise of
writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the objection regarding alternative
remedy is also liable to be rejected.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that the
present writ petition is not maintainable as the principal relief is directed

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
against respondent no.4, who is admittedly a private individual. It is
urged that the dispute essentially concerns competing rights arising out
of a registered sale deed and the consequential recognition thereof by the
Prescribed Authority. According to the respondents, the controversy
pertains to title, succession and transfer of immovable property and is,
therefore, a dispute of a purely private nature, for which the
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be
invoked.
12. The aforesaid submission cannot be accepted in the facts of the
present case. A careful reading of the relief clause shows that the
petitioners have not sought cancellation of the sale deed dated
23.05.2007 executed in favour of respondent no.4, nor have they prayed
for declaration of title or adjudication of any civil right inter se between
private parties. The Petitioners are primarily challenging the orders dated
28.11.2018 and 13.12.2018 as well as the orders dated 02.3.2010 as
modified on 06.3.2010 passed by the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) in
exercise of statutory powers under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on
Land Holdings Act, 1960, whereby the authority recognised the transfer
in favour of respondent no.4 and excluded the transferred land from the
surplus pool. The petitioners further challenge the order dated
19.09.2016 passed by the Tehsildar in exercise of statutory jurisdiction.
Thus, the grievance is essentially against the exercise of statutory power
by public authorities and not against any private act of respondent no.4.
13. In the present case, the petitioners have specifically pleaded that
the Prescribed Authority acted wholly without jurisdiction in recognising
a transfer allegedly hit by Section 5(8) of the Act and that the
proceedings themselves stood vitiated for non-compliance with the
mandatory requirement of notice under Rule 8 of the Rules. These
allegations directly question the legality of the exercise of statutory
power by authorities constituted under the Ceiling Act. Such issues
undoubtedly fall within the realm of public law. Consequently, this Court
is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition is directed
primarily against the legality of orders passed by statutory authorities

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act and not
against the private rights of respondent No.4.
14. Accordingly, it is held that the writ petition is maintainable and the
preliminary objections raised by the respondents are hereby rejected.
15. Now the facts necessary for adjudication of the present matter are
required to be looked upon. The present matter roots back to the
initiation of ceiling proceeding under Section 10(2) of the Act. The
prescribed authority initiated proceedings under Section 10(2) of the Act
on 30.01.2006 on the basis of the report of Sub Divisional Officer
Mohanlalganj dated 27.01.2006. The notice was issued to Ms.
Noorjahan, the original tenure-holder. Later on, Noorjahan died therefore
her sons namely, respondent Nos.5 and 6 were substituted.
16. The Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) Additional Collector
(Administration), Lucknow vide order dated 02.03.2010 held 24.791
hectare of land as surplus land in terms of irrigated land which was later
on modified by order dated 06.03.2010 and was changed to 24.781
hectare land in terms of irrigated land.
17. Being aggrieved by orders dated 02.03.2010 and 06.03.2010, the
petitioners preferred Writ Petition No.16 of 2010 (Ceiling) in which this
Court vide order dated 12.03.2010 stayed the operation of the said
orders.
18. After initiation of ceiling proceedings, respondent Nos.5 & 6 sold
1.436 hectares land of village Salempur vide registered sale deed dated
23.05.2007 to respondent No.4 namely, Surendra Kumar Shukla.
19. It is also to be noted that three tenure-holders being aggrieved by
the order dated 02.03.2006 and 06.03.2006 preferred an appeal under
Section 13 of the Act before the Commissioner, Lucknow Division,
which are as follows :
Appeal No. 05/09-10 Raja Sayed Mohammad Sajjad and others
•
Versus State of U.P. and others.
Appeal No. 06/09-10 Sayed Mohammad Ali Khan and others
•
Versus State of U.P. and others.

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
Appeal No. 07/09-10 Smt. Sabiha Hussain and others Versus State
•
of U.P. and others.
20. All three appeals were heard and decided together vide order dated
11.04.2016. It was held that sale deeds dated 29.04.1997, 30.04.2003 and
19.05.2003 are excluded from the holdings of original tenure holder Smt.
Noorjaha as these sale deeds were executed by her and it was provided
that Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) may take choice from the substituted
heirs of Smt. Noorjaha i.e. opposite party no. 5 and 6 and may afford
adequate opportunity and may take equivalent land from their ceiling
area for declaration as surplus land. It was further provided that benefit
of this order be available on these three appellants only.
21. In the meantime opposite party no. 4 applied for mutation of his
name under Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act in the court of
Tehsildar Mohanlalganj, District Lucknow. It has been registered as case
No.45/07-08 under Section 34 L.R. Act, village Salempur titled as
Surendra Kumar Shukla Versus Sayed Mohammad Sajjad and others.
22. The Tehsildar Mohanlalganj held that as the land in question has
been sold during pendency of ceiling proceedings therefore the sale deed
is void ab-initio and a report was sent to Sub Divisional Officer
Mohanlalganj for declaring the transfers to be void and land in question
may vest with the State Government vide order dated 15.12.2007.
23. After the aforesaid report dated 15.12.2007, the matter came up
before the Assistant Collector who considered the report and that the sale
is hit by section 5(8) of the Act therefore it is void ab-initio therefore the
proceedings U/s 34 L.R. Act should be disposed of in accordance of law
and the provisions of Sections 166 and 163 of the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act shall not apply in the matter. The
matter was remanded back to the Tehsildar for deciding the same vide
order dated 21.01.2008.
24. The Tehsildar again considered the matter and vide order dated
14.03.2008 held that the impugned sale deed on which basis the
mutation sought for is contrary to law and the proceedings for mutation
are not maintainable accordingly the mutation proceedings are cancelled

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
and the parties may appear in the Court of prescribed authority (Ceiling)
and do necessary pairvi.
25. Against the said order respondent No.4 preferred an appeal u/s
210 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act which has been registered as Appeal
No. 110/07-08 village Salempur. The Sub Divisional Officer upheld the
order dated 14.03.2008 and therefore the appeal was dismissed.
26. The respondent No.4 then again moved an application dated
01.08.2016 for restoration of mutation case and for the benefit of Section
5 of Limitation Act, 1963. Tehsildar, Mohanlalganj this time allowed the
application vide order dated 19.09.2016 and held that since the order
dated 11.04.2016 exclude the land purchased by respondent No. 4 from
the holdings of original tenure holder ( i.e., Noorjahan), therefore
mutation is decided is his favour.
27. Thereafter, respondent No. 4 moved an application dated
18.07.2017 under Section 24 of UP Revenue Code 2006 for demarcation
of land in respect of Khasra plot no. 1464 Ka, area 1.322 hectare before
SDO, Mohanlalganj, Lucknow. The Sub Divisional Officer vide order
dated 07.04.2018 allowed the application and ordered to do the
measurement within 5 days.
28. Now, the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) passed an order dated
28.11.2018 and 13.12.2018 under Section 10(2) of the Ceiling Act and
held that the land sold by respondent Nos. 5 and 6 to respondent No. 4
has been excluded and direct the Tehsildar, Mohanlalganj to declare the
area of equivalent land from the ceiling area of the respondent Nos.5 and
6 as surplus land.
29. The present bunch of writ petitions have been filed with the
following prayers :-
WRIT : C - 2780 of 2019 is preferred with the following prayer :
•
a) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of Certiorari to quash
the impugned order dated 28.11.2018/13.12.2018 passed by
Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) as contained in Annexure no. 23 in

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
case no. 7701/2016 titled as Sarkar Versus Raja Sayed
Mohammad Sajjad and others.
b) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of Certiorari to quash
the impugned order dated 19.09.2016 passed by Tehsildar
Mohanlalganj as contained in Annexure No. 16 in case no.
7701/2016 titled as Sarkar Versus Raja Sayed Mohammad Sajjad
and others.
c) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus
commanding opposite parties to not interfere in the peaceful
possession of petitioners over the land recorded in Annexure No. 6
during pendency of the writ petition.
d) Issue any writ, order or direction which the Hon'ble Court may
deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case as also in the
interest of justice.
e) Allow the writ petition with costs.
• WRIT PETITION NO. 20 of 2010, 16 of 2010 and 61 of 2010 is
preferred with the following prayer :
a) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing
the order dated 02.3.2010 as modified on 06.3.2010 passed by the
opposite party No. 1, contained in Annexure No. 4 to the writ
petition to the extent it relates to the land of petitioner as
mentioned in Annexure No. 3 to the writ petition;
b) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus
directing the opposite party No. 1 not to give effect and implement
the order dated 02.3.2010 contained in Annexure No. 4 to the writ
petition;
c) issue any other suitable writ, order or direction which the Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case as
also in the interest of justice;
d) allow this writ petition with costs.

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30. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are
in possession over the land since 1997 and interim order of the Court
dated 12.03.2010 is in their favour and still operative then any
interference on the strength of impugned order by the ceiling authorities
may cause substantial injury to the petitioners, specially when the State
of U.P. is also challenging the impugned order of mutation.
31. It is further submitted that the proceedings for demarcation are
also premature and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law as the
impugned sale deed has been recognised by the ceiling authority
subsequently by the impugned order. It is relevant to point out at this
stage that petitioners’ land purchased in the year 1997 is surrounded by a
pakka brick wall and barbed wire and the respondent No.4 wants to
encroach in petitioners’ land, thus, he has initiated the proceedings for
demarcation, in the revenue map no demarcation is indicated on khasra
plot no. 1464 Ka area 1.332 hectare, 1464 Kha area 1.549 hectare and
1464 Ga area 1.955 hectare. The revenue map of 1464 has an area of
4.428 hectare and recorded area is 4.836 hectare. Therefore area shown
in the revenue map is lesser 0.588 hectare than the recorded area, unless
the revenue map is not corrected according to recorded area
measurement is not possible.
32. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned
order of mutation is based on fraud. The mutation case of respondent
No.4 under Section 34 of the L.R. Act was considered vide judgment
dated 15.12.2007, 21.01.2008, 14.03.2008, 27.08.2008 but the
respondent No.4 played fraud upon the Court and moved an application
for restoration dated 01.08.2016 without disclosing the particulars of
these cases, hence, get the application fraudulently decided in his favour.
33. It is further argued that the Appellate Authority (Ceiling) has
granted recognition to the sale deed dated 29.04.1997, 30.04.2003 and
19.05.2003 which were executed by original tenure holder Smt.
Noorjahan and no concession has been granted by him to the sale deed
executed on 23.05.2007 in favour of opposite party No.4 by the opposite
parties no. 5 and 6 i.e. the heirs of original tenure holder. The interim

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order dated 12.03.2010 passed in writ petition No.16 of 2010 (Ceiling) is
still operative, therefore ceiling authorities or revenue authorities cannot
interfere with it.
34. In support of the submissions advanced, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the petitioners placed reliance upon the following
judgments :-
(i) Shantanu Kumar vs State of UP & Ors. (1979 SCC Online All
557) . Relevant paragraphs are being quoted below :-
"7. Rule 8 provides for service of notice on every
tenure-holder to show cause within fifteen days
why the aforesaid statement prepared by the
Prescribed Authority be not taken as correct.
Proviso to this rule then provides:
'Provided that where the statement in C.L.H. Form
3 also includes land ostensibly held in the name of
any other person, the prescribed authority shall
cause to be served upon such other person a notice
in C.L.H. Form 4 together with a copy of the
statement in C.L.H. Form 3 calling upon him to
show cause within a period of 15 days from the
date of service of the notice why the aforesaid
statement be not taken as correct.'
8. It is thus evident that the notice requiring the
tenure-holder to show cause why the statement
prepared by the Prescribed Authority be not taken
as correct is to be issued to the tenure-holder in
respect of whose holding the statement has been
prepared. Under the proviso, the Prescribed
Authority shall cause to be served a notice to the
person in whose name the land included in C.L.H.
Form 3 is ostensibly held. The Prescribed
Authority prepares the statement on the basis of
revenue records. If from the revenue records or
other information, the Prescribed Authority comes
to know that the land included in the statement in
C.L.H. Form 3 includes land ostensibly held in the
name of any other person, the Prescribed Authority
is bound to serve notice on such person. The
phrase used is 'shall cause to be served."
9. The petitioner claimed under a sale deed. It is
not disputed that the petitioner's I name was
recorded in the revenue papers lover the land
which was transferred to him. It is admitted that
the statement in C.L.H. Form 3 included the land
held by the petitioner. He was hence a person in
whose name some part of the land mentioned in the
statement was believed by the Prescribed Authority
to be ostensibly held. In this situation, it was

16
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
incumbent upon the Prescribed Authority to serve
upon the petitioner the requisite notice together
with a copy of the statement In this cause why that
statement be not taken as correct. copy of the
statement and call upon him to show held cause
why that statement be not taken as correct.
10. It is obvious that service of such a notice is
preliminary to the acquisition of jurisdiction to
proceed in the matter and decide whether the land
ostensibly held in the name of the petitioner could
be declared as surplus land in the hands of
Bhupendra Singh. In the premises, the proceedings
were without jurisdiction and void. Learned
Standing Counsel submitted that the petitioner had
knowledge and he should have filed an objection
under Section 11(2) of the Act as has been held by
a Division Bench of this Court in Dilbagh Singh v.
State of U.P. (1978 All LJ 717). The existence of
another remedy under the Act cannot validate the
proceedings which are void for lack of jurisdiction
and which have resulted in the declaration as
surplus land of an area which a person other than
the tenure-holder who has been heard, claims. The
fact that the petitioner could have filed an
objection under Section 11(2) will not breathe life
into or validate these dead proceedings.
11. It was urged that since the petitioner knew of
these proceedings he kept silent all this while, this
Court need not interfere in exercise of its
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. It is well settled that an objection to
lack of jurisdiction can be taken at any stage of the
proceedings and even in collateral proceedings
(See Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (AIR 1954 SC
340)). Consent or waiver cannot be be a ground for
refusing to entertain such an objection. We hence
cannot deny relief to the petitioner on the ground of
alternative remedy. It is equally settled that
existence of jurisdiction cannot be conferred by
consent or waiver. This plea is only relevant to the
exercise of jurisdiction. Here there was lack of
jurisdiction by reason of non-compliance of the
first proviso to Rule 8.
12. It was also urged that the petitioner's father
took all possible pleas and the petitioner has no
bona fide case. The petitioner has alleged that the
sale deed in his favour was bona fide and for
adequate consideration. It was not a Benami
transaction and was not for the immediate or
deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other
members of his family. No such plea was taken by
the petitioner's father. If the petitioner is successful
in establishing this plea his land may be liable to
be exempted. The proviso to sub-section (6) of
Section 5 exempts land covered by-

17
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
'a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the
prescribed authority to be in good faith and for
adequate consideration and under an irrevocable
instrument not being a benami transaction or for
the immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-
holders or other members of his family.' "
(ii) Kamlesh Kumari v. State of U.P., (1982) 3 SCC 315 . Relevant
paragraphs are being quoted as under :-
“The short point taken by Mr Ashoke Sen in support
of the petition is that even assuming that the finding
of the prescribed authority that the transfer was not
bona fide is correct, the prescribed authority was in
error in not excluding the land said to have been
transferred from the surplus area. The land which
was the subject-matter of transfer was covered by
Plot 460. The contention is well-founded and must
prevail. In these circumstances, we set aside the
judgment of the High Court and that of the
prescribed authority and remit the case to the
prescribed authority to decide the surplus land in
accordance with Section 12-A(d) of the Act by
excluding the area which was the subject of transfer
as far as possible.”
(iii) Kuntesh Gupta v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, (1987) 4 SCC
525 . Relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under :-
"12.  The next question that falls for our
consideration is whether the High Court was
justified in dismissing the writ petition of the
appellant on the ground of availability of an
alternative remedy. It is true that there was an
alternative remedy for challenging the impugned
order by referring the question to the Chancellor
under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act.
It is well established that an alternative remedy is
not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ
petition. When an authority has acted wholly
without jurisdiction, the High Court should not
refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution on the ground of existence of an
alternative remedy. In the instant case, the Vice-
Chancellor had no power of review and the exercise
of such a power by her was absolutely without
jurisdiction. Indeed, the order passed by the Vice-
Chancellor on review was a nullity; such an order
could surely be challenged before the High Court by
a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and,
in our opinion, the High Court was not justified in
dismissing the writ petition on the ground that an
alternative remedy was available to the appellant
under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act"

18
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(iv) Ravindra Singh v. Phool Singh, (1995) 1 SCC 251 . Relevant
paragraphs are being quoted as under :-
5. In this appeal the learned counsel for the
appellant relies upon the provisions contained in
clause (d) of the proviso to Section 12-A of the Act.
Section 12-A reads as follows:
“12-A. In determining the surplus land under
Section 11 or Section 12, the Prescribed Authority
shall, as far as possible, accept the choice indicated
by the tenure-holder to the plot or plots which he
and other members of his family, if any, would like
to retain as part of the ceiling area applicable to
him or them under the provisions of this Act,
whether indicated by him in his statement under
Section 9 or in any subsequent proceedings:
Provided that—
(a) the Prescribed Authority shall have regard to the
compactness of the land to be included in the ceiling
area applicable to the tenure-holder;
(b) where the tenure-holder's wife holds any land
which is aggregated with the land held by the
tenure-holder for purposes of determination of the
ceiling area, and his wife has not consented to the
choice indicated by the tenure-holder as to the plot
or plots to be retained as part of the ceiling area
applicable to them, then the Prescribed Authority
shall, as far as possible, declare the surplus land in
such manner that the area taken out of the land held
by the tenure-holder's wife bears to the total surplus
area the same proportion as the area originally held
by her bore to the total land held by the family;
(c) where any person holds land in excess of the
ceiling area including any land mortgaged to the
State Government or to a bank as defined in clause
(c) of Section 2 of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural
Credit Act, 1973 or to a cooperative land
development bank or other cooperative society or to
the Corporation or to a Government Company, the
surplus land to be determined shall, as far as
possible, be land other than that so mortgaged;
(d) where any person holds land in excess of the
ceiling area including land which is the subject of
any transfer or partition referred to in sub-section
(6) or sub-section (7) of Section 5, the surplus land
determined shall, as far as possible, be land other
than land which is the subject of such transfer or
partition, and if the surplus land includes any land
which is the subject of such transfer or partition, the
transfer or partition shall, insofar as it relates to the
land included in the surplus land, be deemed to be
and always to have been void, and—
(i) it shall be open to the transferee to claim refund
of the proportionate amount of consideration, if any,

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
advanced by him to the transferor, and such amount
shall be charged on the amount payable to the
transferor under Section 17 and also on any land
retained by the transferor within the ceiling area,
which shall be liable to be sold in satisfaction of the
charge, notwithstanding anything contained in
Section 153 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950;
(ii) any party to the partition (other than the tenure-
holder in respect of whom the surplus land has been
determined) whose land is included in surplus land
of the said tenure-holder, shall be entitled to have
the partition reopened.”
6. A combined reading of sub-section (6) of Section
5 and clause (d) of the proviso to Section 12-A
yields the following position (insofar as it is relevant
for the purpose of this appeal):
(a) In determining the ceiling area applicable to a
tenure-holder, any transfer of land made after 24-1-
1971 shall be ignored and such transferred land
shall be included in the holding of the transferor
except where such transfer is saved by the proviso to
sub-section (6) of Section 5;
(b) In the matter of surrender, however, the
Prescribed Authority is entitled to insist that the
tenure-holder surrender land which is not the
subject-matter of transfer referred to in Section
5(6);
(c) If, however, surrender of surplus land by the
tenure-holder is not possible or feasible without
including the transferred land, then the Prescribed
Authority will accept such surrender, in which event
transfer of such land shall be deemed to be null and
void;
(d) Where the Prescribed Authority accepts the
surrender of transferred land, the transferee is
entitled to compensation and other rights as are
provided in sub-clause (1) of clause (d) of the
proviso to Section 12-A.
The object of the above provisions is quite clear and
consistent. Any transfer effected after 24-1-1971
shall be ignored for the purpose of determining the
ceiling area of the tenure-holder, but in the matter of
surrender, the Government does not want, as far as
possible, to accept surrender of transferred land.
This may be for the reason that acceptance of
surrender of transferred land is likely to lead to
complications and disputes; the Government wants
to accept the surrender of lands which are free of
any such controversy. But if that does not prove
possible, the Government will accept the surrender
of transferred land even, in which event the transfer
of such land shall be treated as null and void so as
to vest clear title in the Government. The transferee
of a land so surrendered is entitled to claim the

20
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
compensation money and other rights mentioned in
sub-clause (i) of clause (d).
7. In the light of the above provisions, the
Authorities ought to have examined the offer of
surrender made by the respondent, Phool Singh in
accordance therewith. He must be asked to
surrender lands which are not the subject-matter of
transfer. Only where the Prescribed Authority is
satisfied that surrender of surplus land is not
possible without including the transferred land, will
he accept the surrender of transferred land, to the
extent necessary—with the necessary consequences
flowing therefrom. The High Court and Authorities
under the Act, however, have not followed this
course because they felt that the order of this Court
dated 7-5-1981 entitles the respondent Phool Singh
to surrender such land as he chooses. We are of the
opinion that they were not right in construing this
Court's order in the above manner. Firstly, the
appellant herein was not heard (he says that he was
not even a party to the said SLP) before passing
such order. Secondly, the said order cannot be
understood as laying down a proposition contrary
to law. All that it says is that the petitioner therein,
i.e., respondent Phool Singh “will be entitled to
choice in respect of plots forming the subject-matter
of the sale deed”. The said words are not capable of
being construed as authorising Phool Singh to
surrender the transferred land even if he is in a
position to comply with the requirement of
surrender of surplus land without touching the
transferred land. To repeat, the order of this Court
cannot and should not be construed in a manner
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. This
Court could not have contemplated passing an
order contrary to the provisions of the Act or to
authorise the respondent Phool Singh to surrender
surplus land contrary to the provisions of the Act.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the said order
of this Court is not capable of nor can it be
construed as overriding or superseding the
provisions of the Act. The choice referred to in the
order of this Court is the choice referred to in
Section 12-A(d) and not independent of it.
8. The view taken by us is supported by an order of
this Court in Kamlesh Kumari v. State of U.P.
[(1982) 3 SCC 315 : 1981 All LJ 1139] It is a short
order and it reads thus:
“The short point taken by Mr Ashok Sen in support
of the petition is that even assuming that the finding
of the Prescribed Authority that the transfer was not
bona fide is correct, the Prescribed Authority was in
error in not excluding the land said to have been
transferred from the surplus area. The land which
was the subject-matter of transfer was covered by
Plot No. 460. The contention is well founded and
must prevail. In these circumstances, we set aside

21
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
the judgment of the High Court and that of the
Prescribed Authority and remit the case to the
Prescribed Authority to decide the surplus land in
accordance with Section 12-A(d) of the Act by
excluding the area which was the subject of transfer
as far as possible.
2. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Order accordingly.”
(v) Rajendra Singh v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 654 . Relevant
paragraphs are being quoted as under :-
9. This provision has to be read in the light of the
provisions contained in sub-sections (6), (7) and (8)
of Section 5 which provide as under:
“5. (6) In determining the ceiling area applicable to
a tenure-holder, any transfer of land made after the
twenty-fourth day of January, 1971, which but for
the transfer would have been declared surplus land
under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into
account:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply
to—
(a) a transfer in favour of any person (including
Government) referred to in sub-section (2);
(b) a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the
prescribed authority to be in good faith and for
adequate consideration and under an irrevocable
instrument not being a ‘benami’ transaction or for
immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder
or other members of his family.
Explanation I.—For the purposes of this sub-
section, the expression transfer of land made after
the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971, includes—
(a) a declaration of a person as a co-tenure-holder
made after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971
in a suit or proceeding irrespective of whether such
suit or proceeding was pending on or was instituted
after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971;
(b) any admission, acknowledgement,
relinquishment or declaration in favour of a person
to the like effect, made in any other deed or
instrument or in any other manner.
Explanation II.—The burden of proving that a case
falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with
the party claiming its benefit.
(7) In determining the ceiling area applicable to a
tenure-holder, any partition of land made after the
twenty-fourth day of January, 1971, which but for
the partition would have been declared surplus land
under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into
account:

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Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply
to—
*(a) 
(b) a partition of a holding made in a suit or a
proceeding pending on the said date:
Provided further that notwithstanding anything
contained in the preceding proviso the prescribed
authority, if it is of opinion that by collusion
between the tenure-holder and any other party to
the partition, such other party has been given a
share which he was not entitled to, or a large share
than he was entitled to, may ignore such partition.
Explanation I.—If a suit is instituted after the said
date for declaration that a partition of land has
taken place on or before the said date, then such
declaration shall be ignored and not be taken into
account, and it shall be deemed that no partition
has taken place on or before the said date.
Explanation II.—The burden of proving that a case
falls within the first proviso shall rest with the party
claiming its benefit.
(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
sections (6) and (7), no tenure-holder shall transfer
any land held by him during the continuance of
proceedings for determination of surplus land in
relation to such tenure-holder and every transfer
made in contravention of this sub-section shall be
void.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section,
proceedings for determination of surplus land shall
be deemed to have commenced on the date of
publication of notice under sub-section (2) of
Section 9 and shall be deemed to have concluded on
the date when an order in relation to such tenure-
holder is passed under sub-section (1) of Section 11
or under sub-section (1) of Section 12, or as the
case may be, under Section 13.”
10. The relevant date under the Act which constitutes
the basis for determining the ceiling or surplus area
of a tenure-holder is 24-1-1971. Whatever land was
held by a tenure-holder on that date will have to be
indicated by him in the statement required to be
submitted under Section 9 of the Act.
13. Thus, the sale deeds executed by the tenure-
holder after 24-1-1971 have been classified into two
distinct categories:
(i) sale deeds executed by the tenure-holder after
24-1-1971, without the proceedings under the Act
for determination of the ceiling and surplus area
having been commenced or being pending. Proviso
(b) to sub-section (6) of Section 5 would be
applicable to such a sale deed and it would be open
to the prescribed authority to look into the

23
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
genuineness of such a sale deed in the light of the
factors indicated therein; and
(ii) sale deeds executed by the tenure-holder after
24-1-1971, but during the pendency of the
proceedings for determination of the ceiling and
surplus area. Such a sale deed would be void in
view of sub-section (8) of Section 5. It will not be
open to the prescribed authority to hold any enquiry
in respect of such a sale deed which has to be
treated as void from its inception.
14. The prohibition on transfer of land during the
pendency of the proceedings was introduced in the
principal Act by U.P. Act 20 of 1976 with
retrospective effect from 10-10-1975, that is, with
effect from the date on which U.P. Ordinance 31 of
1975 was issued. This prohibition was introduced
with the object of facilitating an early disposal of
the proceedings for determination of surplus land as
also for preventing the tenure-holder from
disturbing the status quo of his holding as existing
on the date of the notification under Section 9 of the
Act by making transfers of land in favour of other
persons which obviously would have the effect of
complicating the process of determination of surplus
land.”
(vi) Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 .
Relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under :-
“ 14. The power to issue prerogative writs under
Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature
and is not limited by any other provision of the
Constitution. This power can be exercised by the
High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature
of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any
of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of
the Constitution but also for “any other purpose” .
15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High
Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a
discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ
petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself
certain restrictions one of which is that if an
effective and efficacious remedy is available, the
High Court would not normally exercise its
jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been
consistently held by this Court not to operate as a
bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where
the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement
of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has
been a violation of the principle of natural justice or
where the order or proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.
There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to
cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would

24
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of
the constitutional law as they still hold the field.”
35. Submission of learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent
No.4 is that the land purchased by the petitioners and the land purchased
by the answering respondent No. 4 are distinct and comprise different
Gata numbers. The petitioners neither claim any title over the land
purchased by the answering respondent No. 4 nor do the impugned
orders affect their ownership or possession over their own land.
Consequently, the petitioners suffer no civil consequences or prejudice
on account of the impugned orders. In the absence of any direct legal
prejudice, the present writ petition is devoid of any cause of action
against respondent No. 4 and deserve to be rejected.
36. It is submitted by counsel for respondent No.4 that the impugned
orders have been passed on the application filed by opposite party Nos.5
and 6 in the proceedings under Section 10(2) of the U.P. Imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, in exercise of their statutory right of
choice in respect of the land validly transferred by them in favour of the
opposite party No. 4 by means of a registered sale deed. Opposite party
Nos.5 and 6, being the recorded tenure-holders and vendors of the
opposite party No. 4, duly pursued the proceedings before the prescribed
authority for giving effect to their statutory right of choice and for
excluding the land sold to the opposite party No.4 from the surplus land.
The said application/objections were duly considered and accepted by
the prescribed authority while passing the impugned orders dated
28.11.2018 and 13.12.2018. The opposite party No.4 is merely the bona
fide purchaser of the land whose rights stood protected as a consequence
of the lawful exercise of the statutory right of choice by Opposite Party
Nos. 5 and 6.
37. It is further submitted that the petitioners had already filed Ceiling
Writ Petition No. 16 of 2010 (Kamlesh Prasad and Others vs. Prescribed
Authority (Ceiling)/Additional Collector and Others), wherein they
challenged the ceiling proceedings, including the orders dated

25
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
02.03.2010 and 06.03.2010. The said writ is pending before this Hon'ble
High Court and is continuing under the protection of an interim order.
38. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that the orders
dated 28.11.2018 and 13.12.2018, impugned in the present writ petition,
have been passed in continuation of the very same ceiling proceedings
which are already the subject matter of Ceiling Writ Petition No. 16 of
2010, pending before this Court. Instead of seeking amendment of the
pleadings in the said writ petition or bringing the subsequent
developments on record by filing a supplementary affidavit, the
petitioners have deliberately filed the present independent writ petition
arising out of the very same proceedings. The petitioners have adopted
this course only with a view to split a single cause of action into multiple
proceedings, create unnecessary complications in the adjudication of the
dispute and mislead this Court by presenting an incomplete and selective
factual record.
39. It is further submitted by respondents’ counsel that the petitioners
have deliberately withheld their own title deeds and the relevant revenue
records from the present writ petition, despite placing reliance upon the
same, on the pretext that such documents had been filed in the earlier
writ petition of the year 2010. Had the petitioners been bona fide, they
would have either amended the pending writ petition by incorporating
the subsequent developments or filed the present documents along with
this writ petition. Their conscious omission to do so clearly demonstrates
an attempt to mislead this Court regarding the identity of the disputed
land, the respective rights of the parties and the true factual matrix, so as
to create an impression that the land of the opposite party No.4 forms
part of the petitioners' holding, whereas the revenue records
unequivocally establish otherwise. The petitioners cannot be permitted to
circumvent the settled principles of law by challenging different stages
of the same ceiling proceedings through successive writ petitions with a
view to achieving indirectly what they could not have achieved directly.
On this ground alone, the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed
with exemplary costs.

26
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
40. Learned counsel for the respondents further submit that a bare
perusal of the order dated 02.03.2010 and 06.03.2010, passed by the
prescribed authority in the ceiling proceedings, clearly demonstrates
that, after considering the entire material on record and affording due
opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties, the prescribed authority
determined the surplus land and issued directions for taking
consequential action in accordance with law.
41. It is submitted that aggrieved by the said mutation order, the
petitioners preferred a statutory revision under the provisions of the U.P.
Revenue laws, which is admittedly still pending before the competent
revisional authority. Despite having already invoked the statutory
revisional jurisdiction against the mutation order dated 19.09.2016, the
petitioners have once again sought quashing of the very same order in
the present writ petition (as is evident from the prayer clause). Such
simultaneous pursuit of a statutory revision and a writ petition against
the very same order is wholly impermissible in law. The petitioners
cannot be permitted to pursue dual remedies in respect of the same cause
of action or indulge in forum shopping by simultaneously prosecuting
parallel proceedings before different forums with the object of securing
the same relief. Accordingly, on this ground alone, the relief sought by
the petitioners in respect of the mutation order dated 19.09.2016
deserves to be rejected.
42. Counsel for the Respondents placed reliance upon the following
judgments :
(i) Jagdish Prasad Patel v. Shivnath, (2019) 6 SCC 82
“22. The revenue records produced by the
appellants for several years amply strengthen the
case of the appellants that patta (Ext. D-20) was
granted to them and that they are in possession of
the suit properties for several years. The oral and
documentary evidence clearly establish that the
father of the respondent-plaintiffs had abandoned
the suit properties, pursuant to which, auction was
held by the Pawaidar and lease was issued by
Ilaqedar in favour of Gaya Din and that he was in
continuous possession of the suit properties.

27
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
44.  In the suit for declaration of title and
possession, the respondent-plaintiffs could succeed
only on the strength of their own title and not on the
weakness of the case of the appellant-defendants.
The burden is on the respondent-plaintiffs to
establish their title to the suit properties to show
that they are entitled for a decree for declaration.
The respondent-plaintiffs have neither produced the
title document i.e. patta-lease which the respondent-
plaintiffs are relying upon nor proved their right by
adducing any other evidence. As noted above, the
revenue entries relied on by them are also held to be
not genuine. In any event, revenue entries for few
khataunis are not proof of title; but are mere
statements for revenue purpose. They cannot confer
any right or title on the party relying on them for
proving their title.
45.  Observing that in a suit for declaration of title,
the respondent-plaintiffs are to succeed only on the
strength of their own title irrespective of whether the
appellant-defendants have proved their case or not,
in Union of India v. Vasavi Coop. Housing Society
Ltd. [Union of India v. Vasavi Coop. Housing
Society Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269 : (2014) 2 SCC
(Civ) 66] , it was held as under: (SCC p. 275, para
15)
“15. It is trite law that, in a suit for declaration of
title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to make
out and establish a clear case for granting such a
declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set
up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant
relief to the plaintiff.”
(ii) Rikhab Chand Jain vs Union of India & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. :
6719 of 2012)
9. While deciding whether to entertain a petition
under Article 226 bearing in mind the precedents in
the field, a writ court ought to additionally notice
the forum designated by the statute for the litigant
to approach. This is necessary because the
alternative forum that is provided by the statute has
to be one which can dispense speedy and efficacious
relief. However, as in the present case, if the
statutorily designated alternative forum happens to
be the high court itself whose jurisdiction under
Article 226 is invoked and not any ordinary
statutory functionary/tribunal, refusal to entertain
the petition should be the rule and entertaining it an
exception.
10. We may profitably refer, in this context, to the
Constitution Bench decision in Thansingh Nathmal
v. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes, In Thansingh
Nathmal (supra), this Court had the occasion to lay
down a principle of law which is salutary and not to
be found in any other previous decision rendered by

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
it. The principle, plainly, is that, if a remedy is
available to a party before the high court in another
jurisdiction, the writ jurisdiction should not
normally be exercised on a petition under Article
226, for, that would allow the machinery set up by
the concerned statute to be bye-passed. The relevant
passage from the decision reads as follows:
"The jurisdiction of the High Court under article
226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms
and the exercise thereof is not subject to any
restrictions except the territorial restrictions which
are expressly provided in the article. But the
exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not
exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The
very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it
will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-
imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is
not intended as an alternative remedy for relief
which may be obtained in a suit or other mode
prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the court will not
entertain a petition for a writ under article 226,
where the petitioner has an alternative remedy,
which, without being unduly onerous, provides an
equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court
does not generally enter upon a determination of
questions which demand an elaborate examination
of evidence to establish the right to enforce which
the writ is claimed. The High Court does not
therefore act as a court of appeal against the
decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of
fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under
article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy
provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is
open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another
tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for
obtaining redress in the manner provided by a
statute, the High Court normally will not permit, by
entertaining a petition under article 226 of the
Constitution, the machinery created under the
statute to be by-passed, and will leave the party
applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set
up."
12. That apart, the majority view in a previous
Constitution Bench in A. V Venkateswaran,
Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand
Sobhraj Wadhwani¹ reads thus:
"14...., we must express our dissent from the
reasoning by which the learned Judges of the High
Court held that the writ petitioner was absolved
from the normal obligation to exhaust his statutory
remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of the
High Court C under Article 226 of the Constitution.
If a petitioner has disabled himself from availing
himself of the statutory remedy by his own fault in
not doing so within the prescribed time, he cannot
certainly be permitted to urge that as a ground for
the Court dealing with his petition under Article 226

29
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
to exercise its discretion in his favour, Indeed, the
second passage extracted from the Judgment of the
learned C.J. in Mohammed Nooh case with its
reference to the right to appeal being lost 'through
no fault of his own' emphasizes this aspect of the
Rule."
In essence, this Court was of the opinion that once a
petitioner has due to his own fault disabled himself
from availing a statutory remedy, the discretionary
remedy under Article 226 may not be available.
15. In our considered opinion, the appellant having
had a remedy before the High Court in a separate
jurisdiction which was equally efficacious, he
indulged in the (mis)adventure of invoking its writ
jurisdiction which was rightly not entertained.
(iii) Leelawati (Dead) thr, LRS. vs State of UP & Ors.
“ 9. It is necessary to observe that the proceedings in
the Court of law are initiated for adjudication of
disputes and to provide justice to the parties, by
which trust and confidence of the litigants reposed
on this great institution can be maintained. In case
one of the parties misuse the said process or attempt
to obtain an order by trick and strategem, the
Courts would be justified in imposing the costs for
igniting such vexatious litigation. In our view, the
cost imposed by the High Court in a sum of
Rs.20,000/- is meagre, which be increased to
Rs.50,000/-, as the petitioner has proceeded to
pursue his vexatious claim even before this Court.
Said costs shall be deposited before the Uttar
Pradesh State Legal Services Authority,
Allahabad.”
(iv) Dharam Raj vs State of UP & Ors. [2009 (27) LCD 1373]
12. According to our opinion a "person aggrieved",
means a person who is wrongly deprived of his
entitlement which he is legally entitled to receive
and it does not include any kind of disappointment
or personal in-convenience. "Person aggrieved"
means a person who is injured or he is adversely
affected in a legal sense.

30
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
(v) State of UP & Anr. vs Zila Parishad Ghaziabad & Anr. [Civil
Appeal No. 8137 of 2003]
3. Before taking up the appeal on merit, it may be
necessary for this Court to deal with the procedural
requirement in filing the writ petition and appeal. In
fact, in view of the instrumental delegation by the
Central Government, the State Government had
conferred the power to grant and cancel the licence
of fair price shops to the Gaon Sabha, and it had
never been conferred upon the Kshetriya Panchayat
or Zila Panchayat. Power to deal with PDS by
Gram Panchayat was withdrawn by the State of
U.P. yide order dated 13.1.2000. Respondent, Zila
Parishad filed writ petition for quashing of the
order dated 13.1.2000, though by no stretch of the
imagination the said respondent No.1 could claim
itself to be an aggrieved party. In fact, it had no
locus to challenge the said order of withdrawal
dated 13.1.2000. The State of U.P and a few District
Officials were impleaded as respondent No.1 before
the High Court. None of the Gram Panchayats was
party to the said petition. The High Court reached
its decision on the legal issues, with-out considering
the locus standi of Zila Parishad, respondent No.1.
The High Court came to the conclusion that the
power of dealing with PDS could be conferred only
on Kshetriya Panchayat. Neither Zila Panchayat
nor the Gaon Sabha nor the District Collector could
be assigned the said job. However, Respondent
No.1, Zila e Panchayat has not preferred any appeal
against the impugned judgment and order. None of
the Gram Panchayats which were aggrieved by the
order of withdrawal dated 13.1.2000 had ever
approached any court for any relief whatsoever.
18. As explained hereinabove, the writ petition had
been filed by the respondent no. 1 without having
any locus standi nor it could claim to be a person
aggrieved of the order of the Government dated

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WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
13.1.2000, withdrawing the order dated 10.8.1999
conferring the power to allot and cancel the fair
price shops in rural areas on the Gram Panchayats.
The writ petition was filed in 2003 after a delay of 3
years. The writ petition was liable to be dismissed
on the ground of delay and laches.
(v) Smt. Chanda Devi and others Vs. State of U.P. and others [2019
(10) ADJ 199]
“3. We find that while the writ petition was
Entertained by this Court under the order dated
10.4.2009 this Court had questioned the main
tainability of the present writ petition and issued
notices to the respondent No. 6, but declined to
grant any interim stay order. The situation has not
changed today either. The petitioner is at the most
enjoys status a complainant who had a grievance
regarding running of the fair price shop licence. The
privity of the contract be tween licencing authority
and the respondent No. 6 shall govern the field if the
licence has come to be restored by the State-
respondent in favour of respondent No. 6, the
complain-ant, in our considered opinion does not
enjoy the right to litigate the matter further invoking
our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution. The Apex Court in case of
Laxminarayan R. Bhattad and others v. State of
Maharashtra and another, (2003) 5 SCC 413, has
held that in order to maintain writ petition one can
have locus if he has legally enforceable right and
that we do not find in the present case. Further
invoking the prin-ciple laid down in the case of
Utkal Univer-sity v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi,
AIR 1999 SC 943, petitioner herein since would not
be ben-efited by cancellation of fair price shop
licence, he cannot be aggrieved person to maintain
the writ petition.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the another judgment of the Apex Court in

32
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govern-ment of Andhra
Pradesh, AIR (SC)-1966-0-828. In support of his
argument that he being a com-plainant has a right
to file a writ petition chal-lenging the order.
4. We have carefully studied the judgment and find
that in that case the appellant's right to file petition
was upheld on the ground that he was President of
the Panchayat Samiti that formed a Committee
headed by the same president to collect money/fund
to establish a primary health centre and so the
committee were trust-ees of the amount collected
and further appellant in that capacity was dealing
with officials re-garding location of health centre. It
is in the backdrop of the above facts peculiar to the
said case that applying the principle laid down by
the Apex Court in an earlier judgment [The
Calcutta Gas Company v. The State of West Bengal
and others, (1962) Suppl. 3 SCR 1] the Court held
that a personal right need not be in respect of a
proprietary interest, it can also relate to an interest
of trustee and even in exceptional case as the
expression 'ordinarily' indicates, a person who has
been prejudicially affected by an act or opinion of
the authority can file a writ even though he has no
proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject
matter thereof.
5. In the said above case the site of primary health
centre was sought to be changed inspite of deposit
of money by Committee that collected the fund and
the land was also donated. The Court then applying
the above principle held that appel-lant has
certainly been prejudiced by the said order and
petition, therefore, under Article 226 was
maintainable. Thus, on facts of the above case cited
by the petitioner is distinguishable and the
judgment, in our considered opinion, is of no help to
the petitioner.

33
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
6. We further notice that in the present case there
were a general complaint, including com-plaint of
the petitioner and the authorities have duly applied
their mind and in their well considered opinion they
have found that there was no seriousillegality in
discharge of onerous duty of the distribution of
essential commodities by the petitioner. We,
therefore, do not find it to be an appropriate case
where findings of fact so recorded by the authority
should be judicially reviewed.
Writ petition accordingly fails and is dis-missed.”
(vi) The National Textile Corporation Ltd. Vs. Naresh Kumar Badri
Kumar Jagad and others [2011 (29) LCD 1793]
“7. Pleadings and particulars are necessary to
enable the court to decide the rights of the parties
in the trial. Therefore, the pleadings are more of
help to the court in narrowing the controversy
involved and to inform the parties concerned to the
question in issue, so that the parties may adduce
appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is a
settled legal proposition that "as a rule relief not
founded on the pleadings should not be granted". A
decision of a case cannot be based on grounds
outside the olesdings of the parties. The pleadings
and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between
the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see
just where the two sides differ. (Vide: M/s. Trojan &
Co. v. RM N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC
235; State of Maharashtra v. M/s. Hindustan
Construction Company Ltd., AIR 2010 SC 1299;
and Kalyan Singh Chouhan VCP Joshi, AIR 2011
SC 1127).
8. In Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by L. Rs. v. Bishun
Narain Inter College & Ors.. AIR 1987 SC 1242,
this Court held as under:
"...... in the absence of pleadings, evidence if any,
produced by the parties cannot be considered......

34
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
no party should be permitted to travel beyond its
pleading and that all necessary and material facts
should be pleaded by the party in support of the
case set up by it."
Similar view has been reiterated in Bachhaj Nahar
v. Nilima Mandal & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1103.
9. In Kashi Nath (Dead) through L.Rs. v. Jaganath,
(2003) 8 SCC 740, this Court held that "where the
evidence is not in line of the pleadings and is at
variance with it, the said evidence cannot be
looked into or relied upon." Same remain the
object for framing the issues under Order XIV CPC
and the court should not decide a suit on a
matter/point on which no issue has been framed.
(Vide: Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera & Ors..
(2009) 15 SCC 693; and Kalyan Singh Chouhan
(supra).
10. In Syed and Company & Ors. v. State of Jammu
& Kashmir & Ors. 1995 Supp (4) SCC 422, this
Court held as under:
"Without specific pleadings in that regard,
evidence could not be led in since it is settled
principle of law that no amount of evidence can be
looked unless there is a pleading. Therefore,
without amendment of the pleadings merely trying
to lead evidence is not permissible."
11. In Chinta Lingam & Ors. v. The Govt. of India
& Ors., AIR 1971 SC 474, this Court held that
unless factual foundation has been laid in the
pleadings no argument is permissible to be raised
on that particular point.
12. In J. Jermons v. Aliammal & Ors., (1999) 7
SCC 382, while dealing with a similar issue, this
Court held as under:
there is a fundamental difference between a case of
raising additional grounds based on the pleadings
and the material available on record and a case of

35
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
taking a new plea not borne out of the pleadings. In
the former case no amendment of pleading is
required, whereas in the latter it is necessary to
amend the pleadings... The respondents cannot be
permitted to make out a new case by seeking
permission to raise additional grounds in revision."
13. In view of the above, the law on the issue
stands crystallised to the effect that a party has to
take proper pleadings and prove the same by
adducing sufficient evidence. No evidence can be
permitted to be adduced on a issue unless factual
foundation has been laid down in respect of the
same.”
43. Having heard the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties, I perused the material on record as well as the law report
cited by counsel for both the parties.
44. The principal controversy in the present writ petition centers
around the legality of the registered sale deed dated 23.05.2007 executed
by respondent nos.5 and 6 in favour of respondent no.4 during the
pendency of the ceiling proceedings.
45. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that once proceedings
for determination of surplus land had commenced, every transfer made
thereafter became void by virtue of Section 5(8) of the Act. According to
the petitioners, the prescribed authority could not subsequently validate
such transfer by accepting the choice exercised by the tenure-holders
under Section 12-A. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the
prescribed authority merely gave effect to the statutory right of choice
available to the tenure-holders and excluded the transferred land while
directing equivalent land to be declared surplus.
46. Section 5(6) provides that transfers effected after 24 January 1971
are ordinarily to be ignored while determining the ceiling area unless
they satisfy the conditions contained in clause (b) of the proviso, namely
that the transfer was bona fide, for adequate consideration, under an

36
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
irrevocable instrument and not intended for the benefit of the transferor
or members of his family.
47. Section 12-A(d) , in turn, provides that while determining the
surplus land, the Prescribed Authority shall, as far as possible, avoid
taking land which is the subject matter of such transfer. However, if such
land is necessarily included in the surplus area, the transfer shall stand
void to that extent and the transferee shall be entitled to the statutory
consequences.
48. Section 5(8) , however, provides that notwithstanding anything
contained in sub-sections (6) and (7), no tenure-holder shall transfer any
land during the continuance of proceedings for determination of surplus
land and every transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be
void. The Explanation appended thereto further clarifies that such
proceedings commence with the publication of notice under Section 9(2)
and conclude only upon the passing of the final order under Sections 11,
12 or 13 of the Act.
49. The Supreme Court in Rajendra Singh v. State of U.P. (supra)
has authoritatively interpreted this provision. The Court categorically
held that transfers made after 24.01.1971 but before commencement of
ceiling proceedings fall within Section 5(6), whereas transfers effected
during the pendency of ceiling proceedings are governed exclusively by
Section 5(8). In the latter category, no enquiry regarding bona fides or
adequacy of consideration is permissible because the statute itself
declares such transfers void from their inception.
50. The distinction drawn by the Supreme Court is significant.
Whereas Section 5(6) leaves room for judicial scrutiny regarding the
genuineness of the transfer, Section 5(8) leaves no such discretion. The
legislative command is absolute.
51. Equally instructive is the decision in Ravindra Singh v. Phool
Singh (supra) , wherein the Supreme Court explained the scope of
Section 12-A(d). The Court held that the right of choice conferred upon
the tenure-holder is restricted and has to operate strictly within the

37
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
framework of the Act. The Prescribed Authority must, as far as possible,
exclude transferred land while determining the surplus area only in cases
where the transfer falls within the ambit of Section 5(6). The Court
expressly observed that no judicial order can be construed so as to
override the statutory mandate contained in the Ceiling Act.
52. Likewise, in Kamlesh Kumari v. State of U.P. (supra), the
Supreme Court remitted the matter directing exclusion of transferred
land while applying Section 12-A(d). That decision also arose in the
context of transfers governed by Section 5(6) and cannot be read as
permitting validation of transfers expressly prohibited by Section 5(8).
53. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, it is evident
from the pleadings that the sale deed in favour of respondent no.4 was
executed on 23.05.2007, after initiation of the ceiling proceedings
against the tenure-holder. The respondents themselves do not dispute that
the transfer was made during the continuance of the proceedings.
54. Therefore, once this fact stands established, the consequence
contemplated by Section 5(8) follows. The transfer becomes void by
operation of law and no adjudicatory discretion can be exercised by the
prescribed authority to validate the same on considerations of equity,
bona fides or statutory choice.
55. The impugned order dated 28.11.2018 proceeds on the ground that
because respondent nos.5 and 6 exercised their choice, the land sold to
respondent no.4 deserved to be excluded from the surplus area. Such
reasoning, in the considered opinion of this Court, combines the
operation of Sections 5(6) and 12-A with the mandatory prohibition
contained in Section 5(8). It is to be noted that the expression contained
in Section 5(8), "notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections
(6) and (7)" , has consciously excluded transfers made during pending
ceiling proceedings from the protective umbrella otherwise available
under Section 5(6).
56. Therefore, acceptance of the statutory choice by itself could not
have the effect of validating a transfer which by virtue of the statue is

38
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void. Consequently, this Court is of the opinion that the prescribed
authority committed a manifest error of law in proceeding to recognise
and protect the transfer dated 23.05.2007 notwithstanding the statutory
prohibition contained in Section 5(8). The findings recorded by the
prescribed authority on this aspect are therefore unsustainable in law and
cannot be allowed to stand.
57. The next question before this Court is that whether the impugned
proceedings are vitiated for violation of principles of natural justice. The
submission advanced by the petitioners is that no notice was ever served
upon them although they were recorded tenure-holders in respect of the
land purchased by them prior to the commencement of the ceiling
proceedings. According to them, once their names stood recorded in the
revenue records, the prescribed authority was under a statutory
obligation to issue notice before initiating proceeding to determine
surplus land.
58. It has been argued that omission to serve notice is not a mere
procedural irregularity but a jurisdictional defect which strikes at the
very root of the proceedings. The question is no longer res integra.
59. The Full Bench of this Court in Shantanu Kumar v. State of U.P.
(supra) held that where land included in C.L.H. Form-3 is ostensibly
held in the name of another person, Rule 8 of the U.P. Imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules mandates issuance of notice to such
recorded tenure-holder together with a copy of the statement. The Full
Bench further observed that such notice constitutes the very foundation
upon which jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority rests and that
proceedings undertaken in its absence are without jurisdiction.
60. The Full Bench further held that the existence of a remedy under
Section 11(2) of the Act or the fact that the affected person may have
acquired knowledge of the proceedings at a later stage cannot cure the
inherent defect arising from failure to comply with Rule 8. Jurisdiction
cannot be conferred by acquiescence, waiver or consent.

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61. The petitioners have specifically pleaded that the land transferred
in their favour in the year 1997 had already been mutated in the revenue
records and that despite such entries they were never served with notice
before the ceiling proceedings culminated in declaration of surplus land.
62. The respondents, while disputing the maintainability of the writ
petition, have not pointed out any material from the record
demonstrating service of notice upon the petitioners in terms of Rule 8.
Their principal defence is that the petitioners' land is distinct from that
purchased by respondent no.4 and, therefore, no prejudice has been
caused.
63. In the opinion of this Court, these are two distinct issues. The
question whether respondent No.4 purchased different Gata numbers has
no bearing upon the statutory obligation of the prescribed authority to
serve notice upon every recorded tenure-holder whose land forms part of
the proceedings. Therefore, failure to adhere to the said requirement
would amount to denial of reasonable opportunity and violation of
principles of natural justice.
64. The petitioners had earlier instituted Ceiling Writ Petition No.16
of 2010 challenging the original ceiling order dated 02.02.2006 and
06.03.2010 and obtained interim protection. The respondents have
specifically pointed out that the present orders dated 28.11.2018 and
13.12.2018 merely constitute subsequent stages of the very same
proceedings already pending before this Court. Ordinarily, subsequent
developments arising out of pending proceedings ought to be brought
before the Court by way of amendment or supplementary affidavit in the
pending writ petition rather than by instituting successive writ petitions.
65. However, the Court is of the opinion that this principle is more a
principle of judicial discipline and cannot operate to sustain an order
which is passed without jurisdiction or passed in contravention of
mandatory statutory provisions. Consequently, it cannot, by itself,
prevent this Court from examining the legality of the impugned orders

40
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
where allegations of jurisdictional error and violation of mandatory
statutory provisions have been raised.
66. The petitioners have also sought quashing of the mutation order
dated 19.09.2016 passed by the Tehsildar. The respondents have
specifically pleaded that against the said mutation order, the petitioners
have already availed the statutory remedy of revision, which remains
pending before the competent authority.
67. It is a settled principle that mutation proceedings are fiscal in
nature. Entries made in revenue records neither create nor extinguish
title. They are intended only for maintenance of revenue records and
collection of land revenue. The Supreme Court has consistently held that
mutation orders do not finally determine proprietary rights and that
disputes regarding title must be adjudicated before the competent civil or
statutory forum.
68. In the present case, the legality of the mutation order is itself
dependent upon the legality of the transfer dated 23.05.2007 and the
validity of the orders passed by the prescribed authority under the
Ceiling Act.
69. Since the petitioners have already invoked the revisional
jurisdiction provided under the revenue laws, and the revisional
proceedings are pending, this Court is of the view that no separate order
on the correctness of the mutation order is called for in exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. Accordingly, this Court
refrains from expressing any concluded opinion on the merits of the
mutation proceedings.
70. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present bunch of writ
petitions succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed .
71. The orders dated 02.3.2010 as modified on 06.3.2010 passed by
the Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) are hereby set aside, and the order
dated 28.11.2018 and 13.12.2018 to the extent they recognise and
exclude the land transferred vide sale deed dated 23.05.2007 executed in

41
WRIC No. - 2780 of 2019
favour of respondent no.4 by treating the same as protected under the
statutory right of choice, are hereby quashed.
72. The matter is remitted to the Prescribed Authority for a fresh
decision strictly in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Imposition
of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960.
73. Insofar as the challenge to the mutation order dated 19.09.2016 is
concerned, no interference is called for in the present writ petition in
view of the pending statutory revision.
(Irshad Ali,J.)
September 2, 2026
Gautam
Digitally signed by :-
GAUTAM TECKCHANDANI
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench