Commissioner Of Customs Air Cargo Complex (Import) vs Spectro Lab Equipments Pvt Ltd

$~14
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Date of decision: 15.10.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010010792026
+ CUSAA 3/2026 & CM APPL. 2833/2026
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AIR CARGO COMPLEX
(IMPORT) .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Arjun Malik, SSC.

versus

SPECTRO LAB EQUIPMENTS PVT LTD .....Respondent
Through: Counsel appearance not given.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

AVNEESH JHINGAN, J. (ORAL)

CM APPL. 2832/2026

1. The appeal under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962 filed
against the order dated 29.01.2025 of the Customs, Excise and Service
Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (hereinafter ‘the tribunal’), is ac-
companied by the application seeking condonation of 154 days delay.
2. As per the pleadings in the application, the impugned order was
received by the appellant/applicant on 13.02.2025 and this appeal was
filed on 09.01.2026.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant contends that on
26.06.2025 the complete case file was handed over to the counsel (here-
inafter referred to as ‘earlier counsel’) but neither the appeal was filed
nor the information was given to the applicant-department. The
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submission is that on 16.10.2025 the file was marked to the present
counsel. After obtaining some more documents from the appellant-de-
partment the appeal was filed.
4. Learned counsel for the non-applicant opposes the condonation
application and contends that no reasonable explanation is pleaded for
condoning the delay.
5. It took more than four months to the applicant-department after
receipt of the impugned order to handover the file to the earlier counsel.
Despite having its own panel of counsel the department chose neither
to disclose the details of the earlier counsel nor to file an affidavit of the
counsel in support of the application.
6. Be that as it may after handing over the file to the earlier counsel
on 26.06.2025, there is no pleadings that the applicant-department ever
inquired the status of the appeal from the earlier counsel. It is not
pleaded as to when the file was retrieved from the earlier counsel, it
only states that the file was handed over to the present counsel on
16.10.2025.
7. On one hand, it is pleaded that a complete file was handed over
to the earlier counsel whereas the counsel has argued that even after the
receipt of the file, certain documents were required and hence it took
time to file the appeal. The contradiction is writ large.
8. The law is well-settled that a public sector undertaking/Govern-
ment department taking its own sweet time to move the file at a leisure
pace cannot be a ground for condoning the delay. In Postmaster Gen-
eral v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 , the Supreme Court
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held that Government departments are equally bound by the law of lim-
itation and that administrative negligence or inaction in the absence of
a plausible and acceptable explanation, cannot constitute sufficient
cause for condonation of delay. The relevant para is as under:
“ 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter
of condonation of delay when there was no gross
negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a
liberal concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and
circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of
various earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted
in view of the modern technologies being used and
available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities
that unless they have reasonable and acceptable
explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort,
there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the
file was kept pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process.
The government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with
diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit
for the government departments. The law shelters
everyone under the same light and should not be swirled
for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper
explanation offered by the Department for the delay
except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the
Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable
and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge
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delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed
on the ground of delay.”
(emphasis supplied)
9. The Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Deo Kumar Singh,
(2022) 16 SCC 483 considering the decision in Chief Post Master Gen-
eral (supra) , held that condonation of delay is no more admissible on
the pretext of lethargic working of Government.
10. The period from 26.06.2025 to 15.10.2025 is simply brushed
aside by shifting the blame on the earlier counsel even the pleadings are
vague and unsubstantiated. The Supreme Court in Rajneesh Kumar v.
Ved Prakash , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380 has held that for an inordi-
nate delay the entire blame cannot be shifted upon learned counsel. The
relevant paras as under:
“ 10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown
on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the
petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a
period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to
blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in
attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we
assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was
careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground
to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant
owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is
expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial
proceedings pending in the court initiated at his
instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be
permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the
advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek
relief.
11. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision
of this Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C.
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Private Ltd. , (1993) 2 SCC 185, wherein this Court
observed as under:—

“8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts
and statements, made within the limits of authority
given to him, are the acts and statements of the
principal i.e. the party who engage him. It is true
that in certain situations, the court may, in the
interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an
ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence
and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds
that the client was an innocent litigant but there is
no such absolute rule that a party can disown its
advocate at any time and seek relief. No such
absolute immunity can be recognized. Such an
absolute rule would make the working of the system
extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq
[(1981) 2 SCC 788 : AIR 1981 SC 1400] must not be
understood as an absolute proposition. As we have
mentioned hereinabove, this was an on-going suit
posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven years
of its institution. It was not a second appeal filed by
a villager residing away from the city, where the
court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic
ignorant villager but a private limited company with
its head office at Calcutta itself and managed by
educated businessmen who know where their
interest lies. It is evident that when their applications
were not deposed of before taking up the suit for
final hearing they felt piqued and refused to appear
before the court. May be, it was part of their
delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. May be
not. But one thing is clear they chose to non-
cooperate with the court. Having adopted such a
stand towards the court, the defendant has no right
to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon
the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were
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totally unaware of the nature or significance of the
proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted
and ought not to have been accepted.”
(emphasis supplied)

11. The pleadings in the application are general in nature, giving no
reasonable cause for condoning the delay. The pace of handing over the
file to the earlier counsel and failure to pursue the matter is the reason
pleaded for condoning the delay. The Supreme Court in Pathapati
Subba Reddy v. Collector (LA), (2024) 12 SCC 336 has held that there
has to be a sufficient cause for condoning the delay and condonation
cannot be done mechanically. The relevant paras are as under:
“ 18. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji [ Collector (LA) v.
Katiji , (1987) 2 SCC 107 : (1987) 62 Comp Cas 370 :
AIR 1987 SC 1353] , this Court in advocating the
liberal approach in condoning the delay for “sufficient
cause” held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to
benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary
to explain every day's delay in filing the appeal; and
since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result
in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in
the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice
should be allowed to prevail upon technical
considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it
ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above,
howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning
the delay, existence of “sufficient cause” for not filing
the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for
exercising the discretionary power to condone the
delay. The phrases “liberal approach”, “justice-
oriented approach” and cause for the advancement of
“substantial justice” cannot be employed to defeat the
law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a
matter of fact dead matters to be revived and reopened
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by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
*
25. In Basawaraj v. LAO [ Basawaraj v. LAO , (2013)
14 SCC 81] , this Court held that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously
based upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
The expression “sufficient cause” as occurring in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally
interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide
is writ large. It was also observed that even though
limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but
it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed
under the statute as the courts have no choice but to
apply the law as it stands and they have no power to
condone the delay on equitable grounds.”
( emphasis supplied )

12. At the cost of repetition, the application has been filed in a cur-
sory manner without pleading the details and is vague.
13. Consequently, there is no reasonable explanation for condoning
the delay of 154 days.
14. The application is dismissed.
CUSAA 3/2026
15. Accordingly, the appeal also stands disposed of.

AVNEESH JHINGAN, J

SHAIL JAIN, J
OCTOBER 15, 2026/jk

Reportable: Yes
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