REKHA SAHNI vs STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

Court
Uttarakhand High Court

UKHC010098952026

2026:UHC:8792-DB

Reserved on: 23.09.2026
Delivered on: 29.09.2026

HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

Habeas Corpus Petition No.20 of 2026

Rekha Sahni ......Petitioner
Vs.
State of Uttarakhand & Others …..... Respondents
Presence:
1. Mr. Ankur Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner.
2. Ms. Manisha Rana Singh, learned Deputy A.G. for the State.




Coram:Hon’ble Ravindra Maithani, J.
Hon’ble Siddhartha Sah, J.

(Per: Hon’ble Siddhartha Sah, J.)

By means of the present Habeas Corpus Petition, the
petitioner has sought the following reliefs:-
a. Issue a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus quashing the
detention order dated 17.04.2026 passed against the detenu
(contained as Annexure No.1 to the writ petition);
b. Issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding and
directing the respondents to produce the detenu before this
Hon’ble Court and set him at liberty forthwith.

2. It is the case of the petitioner that the detention order
dated 17.04.2026 has been passed on the ground that the petitioner
is in the business of illegal narcotic substances under the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“the NDPS Act”) as
well as alleged criminal history against the petitioner.
3. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State, it has
been inter-alia stated that:-

2
(i) The detenu is a habitual active offender engaged in
continuous illegal trade and trafficking of narcotic
drugs, posing a grave threat to public health and safety.
The detenu has a long criminal history of 10 registered
cases under the NDPS Act at PS Rishikesh, namely:-
1. FIR No.482 of 2021 under Section 8/21 of NDPS Act.
2. FIR No.572 of 2021 under Section 8/20 of NDPS Act.
3. FIR No.161 of 2022 under Section 8/20/29 of NDPS
Act.
4. FIR No.173 of 2022 under Section 8/20 of NDPS Act.
5. FIR No.727 of 2022 under Section 8/21 of NDPS Act.
6. FIR No.463 of 2023 under Section 8/21/29 of NDPS
Act.
7. FIR No.73 of 2024 under Section 29 of NDPS Act.
8. FIR No.199 of 2024 under Section 8/21 of NDPS Act.
9. FIR No.355 of 2024 under Section 29 of NDPS Act.
10. FIR No.388 of 2024 under Section 8/21 of NDPS
Act.

(ii) To prevent her from continuing illicit trafficking
activities, the competent authority, after strictly
adhering to due procedure of law under Section 3(1) of
the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (“the PIT NDPS Act”)
passed the valid detention order. The detenu was
detained on 30.04.2026 in full compliance with
procedural safeguards.
(iii) Direct recovery of illicit narcotic substances was
made from the detenu in 6 registered cases, while in 4

3
other cases, co-accused persons disclosed purchasing
narcotics directly from her. Based on sufficient concrete
material and evidence gathered during investigation, she
was arrayed as an accused under Section 29 of the
NDPS Act.
(iv) Despite multiple cases being registered against the
detenu continuously between 2021 and 2024, she has
remained habitually and persistently active in drug
trafficking.
(v) Whenever the detenu is released on bail in ordinary
criminal cases, she repeatedly indulges in illicit drug
trafficking. This habitual conduct necessitated
preventive detention under the PIT NDPS Act.
(vi) All statutory provisions and mandatory procedural
safeguards under the PIT NDPS Act were strictly
complied with while taking legal action against the
detenu.
(vii) The detenu is a habitual offender, and the detaining
authority strictly complied with every procedural
requirement under the PIT NDPS Act.
(viii) The detention order under Section 3(1) of the PIT
NDPS Act was passed by the competent authority with
full application of mind, following proper evaluation of
material evidence.
(ix) Upon obtaining bail, the detenu continuously
resumes illicit narcotic trade, destroying the younger
generation and creating severe harm to public order and

4
health. To curb this rampant menace, preventive action
was lawfully taken.
(x) The action under the PIT NDPS Act was executed in
strict accordance with statutory rules.
(xi) The detention order is preventive, not punitive, and
was issued based on continuous and live criminal
activity and thus, sought dismissal of the writ petition.
4. Assailing the impugned order, learned counsel for the
petitioner would submit that the last FIR was registered against the
petitioner on 16.07.2024. The proposal/recommendation for
preventive detention of the petitioner was mooted by the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Dehradun dated 24.12.2025. However, the
detention order came to be passed only on 17.04.2026.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit
that there is a huge delay in proposing/recommending the
preventive detention of the petitioner. The claim of the State for
seeking a detention order is stale. There is a further delay of four
months in passing the preventive detention order even after the
proposal/recommendation for the preventive detention.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushanta
Kumar Banik v. State of Tripura and others, reported in 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1333, and in particular has relied upon Paragraphs 22
and 23 thereof, which are being extracted hereunder for ready
reference:-
“22. In the present case, the circumstances indicate that the

detaining authority after the receipt of the proposal from the
sponsoring authority was indifferent in passing the order of
detention with greater promptitude. The “live and proximate

5
link” between the grounds of detention and the purpose of
detention stood snapped in arresting the detenu. More
importantly the delay has not been explained in any manner &
though this point of delay was specifically raised & argued
before the High Court as evident from Para 14 of the impugned
judgment yet the High Court has not recorded any finding on
the same.
VITAL MATERIAL OR VITAL FACT WITHHELD AND NOT
PLACED BY THE SPONSORING AUTHORITY BEFORE THE
DETAINING AUTHORITY
23. As noted above, in the case on hand, in both the cases
relied upon by the detaining authority for the purpose of
preventively detaining the appellant herein, the appellant was
already ordered to be released on bail by the concerned Special
Court. Indisputably, we do not find any reference of this fact in
the proposal forwarded by the Superintendent of Police, West
Tripura District while requesting to process the order of
detention. The reason for laying much stress on this aspect of
the matter is the fact that the appellant though arrested in
connection with the offence under the NDPS Act, 1985, the
Special Court, Tripura thought fit to release the appellant on
bail despite the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985.
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 reads thus:
“Section 37. Offences to be cognizable and nonbailable.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)—
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognizable;
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences
under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A and also for
offences involving commercial quantity shall be released on
bail or on his own bond unless—
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to
oppose the application for such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application,
the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds
for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that
he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

6
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of
sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for
the time being in force, on granting of bail.”

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a
judgment of this Court rendered in Habeas Corpus Petition No.8 of
2026, Raees v. State of Uttarakhand and Others, dated 26.05.2026.
While drawing the attention of the Court to the said judgment
(annexed as Annexure No. 2 to the writ petition), he would draw
parallels with the said judgment and would seek quashing of the
impugned detention order on the premise that petitioner’s case is
squarely covered by the said judgment.
8. On the aspect that delay has occurred in passing the
detention order which vitiates the detention, the learned counsel for
the petitioner would refer to para 12 of the case of Sushanta Kumar
Banik ( supra ), which is extracted hereunder for ready reference:-
“12. We may recapitulate the necessary facts which have a
bearing so far as the issue of delay is concerned. The proposal
to take steps to preventively detain the appellant at the end of
the Superintendent of Police addressed to the Superintendent
of Police (C/S) West Tripura, Agartala is dated 28th of June
2021. The proposal in turn forwarded by the Assistant
Inspector General of Police (Crime) on behalf of the Director
General to the Secretary, Home Department is dated
14.07.2021. The order of detention is dated 12th of November,
2021. There is no explanation worth the name why it took
almost five months for the detaining authority to pass the order
of preventive detention.”

9. It is argued that, in fact, a stale issue should not be
revived by passing any detention order. Learned counsel for the
petitioner submits that there should be proximate and live link
between the activities conducted by the petitioner and its detention

7
order. He has referred to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana , reported in (2023)
9 SCC 587, wherein the guidelines have been laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 28, as to what should be considered
while entertaining challenge to the detention order. Para 28 in the
case of Ameena Begum ( supra ) is being extracted hereunder for
ready reference:-
“28. In the circumstances of a given case, a constitutional
court when called upon to test the legality of orders of
preventive detention would be entitled to examine whether:
28.1. The order is based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit
subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the absence of
such satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or
law, upon which validity of the exercise of the power is
predicated, would be the sine qua non for the exercise of
the power not being satisfied;
28.2. In reaching such requisite satisfaction, the detaining
authority has applied its mind to all relevant
circumstances and the same is not based on material
extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute;
28.3. Power has been exercised for achieving the purpose
for which it has been conferred, or exercised for an
improper purpose, not authorised by the statute, and is
therefore ultra vires;
28.4. The detaining authority has acted independently or
under the dictation of another body;
28.5. The detaining authority, by reason of self-created
rules of policy or in any other manner not authorised by
the governing statute, has disabled itself from applying its
mind to the facts of each individual case.
28.6. The satisfaction of the detaining authority rests on
materials which are of rationally probative value, and the
detaining authority has given due regard to the matters as
per the statutory mandate;

8
28.7. The satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in
mind existence of a live and proximate link between
the past conduct of a person and the imperative need
to detain him or is based on material which is stale;
28.8. The ground(s) for reaching the requisite satisfaction
is/are such which an individual, with some degree of
rationality and prudence, would consider as connected
with the fact and relevant to the subject-matter of the
inquiry in respect whereof the satisfaction is to be reached;
28.9. The grounds on which the order of preventive
detention rests are not vague but are precise, pertinent and
relevant which, with sufficient clarity, inform the detenu
the satisfaction for the detention, giving him the
opportunity to make a suitable representation; and
28.10. The timelines, as provided under the law, have been
strictly adhered to.”

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited the
attention of the Court to para 20 of the judgment in the case of
Sushanta Kumar Banik ( supra ), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
referred the judgment in the case of Shafiq Ahmad Vs. District
Magistrate, Meerut and others, (1989) 4 SCC 556, in which case
there was a delay of two and a half months in detaining the
petitioner. In fact, there are two aspects of delay; (i) the passing of
detention order after recommendation of the sponsoring authority
and; (ii) actual detention of the detenue after passing of the
detention order. In the case of Shafiq ( supra ), actual detention was
done after two and a half months of the order passed and it was held
in that case that the delay was unreasonable. In para 20, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-
“20. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as the learned Chief Justice

then was) in Shafiq Ahmed v. District Magistrate, Meerut,
(1989) 4 SCC 556, having regard to the fact that there was
a delay of two and a half months in detaining the petitioner

9
(detenu) therein, pursuant to the order of detention has
concluded that “there was undue delay, delay not
commensurate with the facts situation in that case and the
conduct of the respondent authorities betrayed that there
was no real and genuine apprehension that the detenu was
likely to act in any manner prejudicial to public order. The
order, therefore is bad and must go”. However, the learned
Judge observed that “whether the delay was unreasonable
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

11. It is also submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the
petitioner has been in bail in nine matters other than the one in
which she was convicted, however, the detention order does not
reflect that the detaining authority has at all considered this aspect
of the petitioner being on bail and whether ordinary remedies under
law are not sufficient in case of the petitioner.

12. Per contra , Ms. Manisha Rana Singh, learned Deputy
Advocate General for the State would submit that though the facts
are not in dispute, however, she would draw a distinction with the
judgment in the case of Raees ( supra ) by inviting the attention of the
Court to the criminal history of the petitioner, stating that she has
been convicted in the year 2022 for an NDPS case in which she was
sentenced to the period already undergone & fine.
13. Learned D.A.G. for the State while referring to the
counter affidavit of the State, would submit that the detenu is a
habitual active offender engaged in continuous illegal trade and
trafficking of narcotic drugs, posing a grave threat to public health
and safety. The detenu has a long criminal history of 10 registered
cases under the NDPS Act at PS Rishikesh. To prevent her from
continuing illicit trafficking activities, the competent authority, after
strictly adhering to due procedure of law under Section 3(1) of the
PIT NDPS Act, 1988, passed the valid detention order. The detenu

10
was detained on 30.04.2026 in full compliance with procedural
safeguards.
14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon
perusal of the record, the following issues arise for determination:-
(i) Whether in the present case, the last FIR against the
petitioner under the NDPS Act having been
registered on 16.07.2024, the proposal/
recommendation dated 24.12.2025 for the preventive
detention of the petitioner is highly delayed and
stale, and if so, its effect?
(ii) Whether the detention order, having been passed
four months after the receipt of the
proposal/recommendation can be justified on the
touchstone of imminent necessity and can it be
justified in the facts and circumstances of the case?
(iii) Whether the petitioner being on bail in other nine
cases having not been considered by the detaining
authority vitiates the impugned detention order?

15. So far as Point for Determination No.(i) is concerned, it
is not disputed that the last FIR against the detenu was registered
on 16.07.2024. It is also not disputed that the proposal for detention
came to be forwarded only on 24.12.2025. The petitioner admittedly
has a criminal history and trials in several cases are stated to be
pending. However, the question is whether the delay between the
last alleged prejudicial activity and the recommendation for
preventive detention can sustain the subjective satisfaction recorded
by the detaining authority?

11
16. Preventive detention is an extraordinary measure and
cannot ordinarily be invoked when the ordinary law of the land is
available to address the situation. The long gap between the last FIR
and the recommendation for detention raises a serious doubt
regarding the existence of any imminent necessity for invoking the
provisions of the PIT NDPS Act.
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sushanta Kumar Banik
(supra) has held that where the detaining authority acts without
promptitude and the delay remains unexplained, the live and
proximate link between the grounds of detention and the purpose of
detention stands snapped. Applying the said principle to the facts of
the present case, this Court finds that the
recommendation/proposal itself appears to have been made after
considerable delay and without demonstrating any compelling or
immediate necessity for preventive detention.
18. Accordingly, Point for Determination No.(i) is answered
in favour of the petitioner.
19. Regarding Point for Determination No.(ii), it is an
admitted position that even after the proposal for detention was
forwarded on 24.12.2025, the detention order came to be passed
only on 17.04.2026. Thus, there is a further delay of close to four
months in passing the detention order.
20. The very object of preventive detention is to prevent an
imminent and continuing threat. Where the detaining authority itself
takes several months in passing the detention order, the plea of
urgency or imminent danger becomes difficult to sustain. In the
present case, no satisfactory explanation has been offered by the

12
respondents for the delay occurring after receipt of the
proposal/recommendation.
21. At this stage, it would also be relevant to notice that this
Court in the case of Raees ( supra ), while considering a challenge to
an order of preventive detention under the PIT NDPS Act, held that
where there is an inordinate and unexplained delay between the
alleged prejudicial activities, the proposal for detention and the
passing of the detention order, the live and proximate link between
the alleged activities of the detenu and the object sought to be
achieved by preventive detention stands snapped. This Court further
observed that preventive detention being an exceptional measure,
the detaining authority is required to demonstrate a real and
imminent necessity for invoking such power.
22. In the present case also, the last FIR against the detenu
was registered on 16.07.2024, whereas the proposal for detention
was made on 24.12.2025 and the detention order came to be passed
on 17.04.2026. The delay at both stages remains unexplained. The
facts of the present case, therefore, stand on a similar footing and
the principle laid down in Raees (supra) also supports the conclusion
that the impugned detention order cannot be sustained in law.
23. In view of the discussion made hereinabove and having
regard to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Sushanta Kumar Banik (supra) and the judgment of this Court in
Raees (supra) , this Court is of the considered view that the live and
proximate link between the alleged activities of the detenu and the
purpose sought to be achieved by preventive detention stood
snapped. The delay in forwarding the proposal as well as the delay
in passing the detention order remains unexplained and renders the

13
subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority
unsustainable in law.
24. Consequently, this Court is of the view that there
existed no live and proximate link between the alleged prejudicial
activities attributed to the detenu and the detention order ultimately
passed against her. The delay in passing the detention order clearly
indicates that there was no immediate necessity warranting recourse
to preventive detention. Thus, point for determination no.(ii) is also
answered in favour of the petitioner.
25. Regarding Point for Determination No.(iii), it is argued
on behalf of the petitioner that one of the essential fact before
passing an order under Section 3 (1) of the PIT NDPS Act was that
the petitioner was on bail. But, it is argued that the impugned order,
by which satisfaction for detaining the petitioner has been recorded
as well as the detention order, does not reveal that this fact was
considered by the competent authority that the petitioner was on
bail in all the nine cases.
26. The proposal/recommendation forwarded by the SSP,
Dehradun on 24.12.2025 records that in all nine cases the
petitioner was on bail. But, it is also admitted neither the order
recording satisfaction to detain the petitioner nor the detention order
reveal that this fact was considered that the petitioner was on bail.
Two things are different. The proposal for detaining the petitioner as
forwarded by the SSP, Dehradun reveals that the petitioner was on
bail in all the four cases pending against him. But, the order by
which the satisfaction to detain the petitioner was recorded does not
reveal that the fact that the petitioner was on bail in all four cases
has been considered by the competent authority.

14
27. It is noteworthy that despite the pendency of criminal
cases and despite the petitioner being on bail, no material has been
brought on record to indicate that the State had taken recourse to
ordinary legal remedies available to it, including seeking cancellation
of bail.
28. In the case of Sushanta Kumar Banik ( supra ), though in
para 23, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the proposal
should contain every details with regard to the detention of a person
including the factum of his being on bail or not in bail. But, in para
27, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has gone a step further. Not only
revealing everything on the proposal, but its consideration as well is
necessary. In para 27, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as
follows:-
“27. From the above decisions, it emerges that the requisite
subjective satisfaction, the formation of which is a condition
precedent to passing of a detention order will get vitiated if material
or vital facts which would have bearing on the issue and weighed
the satisfaction of the detaining authority one way or the other and
influence his mind are either or
withheld suppressed by the
sponsoring authority or ignored and not considered by the
detaining authority before issuing the detention order.”
(emphasis supplied)

29. A bare reading of the observation of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court makes it clear that the detention order gets vitiated
if material facts are withheld or suppressed by the sponsoring
authority or ignored or not considered by the detaining
.
authority
30. In fact, the scope of grant of bail and its impact on such
detaining order has been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

15
in the case of Ameena Begum (supra). In paras 59 and 60, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-
“ 59. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid excerpts from the detention
order lay bare the Commissioner's attempt to transgress his jurisdiction
and to pass an order of detention, which cannot be construed as an order
validly made under the Act. The quoted observations are reflective of the
intention to detain the detenu at any cost without resorting to due
procedure.
It is neither 11 the case of the respondents that the detenu
had not complied with the terms of the notice issued under Section
41-ACrPC, nor has it been alleged that the conditions of bail had been
violated by the detenu. It is pertinent to note that in the three
criminal proceedings where the detenu had been released on bail, no
applications for cancellation of bail had been moved by the State. In
the light of the same, the provisions of the Act, which is an
extraordinary statute, should not have been resorted to when ordinary
criminal law provided sufficient means to address the apprehensions
leading to the impugned detention order. There may have existed
sufficient grounds to appeal against the bail orders, but the
circumstances did not warrant the circumvention of ordinary criminal
procedure to resort to an extraordinary measure of the law of
detention.”
preventive
In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay Narain Singh v. State of
60.
Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361] , Hon'ble E.S.
Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) observed : (SCC pp. 35-
36, para 32)
32. … It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard
law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken
that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls
squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of
preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an
accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended
for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under
ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of
orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would
satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such
detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal
court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of
an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same
charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.”
(emphasis supplied)
31. In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner was on
bail. It has not been the case of the State that the petitioner has
misused the bail. It has also not been the case of the petitioner that

16
any application for cancellation of bail has been moved by the State
in that case.
32. It means not only revelation of the facts by the
sponsoring authority is essential, but equally important is
consideration of those facts by the detaining authority. In case,
those facts are ignored or not considered, in view of the law, laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court such detaining orders further
gets vitiated.
33. Since the detaining authority has not considered the
factum of the petitioner having been released on bail in all the
criminal cases, based on which the detention order has been passed,
it per se vitiates the detention order. Thus the Point for
Determination No.(iii) also needs to be answered against the
respondent.
34. In view of the findings recorded on Point for
Determination Nos.(i), (ii) and (iii), this Court finds that the detention
order suffers from non-consideration of relevant material, absence of
a live and proximate link between the alleged activities and the
detention order, and unexplained delay at various stages of the
process.
35. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances,
namely (i) non-consideration of the fact that the detenue had already
been enlarged on bail, (ii) availability of ordinary criminal law
remedies, (iii) absence of any proceedings for cancellation of bail, (iv)
absence of any fresh prejudicial activity immediately preceding the
detention order, and (v) unexplained delay in passing the detention
order, this Court is of the considered view that the subjective

17
satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority cannot be sustained
in law.
36. Accordingly, the detention order dated 17.04.2026
passed under Section 3(1) of the PIT NDPS Act against the detenu is
hereby quashed.
37. The present Habeas Corpus Petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India is accordingly allowed.
38. The detenu shall be released forthwith unless her
detention is required in connection with any other case.


(Siddartha Sah, J.) (Ravindra Maithani, J.)
29.09.2026 29.09.2026


Akash