Gangaram Rajak vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh
- Court
- Madhya Pradesh High Court
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:90991
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK RUSIA
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AMIT LAHOTI
th
ON THE 16 OF NOVEMBER, 2026
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2416 of 2016
CNR No.: MPHC010444682016
GANGARAM RAJAK
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Surdeep Khampariya - Advocate for the appellant.
Shri Ajay Shukla - Government Advocate for the respondent/State.
Shri Chandrapal Singh Parmar - Advocate for the objector.
ORDER
Per: Justice Vivek Rusia
Despite the matter being listed for hearing on the application for
suspension of jail sentence and grant of bail (I.A. No.20794/2026), with the
consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is heard finally.
2. The present criminal appeal has been preferred under Section 374
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, being aggrieved by the judgment
of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.07.2016 passed by the learned
Sessions Judge, Pawai, District Panna, in Sessions Trial No.92/2015,
whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offences punishable under
Sections 302 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo life
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imprisonment with fine of Rs.500/- for the offence under Section 302 of the
IPC and rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence under Section
323 of the IPC, with the stipulation regarding default in payment of fine.
3. As per the prosecution case, on 17.06.2015 at about 12:45 p.m.,
when the complainant (PW-4) returned to his house, the appellant was
standing outside and abusing him in filthy language. When the complainant
objected to the same, the appellant, who was carrying a lathi, assaulted him
on the head to prevent a subsequent blow; the complainant caught hold of
the lathi from his hand. Thereafter, the appellant went inside the house and
returned with a knife. At that time, the father of the complainant was taking a
bath near the hand pump in the same courtyard. On seeing the appellant
carrying a knife and apprehending that he would assault the complainant, he
intervened to save his son. In such scuffle the appellant inflicted a knife blow
on the chest of the deceased and another blow on his face, as a result of
which he sustained injuries and fell down. The deceased subsequently
succumbed to the injuries. On the basis of the report lodged by the
complainant, the criminal law was set into motion and, after completion of
investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before the competent Court.
4. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions, where charges
for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 323 of the IPC were
framed against the appellant. He abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried.
Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence brought on record,
the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforesaid.
Hence, the present appeal.
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5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that he is not
challenging the findings recorded by the learned trial Court regarding the
occurrence of crime and the involvement of the appellant, however, the
conviction under Section 302 of the IPC is specifically assailed. It is
contended that the appellant had initially brought the knife with the intention
of causing injury to PW-4, but his farther i.e. the deceased suddenly
intervened in the altercation and sustained the fatal injury. There was neither
any premeditation nor any intention on the part of the appellant to kill the
deceased. It is further submitted that, even if the prosecution case is accepted
in its entirety, the act of the appellant would not travel beyond the ambit of
Section 304 of the IPC. The appellant has already undergone more than eight
years of actual incarceration and has no criminal antecedents. Therefore, it is
prayed that the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC be altered to one
under Section 304 of the IPC. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the
case of Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 533
and in the case of Hari Shanker v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (1998) 8
SCC 355 in which the Supreme Court of India held that where an accused
intends to assault another person during an altercation and the deceased
suddenly intervenes to pacify or rescue them, sustaining a fatal blow without
prior enmity or intention to kill the intervener, the offence is brought out of
Section 300 (via Exception 4) and altered to Section 304 Part I or Part II IPC ,
depending on the force and seat of the injury. It is submitted that in the case
of Camilo Vaz v. State of Goa, (2000) 9 SCC 1 & State of U.P. v. Jodha
Singh, reported in (1989) 3 SCC 465, the Apex Court has reduced the
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sentenced by holding that once a conviction is altered from Section 302 to
Section 304 Part II IPC (which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years, or
fine, or both), where the appellant has no prior criminal antecedents and has
already undergone 7 to 8+ years of actual incarceration, the sentence is
routinely reduced to the period already undergone.
6. Per contra, learned Government Advocate appearing for the
respondent/State has opposed the prayer and submitted that the appellant
inflicted a knife blow on the deceased and thereafter fled from the spot
instead of making any effort to arrange medical treatment for him. The
nature and location of the injury clearly establish the commission of murder.
Hence, the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC does not call for any
interference. Learned Government Advocate has relied on Pulicherla
Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (2006)
11 SCC 444 in which the Supreme Court laid down the authoritative
checklist of circumstances to determine whether an act falls under Section
302 or Section 304 IPC—specifically examining the nature of the weapon,
whether it was carried beforehand or picked up on the spot, the part of the
body targeted, the number of blows, and whether the deceased intervened
suddenly in a quarrel aimed at someone else.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record
of the trial Court.
7. On a careful examination of the evidence, it is evident that the
prosecution case is primarily supported by the testimony of the complainant
(PW-4), who is an injured eyewitness, as well as PW-7, another eyewitness
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who is closely related to the deceased. The medical evidence, particularly the
testimony of Dr. M.L. Choudhary (PW-11), establishes that the deceased
sustained a punctured wound measuring 1.1 x 2 x 3 inches, caused by a sharp
and pointed object, which proved fatal. It is also apparent from the evidence
on record that there was no previous enmity between the appellant and the
deceased. The incident occurred suddenly when the deceased intervened in
the altercation between the appellant and PW-4. The prosecution evidence
does not indicate any prior planning or preparation on the part of the
appellant to commit the murder of the deceased. The occurrence and the
involvement of the appellant are not disputed before this Court, and the
findings of the learned trial Court in that regard do not call for any
interference. The only question that survives for consideration is whether the
offence made out is murder punishable under Section 302 IPC or culpable
homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 IPC and, if
the latter, under which part of that Section.
8 . The Apex Court in the case of Gurpal Singh v/s The State of
Punjab reported in AIR 2017 SC 471 has held as under:-
“However, in the singular facts of the case and noticing in
particular, the progression of events culminating in the tragic
incident, we are inclined to reduce the sentence awarded to him.
Incidentally, the occurrence is of the year 2004 and meanwhile
twelve years have elapsed. Further, having regard to the root cause
of the incident and the events that sequentially unfolded thereafter,
we are of the comprehension that the appellant was overpowered
by an uncontrollable fit of anger so much so that he was deprived
of his power of self-control and being drawn in a web of action
reflexes, fired at the deceased and the injured, who were within his
sight. The facts do not commend to conclude that the appellant
had the intention of eliminating any one of those fired at, though
he had the knowledge of the likely fatal consequences thereof. Be
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that as it may, on an overall consideration of the fact situation and
also the time lag in between, we are of the view that the
conviction of the appellant ought to be moderated to one under
Sections 304 Part 1 IPC and 307 IPC. Further, considering the
facts of the case in particular, according to us, it would meet the
ends of justice, if the sentence for the offences is reduced to the
period already undergone. We order accordingly.”
9. The Apex Court in the case of Arjun & Another The State of
Chhattisgarh reported in AIR 2017 SC 1150 held as under:-
“20. To invoke this exception (4), the requirements that are to be
fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v.
Union Territory of Chandigarh (1989) 2 SCC 217 : (AIR 1989 SC
1094, Para 6), it has been explained as under: "7. To invoke this
exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (i) it was a
sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done
in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue
advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is
not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the provocation or
started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the
occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the
occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the
offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender
must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel
manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the
moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries,
one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of
this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.............."
21. Further in the case of Arumugam v. State,Represented by
Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, (2008) 15 SCC 590 : (AIR 2009
SC 331, Para 15), in support of the proposition of law that under
what circumstances exception (4) to Section 300 IPC can be
invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under:
"9. .......
"18. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death
is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden
fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and
(d) the fight must have been with the person killed.
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To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients
mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that
the 'fight' occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes
two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that
there must be no time for the passions to cool down
and in this case, the parties had worked themselves
into a fury on account of the verbal altercation n the
beginning. A fight is a combat between two and
more persons whether with or without weapons. It is
not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what
shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a
question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or
not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of
each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is
not sufficient to show that there was a sudden
quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must
further be shown that the offender has not taken
undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual
manner. The expression 'undue advantage' as used in
the provision means 'unfair advantage'."
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prabhakar Vithal
Gholve v/s State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2016 SC 2292 has laid
down that if the assault on the deceased could be said to be on account of the
sudden fight without premeditation, in heat of passion and upon a sudden
quarrel, Conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained under S. 302 and
altered to one under Section 304 Part-I of IPC. In Sikandar Ali v/s State of
Maharashtra reported in AIR 2017 SC 2614, the Court altered the conviction
u/s 302 IPC to one u/s 304 part-2 IPC in the following circumstances:
“We have no doubt about the complicity of all the accused in the
homicide of Sarfraj. A-1 attacked the deceased with the knife and
caused injury on his neck which resulted in his death. The other
accused assisted him in committing the crime by holding the
hands of the deceased. However, the only question that falls for
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our consideration is whether the accused are liable to be punished
for an offence under Section 302 IPC. After considering the
submissions made by the counsel for the Appellants and
scrutinising the material on record, we are of the opinion that the
accused are not liable to be convicted under Section 302 IPC. We
are convinced that there was neither prior concert nor common
intention to commit a murder. During the course of their business
activity the accused reached the dhaba where the deceased was
present. An altercation took place during the discussion they were
having behind the dhaba. That led to a sudden fight during which
A-1 attacked the deceased with a knife. Exception 4 to Section
300 is applicable to the facts of this case. As we are convinced
that the accused are responsible for the death of Sarfraj, we are of
the opinion that they are liable for conviction under Section 304
part II of the IPC. We are informed that A-1 has undergone a
sentence of seven years and that A-2 to A-4 have undergone four
years of imprisonment. We modify the judgment of the High
Court converting the conviction of the accused from Section 302
to Section 304 part II of the IPC sentencing them to the period
already undergone. They shall be released forthwith.”
11. The Apex Court in the case Madhavan & Others State of Tamil
Nadu reported in AIR 2017 SC 3847 has held as under:-
“8. Notably, the High Court has not considered the issue of
quantum of sentence at all, but mechanically proceeded to affirm
the sentence awarded by the Trial Court. From the factual
position, which has emerged from the record, it is noticed that
there was a preexisting property dispute between the two families.
The incident in question happened all of a sudden without any
premeditation after PW1 questioned the appellants about their
behaviour. It was a free fight between the two family members.
Both sides suffered injuries during the altercation. The fatal injury
caused to Periyasamy was by the use of thadi (wooden log) which
was easily available on the spot.The appellants, on their own,
immediately reported the matter to the local police alleging that
the complainant party was the aggressor. No antecedent or
involvement in any other criminal case has been reported against
the appellants. Taking oral view of the matter, therefore, we find
force in the argument of the appellants that the quantum of
sentence is excessive.”
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12. In Chand Khan v/s The State of Madhya Pradesh reported in
2006 (3) M.P.L.J. 549, the Division Bench of this Court has also converted
the conviction of the appellant in attaining facts and circumstances of the
case. Para – 10 & 11 of the judgment are relevant which read thus:-
“If the present case is considered in the light of the aforesaid
decisions of the Supreme Court, it would show that the appellants
caused single injury on the head of the deceased by farsa, which is
a sharp edged weapon, but unfortunately Aziz Khan (PW-11) and
Ishaq Khan (PW-13) have stated that he gave lathi blow on the
head of the deceased. Even after considering this contradictory
evidence it has to be taken into consideration that it is a case of
single farsa blow inflicted by only appellant Chandkhan and
appellant Naseem inflicted only lathi blow on the nonvital part of
the body and in the absence of this evidence that the injury no.(i)
was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and
also looking to the various other circumstances like that the
accused as well as the deceased are close relatives and the
deceased was a person of criminal background and the incident
started because of the abuses made first by the deceased himself,
we find that the case will not fall within the purview of section
300, Indian Penal Code but it will fall under section 304 Part II,
culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
11. Consequently, appeal is partly allowed. Conviction of
appellants under section 302/34 Indian Penal Code, is set aside
and instead they are convicted under section 304 part II, Indian
Penal Code, ..........”
13. In the case of Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v/s State of Maharashtra
reported in (2013) 6 SCC 770 the Supreme Court of India has held as under:-
“10. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the
appellant's case fell within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC which
reads as under: Exception 4. Culpable homicide is not murder if it
is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat
of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's
having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner.
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11. It was argued that the incident in question took place on a
sudden fight without any premeditation and the act of the
appellant hitting the deceased was committed in the heat of
passion upon a sudden quarrel without the appellant having taken
undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner. There is,
in our opinion, considerable merit in that contention. We say so
for three distinct reasons:
11.1. Firstly, because even according to the prosecution version,
there was no premeditation in the commission of the crime. There
is not even a suggestion that the appellant had any enmity or
motive to commit any offence against the deceased, leave alone a
serious offence like murder. The prosecution case, as seen earlier,
is that the deceased and his wife were guarding their jaggery crop
in their field at around 10 p.m. when their dog started barking at
the appellant and his two companions who were walking along a
mud path by the side of the field nearby. It was the barking of the
dog that provoked the appellant to beat the dog with the rod that
he was carrying apparently to protect himself against being
harmed by any stray dog or animal. The deceased took objection
to the beating of the dog without in the least anticipating that the
same would escalate into a serious incident in the heat of the
moment. The exchange of hot words in the quarrel over the
barking of the dog led to a sudden fight which in turn culminated
in the deceased being hit with the rod unfortunately on a vital part
like the head.
11.2. Secondly, because the weapon used was not lethal nor was
the deceased given a second blow once he had collapsed to the
ground. The prosecution case is that no sooner the deceased fell to
the ground on account of the blow on the head, the appellant and
his companions took to their heels a circumstance that shows that
the appellant had not acted in an unusual or cruel manner in the
prevailing situation so as to deprive him of the benefit of
Exception 4.
11.3. Thirdly, because during the exchange of hot words between
the deceased and the appellant all that was said by the appellant
was that if the deceased did not keep quiet even he would be
beaten like a dog. The use of these words also clearly shows that
the intention of the appellant and his companions was at best to
belabour him and not to kill him as such. The cumulative effect of
all these circumstances, in our opinion, should entitle the appellant
to the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.”
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14. Section 304 IPC is in two parts. The first part applies where the act
by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of
causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. The second part applies
where the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but
without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury. Explaining the
distinction between the two parts, the Supreme Court in Anbazhagan v. State,
2023 INSC 632 (2023 SCC OnLine SC 857), held that under the first part the
offence of murder is first established and the accused is then given the
benefit of one of the Exceptions to Section 300 IPC, whereas under the
second part the offence of murder is never established at all. In effect, the
first part applies where there is guilty intention, and the second part applies
where there is no such intention but only guilty knowledge. It was further
held that, for conviction under the second part, it is not necessary to bring the
case within any of the Exceptions to Section 300 IPC. The Court must
therefore first ask whether the act, but for the Exception, would amount to
murder under Section 300 IPC. If it would, and an Exception is available, the
conviction lies under Section 304 Part-I. If it would not amount to murder at
all, and the accused had only the knowledge that his act was likely to cause
death, the conviction lies under Section 304 Part-II. The weapon used, the
part of the body targeted, the nature, depth and number of injuries, and the
conduct of the accused before and after the incident are the relevant factors
for determining the intention.
15. Applying the above principles, this Court finds that the case falls
under Section 304 Part-I and not Part-II, for the following reasons:
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(i). The appellant, after assaulting PW-4 with a lathi, went inside the
house and returned with a knife, a dangerous and sharp-edged weapon. He
then inflicted a knife blow on the chest, which is a vital part of the body, and
another blow on the face of the deceased. As per PW-11, the chest injury is a
punctured wound measuring 1.1 x 2 x 3 inches caused by a sharp and pointed
object, and it proved fatal. A knife blow of such depth on the chest, a vital
part, cannot be said to be inflicted merely with the knowledge that death was
likely. It shows that the appellant intended to cause bodily injury which was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The act, therefore,
falls within clause 'thirdly' of Section 300 IPC and, but for an Exception,
would amount to murder. Unlike the cases of Chand Khan (non-vital injury,
lathi blow and no proof that the injury was sufficient to cause death) and
Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad (iron rod, not a lethal weapon), the present case is
not one of absence of intention, and the second part of Section 304 IPC,
which is reserved for cases of knowledge without intention, is not attracted.
(ii). At the same time, the evidence shows that there was no previous
enmity between the appellant and the deceased, and that the incident arose
suddenly out of an altercation which began with abuses and a lathi blow to
PW-4. The deceased, who was bathing near the hand pump, himself stepped
in to save his son, and the fatal blows were given in the course of this sudden
fight and in the heat of passion, within a short span of time and without any
time for the passion to cool down. The prosecution evidence does not show
any prior planning to commit the murder of the deceased. Only two blows
were given and no further assault was made once the deceased fell down. It
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cannot, therefore, be said that the appellant acted in a cruel or unusual
manner or took undue advantage. The submission of the State that the
appellant fled from the spot may be a relevant circumstance, but it does not
by itself take the case out of Exception 4 (see Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad, para
11.2). All the ingredients of Exception 4, as laid down in Arjun and
Arumugam (supra), are thus satisfied.
(iii). Since the act amounts to murder but for Exception 4, and the
appellant is entitled to the benefit of that Exception, the culpable homicide is
not murder and is punishable under Section 304 Part-I IPC. The submission
of learned counsel for the appellant that the case falls under Section 304 Part-
II IPC cannot be accepted, as the intention to cause a bodily injury likely to
cause death is clearly made out from the weapon used, the vital part targeted
and the depth of the injury.
16. In view of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements of the Apex
Court as well as of this Court, the present Criminal Appeal is partly allowed.
The findings of the learned trial Court regarding the occurrence and the
culpability of the appellant are maintained. However, the conviction of the
appellant is altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-I IPC, and the
sentence is reduced from life imprisonment to the period already undergone
in view of more than eight years of actual incarceration and absence of
criminal antecedents. The conviction and sentence under Section 323 IPC
and the fine amount are maintained, with the stipulation regarding default in
payment of fine. The appellant be released from jail after depositing the fine
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amount, if he is not required to be kept in jail in any other case.
17. Record of the trial Court be sent back along with a copy of this
judgment.
(VIVEK RUSIA)
(AMIT LAHOTI)
JUDGE
JUDGE
ak
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