Aseen vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - C No. - 10803 of 2026
Aseen
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. And 3 Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Intekhab Alam Khan, Janardan Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C.
A.F.R.
Court No. - 40
HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.
HON'BLE GARIMA PRASHAD, J.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Garima Prashad,J.)
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing
Counsel for the State.
2. The petitioner, by means of the present writ petition, has sought
the following reliefs:
“ (i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus
commanding the respondent authority to provide security/protection and
permission of the prayer (Namaz) at the private premises (i.e. area 82.80
sqr mtr of Abadi Land) of petitioner situated at Village Ikona, Pargana
Rajpura, Tehsil Gunnaur, District Sambhal.
(ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus
commanding the respondent no.2/District Magistrate Sambhal to
consider and pass the appropriate order upon the representation dated
15.11.2005 pending before him within stipulated period, otherwise
petitioner shall suffer irreparable loss and injury.”
3. The petitioner’s case is that Namaz has been offered on a piece of
land at Village Ikona, District Sambhal, which he claims to be his
private property. He alleges that the respondent authorities are

WRIC No. 10803 of 2026
2
restraining such prayers. The petitioner asserts ownership over the
land on the basis of a registered gift deed dated 16.06.2023, and
contends that the restraint violates his fundamental rights under
Articles 19, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of the Constitution, as persons
professing Islam are entitled to offer Namaz without interference.
4. It is further alleged that such interference is arbitrary and is being
carried out in collusion with certain social elements, thereby
obstructing the petitioner and other persons from offering prayers.
Reliance has been placed upon the decisions of the coordinate
benches of this Court in Munazir Khan v. State of U.P. & Others
(Writ-C No. 5996 of 2026), Pastor Selvakumar Samu v. State of
U.P. (Writ-C No. 32058 of 2024, decided on 19.03.2025),
Marantha Full Gospel Ministries v. State of U.P. (Writ-C No. 1097
and
of 2026, decided on 27.01.2026) Emmanuel Grace Charitable
Trust v. State of U.P. (Writ-C No. 1080 of 2026, decided on
27.01.2026) to contend that prayers can be conducted on private
premises without requiring prior permission.
5. Per contra , learned Standing Counsel submits, on the basis of
written instructions, that the land in question, being Khata No. 613,
Gata No. 629, is recorded as Abadi land falling under Category
Shreni-6(2), i.e. land meant for public use, and that the petitioner has
no ownership rights over the same. The said gift deed dated
16.06.2023 allegedly executed by one Deen Mohammad in favour of
the petitioner, in respect of an area of 82.80 sq. meters, does not
disclose any Gata number, Khata number or identifiable revenue
particulars, and is based only on vague boundary descriptions. It
therefore cannot confer any legal title upon him.
6. It is also brought on record that as per the report of the Sub-
Divisional Magistrate, Namaz has traditionally been offered at the
said location only on the occasion of Eid, and that no restriction has
been imposed on such established practice. The petitioner, however,
is attempting to introduce regular large scale congregational prayers
by inviting persons from within and outside the village.

WRIC No. 10803 of 2026
3
7. It is further brought on record that Village Ikona has a mixed
population and has remained peaceful for decades. Even the
petitioner, in his own representation, has acknowledged that villagers
have been living harmoniously for more than 50 years. The
photographs annexed with the petition themselves demonstrate that
Namaz has been offered only on specific traditional occasions such
as Eid.
8. Learned Standing Counsel has further relied upon several
Government Orders dated 16.07.2024, 16.08.2024, 24.03.2025 and
11.02.2026, all of which consistently mandate that while religious
practices are to be respected, no new traditions or non-traditional
activities shall be permitted and that established practices must be
adhered to in order to maintain public order.
9. It has further been submitted that even with respect to Hindu
festivals like Holika Dahan, it has been specifically directed that
such ceremonies shall be conducted only at traditional sites and not
in public thoroughfares or new locations, thereby reinforcing the
consistent administrative policy of preservation of established
traditions.
10. Having considered the submissions, the issue that arises for
consideration is:
“ Whether, and to what extent, the rights guaranteed under Articles 25
and 26 extend to the conduct of congregational religious activities ,
whether on public land or private premises”
11. Freedom, in a constitutional society, is always accompanied by
responsibility towards others. The Constitution protects the right to
practice religion, but it also makes it clear that this right is subject to
public order, morality and health. It is not an unlimited right. It
cannot be exercised in a way that affects others or disturbs the
normal functioning of public life. As is often said, one person’s
freedom ends where it begins to affect someone else.
12. When it comes to public land, the position is straightforward.

WRIC No. 10803 of 2026
4
Public land is meant for everyone and is controlled by law. No
individual can claim a right to use it for regular religious gatherings.
Such use affects movement, access and safety, and in appropriate
situations, communal equilibrium; it must therefore be regulated. It
is the State’s obligation to ensure equal access, civic order and non-
discriminatory administration.
13. The law in this regard is well settled. In Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha
Swamiar of Shirur Mutt , 1954 SCR 1005 , the Supreme Court
recognized protection in matters of religion, but made it equally clear
that the right is not dissociated from the constitutional limitations
expressly written into Article 25. In M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of
, it was observed that Namaz may be
India , (1994) 6 SCC 360
offered anywhere, which means that no particular place can be
claimed as a matter of right.
14. In Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India , (2018) 9 SCC 501 ,
the Supreme Court emphasised the importance of maintaining social
harmony, civic peace and the rule of law and reminded that courts
must be mindful of the practical impact of their decisions. Where a
claim to hold religious congregation on public land has the potential
to create social tension, the constitutional court must ensure that the
conditions necessary for peaceful coexistence are maintained.
15. In this context, it must be recognised that existing lawful
practices, long-regulated arrangements, or permissions granted for
limited or specific purposes may stand on their own footing; but no
new or unilateral claim can be founded merely on religion or
personal preference. The State is constitutionally entitled, and in
appropriate cases duty bound, to prevent the use of public land
without lawful authority.
16. The position in respect of private property stands on a different
footing. Private prayer, family worship, and such limited devotional
activity as remains genuinely internal to the premises ordinarily fall
within the protected domain of Articles 25 and 26. This protection,

WRIC No. 10803 of 2026
5
however, is confined to activity that is truly private, occasional, and
non-disruptive. It does not extend to transforming any private
premises into a de facto public religious venue.
17. Once the activity assumes such a congregational character, it is
no longer merely a matter of inward faith. It begins to produce
external consequences: it may draw repeated attendance, including
persons beyond the immediate household, affect ingress and egress,
create traffic and parking concerns, alter the character of the locality,
generate noise, require policing, and in sensitive areas, create the
possibility of inter-community tension. At that stage, the activity
assumes a public or quasi-public dimension. It is not that the private
property loses all protection, but that the use of such property, to that
extent, no longer remains purely private for constitutional purposes
and becomes amenable to reasonable regulation.
18. This position is consistent with the decisions relied upon by the
petitioner. In Munazir Khan vs. State of U.P. & Others , Pastor
Selvakumar Samu vs. State of U.P. , Marantha Full Gospel
Ministries vs. State of U.P. and Emmanuel Grace Charitable Trust
vs. State of U.P. , the Court protected bona fide prayer within private
premises and held that such personal religious exercise cannot be
arbitrarily interfered with. However, those decisions cannot be read
as laying down that organized or regular congregational activity on
private premises is wholly immune from regulation. They recognise
a limited protection, namely where prayer remains confined to a
private, non-disruptive setting. Where the activity extends beyond
that sphere and begins to affect the public domain, lawful regulation
follows. These decisions do not confer a right to convert private
premises into an unregulated congregational space.
19. Further, the law does not require the authorities to wait for an
actual disturbance to occur. Where an activity is likely to affect
public order, the State is entitled to act in advance. The test is not the
religious nature of the activity, but its public consequences. This
approach is consistent with the constitutional principle of secularism,
which requires equal treatment of all religions and equal application

WRIC No. 10803 of 2026
6
of law. While the State must permit private worship, it is equally
bound to regulate activities that affect public order, whether on
public land or on private premises. Maintaining this balance is
essential to the working of Articles 25 and 26 in a constitutional
system.
20. In light of the above discussion, the issue so framed stands
answered in the following terms:
(i) Public land is meant for common use, and no individual or group can
claim a right to use it as an exclusive or recurring religious space; the
State is bound to ensure equal access and cannot permit preferential or
exclusive use of such land.
(ii) The right to practise religion is subject to public order, including
access, movement and peaceful living, and cannot be exercised in a
manner that interferes with these rights of others.
(iii) Private property may be used for personal and limited religious
activity so long as it remains genuinely private, occasional and non-
disruptive; however, once such use extends to regular or organized
congregational activity involving persons beyond a limited private
sphere, it falls outside the protected domain and may attract regulatory
control.
(iv) Where such activity in the private property becomes regular,
organized or large in scale, it may amount to a change in the nature of
use of the premises and is subject to applicable laws, including planning
and local regulations.
(v) The introduction or expansion of a religious use or practice not
previously prevalent, particularly where it disturbs the existing social
balance, is not protected under Articles 25 and 26. The State is not
required to wait for actual disruption and may take reasonable preventive
measures where such activity is likely to affect public life.
21. Turning to the facts of the present case, the material on record
does not support the claim advanced by the petitioner. The pleadings
in the writ petition are vague and lack material particulars. No

WRIC No. 10803 of 2026
7
specific incident, date, time or identifiable act attributable to any
authority has been disclosed. The allegations of interference, threats
and collusion with unnamed persons are general in nature and are not
supported by any material. Such pleadings do not meet the standard
required for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution.
22. On the basis of the material placed on record, this Court finds
that the land in question is recorded as public land. The claim of
ownership rests entirely on a purported gift deed dated 16.06.2023,
which does not contain basic land particulars such as Gata or Khata
numbers and is based only on vague boundary descriptions. Such a
document does not establish any identifiable title and cannot displace
the revenue record.
23. Even otherwise, if the land is assumed to be private, the
petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought. The record shows that
he is not protecting an existing practice, but seeking to introduce
regular congregational gatherings, including persons from within and
outside the village. It is admitted that Namaz was earlier offered only
on specific occasions such as Eid. This expansion beyond a limited
private sphere falls outside the protected domain and is subject to
regulation.
24. In these circumstances, no enforceable legal right is made out.
This Court cannot grant relief on such a basis, particularly where the
matter has implications for public order and social harmony.
25. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
(Garima Prashad,J.) (Saral Srivastava,J.)
April 6, 2026
Sachin Mishra
Digitally signed by :-
SACHIN MISHRA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad