Baldev Singh vs Chand Singh

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

-1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
RSA-620-1995
Reserved on : 24.08.2026
Date of decision : 18.11.2026
BALDEV SINGH (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS
... APPELLANTS
VERSUS
CHAND SINGH (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND ANOTHER
...RESPONDENTS
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PARMOD GOYAL
Present: Mr. M.S. Khaira, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Manpreet Singh, Advocate
for the appellants (Through VC).
Mr. Vishal Gupta, Advocate
for the respondents.
PARMOD GOYAL , J.
Present regular second appeal has been preferred by unsuccessful
appellants/plaintiffs being aggrieved by judgment and decree dated
06.12.1994, passed by learned Additional District Judge, Faridkot vide which
appeal preferred by respondents/defendants was allowed and judgment and
decree dated 21.05.1990, passed by learned Sub Judge, First Class, Moga
whereby suit of possession preferred by appellants/plaintiffs was decreed, was
set aside and suit for possession was dismissed.
2. In their suit for possession, appellants/plaintiffs had asserted that
their predecessor-in-interest namely Sher Singh was owner of the suit property
and had sold suit land along with other land to the father of
respondents/defendants. The said sale was challenged vide two suits including
one of them which was preferred by one of the appellant/plaintiff namely
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Baldev Singh challenging the sale deed dated 10.11.1941. Both the suits were
decided vide judgment and decree dated 05.10.1945 by the then learned
Additional Sub Judge, Moga. Sale qua suit land was set aside on payment of
Rs.976/- which was sale consideration. The appellants/plaintiffs in said suits
were allowed to take benefit of judgment only after the death of vendor Sher
Singh. That Sher Singh had died on 26.08.1985 leaving behind
appellants/plaintiffs as his heirs and accordingly, appellants/plaintiffs had
sought possession of suit land which respondents/defendants were holding
only on the basis of sale dated 10.11.1941, which was set aside vide judgment
and decree dated 05.10.1945 passed by learned Additional Sub Judge, Moga.
3. Respondents/defendants had contested the suit by filing detailed
written statement taking preliminary objections as regards to maintainability
etc. It was asserted that suit is beyond limitation and is not maintainable in
absence of daughter of Sher Singh namely Gurdev Kaur as necessary party.
That the suit is not maintainable in the present form and is hit by the principles
of res judicata . Accordingly, dismissal of suit was prayed for.
4. Following issues were framed from the pleadings of parties :-
1. Whether the plaintiffs are the owner of the land in dispute?
OPP
2. If issue No.1 proved, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
the decree for possession? OPP
3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary
parties? OPD
4. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD
5. Whether the suit is not properly valued as alleged? OPD
6. Whether the suit is hit by principle of res judicata? OPD
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RSA-620-1995 -3-
7. Relief.
5. Learned Court of first instance had decided issues No.1 and 2 in
favour of appellants/plaintiffs and against respondents/defendants. Issues No.3
to 6 were decided against respondents/defendants and accordingly suit for
possession of 7 kanals 14 marlas and 5 kanals 15 marlas was decreed. On
appeal by respondents/defendants, learned First Appellate Court had reversed
the findings of learned Court of First Instance. Accordingly, suit for possession
preferred by appellants/plaintiffs was dismissed.
6. Learned counsel for appellants/plaintiffs has challenged judgment
passed by learned First Appellate Court whereby decree in favour of
appellants/plaintiffs was set aside and suit was dismissed. It is the case of
appellants/plaintiffs that learned First Appellate Court has erred in appreciating
evidence led by parties and has misread Paimaish Khatoni to conclude that suit
property is not identifiable as to grant decree of possession. He has made
reference to various documents adduced by appellants/plaintiffs before the
learned Court of first instance. On the other hand, learned counsel for
respondents/defendants has defended the judgment of reversal passed by
learned First Appellate Court on twin grounds :-
(i) That suit for possession preferred by appellants/plaintiffs itself is
not maintainable as customary rights acknowledged vide Punjab
Customs (Power to Contest) Act 1920 (hereinafter referred to as
‘1920 Act’) were taken away by amendment made in 1920 Act by
amending Act of 1973 with retrospective effect as held by Hon’ble
Supreme Court and once the rights under 1920 Act stood
extinguished, the rights flowing from decree dated 05.10.1945
could not have been enforced after 1973 amendment by filing suit
for possession in the year 1985 and, therefore, suit is not
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maintainable.
(ii) That conclusion drawn by learned First Appellate Court is based
on correct appreciation of evidence. The property which was
subject matter of judgment and decree dated 05.10.1945 on the
basis of which appellants/plaintiffs is seeking possession has since
been consolidated and merged with other properties owned by
respondents/defendants and, therefore, cannot be identified and
separated after consolidation of land holdings.
7. The suit for possession was preferred by appellants/plaintiffs on
the basis of decree dated 05.10.1945 passed by learned Sub Judge, IInd Class,
Moga which was filed on the basis of rights of appellants/plaintiffs based on
customs under the provisions of the Punjab Customs (Power to Contest) Act,
1920.
8. Therefore, fate of present appeal is dependent upon question of
law as to whether decree dated 05.10.1945, has lost its enforceability by virtue
of amendments in 1920 Act by amending Act of 1973, whereby customary
rights were abolished with retrospective effect.
9. The effect of amendment in Punjab Customs (Power to Contest),
Amendment Act, 1973 had come up for consideration before Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Darshan Singh Vs. Ram Pal Singh , 1991 AIR Supreme Court 1654,
wherein, Three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court had held as under:-
“50. In the instant case, as we have seen, the express intention of the
legislature was to do away with the custom of contesting
alienations and negative expression has been used in the section
and as such it is clearly distinguishable from Henshall v. Porter,
(1923(2) 1KB 193) (supra).
51. Considering the above principles, the provisions of the Principal
Act, the statement of objects and reasons and the provisions of the
Amendment Act and the decisions of the Punjab High Court and
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RSA-620-1995 -5-
of this Court, we are of the view that Section 7 of the Principal Act
as amended by the Amendment Act is retroactive and is applicable
to pending proceedings. The decisions of this Court dated 28-11-
1986 in Ujaggar Singh v. Dharam Singh (Civil Appeal No. 1263
of 1973) and in Udham Singh v. Tarsem Singh (Civil Appeal No.
1135 of 1974) dated 15-7-1987 do not need reconsideration.
52. The result is that these appeals fail and are dismissed, but under
the facts and circumstances of the cases, without any order as to
costs.
53. In course of the arguments it transpired that some of the
appellants might have had right to contest the alienations under
the Hindu Law. Doubts have been expressed as to whether after
these appeals are dismissed any such claim would be tenable in
law inasmuch as, it is submitted, the right under the Principal Act
was a statutory right which has now been taken away. The answer
to the question would depend on what resulted when the Punjab
Laws Act and the Principal Act were passed. There appears to be
no doubt that by the former the customs were preserved and by the
latter the customary right to contest alienation was regulated.
This would be clear from the following analysis.
X X X X X X X X X X X
59. However, the intention of the legislature and the provisions of the
statute have to be carefully examined to ascertain the result. "An
Act of Parliament which recognises the existence and validity of a
custom may not operate to create new statutory rights in favour of
the persons or classes of persons who might formerly have
benefited by the custom. Such a statute may merely have the effect
of sanctioning the validity of the custom as a custom, without
merging the custom in the higher title by statute."
60. In the instant case we are of the view that the custom was
confirmed and regulated by the Punjab Laws Act and the
Principal Act and it was done away with by the Amendment Act.
No statute was passed on the basis of the custom itself so as to
transform the custom itself into a higher statutory right.
Therefore, either before or after the custom has been done away
with by the Amendment Act, the rights of the parties under Hindu
Law remain unaffected and will provide the rule of decision where
alienations are contested under Hindu Law. It was observed by
Robertson, J. in Daya Ram v. Sohel Singh, 110 PR 1906 390 that
"in all cases under Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, it lies upon
the person asserting that he is ruled in regard to a particular
matter by custom, to prove that he is so governed, and not by
personal law, and further to prove what the particular custom is.
There is no presumption created by the clause in favour of custom;
on the contrary it is only when the custom is established that it is
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RSA-620-1995 -6-
to be the rule of decision." These observations were approved by
the Privy Council in Abdul Hussein Khan v. Bibi Sona Dero,
1917(45) Ind Ap 10 (13). This was reiterated by this Court in
Salig Ram v. Munshi Ram, 1962(1) SCR 470 holding that "where
the parties are Hindus, the Hindu Law would apply in the first
instance and whosoever asserts a custom at variance with the
Hindu Law, shall have to prove it.....…"
10. This issue was again considered in case titled Shakuntla Devi Vs.
Kamla & Ors. , 2005(2) RCR(Civil) 668, whereby, Three Judges Bench of
Hon’ble Supreme Court had held as under :-
“19. From the above principles laid down by this Court, it is clear that
if the earlier declaratory decree judgment which is sought to be
made the basis of res judicata is delivered by a court without
jurisdiction or is contrary to the existing law at the time the issue
comes up for reconsideration such earlier declaratory decree
cannot be held to be res judicata in the subsequent case unless, of
course, protected by any special enactment.
20. Learned counsel for the appellant then contended that the
judgment in Tulasamma's case being prospective the first
declaratory decree obtained by her would prevail since that was
based on the law as it stood then and had become final, therefore,
the first declaratory decree would be protected. In support of this
contention he relied upon the judgment of this Court Managing
Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors.,
1994(1) S.C.T. 319 : [(1993)4 SCC 727]. We do not think this
judgment would help the appellant in support of the contention
raised by her. It is true that the judgment in Tulasamma's case is
not retrospective and would not apply to cases which have ended
finally. But a declaratory decree simplicitor does not attain
finality if it has to be used for obtaining any future decree like
possession. In such cases of suit for possession based on an
earlier declaratory decree is filed it is open to the defendant to
establish that the declaratory decree on which suit is based is not
a lawful decree.”
Hon’ble Supreme Court has therefore, held that if a right is based upon decree
and decree upon which right is based is not lawful at the time of consideration
then same can be challenged without attracting principle of res judicata.
11. Again in judgment titled Kesar Singh and others Vs. Sadhu ,
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1996 (7) SCC 711, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering whether
objection regarding executability of decree can be raised in execution had held
as under :-
“5. In view of the above position, the view of the learned Judge that
the appellant is not entitled to raise the executability of the decree
in execution is not correct since the Amendment Act was
applicable at the time of passing the decree by the appellate Court
and the above decree, therefore, is nullity. When the matter goes
to the root of the jurisdiction, it is settled law that it can be raised
even in execution also. Under those circumstances, the High
Court was not right in rejecting the revision of the appellants
stating that they are not entitled to raise the plea of nullity. In this
view of settled legal position, it does not serve any purpose to
remand the matter to the executing court for fresh orders.
6. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The orders of the courts below
are set aside. Consequently, the execution petition also stands
dismissed. No costs.”
12. Division Bench of this Court in judgment titled Kamakar Singh
, 2011(2), RCR (Civil) 550 wherein
and others Vs. Didar Singh and others
suit for declaration preferred under provisions of the Punjab Customs (Power
to Contest) Act, 1920 was decreed in 1944 and upheld by Lahore High Court,
had held that decree for declaration no longer remained binding after the
Punjab Customs (Power to Contest) Amendment Act, 1973 retrospectively
taking away right to enforce right under customary law for recovering
possession. It was held that finality of decree was taken away by operation of
law, therefore, suit for declaration was not maintainable. It was held:-
“10. In Surain Singh, doubt was expressed about the correctness of the
view taken in Kesar Singh on the ground that the question of
finality of the decree for declaration was not considered in which
case, view taken in Darshan Singh could not apply to decree
which had become final. The matter was referred to a three
member Bench. In Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla and others, (2005)5
SCC 400, in para 10, it was noticed that before the three Judge
Bench could give judgment in Surain Singh, appeal was dismissed
for non-prosecution and no final adjudication took place in that
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RSA-620-1995 -8-
case. Accordingly, a fresh reference was made to a Bench of three
Hon'ble Judges which was decided vide judgment reported as
Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla and others, (2005)5 SCC 390. Therein,
after referring to other judgments on the point including Mathura
Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B.Jeejeebhoy, (1970)1 SCC
613, Chief Justice of AP v. LVA Dixitulu, (1979) 2 SCC 34,
Ashok Leyland Limited v. State of T.N., (2004)3 SCC 1 and
Sonepat Coop. Sugar Mills Limited v. Ajit Singh, 2005(1) S.C.T.
833 : (2005)3 SCC 232, it was held that if law is altered after the
earlier decision, earlier decision will not operate as res judicata
between the same parties. It was concluded as under :-
"22. Thus, the law is clear on this point i.e. if a suit is
based on an earlier declaratory decree and such decree is
contrary to the law prevailing at the time of its
consideration as to its legality or is a decree granted by a
court which has no jurisdiction to grant such decree,
principles of res judicata under Section 11 Civil
Procedure Code will not be attracted and it is open to the
defendant in such suits to establish that the declaratory
decree relied upon by the plaintiff is not based on a good
law or court granting such decree did not have the
jurisdiction to grant such decree."
11. In view of Shakuntla Devi, it can safely be held that decree dated
18.4.1944 as affirmed by the Lahore High Court on 4.11.1947 no
longer remained binding after 1973 Amendment Act
retrospectively taking away right to enforce right under the
customary law of recovering possession where alienation was
without legal necessity. There being no contrary view except
observation in referring order in Surain Singh, the view taken in
Shakuntla Devi has to be followed and the finality of decree has to
be held to have been taken away by operation of law and suit of
the appellants is, thus, not maintainable. They cannot be granted
decree for possession even on the basis of earlier decree. The
question has, thus, to be answered against the appellants and in
favour of the respondents.”
13. Similarly, learned Single Bench of this Court in judgments titled
Satvir Singh Vs. Arjan Singh and others , 2011(53) RCR (Civil) 857, Bhajan
Singh (Since Deceased) through his LR Vs. Jagir Singh (Since Deceased)
through his LRs and others and Jagir Singh (Since Deceased) through his
LRs and others Vs. Bhajan Singh (Since Deceased) through his LR bearing
RSA Nos.895 and 908 of 1990, decided on 13.07.2022 had concluded that
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RSA-620-1995 -9-
declaratory suit seeking possession on the basis of decree passed under the

Punjab Customs (Power to Contest) Act, 1920, filed subsequent to amendment
in the Punjab Customs (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 in 1973 is not
maintainable.
14. In judgment titled Satvir Singh Vs. Arjan Singh and others ,
(supra), learned Single Judge of this Court has taken in consideration
judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Darshan Singh Vs. Ram Pal Singh
and Kesar Singh and others Vs. Sadhu, (supra) as well as Teg Singh and
others Vs. Charan Singh and another , (1977) 2 Supreme Court Cases 732,
which has been relied upon by appellants/plaintiffs in support of
maintainability of their suit. Learned Court in judgment titled Satvir Singh Vs.
Arjan Singh and others , (supra) had rightly held that judgment (relied upon
by appellants/plaintiffs titled as Teg Singh and others Vs. Charan Singh and
another, (supra) has got no applicability to the facts of the case as in judgment
cited, the original donor had died prior to coming into force of Amendment
Act, 1973 . The execution for execution of decree passed under the provisions
of Punjab Customs (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 was also preferred prior to
1973 when the right on the basis of custom protected by Punjab Customs
(Power to Contest) Amendment Act, 1973 were abolished. In present case, suit
was filed to get rights under customs and said right stood extinguished prior to
filing of suit in 1973 on account of 1973 Amending Act. Judgment titled as
Teg Singh and others Vs. Charan Singh and another, (supra), is therefore,
not applicable where rights were enforced after 1973 amendment.
15. This Court in Bhajan Singh (Since Deceased) through his LR
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and
Vs. Jagir Singh (Since Deceased) through his LRs and others Jagir
Singh (Since Deceased) through his LRs and others Vs. Bhajan Singh
(Since Deceased) through his LR (supra) has held as under :-
“7. It may be noted here that the point involved in the present appeals
is covered by a Division Bench judgment in Kamakar Singh and
others v. Didar Singh and others 2010 (2) ILR P&H 772 . The
Division Bench took note of the fact that the Punjab Custom
(Power to Contest) Amendment Act, 1973, provides that the right
to contest alienation on the basis of the Customary Law has
ceased to exist. After relying upon a Larger Bench judgment of the
Supreme Court in Darshan Singh v. Ram Singh and another,
AIR 1991 SC 1654 , Kesar Singh and others v. Sadhu (1996) 7
SCC 711 and Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla and others, (2005) 5 SCC
390 , the Division Bench held that in view of the 1973 Amendment
Act, such right has been taken away with retroactive effect i.e. the
amendment shall apply to the pending proceedings, at any stage.
Thus, no decree for possession could be passed in such pending
cases. In that case also, there was a prior decree on the basis of
Customary Law to the effect that the reversionary rights of the
plaintiff in the previous suit shall not be affected. However, in the
subsequent suit, the Court held that in view of the 1973
Amendment Act, such decree is no longer enforceable.
8. It may be noted here that the same view has been reiterated in
Baldev Singh and another v. Makhan Singh and others, 2012
SCC (online) P&H 17458 . In this case also,the Court relied upon
the judgment passed by the Division Bench in Kamakar Singh's
case (supra) and Kesar Singh's case (supra). Moreover, in Ujagar
Singh v. Badan Singh and others, 2011 (1) PLR 139 , again, the
same view was taken and it was held that the declaratory decree
obtained by the plaintiff under the Customary Law is rendered
ineffective and is no longer enforceable because the 1973
Amendment Act is applicable with retroactive effect.”
16. Therefore, consistent view of Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as
this Court is that declaratory suit on the basis of right which stood extinguished
by virtue of Amending Act of 1973, cannot be pursued. Therefore, in the
present case also, since the present suit was filed in 1985 after amendment in
1973, therefore, the suit on the basis of decree which has lost its efficacy or
legality is not maintainable.
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17. Since, on the date of death of predecessor-in-interest of
appellants/plaintiffs namely Sher Singh, no right to possession based upon
custom existed in law, therefore, decree so passed in favour of
appellants/plaintiffs could have been enforced by way of suit for possession. In
view of fact that appellants/plaintiffs could not have sought possession on the
basis of judgment and decree dated 05.10.1945 as the said decree had become
ineffective by virtue of amendment made in 1973 in the Punjab Customs
(Power to Contest) Act, 1920, suit by appellants/plaintiffs was not
maintainable and was liable to be dismissed.
18. Since suit is liable to be dismissed being not maintainable as
decree dated 05.10.1945 cannot be enforced after amendment by amending Act
of 1973 in 1920 Act, therefore, the suit as well as present appeal are liable to
be dismissed being not maintainable. The second ground taken on behalf of
appellants/plaintiffs that learned First Appellate Court has misread evidence
pales in insignificance in view of conclusion by this Court that suit itself was
not maintainable and, therefore, not required to be adjudicated in the present
appeal.
19. For the reasons recorded above, I do not find merit in the present
appeal. Regular second appeal is accordingly dismissed holding that suit
preferred by appellant/plaintiff is not maintainable. Pending miscellaneous
application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of accordingly.
18.11.2026 (PARMOD GOYAL)
Chiranjeev/Ravinder JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned Yes
Whether reportable Yes/No
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
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