Bijendra Kumar Kaushik vs District And Session Judge, Exercising The Powers Of Educational Tribunal And Ors.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH

119
CWP No.29661 of 2026
Date of Decision: 11.09.2026


Bijendra Kumar Kaushik .....Petitioner
VERSUS
District and Sessions Judge and others …..Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR

Present : Petitioner-in-person.
*

HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J.
1. The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India for issuance of writs in the nature of certiorari , mandamus ,
prohibition etc. against the order dated 14.11.2018 (Annexure P1), partly allowed
by respondent No.1-Educational Tribunal, Karnal, praying for grant of interest on
summer vacation salary from 15.05.2000 to 30.06.2000, on the arrears of annual
increments for the years 1999-2000, 2007-08, 2008-09 and on the arrears of ACP
scales due in the years 2009 and 2019 for which the execution petition is pending.
Further prayer has been made to direct the respondents to make payment of interest
@ 12% per annum on arrears of Rs.12,56,465/- as principal amount due in July,
2020, towards arrears of ACP scales w.e.f. 2009 and 2019 and arrears of annual
increments for the years 1999-2000, 2007-08 and 2008-09, as delayed payment and
otherwise also, from the date it fell due till the date of payment made by the
respondents from time to time, and to be paid accordingly.
OMKAR SINGH
2026.09.15 17:22
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High Court Chandigarh

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2. The petitioner, appearing in person, inter alia , contends that he served
respondent No.2 as a Lecturer in Physics for about 20 years, whereafter his services
were terminated vide order dated 31.07.2014 on flimsy grounds. The petitioner
challenged the termination order before the Educational Tribunal, Karnal, and his
claim was allowed vide order dated 06.03.2019 whereby the termination order was
set aside and the respondents were directed to release the consequential benefits
within three months. CWP No.14111 of 2019, preferred by the respondents against
the said order, was dismissed by this Court. LPA No.1534 of 2023 was also
dismissed on 24.01.2024, and the Special Leave Petition preferred thereafter was
dismissed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court on 04.12.2024, as is discernible from
Annexure P2. The petitioner had sought pay protection which he was getting prior
to his posting at DAV School, Assandh and also other benefits, which were denied
by the respondent-Management. It is further submitted that he was treated as
regular w.e.f. 01.10.1999 and was held entitled to salary for the summer vacation
from 15.05.2000 to 30.06.2000 alongwith annual increment w.e.f. 01.10.2000 as
well as first ACP vide judgment dated 14.11.2018 (Annexure P1) passed by the
Educational Tribunal, Karnal. Accordingly, the petitioner claims interest at the rate
of 12% per annum on the arrears of salary amounting to ₹12,56,465/- on account
of delayed payment.
3. Having heard the petitioner in person and upon perusal of the record,
it transpires that, while challenging the termination order dated 31.07.2014 before
the Educational Tribunal, the petitioner had also claimed interest at the rate of 18%
per annum on the salary payable for the suspension period. Vide the impugned
order dated 18.11.2018, the Educational Tribunal, Karnal held the appeal to be
treated as as regular w.e.f. 01.10.1999 and further held him entitled to salary for
the summer vacation from 15.05.2000 to 30.06.2000 alongwith annual increment
OMKAR SINGH
2026.09.15 17:22
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High Court Chandigarh

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w.e.f. 01.10.2000 as well as first ACP ; however, no interest thereon was awarded.
The petitioner did not challenge the said order to the extent of non-grant of interest
within a reasonable period. Having accepted the order and allowed it to attain
finality, he has now, after an unexplained delay of more than seven and a half years,
invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court to claim interest at the rate of 12% per
annum. The relief sought is, therefore, barred by delay and laches.
4. In the present case, the petitioner has approached this Court after a
considerable lapse of time. Admittedly, the petitioner has not challenged the order
dated 06.03.2019 passed by the Educational Tribunal, Karnal and now by invoking
the writ jurisdiction of this Court, the petitioner is seeking the relief, which is hit
by the vice of delay and laches. Further, no plausible explanation is forthcoming
for the delay in filing the present petition. It is trite law that the delay in approaching
this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be condoned if
sufficient cause is indicated or a reasonable explanation is provided for the same.
However, the facts of the matter at hand indicate otherwise. Learned counsel
petitioner has failed to specify any compelling or extenuating circumstance which
prevented him/her from approaching this Court for such a long time. Reference in
this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by a three-Judge Bench of
Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power
Corporation Limited and others v. Ram Gopal, (2021) 13 SCC 225 , wherein, the
following was held:
“16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to
proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India,
nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable
lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate
laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts
naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary
OMKAR SINGH
2026.09.15 17:22
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jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed
illegalities to fester. Fence- sitters cannot be allowed to barge into
Courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant
citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists . On
multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit
limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS
Balu v. State of Kerala , this Court observed thus:
“17. It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats
equity". .... It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner
approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed
for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches
irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the
other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. ”
( emphasis added )
5. Further, in Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and others 2024 AIR
SC 2717, Hon’ble the Supreme Court has categorically observed that the High
Courts must factor in the delay, while exercising its discretionary powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was further opined that undue and
unexplained delay may be reason enough to dismiss a petition as indolent litigants
ought not to be encouraged by writ Courts.
6. Furthermore, the petitioner is claiming interest for which no prayer
was made before the Educational Tribunal as discernible from Annexure P1, thus,
the plea with regard to claim of interest before this Court is hit by the principle of
Constructive Res Judicata and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(in short ‘CPC’). The principle of Constructive Res Judicata is an extension of the
principle of Res Judicata . A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam and Others, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 17
has clearly held that the principle of Constructive Res Judicata would be applicable
to the writ proceedings as well. The Court speaking through Justice P.B.
OMKAR SINGH
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Gajendragadkar observed as follows in Para 9 of the judgement:
“ 9. It may be conceded in favour of Mr Trivedi that the rule of constructive
res judicata which is pleaded against him in the present appeal is in a sense
a somewhat technical or artificial rule prescribed by the Code of Civil
Procedure. This rule postulates that if a plea could have been taken by a
party in a proceeding between him and his opponent, he would not be
permitted to take that plea against the same party in a subsequent
proceeding which is based on the same cause of action; but basically, even
this view is founded on the same considerations of public policy, because
if the doctrine of constructive res judicata is not applied to writ
proceedings, it would be open to the party to take one proceeding after
another and urge new grounds every time; and that plainly is inconsistent
with considerations of public policy to which we have just referred . ”

(emphasis supplied)

7. Similar view has been expressed by a Three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain, 1977 2 SCC 806 ,
wherein the Court speaking through Justice P.N. Shinghal has held that there may
be a situation that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of
action, however, in such a case, if a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one
cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that
would aggravate the burden of litigation and, therefore, such a course of action will
be an abuse of the process of law. The Two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court speaking through Justice A.K. Ganguly in M. Nagabhushana v. State of
Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 408 has also concluded that there can be no doubt that
the principle of constructive Res Judicata , as explained in Explanation IV to

Section 11 CPC, is also applicable to writ petitions.
8. Any cause of action or claim that was available to the petitioner before
the Educational Tribunal but was not raised therein is barred under Order II Rule 2
CPC. The petitioner cannot be permitted to institute a fresh petition for the same
cause of action by giving a new twist to the factual matrix already canvassed in the
OMKAR SINGH
2026.09.15 17:22
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High Court Chandigarh

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earlier writ. No cogent reason has been shown as to why such reliefs were not
sought previously. Furthermore, any additional grounds or issues now raised shall
be deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue in the former
proceedings and are, therefore, barred by the principle of Constructive Res
Judicata .
9. In view of the discussion above, this Court does not find it appropriate
to invoke its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed.
10. Pending misc. application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of
accordingly.

( HARPREET SINGH BRAR )
September 11 , 2026. JUDGE
‘om’

Whether speaking/reasoned. : Yes/No
Whether Reportable. : Yes/No
OMKAR SINGH
2026.09.15 17:22
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
High Court Chandigarh