Chaudhary Manish Singh vs State of U.P. and Another

A.F.R.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 6433 of 2026
Chaudhary Manish Singh
.....Revisionist(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and Another
.....Opposite
Party(s)
Counsel for Revisionist(s) : Anand Mohan Pandey, Krishan Mohan
Pandey
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : G.A.
Court No. - 83
HON'BLE PRAVEEN KUMAR GIRI, J.
1. Heard Mr. Anand Mohan Pandey, learned counsel for the revisionist
and Mr. Pankaj Kumar, learned AGA for the State.
2. Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that he has preferred the
instant criminal revision with the relief which has been mentioned in the
prayer clause of the revision. The relief which has been mentioned in the
prayer clause is delineated below:-
"It is, therefore, Most Respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may
kindly be pleased to admit and allow the present criminal revision, calls
for the records of the case from the court below and set aside the
impugned order dated 8.9.2026 passed by Additional Sessions Judge
/F.T.C-I Agra in criminal appeal No.111 of 2026 (Chaudhary Manish
Singh Vs. State of U.P. and another) and that of impugned order dated
8.10.2024 passed by Civil Judge (J.D.) /F.T.C-I Agra in Case No. 14837
of 2023 (Pratigya Vs. Chaudhary Manish Singh and others) under section
12 of Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act) Police Station
Shahganj District Agra otherwise the revisionist shall suffer irreparable
loss and injury And/or pass such other and further order which this
Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the circumstances of the

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case."
3. Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that the marriage of the
revisionist was solemnized with opposite party No. 2 on 27.11.2014. He
further submits that opposite party No. 2-wife has initiated criminal
proceedings against the revisionist alleging cruelty and demand of dowry.
He further submits that proceeding for maintenance has also been initiated
under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He further submits that opposite
party No. 2 has been residing separately since 2018 without any sufficient
reason.
4. Learned counsel for the revisionist further submits that opposite party
No. 2 has filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act,
2005'), seeking reliefs under Sections 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the said Act.
For ready reference, Section 12 of the Act, 2005 is delineated below:
" 12. Application to Magistrate- (1)An aggrieved person or a Protection
Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may
present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs
under this Act:
Provided that before passing any order on such application,
the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic
incident report received by him from the Protection Officer
or the service provider.
(2)The relief sought for under sub-section (1) may include a relief for
issuance of an order for payment of compensation or damages without
prejudice to the right of such person to institute a suit for compensation
or damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence
committed by the respondent:Provided that where a decree for any
amount as compensation or damages has been passed by any Court in
favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if any, paid or payable in
pursuance of the order made by the Magistrate under this Act shall be set
off against the amount payable under such decree and the decree shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908), or any other law for the time being in force, be executable for

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the balance amount, if any, left after such set off.
(3)Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and
contain such particulars as may be prescribed or as nearly as possible
thereto.
(4)The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which shall not
ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of receipt of the application
by the Court.
(5)The Magistrate shall to dispose of every application made
endeavour
under sub-section (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its
first hearing."
5. Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that the revisionist-husband
raised a preliminary objection by filing an application under Section 468
Cr.P.C. on the ground that the proceedings initiated under Section 12 of
the Act, 2005, as well as the reliefs sought therein, are barred by
limitation. He has placed reliance upon Section 468 Cr.P.C., which
provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence after the expiry
of the period of limitation prescribed therein. However, the trial court as
well as the appellate court have erroneously rejected the said application
filed by the revisionist.
6. For ready reference, Section 468 Cr.P.C. is delineated below:
" 468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation-
(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court, shall
take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in Sub-Section (2),
after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be-
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment
for a term not exceeding one year
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with

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imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not
exceeding three years.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to
offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference
to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as
the case may be, the most severe punishment."
7. Sri Pankaj Kumar, learned A.G.A., submits that the provisions of
Section 468 Cr.P.C. are not applicable to the proceedings under Section
12 of the Act, 2005, and, therefore, the application filed by the revisionist
under Section 468 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable. He further submits that the
said application has been filed only to delay the proceedings, whereas
under Section 12(5) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the Magistrate
is under an obligation to endeavour to dispose of every application made
under sub-section (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its
first hearing.
8. Learned A.G.A. further submits that the controversy regarding the
applicability of Section 468 Cr.P.C. to proceedings under Section 12 of
the Act, 2005, has already been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
. He further
Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan; (2022) 15 SCC 50
submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that filing of an
application under Section 12 of the Act does not constitute an offence and
that an offence arises only when the respondent breaches a protection
order or an interim protection order passed by the Magistrate under the
Act. Therefore, the limitation prescribed under Section 468 Cr.P.C.
cannot be calculated from the date of filing of the application under
Section 12 of the Act. He further submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has clarified that an application under Section 12 of the Act cannot be
treated as a criminal complaint or initiation of prosecution.
9. For ready reference, the relevant observations made by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in paragraph Nos. 19 and 28 of the judgment of
(supra) are delineated below:
Kamatchi
"19. Let us now consider the applicability of these principles to cases
under the Act. The provisions of the Act contemplate filing of an

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application under Section 12 to initiate the proceedings before the
concerned Magistrate. After hearing both sides and after taking into
account the material on record, the Magistrate may pass an appropriate
order under Section 12 of the Act. It is only the breach of such order
which constitutes an offence as is clear from Section 31 of the Act. Thus,
if there be any offence committed in terms of the provisions of the Act, the
limitation prescribed under Section 468 of the Code will apply from the
date of commission of such offence. By the time an application is
preferred under Section 12 of the Act, there is no offence committed in
terms of the provisions of the Act and as such there would never be a
starting point for limitation from the date of application under Section 12
of the Act. Such a starting point for limitation would arise only and only
after there is a breach of an order passed under Section 12 of the Act.
28. It is thus clear that the High Court wrongly equated filing of an
application under Section 12 of the Act to lodging of a complaint or
initiation of prosecution. In our considered view, the High Court was in
error in observing that the application under Section 12 of the Act ought
to have been filed within a period of one year of the alleged acts of
domestic violence."
10. Learned A.G.A. further submits that the Division Bench of this Court
in
Reference in Re: Trilochan Singh v. Manpreet Kaur and Another,
in Misc. Single No. 4177 of 2012 , decided on 23.10.2021, has also taken
a similar view. The Division Bench has categorically held that Section
468 Cr.P.C. has no applicability to an application filed under Section 12
of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, as the proceedings under the said
provision are for seeking statutory reliefs and do not involve taking
cognizance of an offence.
11. For ready reference, paragraphs 55 and 56 of the aforesaid judgment
are delineated below:
"55. Section 468 Cr.P.C. speaks about taking of "cognizance of an
offence" and the acts of domestic violence described in the D.V.Act are
not offences under the D.V.Act, hence taking of the cognizance of offence
is out of question, therefore, applicability of Section 468 Cr.P.C. for
acting upon the applications moved under Section 12 of the D.V.Act does

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not seem just and legal. In other words, Section 468 Cr.P.C. has no
application as far as the applications under Section 12 of the D.V.Act are
concerned.
56. Thus, it is concluded that Section 468 Cr.P.C. has no applicability for
filing complaint under Section 12 of the D.V.Act. The question no.(i) is
answered accordingly. "
12. This Court has perused the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C. and
finds that the said provision prescribes the period of limitation for taking
cognizance of offences punishable with imprisonment up to six months,
one year and three years, respectively. However, under the provisions of
the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, there is no specific punishment
prescribed in respect of the reliefs sought under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21
and 22 of the said Act. Section 18 provides for protection orders, Section
19 deals with residence orders, Section 20 provides for monetary
reliefs, Section 21 deals with custody orders in respect of children and
Section 22 provides for compensation orders.
13. For ready reference, Sections 18,19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Act, 2005
are delineated below respectively:
" Section 18. Protection orders.- The Magistrate may, after giving the
aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being heard and
on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is
likely to take place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved
person and prohibit the respondent from—
(a) committing any act of domestic violence;
(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic
violence;
(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person
or, if the person aggrieved is a child, its school or any other
place frequented by the aggrieved person;
(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with
the aggrieved person, including personal, oral or written or

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electronic or telephonic contact;
(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank
accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties, jointly
by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by the
respondent, including her stridhan or any other property held
either jointly by the parties or separately by them without the
leave of the Magistrate;
(f) causing violence to the dependants, other relatives or any
person who give the aggrieved person assistance from
domestic violence;
(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection
order.
Section 19. Residence orders. - (1) While disposing of an application
under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied
that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order—
(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any
other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved
person from the shared household, whether or not the
respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared
household;
(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the
shared household;
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from
entering any portion of the shared household in which the
aggrieved person resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing
off the shared household or encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in
the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate;
or

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(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate
accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her
in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the
circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any
person who is a woman.
(2) The Magistrate may impose any additional conditions or pass any
other direction which he may deem reasonably necessary to protect or to
provide for the safety of the aggrieved person or any child of such
aggrieved person.
(3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to execute a bond,
with or without sureties, for preventing the commission of domestic
violence.
(4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be an order under
Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and
shall be dealt with accordingly.
(5) While passing an order under sub-section (1), sub-section (2) or sub-
section (3), the court may also pass an order directing the officer-in-
charge of the nearest police station to give protection to the aggrieved
person or to assist her or the person making an application on her behalf
in the implementation of the order.
(6) While making an order under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may
impose on the respondent obligations relating to the discharge of rent and
other payments, having regard to the financial needs and resources of the
parties.
(7) The Magistrate may direct the officer-in-charge of the police station
in whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has been approached to assist in the
implementation of the protection order.
(8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to return to the possession
of the aggrieved person her stridhan or any other property or valuable
security to which she is entitled to.

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Section 20. Monetary reliefs.- (1) While disposing of an application
under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may direct the
respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and
losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved
person as a result of the domestic violence and such relief may include,
but is not limited to,—
(a) the loss of earnings;
(b) the medical expenses;
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal
of any property from the control of the aggrieved person; and
(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her
children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an
order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for
the time being in force.
(2) The monetary relief granted under this section shall be adequate, fair
and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the
aggrieved person is accustomed.
(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an appropriate lump
sum payment or monthly payments of maintenance, as the nature and
circumstances of the case may require.
(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for monetary relief
made under sub-section (1) to the parties to the application and to the in-
charge of the police station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction
the respondent resides.
(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted to the aggrieved
person within the period specified in the order under sub-section (1).
(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make payment in
terms of the order under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may direct the
employer or a debtor of the respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved

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person or to deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries or
debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which amount may
be adjusted towards the monetary relief payable by the respondent.
Notwithstanding anything contained in any
Section 21. Custody orders.-
other law for the time being in force, the Magistrate may, at any stage of
hearing of the application for protection order or for any other relief
under this Act grant temporary custody of any child or children to the
aggrieved person or the person making an application on her behalf and
specify, if necessary, the arrangements for visit of such child or children
by the respondent:
Provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that any visit of the
respondent may be harmful to the interests of the child or children, the
Magistrate shall refuse to allow such visit.
In addition to other reliefs as may be
Section 22. Compensation orders.-
granted under this Act, the Magistrate may on an application being made
by the aggrieved person, pass an order directing the respondent to pay
compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and
emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by
that respondent."
14. Sections 31, 32 and 33 of the Protection of Women from the Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 are applicable after passing of a protection order or
relief order by the competent court of law. As per Section 31 of the Act,
2005, punishment is prescribed for breach of a protection order or an
interim protection order. For ready reference, Section 31 of the said Act is
delineated below:
(1) A breach
31. Penalty for breach of protection order by respondent.-
of protection order, or of an interim protection order, by the respondent
shall be an offence under this Act and shall be punishable with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one
year, or with fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or with
both.
(2) The offence under sub-section (1) shall as far as practicable be tried

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by the Magistrate who has passed the order, the breach of which has been
alleged to have been caused by the accused.
(3) While framing charges under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may also
frame charges under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
or any provision of that Code or the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of
1961), as the case may be, if the facts disclose the commission of an
offence under those provisions.
15. The provisions relating to cognizance and proof are contained in
Section 32 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, whereas Section 33
provides for penalty for failure on the part of the Protection Officer to
discharge his duties:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
32. Cognizance and proof.-
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the offence under sub-
section (1) of section 31 shall be cognizable and non-bailable.
(2) Upon the sole testimony of the aggrieved person, the court may
conclude that an offence under sub-section (1) of section 31 has been
committed by the accused.
If any
33. Penalty for not discharging duty by Protection Officer.-
Protection Officer fails or refuses to discharge his duties as directed by
the Magistrate in the protection order without any sufficient cause, he
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twenty
thousand rupees, or with both.
16. This Court has considered the submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the revisionist as well as learned A.G.A. for the State and
perused the record. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in paragraph No. 19 of
the judgment of (supra), has clearly held that filing of an
Kamatchi
application under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, does
not constitute an offence and that an offence arises only when the
respondent breaches a protection order or an interim protection order
passed by the Magistrate under the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has
further clarified in paragraph No. 28 that filing of an application under

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Section 12 of the Act cannot be equated with lodging of a criminal
complaint or initiation of prosecution. A similar view has also been taken
by the Division Bench of this Court in (supra), wherein
Trilochan Singh
it has been held that Section 468 Cr.P.C. has no applicability to an
application filed under Section 12 of the Act.
17. This Court finds that Section 468 Cr.P.C. deals with the limitation for
taking cognizance of offences punishable under the law. However, the
application filed under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, is
for seeking reliefs provided under Sections 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the said
Act, which are not offences. The offences and punishments are separately
provided under Sections 31 and 33 of the Act, 2005. In the present case,
no protection order or interim protection order has yet been passed, nor
has any occasion arisen for invoking the penal provisions of Sections 31,
32 and 33 of the Act, 2005, therefore, the provisions of Section 468
Cr.P.C. are not attracted to the proceedings in question.
18. This Court further finds that the revisionist, instead of contesting the
application on its merits before the trial court, has raised a preliminary
objection under Section 468 Cr.P.C., which is not applicable to the reliefs
claimed under the Act, 2005. Such an objection would unnecessarily
delay the proceedings and defeat the object of the Act, which provides for
speedy relief to the aggrieved person. Thus, the application filed by the
revisionist appears to be an attempt to delay the proceedings rather than
contesting the matter on its merits. Accordingly, no interference is
warranted by this Court in the impugned orders dated 08.09.2026 passed
by the Additional Sessions Judge /F.T.C-I Agra and 08.10.2024 passed by
the Civil Judge (J.D.) /F.T.C-I Agra.
19. In view of the aforesaid observations, the revision is with a
dismissed
direction to all the courts dealing with cases under the the Protection of
Women from the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 to make an endeavour to
decide the pending proceeding within 60 days as provided under Section
12(5) of the Act, 2005, including execution proceedings also; otherwise,
the trial court shall frustrate the mandate and spirit of law, which would
lead to the conduct of the Judicial Officers being called into question.

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20. Registrar (compliance) is directed to communicate this order to the
Presiding Officers of the Gram Nyayalaya, Judicial Magistrates and the
District and Sessions Judge, Agra as well as transmit a copy of this order
to the Judicial Training and Research Institute, U.P. Lucknow (J.T.R.I.),
for the academic purposes of the Judicial Officers.
(Praveen Kumar Giri,J.)
October 30, 2026
K.Tiwari
Digitally signed by :-
KRISHNA KANT TIWARI
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad