Jassa Singh vs State Of Punjab

230

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH



CRM-M-55774-2026 (O&M)
Date of decision: 11.11.2026
Date of uploading: 11.11.2026
Jassa Singh ….Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab ….Respondent

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present: - Mr. Narinder S. Lucky, Advocate, for the petitioner.
Mr. Anup Singh, AAG, Punjab.

*

SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)

th
Present 4 petition has been filed under Section 483 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNSS’) for grant of
regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No. 156 dated 06.11.2020,
registered under Section 22 & 29 of the NDPS Act, at Police Station Barnala,
District Barnala.
2. The gravamen of the FIR in question pertains to the alleged
recovery of 1081.10 grams of tramadol.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner
is in custody since 26.08.2024. Learned counsel has further submitted that the
mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not been scrupulously complied
with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects. Learned
counsel has iterated that the trial is delayed and the liability thereof cannot be
fastened upon the petitioner. Learned counsel has further iterated that the
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CRM-M-55774-2026 (O&M)

petitioner has suffered incarceration for more than 2 years & 2 months. Thus,
regular bail is prayed for.
4. Learned State counsel has filed status report dated 10.11.2026,
in Court today, which is taken on record. Raising submissions in tandem with
the said status report, learned State counsel has opposed the present petition
by arguing that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in
nature and, thus, he does not deserve the concession of regular bail. Learned
State counsel has further submitted that the instant bail plea is barred by the
rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus, the same ought to be
dismissed. Learned State counsel seeks to place on record the custody
certificate dated 10.11.2026, which is taken on record.
5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through
the available records of the case.
6. The petitioner was arrested on 26.08.2024 whereinafter
investigation was carried out and challan qua the petitioner was presented on
21.09.2024. Total 17 prosecution witnesses have been cited, out of which only
two have been examined till date. The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise
to debatable issues, which shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial.
This Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival
contentions at this stage, lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has
been brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding
from the process of justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence.
6.1. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be
saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 10.11.2026 filed
by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration







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CRM-M-55774-2026 (O&M)

for a period of 2 years, 2 months & 15 days and is not shown to be involved
in other FIR/case. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section
37 of the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.
6.2. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of
Punjab passed in CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying
upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul
Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh
vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd
Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311;
Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias
Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal”; “Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The
State of West Bengal”, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated
22.08.2022 titled as “Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of
Gujarat”; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal
Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:
7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital
“
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate
anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any
impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an
overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has
been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the
above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid down a series of
decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of
speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint
imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent
incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible
prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since







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4
CRM-M-55774-2026 (O&M)

the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings
consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early
hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The
overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant
pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire
criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this
cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the
accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the
criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The
guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent
delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to
proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a
threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre-
trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and
public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects
against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the
passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself.
It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention are
grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to
psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous
conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused
frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.

There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to
accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition
in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the
rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates
that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public
prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence
charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be
meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused’s fundamental
right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be
rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process,
particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the accused nor
justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual
cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge
in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature
in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases
under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under
Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson’s eye to
the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this
legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does not
become complicit in violation of an individual’s fundamental rights,
notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail
petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative
intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused
to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable
cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment, an
outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity.

Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has
failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged







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CRM-M-55774-2026 (O&M)

incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life
and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty
overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other
words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the
ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37
of the NDPS Act, 1985. ”

6.3. More recently the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment titled
as Sri Sujit Das and others Vs. Union of India [SLP (Crl.) No.12451-12453
of 2026] decided on 05.11.2026 has held thus:
“48. We also find that the High Court in its impugned judgment has
placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Sukhwinder Singh
@ Gora. By way of the aforesaid decision this Court had set aside
the bail granted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court to the
accused for an offence punishable under Sections 21(c) and 29 of
the NDPS Act. While doing so, this Court found that the High Court
did not record any satisfaction that the twin conditions under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act were satisfied and held that without
recording such satisfaction, bail could not have been granted.
48.1. In the course of the deliberation, this Court observed that the
right to speedy trial rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution is
undoubtedly a precious constitutional right. However, the Bench
proceeded to further observe that in matters governed by special
enactments such as the NDPS Act , particularly where the recovery
is of commercial quantity, the said right under Article 21 must be
exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed
into service solely on the ground of delay to override Section 37 .
The constitutional right under Article 21 and the special provisions
of law under Section 37 of the NDPS Act are to be read
harmoniously and not placed in opposition to each other.
49. We have our reservation on the aforesaid observations made by
the Bench. First and foremost, the rights conferred by Article 21 of
the Constitution of India are not only constitutional rights. These
are fundamental rights. Right to life and liberty as enshrined in
Article 21 are at the core of our constitutional jurisprudence. These
fundamental rights cannot be tinkered with so lightly, not even
under the special statutes. Such observations run counter to
numerous judgments of this Court which reiterate the proposition







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CRM-M-55774-2026 (O&M)

that when there is a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, the
rigor of Section 37 of the NDPS Act or similar such provisions under
the special statutes would have to give way. [Please see Union of
India Vs. K.A. Najeeb16 , Satender Kumar (2021) 3 SCC 713 Antil
Vs. CBI17 , Mohd. Muslim Vs. State (NCT of Delhi )18, Ankur
Chadha Vs. State of Madya Pradesh19, Vijay Singh Vs. Union of
India20 wherein this Court clearly held that Article 21 of the
Constitution of India over-rides Section 37 of the NDPS Act, Syed
Iftikhar Andrabi Vs. National Investigation Agency21 and Jaskaran
Jeet Singh Deol Vs. State of Punjab22 ]. In fact, it could be urged
that such an observation by the two-Judge Bench in Sukhwinder
Singh @ Gola may be hit by the principle of per incuriam as K.A.
Najeeb is a judgment by a three-Judge Bench. However, we would
not comment beyond this point since Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora is
also by a coordinate Bench. That apart, from the facts of that case,
it appears that the accused was in custody from 10.01.2024 and bail
was granted to him by the High Court on 18.02.2026. At that stage,
2 out of the 24 prosecution witnesses were examined. It is a
debatable issue as to whether a view could have been taken by the
High Court that right to speedy trial of the accused was being
jeopardized. Moreover, clause (2) (2022) 10 SCC 51 (2023) 18 SCC
166 (2024) SCC Online SC 2730 2026 SCC OnLine SC 881 2026
SCC OnLine SC 1939 of Article 22 was not an issue before the
Bench in Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora. Therefore, this decision also
cannot come to the aid of the respondent.”
6.4. Indubitably, the present petition is the fourth attempt on behalf
of the petitioner for securing regular bail. The last one bearing CRM-M-412-
2026 was dismissed as withdrawn on 15.01.2026. However, keeping in view
the entirety of facts and circumstance of the case in hand especially keeping
in view the extended custody and glacial pace of trial, this Court is inclined to
favourably consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable reference, in this
regard, can be made to a judgment of this Court passed in CRA-S-2332-2023
titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another ; relevant whereof
reads as under:







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CRM-M-55774-2026 (O&M)

“ 10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following principles
emerge:
I Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is maintainable in
law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on the ground of
maintainability thereof.
II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is maintainable
whether earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn/dismissed as not
pressed/dismissed for non-prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed
on merits.
III For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed, the
petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show
substantial change in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or
ostensible change would not suffice. The metaphoric expression of seeking
second/successive bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal
iterations of petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential
change in circumstances.
IV No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what
would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every case has its
own unique facts/circumstance. Making such an attempt is nothing but an
utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and
discretion of the Court dealing with such second/successive regular bail
petition(s).
V In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular bail
petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently required to be
recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being
second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court having
successfully countenanced/entertained such second/successive petition(s)
ought to be readily and clearly decipherable from the said order passed. ”

Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial
is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is
ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to
the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate. However, in
addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned trial Court/Duty
Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or
documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before
the trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.







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CRM-M-55774-2026 (O&M)

(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the
trial Court.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the
Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station
and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior
permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of
every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court,
to the effect that he has not been involved in commission
of any offence after being released on bail. In case the
petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his
being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of
his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move,
forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of
course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.

8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those
which may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as directed
hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the
State/complainant shall be at liberty to move for cancellation of bail of the
petitioner.
9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case.
11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous
application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off.





(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
11.11.2026
Naveen
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No







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