Chhatrapal Baghele vs Allahabad Bank (Deleted) (1) Indian Bank

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THE IN HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
WRIT PETITION No. 7819 of 2016
CHHATRAPAL BAGHELE
Versus
ALLAHABAD BANK (DELETED) (1) INDIAN BANK AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Rajeev Shrivastava - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Praveen Surange- Advocate for respondents No.1 to 4/Indian Bank.
Reserved on : 06.08.2026
Pronounced on : 08.09.2026
_________________________________________________________________
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed
seeking the following relief (s): -
“(i) That, the present petition filed by the petitioner may kindly be
allowed;
(ii) That, by issuance of the writ order or direction the order
Annexure P/1 dated 7.8.2015, order dated 17.3.2016 Annexure P/3
and order dated 27.7.2016 Annexure P/5 may kindly be directed to be
set aside and the respondents may kindly be directed to pay the
outstanding amount of Provident Fund approximately Rs.7 Lacs,
leave encashment approximately Rs.5 Lacs, by-partite settlement
arrears Rs.1 Lacs and also the amount of scale of stagnation which
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the petitioner is entitled for the same for the month of February, 2015
to till date of passing the impugned order i.e. 7.8.2015 along with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
(iii) That, any other just, suitable and proper relief, which this
Hon'ble Court deems fit, may also kindly be granted to the petitioner.
Costs be also awarded in favour of the petitioner.”
2. The petitioner was appointed as a Peon, Grade-D/Class-IV employee on
01.01.1985. He was promoted as Clerk on 27.04.1996 and subsequently as Head
Cashier, where he served under respondent No.2. The petitioner was suspended
on 20.12.2013 vide Annexure P/6, but the charge-sheet was issued only on
26.05.2014 and received on 31.05.2014, after more than 90 days of suspension,
in violation of Para 19.11 of the First Bipartite Settlement and Awards. The
charge-sheet was vague and was not accompanied by the list of witnesses and
documents relied upon by the management, thereby depriving the petitioner of an
effective opportunity of defence. The petitioner had already submitted his reply
to the show-cause notice dated 15.02.2014, but the charge-sheet did not state that
the said reply was found unsatisfactory. The initiation of disciplinary proceedings
was therefore procedurally defective. The Presenting Officer was changed during
the enquiry without assigning any reason. The change, particularly in the
circumstances of the petitioner's active trade union activities, caused serious
prejudice and gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Enquiry Officer
failed to conduct the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice
and Para 12(a) of the MOS dated 10.04.2002. The management's written brief
was accepted despite being filed beyond the prescribed time, while the petitioner
was not afforded an effective opportunity to rebut the same. Material documents
sought by the petitioner, including the original pre-cash scrolls, were not
produced by the management merely on the ground of non-availability. Non-
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production of these documents materially prejudiced the petitioner's defence. The
findings on the charges are based on improper appreciation of evidence. In
particular, the allegations of embezzlement and misbehaviour were not
established by reliable and cogent evidence. The relevant complainants were not
produced for examination and cross-examination, and the petitioner was thereby
denied a fair opportunity to disprove the allegations. The Disciplinary Authority
failed to properly consider the petitioner's defence, written brief and submissions
made during personal hearing. In respect of Charge No. 4, the Disciplinary
Authority disagreed with the Enquiry Officer without recording cogent reasons
for such disagreement. The petitioner submits that the disciplinary proceedings
were also motivated by his legitimate trade union activities and complaints made
against the then Branch Head regarding alleged irregularities and acts prejudicial
to the Bank's interests. The Disciplinary Authority, vide order dated 07.08.2015
(Annexure P/1), imposed the extreme penalty of dismissal without notice without
proper and independent consideration of the evidence and defence. The
punishment is also disproportionate considering the petitioner's long and
otherwise unblemished service. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was
dismissed vide order dated 17.03.2016 (Annexure P/3) in a cryptic and non-
speaking manner. The Appellate Authority failed to consider the specific grounds
raised in the appeal, the petitioner's long service, the procedural violations and
the proportionality of punishment. The appellate order is contrary to the
principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd.
v. Masood Ahmed Khan , (2010) 9 SCC 496 , wherein recording of reasons by
administrative and quasi-judicial authorities has been held to be an essential
requirement of fair decision-making. Despite the dismissal, the petitioner has not
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been paid his legally admissible retiral/service dues, including Provident Fund,
leave encashment, Bipartite Settlement arrears and applicable stagnation benefits.
The withholding of such dues has caused grave financial hardship to the
petitioner and his family. In view of the aforesaid facts, the disciplinary
proceedings, the punishment order dated 07.08.2015 (Annexure P-1) and the
appellate order dated 17.03.2016 (Annexure P-3) are arbitrary, violative of
principle of natural justice and liable to be quashed, with consequential benefits,
including payment of all legally admissible retiral dues with appropriate interest.
3. Per contra , it is submitted by learned counsel for respondents that the
allegations that the petitioner was suspended on 20.12.2013 without specifying
any misconduct and that the charge-sheet was issued after an impermissible delay
are denied. The suspension order itself contained allegations of misconduct.
Thereafter, a show-cause notice dated 15.02.2014 was issued alleging, inter alia,
embezzlement/cheating of cash, misbehaviour with customers and creating a
hostile atmosphere in the branch. The charge-sheet was subsequently issued on
26.05.2014. The issuance of the show-cause notice dated 15.02.2014, the
petitioner's reply dated 26.02.2014 and the charge-sheet dated 26.05.2014 are
matters of record. However, it is specifically denied that the petitioner's reply to
the show-cause notice was satisfactory or that the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings was illegal. The Disciplinary Authority, after considering the
petitioner's reply and finding it unsatisfactory, instituted a departmental enquiry
in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Memorandum of Settlement
dated 10.04.2002. An Enquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer were duly
appointed and the relevant orders were communicated to the petitioner. The
Presenting Officer was subsequently changed due to administrative exigencies
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and non-availability of the earlier incumbent. Shri Pankaj Choubey, Senior
Manager, Service Branch, Bhopal, was accordingly appointed as the Presenting
Officer vide order dated 17.11.2014. The change was duly communicated to the
petitioner and caused no prejudice to his defence. The allegation that the
appointment of the Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer was contrary to law or
that the proceedings were biased is denied. The Enquiry Officer satisfied the
applicable requirements and had no personal interest, prejudice or prior
involvement in the matter. The petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity to
defend himself throughout the enquiry. The allegations that the Enquiry Officer
acted in violation of the principles of natural justice, denied reasonable
opportunity, or improperly favoured the management are false and denied. The
enquiry was conducted in accordance with the applicable procedure and the
petitioner was given adequate opportunity to participate and present his defence.
The allegation that the Disciplinary Authority failed to apply its mind is also
denied. A perusal of the punishment order dated 07.08.2015 (Annexure P/1)
demonstrates that the relevant evidence, enquiry proceedings, defence
submissions and other material were duly considered before imposing the
penalty. The allegations regarding the charges of attempted embezzlement,
misbehaviour with customers, tarnishing the Bank's image and failure to
discharge duties diligently are supported by the evidence and findings recorded
during the disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner's allegation that the
proceedings were a result of a conspiracy or were motivated by his trade union
activities is baseless and unsupported by any material. It is admitted that the
petitioner preferred an appeal against the punishment order dated 07.08.2015
(Annexure P-1) and that the same was dismissed vide order dated 17.03.2016
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(Annexure P-3). However, it is denied that the appellate order was cryptic or
non-speaking. The Appellate Authority duly considered the grounds raised by the
petitioner and passed a reasoned and speaking order. The charge-sheet was issued
in accordance with Para 19.12 of the Memorandum of Settlement dated
10.04.2002. The management documents and list of witnesses were supplied to
the petitioner at the preliminary hearing held on 15.12.2014, well before
commencement of the regular enquiry on 19.01.2015. Thus, sufficient time and
reasonable opportunity were afforded to the petitioner to prepare his defence. The
non-production of certain witnesses was due to their retirement or non-
availability at the recorded address and did not prejudice the enquiry. The passing
of the punishment order dated 07.08.2015 is admitted. However, the petitioner's
allegation regarding non-payment of retiral dues is no longer subsisting. The
petitioner had filed I.A. No.4186/2017 seeking release of his post-retiral dues,
which was disposed of by the Court vide order dated 21.11.2017, directing the
respondent Bank to consider and release the dues legally payable to him. In
compliance with the said order, the respondent Bank released the petitioner's
admissible post-retiral dues vide letters dated 13.12.2017 and 15.12.2017, and
the amounts were duly paid to the petitioner. The relevant documents have been
filed as Annexure R-1. Therefore, the allegations regarding withholding of retiral
benefits are false and no longer survive. The respondents submit that both the
Disciplinary Authority's order dated 07.08.2015 (Annexure P-1) and the
Appellate Authority's order dated 17.03.2016 (Annexure P-3) are reasoned and
speaking orders passed by competent authorities after considering the material
available on record. The punishment imposed was commensurate with the
gravity of the misconduct proved against the petitioner. Accordingly, the
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allegations of procedural illegality, violation of natural justice, bias, non-
application of mind and non-payment of retiral dues are denied. The disciplinary
proceedings and the orders passed thereunder are lawful, reasoned and
sustainable in law.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. Before adverting to the facts of the case, this Court would like to consider
the scope of interference by this Court in departmental matters.
6. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka and Another Vs.
N. Gangaraj reported in (2020) 3 SCC 423 has held as under:
“ 8. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by the
Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error.
The power of judicial review is confined to the decision-making
process. The power of judicial review conferred on the constitutional
court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority.
9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a three-
Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a
court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in
that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The
Court held as under : (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7)
“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding
under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over
the decision of the authorities holding a departmental
enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority
competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural
justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence,
which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the
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enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably
support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of
the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a
petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence
and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.”
10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996
SCC (L&S) 80], again a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held
that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a
review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of
judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority
reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The
court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an
appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its
own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under :
(SCC pp. 759-60, paras 12-13)
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision
but a review of the manner in which the decision is made.
Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the
individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that
the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily
correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is
conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant,
the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the
inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules
of natural justice are complied with. Whether the
findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the
authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has
jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of
fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on
some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the
Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined
therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the
authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives
support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to
hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge.
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The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does
not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the
evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on
the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
authority held the proceedings against the delinquent
officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the
mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding
reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no
evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no
reasonable person would have ever reached, the
Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the
finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate
to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts.
Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has
co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the
nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict
proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are
not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the
Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4
SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364, this Court held at p. 728
that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or
suffers from patent error on the face of the record or
based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be
issued.”
11. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC
416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144, this Court held that interference with
the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such
authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of
natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing
the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution. It was held as under : (SCC p. 423, para 16)
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“16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S. Patil v. High
Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 97 : (2000) 1
LLN 160] of the High Court seems to have approached
the case as though it was an appeal against the order of
the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High
Court. Interference with the decision of departmental
authorities can be permitted, while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such
authority had held proceedings in violation of the
principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory
regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the
decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if
the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of
it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable
person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or
grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot
overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the
Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole
judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly
conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is
some legal evidence on which the findings can be based,
then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a
matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ
petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya,
(2011) 4 SCC 584:(2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 721, this Court held that the
courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence
led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another
view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been
fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the
question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the
evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in
departmental enquiries. The Court held as under:(SCC pp. 587-88,
paras 7 & 10)
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“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as
an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the
domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that
another view is possible on the material on record. If the
enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the
findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy
of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will
not be grounds for interfering with the findings in
departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not
interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental
enquiries, except where such findings are based on no
evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to
find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting
reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or
finding, on the material on record. The courts will
however interfere with the findings in disciplinary
matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory
regulations have been violated or if the order is found to
be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on
extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80,
Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 1806 and Bank of India v. Degala
Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S)
1036, High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil,
(2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144].)
*
10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently
acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of
doubt, will not in any way render a completed
disciplinary proceeding invalid nor affect the validity of
the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The
standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being
different from the standard of proof required in
departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence
may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that
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is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an
acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal
proceedings. This is more so when the departmental
proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point
of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The
findings by the criminal court will have no effect on
previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee
who allows the findings in the enquiry and the
punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality
by nonchallenge, cannot after several years, challenge
the decision on the ground that subsequently, the
criminal court has acquitted him.”
13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P.
Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554, this
Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court
cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings.
The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not
interfere in the disciplinary proceedings : (SCC p. 617, para 13)
“13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India,
the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case
the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear
to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience.”
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14. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent relies
upon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan
Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 335, wherein this
Court held that if the disciplinary authority records a finding that is
not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is
unreasonably arrived at, the writ court could interfere with the
finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even on
touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could
interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority It is
not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The
finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been
interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in the
evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will
not make it a case of no evidence. The inquiry officer has
appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent
is guilty of misconduct.
15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the
enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal
before the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence
has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of
power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not
interfere with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating
evidence as if the courts are the appellate authority. We may notice
that the said judgment has not noticed the larger Bench judgments in
State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 and B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S)
80 as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal
and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be
sustained in law.”
7. The Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India and others Vs.
Ramesh Dinkar Punde reported in (2006) 7 SCC 212 has held a under:
“6. Before we proceed further, we may observe at this stage that it
is unfortunate that the High Court has acted as an Appellate
Authority despite the consistent view taken by this Court that the
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High Court and the Tribunal while exercising the judicial review do
not act as an Appellate Authority:
“Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct
errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in
manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles
of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to
adjudication on merit by reappreciating the evidence as
an Appellate Authority.” (See Govt. of A.P. v. Mohd.
Nasrullah Khan [(2006) 2 SCC 373 : 2006 SCC (L&S)
316], SCC p. 379, para 11.)
9. It is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the
evidence which had been considered by the inquiry officer, a
disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority. The finding of the
High Court, on facts, runs to the teeth of the evidence on record.
12. From the facts collected and the report submitted by the inquiry
officer, which has been accepted by the disciplinary authority and
the Appellate Authority, active connivance of the respondent is
eloquent enough to connect the respondent with the issue of TDRs
and overdrafts in favour of Bidaye.
15. In Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur [(1972) 4 SCC 618 : (1972)
2 SCR 218] it is held as under: (SCC p. 623, para 15)
A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The
standard proof required is that of preponderance of
probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
inference that lender was a person likely to have official
dealings with the respondent was one which a reasonable
person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the
High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a
decision based on it. The Letters Patent Bench had the
same power of dealing with all questions, either of fact
or of law arising in the appeal, as the Single Judge of the
High Court. If the enquiry has been properly held the
question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot
be canvassed before the High Court. A finding cannot be
characterised as perverse or unsupported by any relevant
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materials, if it was a reasonable inference from proved
facts. (SCR p. 219)
16. In Union of India v. Parma Nanda [(1989) 2 SCC 177 : 1989
SCC (L&S) 303 : (1989) 10 ATC 30] it is held at SCC p. 189, para
27 as under:
“27. We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters
or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate
jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the
findings of the inquiry officer or competent authority
where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is
appropriate to remember that the power to impose
penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the
competent authority either by an Act of legislature or
rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the
Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with
the rules and in accordance with principles of natural
justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is
a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be
imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the
Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for
that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is
mala fide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to
concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere
with the penalty if the conclusion of the inquiry officer or
the competent authority is based on evidence even if
some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the
matter.”
17. In Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan [(1998) 4 SCC 310 :
1998 SCC (L&S) 1129] this Court held at SCC p. 315, para 12 as
under:
“12. After hearing the rival contentions, we are of the
firm view that all the four charge-sheets which were
enquired into relate to serious misconduct. The
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respondent was unable to demonstrate before us how
prejudice was caused to him due to non-supply of the
enquiry authority's report/findings in the present case. It
needs to be emphasised that in the banking business
absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs
to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular
the bank officer. If this is not observed, the confidence of
the public/depositors would be impaired. It is for this
reason, we are of the opinion that the High Court had
committed an error while setting aside the order of
dismissal of the respondent on the ground of prejudice on
account of non-furnishing of the enquiry report/findings
to him.”
18. In Chairman and MD, United Commercial Bank v. P.C. Kakkar
[(2003) 4 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 468] this Court held at SCC
pp. 376-77, para 14 as under:
“14. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of
honesty and integrity. He deals with the money of the depositors and
the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take
all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to
discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and
diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer.
Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of
every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in
Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari
Patnaik [(1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194] it is no defence
available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case,
when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very
discipline of an organisation more particularly a bank is dependent
upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within
their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a
breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the
employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects
do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court.”
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19. In Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal [(2003) 3 SCC
605 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 363] it was pointed out as under: (SCC p.
614, para 10)
“If the charged employee holds a position of trust
where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of
functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the
matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt
with iron hands. Where the person deals with public
money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a
fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and
trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable.”
20. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam [(2005)
3 SCC 241 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 395] this Court at SCC p. 247, para
15 held:
“15. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the
principles of the Evidence Act have no application in a
domestic enquiry.”
8. This Court, in exercise of power under Article 226 of Constitution of India,
cannot act as an Appellate Authority and cannot substitute its own findings by
reversing the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. This Court can
interfere with the findings of fact, provided they are based on no evidence.
9. After going through the record of case, judgments of Hon'ble Supreme
Court, it is clear that the submissions put forth by learned counsel for petitioner
are misconceived. The Courts will not act as an appellate court and re-assess the
evidence led in the departmental enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another
view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and
properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy
of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be a ground for
interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries.
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:26841
18 WP. No. 7819 of 2016
10. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall
not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same
has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can
be based;
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; and
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its
conscience.
11. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer
and passed an order of punishment. An appeal preferred thereagainst was also
dismissed. Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in
exercise of power of judicial review, this Court could not interfere with the
findings of facts recorded by re-appreciating evidence as if the courts are the
appellate authority. The courts will, however, interfere with the findings in
disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have
been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or
based on extraneous considerations.
12. It is impermissible for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence which
had been considered by the enquiry officer, a disciplinary authority and the
Appellate Authority. Jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors
of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:26841
19 WP. No. 7819 of 2016
violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to
adjudication on merit by re-appreciating the evidence as an Appellate Authority.
In the respondent/department, absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty
need to be preserved by every employee. The departmental enquiries are decided
on preponderance of probability.
13. The contentions raised by the petitioner have been considered, but the
same do not find support from the record. From a perusal of the record, it is clear
that after the petitioner was suspended, a show-cause notice was issued to him
and his reply was duly considered before the departmental enquiry was initiated.
The petitioner participated in the enquiry and was given sufficient opportunity to
defend himself. The record further shows that the relevant documents and list of
witnesses were supplied to him before the regular enquiry commenced.
Therefore, the contention that the petitioner was not given a proper opportunity
to defend himself cannot be accepted. The change of the Presenting Officer was
also made for administrative reasons and the petitioner has not been able to show
that such change caused any prejudice to him. The allegation of bias and mala
fide is also not supported by any material on record. In fact, although the
petitioner has alleged mala fides against the concerned officer, he has not even
impleaded the said officer by name as a party to the petition, and in the absence
of the concerned person against whom mala fides are alleged, such a vague
allegation cannot be accepted. The allegations regarding non-production of
certain documents, non-examination of some complainants and improper
appreciation of evidence also do not establish any violation of natural justice.
The petitioner participated in the enquiry and has not been able to show what
specific prejudice was caused to him on account of any alleged irregularity. His
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:26841
20 WP. No. 7819 of 2016
grievance regarding the appreciation of evidence is essentially an attempt to
invite this Court to re-examine the evidence and take a different view from the
Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority. Such an exercise is not
permissible while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
This Court is not sitting as an appellate authority over the departmental enquiry
and cannot re-appreciate the evidence merely because another view may be
possible. The findings recorded in the enquiry are based on the material available
on record and the petitioner has failed to show that the findings are based on no
evidence or are so unreasonable that no person could have arrived at them. The
allegation that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated because of the
petitioner's trade union activities is also not established by any material and
remains only an assertion. Similarly, the fact that the petitioner had rendered
about 29 years of service without any previous punishment, by itself, is not
sufficient to interfere with the punishment imposed, particularly when the
charges relate to cash transactions, misbehaviour with customers and conduct
affecting the functioning of a bank. Thus, on consideration of the entire record,
this Court finds that the petitioner has failed to establish violation of any rule,
denial of reasonable opportunity, mala fide action or perversity in the findings
recorded by the departmental authorities. Consequently, no ground is made out
for exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court and interfering with the
impugned orders.
14. As per the contention made by learned counsel for petitioner, the Enquiry
Officer failed to conduct the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural
justice and Para 12(a) of the MOS dated 10.04.2002. From perusal of record, it is
clear that the same contention of petitioner has been dealt with, by respondents
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21 WP. No. 7819 of 2016
in the impugned order dated 07.08.2015 which for ready reference and
convenience is quoted below:
“1. Although MOS dated 10.04.2002 on Disciplinary Action
Procedure for Workmen does not stipulates any eligibility criteria for
appointment of Enquiry Officer but the different pronouncements of
the Hon'ble Courts on the issue certainly set some pre-requisites of
appointment of Enquiry Officer as under:-
- The Enquiry Officer should not be lower in rank to
Charged Official. He should be normally be senior to Charged
Official.
- The Enquiry Officer is not suspected of any prejudice or
bias against the Charged Official.
- The officer so appointed had no occasion to express an
opinion in the earlier stages of the case.
- The Enquiry Officer should not have been connected with
the case either as an Investigating Officer or Dealing Officer.
No eligibility criteria for appointment of Presenting Officer are
stipulated in MOS dated 10.04.2002 on Disciplinary Action
Procedure for Workmen.”
15. It is the say of learned counsel for petitioner that material documents
sought by petitioner, including the original pre-cash scrolls, were not produced
by the management merely on the ground of non-availability, the same has been
dealt with, by respondents in the impugned order dated 07.08.2015 which goes as
under:
ME-27 tks fd tk¡p çfØ;k esa lfEefyr ,d nLrkost gS] ftlesa Li"V #i ls
fy[kk x;k gS fd pre scrolling of cash deposit voucher fnuk¡d 30-03-2013 ls
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:26841
22 WP. No. 7819 of 2016
iquZçpyu esa yk;k x;k FkkA vr% fnuk¡d 29-03-2013 rd çpyu esa gh ugha FkkA ,slk
nLrkost ¼fofHkUu fnuk¡dksa ls lacaf/kr pre - scroll register ½ tks fd vfLrRo esa ugha
gS dks cpko i{k }kjk tkucw>dj ek¡xk tkuk vkSj ftldks çkIr u gksus ij ;g dFku
djuk fd mldh vçkfIr ds dkj.k og Lo;a dks funksZ"k fl) djus esa vleFkZ jgk]
rdZghu] ;FkkFkZ ls ijs] Hkzked ,oa ifjfLFkfr dks vius i{k esa eksM+us ds nq"ç;kl ls çsfjr
gSA
16. Further, as per learned counsel for petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority
disagreed with the Eqnuiry Officer without recording cogent reasons for such
disagreement in respect of Charge No.4. Since other charges have been proved,
this Court cannot interfere with action of the disciplinary authority.
17. In view of the above discussion and the material on record, this Court finds
that the petitioner was proceeded against in a departmental enquiry on allegations
relating to cash transactions, misbehaviour with customers and creating nuisance
in the branch. The petitioner was given an opportunity to defend himself and he
participated in the enquiry. After considering the material on record, the
Disciplinary Authority passed the order dated 07.08.2015 (Annexure P-1)
dismissing him from service. His appeal and mercy appeal were also considered
and rejected. The petitioner has not been able to show that the enquiry was
conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice or that the findings are
based on no evidence. His objections regarding non-supply of documents, non-
examination of the complainant and appreciation of evidence cannot be
examined by this Court as an appellate authority. The fact that the petitioner had
rendered about 29 years of service without any previous punishment, by itself, is
not sufficient to interfere with the punishment. The punishment imposed also
cannot be said to be so excessive as to shock the conscience of the Court.
Therefore, no ground is made out for interference with the orders dated
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:26841
23 WP. No. 7819 of 2016
07.08.2015 (Annexure P-1), 17.03.2016 (Annexure P-3) and 27.07.2016
(Annexure P-5).
18. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed .
(Anand Singh Bahrawat)
Judge
pd
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