Cinda Engineering And Construction Private Limited vs Cy Engineering India Private Limited
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~44
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision : 12.05.2026
+ O.M.P. (COMM) 67/2025, I.A. 2993/2025 (Stay), I.A.
2995/2025 (Lengthy synopsis and list of dates) & I.A.
6820/2025 (Seeking stay of the arbitration proceedings)
CINDA ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION PRIVATE
LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Shikha Tandon, Ms. Sejal
Sethi and Mr. Abhinav Gupta,
Advocates.
versus
CY ENGINEERING INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Prateek Bhatia, Mr. Luv
Virmani and Mr. Aakash R.
Nair, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
1. The present Petition has been instituted under Section 34 of the
1
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 , challenging the Order
2
dated 13.01.2025 passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator during the
pendency of the arbitral proceedings between the parties.
2. By way of the Impugned Order, the learned Arbitral Tribunal
dismissed:
1
A&C Act
2
Impugned Order
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(i) I.A. No.1 of 2024 - filed by the Petitioner seeking leave to place
additional documents on record; and
(ii) I.A. No.2 of 2024 seeking leave to amend the Statement of
3
Defence and Counter-Claim .
3. The principal challenge laid by the Petitioner proceeds on the
premise that the rejection of the aforesaid applications has the effect of
conclusively foreclosing substantial portions of the Petitioner‟s
counterclaims and, therefore, the Impugned Order would qualify as an
“ interim award ” within the meaning of Sections 2(1)(c) and 31(6) of
the A&C Act, rendering the same amenable to challenge under
Section 34 thereof.
BRIEF FACTS:
4. Disputes arose between the parties in relation to the Contracts
dated 15.07.2020 and 22.04.2021, pursuant to which arbitral
proceedings came to be initiated before the learned Sole Arbitrator.
5. During the course of the arbitral proceedings, the parties filed
their pleadings, including SOD-CC by the Petitioner herein/
Respondent therein.
6. The arbitral proceedings thereafter progressed in terms of the
procedural schedule framed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
7. Pleadings stood completed and evidence on behalf of the
Petitioner herein was led through RW-1, whose cross-examination
concluded on 10.09.2024.
8. Subsequently, the Petitioner herein moved I.A. No. 1 of 2024
dated 11.10.2024 seeking leave to place additional documents on
record. The case set up in the said application was that certain
3
SOD-CC
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documents had assumed relevance in view of the nature of the cross-
examination conducted by learned counsel for the Respondent herein
and were necessary for proper adjudication of the disputes.
9. The said application was opposed by the Respondent herein,
inter alia , on the ground that the documents were always within the
possession and knowledge of the Petitioner herein and that no
sufficient explanation had been furnished for their belated production.
10. During the pendency of the aforesaid application, the Petitioner
herein also filed I.A. No.2 of 2024 dated 13.12.2024 seeking leave to
amend the SOD-CC filed on its behalf.
11. The learned Arbitral Tribunal, after hearing the parties, passed
the Impugned Order whereby both the aforesaid applications came to
be dismissed observing that the additional documents sought to be
produced were always within the possession and control of the
Petitioner herein; that sufficient opportunities had been available at
earlier stages of the proceedings to place the same on record; and that
no adequate justification had been furnished for the belated
applications.
12. The learned Tribunal further held that the pleadings did not
contain sufficient foundational averments concerning the alleged
third-party engagements and that the proposed amendments could not
be permitted at such stage of the proceedings.
13. Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the present Petition under
Section 34 of the A&C Act has been preferred before this Court .
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
14. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Impugned
Order qualifies as an “ interim award ” within the meaning of Sections
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2(1)(c) and 31(6) of the A&C Act inasmuch as the rejection of the
applications substantially impacts and conclusively affects the
adjudication of the counterclaims raised by the Petitioner. Reliance in
4
this regard has been placed on Cinevistaas Ltd. v. Prasar Bharti ,
5
Aptec Advanced Protective Technologies AG v. Union of India and
6
H.S. Nag v. Asian Hotel (North) Ltd. to contend that where an order
attains finality in respect of substantive rights or claims, the same
becomes amenable to challenge under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
15. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submits that, insofar
as I.A. No.1 of 2024 is concerned, the additional documents sought to
be placed on record were directly connected with the counterclaims
already forming part of the SOD-CC, particularly the claims
pertaining to back charges and third-party works reflected in
Annexure-C thereto.
16. It is further submitted that the necessity for production of the
said documents arose during the course of cross-examination of RW-1
and that the witness had specifically stated that the relevant records
concerning third-party contracts and purchase orders were available
with the Petitioner and could be produced.
17. According to the Petitioner, the learned Arbitral Tribunal failed
to appreciate that the documents were intrinsically connected with the
existing pleadings and that no prejudice would have been caused to
the Respondent, particularly when RW-1 remained available for
further cross-examination on the said documents.
18. With respect to I.A. No.2 of 2024 , learned counsel for the
Petitioner submits that the proposed amendments were merely
4
2019 SCC OnLine Del 7071
5
2025 SCC OnLine Del 92
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clarificatory and intended to furnish greater particulars in support of
the existing counterclaims without altering the fundamental nature of
the dispute. It is submitted that the amendment only sought
substitution of Annexure-C with a more detailed tabulation correlating
the alleged back charges with third-party contracts/purchase orders
already referred to in the pleadings.
19. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contends that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal adopted an unduly restrictive approach despite the
procedural flexibility contemplated under Sections 18, 19 and 23 of
the A&C Act as well as Rule 18.1 of the DIAC Rules, 2023,
particularly when the arbitral proceedings remained within the
subsisting mandate of the learned Tribunal under Section 29A of the
A&C Act.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
20. Per contra , the learned counsel for the Respondent raises a
preliminary objection to the maintainability of the present Petition on
the ground that the Impugned Order does not qualify as an “ interim
award ” within the meaning of Section 31(6) of the A&C Act.
21. According to the Respondent, the Impugned Order neither
conclusively adjudicates any substantive dispute between the parties
nor finally extinguishes the counterclaims raised by the Petitioner.
22. It is submitted that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has merely
declined the belated production of additional documents and the
proposed amendment/enhancement of the counterclaims, while
expressly clarifying that the merits of the disputes remain open for
adjudication. Reliance in this regard has been placed on ONGC Petro
6
2026 SCC OnLine Del 692
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7
Additions Ltd. v. Tecnimont S.P.A. to contend that orders rejecting
production of documents or amendment applications are procedural in
nature and do not constitute interim awards amenable to challenge
under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
23. Insofar as I.A. No.1 of 2024 is concerned, learned counsel for
the Respondent submits that the arbitral proceedings had progressed
substantially in terms of the procedural schedule framed by the
learned Tribunal; pleadings stood completed, issues had already been
framed, evidence of RW-1 had concluded and the Petitioner had itself
closed its evidence before the applications came to be instituted.
24. It is further submitted that the documents sought to be
introduced were always within the possession, knowledge and control
of the Petitioner and no satisfactory explanation was furnished for the
belated attempt to place the same on record.
25. Learned counsel for the Respondent also contends that the
pleadings in the SOD-CC did not contain foundational particulars
concerning third-party contracts or linkage between the alleged back
charges and the works executed under the subject contracts and,
therefore, the learned Tribunal rightly declined to permit production of
documents at the stage of final arguments.
26. In relation to I.A. No. 2 of 2024 , learned counsel for the
Respondent submits that the proposed amendment was not merely
clarificatory in nature but sought substantive enhancement and
restructuring of the counterclaims at a highly belated stage of the
proceedings.
27. According to the Respondent, permitting such amendments
after closure of evidence would have resulted in reopening of the
7
2021 SCC OnLine SC 3376
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BHATIA
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arbitral proceedings and caused serious prejudice to the Respondent,
which had proceeded on the basis of the pleadings already on record.
28. Learned counsel for the Respondent further submits that the
learned Tribunal exercised its procedural discretion upon due
consideration of the conduct of the proceedings, the stage at which the
applications were moved and the absence of due diligence on the part
of the Petitioner.
ANALYSIS:
29. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties at length and, with their able assistance, has carefully perused
the Impugned Arbitral Award and the other material placed on record.
30. Before proceeding to examine the Impugned Order on the
touchstone of Section 34 of the A&C Act, the principal issue that
arises for consideration before this Court is whether the rejection of
I.A. No. 1 of 2024 , seeking production of additional documents, and
I.A. No. 2 of 2024 , seeking leave to amend the
pleadings/counterclaims, at a stage subsequent to the closure of
evidence, can be construed as “ interim awards ” amenable to challenge
under Section 34 of the A&C Act, or whether such directions merely
fall within the category of procedural orders passed by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal in exercise of its case-management and procedural
discretion.
31. In the event it is found that the impugned order does not partake
the character of an interim award, but is merely a procedural
determination regulating the conduct of arbitral proceedings, the
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 34 of the A&C Act would not
be attracted, as the scope of challenge under the said provision is
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confined to arbitral awards, including interim awards, and does not
extend to interlocutory or procedural orders passed during the
pendency of arbitral proceedings.
32. In order to examine the aforesaid issue, this Court finds it
apposite to advert to the recent decision of this Court in H.S. Nag and
8
Ors. v. Asian Hotel (North) Ltd . , wherein the scope and attributes of
an “ interim award ” under the A&C Act came to be comprehensively
examined after considering the line of precedents on this aspect. The
said decision, upon consideration of the statutory framework and the
judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in IFFCO Ltd. v. Bhadra
9
Products , delineates the distinction between a substantive
adjudicatory determination and a procedural order passed in exercise
of arbitral case-management jurisdiction. The relevant observations of
H.S. Nag and Ors. (supra) are extracted herein below:
“54. The Respondent asserts that the Impugned Orders are in the
nature of procedural directions, which do not attract the
interference of this Court under Section 34 of the Act. The
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that though coloured as
procedural, the Impugned Orders operate with finality, affecting
their substantial rights, thereby assuming the character of interim
awards.
55. In this backdrop, before embarking upon an examination of the
merits, this Court deems it apposite to first address the preliminary
objection as to the maintainability, since the adjudication upon the
merits of the present Petitions necessarily hinges upon whether the
Impugned Orders are amenable to challenge under Section 34 of
the Act.
56. In view of the apparent divergence in approach, discernible
from various precedents and the consequent uncertainty
surrounding the question as to what constitutes an “interim award”,
this Court deems it apposite to examine the statutory scheme, the
governing jurisprudence as established by various judicial
precedents, with some degree of clarity.
57. Accordingly, the discussion that follows is organised along
three distinct yet interrelated facets, viz., first, the scope and limits
8
2026:DHC:1396
9
(2018) 2 SCC 534
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of judicial interference permissible under Section 34 of the Act vis-
à-vis an Order passed in the course of arbitral proceedings; second,
the legal contours and attributes of what constitutes an “Interim
Award”; and third, whether the Impugned Orders, when examined
on the touchstone of the settled principles, satisfy the parameters so
as to fall within the ambit of an “Interim Award” amenable to
challenge under Section 34 of the Act.
Interference under Section 34 of the Act extends to an Arbitral
Award, including an „Interim Award‟
58. It is well settled that the jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act
is neither appellate nor supervisory in the conventional sense. The
Court does not sit in appeal over the findings of the Arbitral
Tribunal, nor does it re-appreciate evidence or correct errors of fact
or law, save where such errors fall within the narrowly tailored
grounds statutorily prescribed. The provision thus reflects a
conscious legislative departure from expansive judicial review and
is rooted in the principle of party autonomy and finality of arbitral
adjudication.
*
60. Further, Section 2(1)(c) of the Act defines the expression
“Arbitral award”, which expressly includes interim awards. Section
2 of the Act is reproduced herein under for the sake of clarity:
“2. Definitions. — (1) In this Part, unless the context
otherwise requires, —
(c) “arbitral award” includes an interim award;”
61. A conjoint reading of Section 2(1)(c) and Section 34 of the Act
makes it abundantly clear that the jurisdiction of the Court under
Section 34 extends to the setting aside of an interim award as well,
provided such interim award satisfies the statutory requirements
and falls within the limited grounds expressly enumerated under
Section 34 of the Act and their consistent interpretations by the
Courts.
62. To complete the scheme of the Act, Section 31(6) of the Act is
also material. It empowers an Arbitral Tribunal to render an interim
award at any stage of the arbitral proceedings, prior to the
pronouncement of the final award, in respect of any matter on
which it may make a final determination. The same is reproduced
herein under for the sake of completeness:
“ 31. Form and contents of arbitral award. —
*
(6) The arbitral tribunal may, at any time during the
arbitral proceedings, make an interim arbitral award on
any matter with respect to which it may make a final
arbitral award.”
63. A holistic reading of the aforesaid statutory provisions leads to
two clear and inescapable conclusions. First, that an Arbitral
Tribunal is vested with the authority to render an interim award
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during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings, prior to the
culmination of final adjudication. Second, that such interim awards,
being statutorily subsumed within the definition of an arbitral
award, are amenable to judicial scrutiny under Section 34 of the
Act, subject to the same limited and well-settled grounds on which
a final arbitral award may be interfered with.
64. At the same time, it must be underscored that though the statute
includes an “interim award” within the ambit of an arbitral award,
it does not follow that every interlocutory or procedural order
passed during arbitral proceedings partakes such character.
65. However, this statutory inclusion does not efface the
fundamental distinction between a determination that conclusively
adjudicates an issue and, a direction that merely regulates the
conduct of proceedings. It is this nuanced yet decisive distinction
that now warrants closer judicial scrutiny.
Distinction between a Procedural Order and an Interim Award
passed by an Arbitral Tribunal
66. Having thus established that the jurisdiction of this Court under
Section 34 of the Act extends, in principle, to an interim arbitral
award, the enquiry must now turn to the equally significant
question, namely, what, in law, qualifies as an “interim award”.
67. Further, since the Act does not expressly define what
constitutes an “interim award”, this Court deems it necessary to
advert to the judicially evolved principles which illuminate its
nature, attributes and legal contours. The classification of an order
cannot depend upon nomenclature alone but must be determined by
its substance and legal effect.
68. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in IFFCO (supra), while
authoritatively interpreting the expression “interim award”, held
that an Arbitral Tribunal is empowered under Section 31(6) of the
Act to render an interim award on any matter in respect of which it
is competent to make a final award. The Court clarified that the
expression “any matter” is of wide import and encompasses any
point of dispute between the parties that calls for a definitive
adjudication.
69. At the same time, the decision underscores that such a
determination must possess the element of finality in respect of the
issue decided, so as to qualify as an interim award within the
statutory framework. The relevant observations of IFFCO (supra)
are extracted herein under for ready reference:
“ 8. The language of Section 31(6) is advisedly wide in
nature. A reading of the said sub-section makes it clear
that the jurisdiction to make an interim arbitral award is
left to the good sense of the arbitral tribunal, and that it
extends to “any matter” with respect to which it may make
a final arbitral award. The expression “matter” is wide in
nature, and subsumes issues at which the parties are in
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dispute. It is clear, therefore, that any point of dispute
between the parties which has to be answered by the
arbitral tribunal can be the subject matter of an interim
arbitral award. However, it is important to add a note of
caution. In an appropriate case, the issue of more than one
award may be necessitated on the facts of that case.
However, by dealing with the matter in a piecemeal
fashion, what must be borne in mind is that the resolution
of the dispute as a whole will be delayed and parties will
be put to additional expense. The arbitral tribunal should,
therefore, consider whether there is any real advantage in
delivering interim awards or in proceeding with the matter
as a whole and delivering one final award, bearing in mind
the avoidance of delay and additional expense. Ultimately,
a fair means for resolution of all disputes should be
uppermost in the mind of the arbitral tribunal.
9. To complete the scheme of the Act, Section 32(1) is
also material. This section goes on to state that the arbitral
proceedings would be terminated only by the final arbitral
award, as opposed to an interim award, thus making it
clear that there can be one or more interim awards, prior to
a final award, which conclusively determine some of the
issues between the parties, culminating in a final arbitral
award which ultimately decides all remaining issues
between the parties.”
70. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid judgment,
underscored that although arbitral proceedings culminate only upon
the pronouncement of the final award, the statutory scheme
unmistakably contemplates rendering of one or more interim
awards during their pendency. Such interim awards are not mere
procedural directions, rather they are determinations that finally
and conclusively adjudicate specific issues or claims between the
parties. The interim orders decisively settle the discrete facets of
the dispute, and thus, progressively narrow the field of controversy
and pave the way toward the final award.
*
75. The common thread running through the aforesaid decisions is
that the twin pillars of „finality‟ and „substantive issue
determination‟ form the bedrock of the test. An order that merely
regulates procedure, even if it affects a valuable right, does not
cross the statutory threshold unless it conclusively determines a
substantive component of the arbitral reference.
76. In view of the foregoing discussion, it stands well settled that
an interim award must bear the hallmark of finality in respect of the
issue it addresses. The determinative consideration is whether the
arbitral tribunal has conclusively adjudicated a substantive
component of the dispute and rendered itself functus officio qua
that issue. If nothing further remains to be decided on that aspect
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within the arbitral proceedings, such a determination would fall
within the ambit of an interim award and would be amenable to
challenge under Section 34 of the Act, notwithstanding that the
arbitration continues in respect of other matters.
77. Therefore, the question as to whether an order constitutes an
“interim award” is no longer res integra. The determination does
not hinge upon the nomenclature employed by the Arbitral
Tribunal, but upon the substance, effect, and legal consequences of
the order in question. The Court must examine whether the order
conclusively adjudicates a substantive issue between the parties at
an intermediate stage of the proceedings, thereby leaving nothing
further to be decided on that issue.
Nature of the Impugned Orders: Procedural or Interim Award
78. Having delineated the statutory framework and crystallised the
principles as to what constitutes an “interim award” within the
meaning of Sections 2(1)(c) and 31(6) of the Act, this Court now
proceeds to examine whether the Impugned Orders, in substance
and effect, meet the settled parameters so as to attract the
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 34 of the Act.
*
104. The judicial precedents cited and analysed hereinabove yield a
clear and consistent position in law, i.e., an order disposing of an
application for amendment of pleadings does not, by that
circumstance alone, acquire the status of an interim award. The
determinative consideration is not the nature of the application, but
the legal effect of its rejection.
105. The position may thus be summarised as first, not every order
passed by an Arbitral Tribunal qualifies as an interim award;
second, there exists no straight-jacket rule that an order rejecting an
amendment application necessarily constitutes an interim award;
and third, it is the element of finality in respect of a substantive
issue, resulting in crystallisation of a right, that determines whether
an order crosses the threshold into the domain of an interim award.
Governing Test for determining what constitutes an “Interim
Award”
106. In light of the foregoing discussion and the judicial precedents
noticed hereinabove, the governing test for determining whether an
order qualifies as an “interim award” may now be articulated.
(a) Whether the Order finally adjudicates a substantive dispute or
claims between the parties;
(b) Whether such adjudication attains finality and has a binding
effect insofar as that issue is concerned; and
(c) Whether, upon such determination, the Arbitral Tribunal
becomes functus officio qua that issue and retains no further
adjudicatory discretion thereon.
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BHATIA
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107. Therefore, if an order answers to all the aforesaid three
elements in affirmative, the order transcends the realm of a mere
procedural order and assumes the character of an Interim Award
within the meaning of Sections 2(1)(c) and 31(6) of the Act, and
consequently becomes susceptible to scrutiny under Section 34,
subject to its limited and circumscribed scope.
108. Tested on this anvil, this Court is of the considered view that
the Impugned Orders do not satisfy the essential indicia of an
interim award. It would be observed as under:
(a). First , the rejection of the amendment applications does not
decide any substantive dispute or independent claim between
the parties, it merely preserves the pleadings in the form in
which they already stood.
(b). Second , the determination lacks finality in respect of any issue
forming part of the arbitral reference, inasmuch as the Points
of Determination framed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal
expressly leave open the questions of entitlement, quantum,
rate and period of compensation to be adjudicated on the basis
of evidence.
(c). Third , the Arbitral Tribunal has not rendered itself functus
officio in respect of any such issue, nor has it exhausted its
adjudicatory discretion thereon.”
33. It is evident from the aforesaid that an “ interim award ” within
the meaning of Sections 2(1)(c) and 31(6) of the A&C Act cannot be
understood to encompass every order or procedural determination
rendered by an Arbitral Tribunal during the pendency of arbitral
proceedings.
34. The legislative architecture underlying the expression “ award ”,
whether final or interim, necessarily postulates an adjudicatory
determination possessing the attributes of conclusiveness, finality and
enforceability in respect of a substantive component of the lis between
the parties. Mere procedural consequences, however significant in
their practical effect, do not by themselves elevate an interlocutory
order to the status of an interim award.
35. The true test, therefore, is not whether the order incidentally
affects the manner in which a party prosecutes its case, but whether
the order conclusively adjudicates a substantive claim or issue in such
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a manner that the said issue stands finally removed from the domain
of arbitral consideration. An order assumes the character of an interim
award only when the Arbitral Tribunal finally determines a distinct
and severable part of the dispute and renders itself functus officio qua
such determination. The essential attribute of an interim award is thus
the attainment of adjudicatory finality in respect of substantive rights.
36. Viewed thus, there exists a fundamental distinction between
adjudicatory determinations on one hand and procedural or case-
management directions on the other. Orders pertaining to amendment
of pleadings, production of documents, admissibility of evidence,
timelines or conduct of proceedings are inherently procedural in
nature and arise from the Tribunal‟s authority to regulate arbitral
procedure. Such orders may undoubtedly have bearing upon the
evidentiary strength or procedural convenience of a party; however,
they do not, for that reason alone, partake the character of a final
decision upon the substantive disputes inter se the parties.
37. To construe every procedural rejection or interlocutory
determination as an “ interim award ” would fundamentally distort the
statutory framework governing arbitral proceedings under the A&C
Act. Such an interpretation would open the floodgates for continuous
judicial intervention against routine procedural orders passed during
the course of arbitration, thereby undermining the autonomy of the
arbitral process, frustrating the objective of expeditious dispute
resolution, and eroding the procedural flexibility that forms the
foundational architecture of the Act.
38. Any such approach would run directly contrary to the
legislative intent underlying the A&C Act, particularly the mandate
embodied in Section 5 of the A&C Act, which expressly limits
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BHATIA
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judicial intervention except where so provided under the statute. The
scheme of the A&C Act is designed to ensure minimal court
interference during the pendency of arbitral proceedings, leaving
procedural and evidentiary matters primarily within the exclusive
domain of the Arbitral Tribunal.
39. Section 34 of the A&C Act was never intended to serve as a
mechanism for appellate scrutiny of every procedural direction or
interlocutory order rendered by an Arbitral Tribunal during the
conduct of proceedings. The scope of challenge under Section 34 of
the A&C Act is confined to arbitral awards, including those interim
decisions that conclusively determine substantive rights or liabilities
of the parties, and cannot be expanded to encompass procedural orders
that merely regulate the manner in which the arbitral proceedings are
to be conducted.
40. In the facts of the present case, the Impugned Order does not
disclose any final adjudication of the substantive counterclaims raised
by the Petitioner. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has merely declined
permission for the production of additional documents and refused
amendment of the SOD-CC at a stage subsequent to the closure of
evidence. The underlying disputes between the parties, including the
counterclaims as originally instituted, continue to remain pending
adjudication before the learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal has
neither conclusively rejected the counterclaims in toto nor rendered
any determination extinguishing the substantive rights asserted by the
Petitioner.
41. Significantly, the learned Tribunal has itself clarified that the
observations rendered in the Impugned Order shall not influence the
final adjudication of the disputes on merits. The learned Tribunal,
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therefore, has not rendered itself functus officio with respect to the
counterclaims or the issues arising therefrom. The arbitral discourse
between the parties remains unfinished; only the procedural contours
within which such adjudication shall proceed have been delineated.
42. In this regard, reference may also be drawn to the judgment of
10
the Co-ordinate Bench in Punit A. Bhardwaj v. Rashmi Juneja ,
wherein, while dealing with a challenge under Section 34 of the A&C
Act to an order rejecting an amendment application to Statement of
Claims, the Court held that the impugned determination therein did
not constitute an “ interim award ”, particularly since the learned
Arbitral Tribunal had clarified that its observations would not amount
to an expression on merits and the arbitral proceedings had already
substantially progressed to the stage of evidence and final arguments.
43. The said decision reiterates that procedural determinations
rendered during the course of arbitral proceedings do not attain the
character of an interim award absent a conclusive adjudication of
substantive rights. The relevant portion of Punit A. Bhardwaj (supra)
reads as under:
“18. The three judgments of this Court cited by learned counsel for
the parties must be read in the context of this provision. The statute
clearly vests discretion in the arbitral tribunal to disallow a party to
amend or supplement its pleadings on the ground that the
25
application is belated. In Container Corporation , the amendment
was rejected by the arbitral tribunal on this ground and the
challenge under Section 34 of the Act was held not to be
26 27
maintainable. In Cinevistaas and Lt. Col. H.S. Bedi Retd on the
other hand, the Court came to the conclusion that the rejection of
the amendments were in the nature of final adjudication of the
claims and defences proposed to be raised. It is this factor which
clothed the orders of the tribunal with the characteristic of finality
and rendered them susceptible to challenge as interim awards. This
distinction, in my view, is the key to determining the
maintainability of the present petition.
10
2022 SCC OnLine Del 2691
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19. In the facts of the present case, the learned arbitrator has
proceeded only on the ground that the amendment was sought
belatedly. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the impugned order make this
position clear, and in fact, in paragraph 13, the learned arbitrator
has stated that “expression of any view herein before will not be
treated as expression on the merit of the case”.
20. Further, it is evident that the suit was filed before this Court as
far back in 2014 and referred to arbitration in the year 2016. The
application for amendment was filed by the petitioner only on
21.07.2017. Even thereafter, it is recorded by the learned arbitrator
that the matter proceeded without the petitioner seeking an
adjudication of the said application until 04.11.2019, when the
impugned order was passed. In the meanwhile, proceedings
continued before the learned arbitrator, and issues appear to have
been framed in these proceedings on 17.05.2018.28 During the
pendency of the present petition before this Court also, I am
informed that the parties have proceeded to lead evidence before
the learned arbitrator and the proceedings are now at the stage of
final arguments.
21. In view of the aforesaid position, I am of the view that the
impugned order in the present case does not constitute an interim
award, susceptible to challenge under Section 34 of the Act. The
petition is, therefore, dismissed as not maintainable, leaving it open
to the parties to take such remedies as may be available to them in
accordance with law.”
44. At this juncture, this Court finds it apposite to advert to the
judgment rendered by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Rhiti
11
Sports Management Pvt Ltd v. Power Play Sports and Events Ltd ,
wherein a petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act, assailing an
order passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal on procedural
applications filed under Order VIII Rule 1A(3) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, seeking to take on record the e-mail dated
06.09.2013 and the Services Agreements dated 23.07.2010 and
24.09.2012, came to be dismissed.
45. The learned Co-ordinate Bench, upon examining the nature of
the impugned order therein, held that such determination, being
confined to procedural matters concerning the taking on record of
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additional documents, did not partake the character of an “ interim
award ” and, therefore, was not amenable to judicial scrutiny under
Section 34 of the A&C Act. The said decision reinforces the settled
principle that orders regulating procedure, evidence, or conduct of
proceedings, without conclusively determining substantive rights or
liabilities of the parties, remain outside the scope of challenge
contemplated under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
46. The said decision, upon an extensive consideration of the
statutory framework and a catena of judicial precedents, reiterates the
settled distinction between a substantive adjudicatory determination
and procedural directions passed in exercise of arbitral case-
management jurisdiction. The relevant portions of the said Judgment
read as under:
“ 10. Arbitration has also been described as 'private justice'. It is an
alternate dispute resolution mechanism that is founded on the
fundamental principles of party autonomy and minimal judicial
intervention. Thus, unless specifically provided, no judicial
intervention would be permissible in arbitral proceedings. One of
the stated primary object of the Act is "to minimize the supervisory
role of courts in the arbitral process". The above principle finds
statutory expression in Section 5 of the Act, which expressly
provides that "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no
judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this
Part"
11. Undisputedly, in view of the express provisions of Section 5 of
the Act, recourse to courts is not available except in cases where
specific provisions have been made in this regard. It is in this
context, the petitioner has founded the present petition on the
assertion that the impugned order is an arbitral award. The
respondent disputes this assertion. Thus, the principal controversy
to be addressed is whether the impugned order is an arbitral award
that is amenable to judicial review under Section 34 of the Act.
12. Section 2(1)(c) of the Act provides for an inclusive definition
of the term "arbitral award". In terms of the aforesaid clause,
arbitral award is defined to include an interim award.
11
2018 SCC Online Del 8678
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13. Section 31 of the Act provides for the form and content of the
arbitral award. Sub-section (6) of Section 31 of the Act reads as
under:-
"(6) The arbitral tribunal may, at any time during the
arbitral proceedings, make an interim arbitral award on
any matter with respect to which it may make a final
arbitral award."
14. It would also be relevant to refer to Section 32 of the Act,
which is set out below:-
“32. Termination of proceedings.-
(1) The arbitral proceedings shall be terminated by the
final arbitral award or by an order of the arbitral tribunal
under sub-section (2).
(2) The arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the
termination of the arbitral proceedings where-
(a) the claimant withdraws his claim, unless the respondent
objects to the order and the arbitral tribunal recognises a
legitimate interest on his part in obtaining a final
settlement of the dispute,
(b) the parties agree on the termination of the proceedings,
or
(c) the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation of the
proceedings has for any other reason become unnecessary
or impossible.
(3) Subject to section 33 and sub-section (4) of section 34,
the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate with
the termination of the arbitral proceedings.”
15. In terms of Section 32(1) of the Act, the arbitral proceedings
would stand terminated by the final arbitral award or by an order of
the Arbitral Tribunal as referred to in Section 32(2) of the Act.
Since the arbitral proceedings terminate on passing of the final
award, it is obvious that the final award would embody a decision
on all or the remaining disputes (disputes that have not been
decided earlier) between the concerned parties. Section 32(2) of the
Act provides an exception to the rule that arbitral proceedings
would be terminated other than by passing a final award. A plain
reading of Section 32(2) of the Act indicates that it, essentially,
contemplates situations where it is not necessary to enter an award
for settlement of the disputes or where the same becomes
impossible. In terms of Clause (a) of Section 32(2) of the Act, an
arbitral proceeding would come to an end with a claimant
withdrawing his claim unless it is necessary to enter a final award
at the instance of the respondent. Clause (b) of Section 32(2) of the
Act contemplates circumstances where parties by consent seek
termination of the arbitral proceedings. This may arise where the
parties have resolved their difference or no longer seek to obtain an
arbitral award. Clause (c) of Section 32(2) of the Act contemplates
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the situation where continuing the arbitral proceedings has become
unnecessary or has been rendered impossible.
16. A plain reading of Section 32 of the Act indicates the fact that
the final award would embody the terms of the final settlement of
disputes (either by adjudication process or otherwise) and would be
a final culmination of the disputes referred to arbitration. Section
31(6) of the Act expressly provides that an Arbitral Tribunal may
make an interim arbitral award in any matter in respect of which it
may make a final award. Thus, plainly, before an order or a
decision can be termed as 'interim award', it is necessary that it
qualifies the condition as specified under Section 31(6) of the Act:
that is, it is in respect of which the arbitral tribunal may make an
arbitral award.
17. As indicated above, a final award would necessarily entail of (i)
all disputes in case no other award has been rendered earlier in
respect of any of the disputes referred to the arbitral tribunal, or (ii)
all the remaining disputes in case a partial or interim award(s) have
been entered prior to entering the final award. In either event, the
final award would necessarily (either through adjudication or
otherwise) entail the settlement of the dispute at which the parties
are at issue. It, thus, necessarily follows that for an order to qualify
as an arbitral award either as final or interim, it must settle a matter
at which the parties are at issue. Further, it would require to be in
the form as specified under Section 31 of the Act.
18. To put it in the negative, any procedural order or an order that
does not finally settle a matter at which the parties are at issue,
would not qualify to be termed as "arbitral award".
19. In an arbitral proceeding, there may be several procedural
orders that may be passed by an arbitral tribunal. Such orders may
include a decision on whether to hold oral hearings for the
presentation of evidence or for oral argument, or whether the
arbitral proceedings are to be conducted on the basis of documents
and other materials as required to be decided - unless otherwise
agreed between the parties - in terms of Section 24(1) of the Act.
There are also other matters that the arbitral tribunal may require to
determine such as time period for filing statement of claims,
statement of defence, counter claims, appointment of an expert
witness etc. The arbitral tribunal may also be required to address
any of the procedural objections that may be raised by any party
from time to time. However, none of those orders would qualify to
be termed as an arbitral award since the same do not decide any
matter at which the parties are at issue in respect of the disputes
referred to the arbitral tribunal.
*
23. The question whether in the given circumstances, a
determination by an arbitral tribunal is an award has come up
before courts in several matters. In Shyam Telecom Ltd. v. Icomm
Ltd 2010 (116) DRJ 456 , this Court considered the challenge laid
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to an order of the arbitral tribunal dismissing an amendment
application filed by the petitioner. In this context, the Court
observed as under:-
"Clearly an interim Award has to be on a matter with
respect to which a final Award can be made i.e. the
interim Award is also the subject matter of a final Award.
Putting it differently therefore an interim Award has to
take the colour of a final Award. An interim Award is a
final Award at the interim stage viz a stage earlier than at
the stage of final arguments. It is a part final Award
because there would remain pending other points and
reliefs for adjudication. It is therefore, that I feel that an
interim Award has to be in the nature of a part judgment
and decree as envisaged under Section 2 (2) of CPC and
the same must be such that it conclusively determines the
rights of the parties on a matter in controversy in the suit
as done in a final judgment. An interim order thus cannot
be said to be an interim Award when the order is not in the
nature of a part decree. In my opinion the impugned order
in view of what I have said hereinabove, is not an interim
Award as it is not in the nature of a part decree being only
an interim order."
24. In Sahyadri Earthmovers v. L&T Finance Limited & Anr:
MANU/MH/1550/2011 : 2011 (6) BomCR 393 , the Bombay High
Court considered an application filed whereby the petitioner had,
inter alia, prayed for directions to be issued to the arbitral tribunal
to "formulate and prescribe the appropriate legal procedure for
adjudicating the arbitration proceedings and convening the
arbitration meetings and more particularly to record the evidence as
per the Indian Evidence Act". The said application was moved
under Section 9 read with Section 19 of the Act, but was
occasioned by an order passed by the arbitral tribunal on an
application filed by the petitioner for determining the arbitral
procedure. In the aforesaid context, the Court observed as under:
"3. The first and foremost thing is that section 9 or section
19 or any other section under the Arbitration Act, nowhere
permit a party to challenge such order passed by the
Arbitrator pending the arbitration proceedings. It is neither
final award and/or interim award. Therefore, there is no
question of invoking even Section 34 of the Arbitration
Act. The Arbitration Act permits or provides the power of
Court to entertain or interfere with the order passed by the
Arbitrator, only if it is prescribed and not otherwise.
Section 5 of the Arbitration Act is very clear which is
reproduced as under."
25 . In the present case, the impugned order relates to rejection of
the petitioner's application to file additional documents. Clearly,
this is a procedural matter and does not decide any issue for
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adjudicating the dispute between the parties. Thus, the contention
that the same would qualify as an interim award is wholly
unmerited.
26. In Sanshin Chemicals Industry v. Oriental Carbons and
Chemicals Ltd. and Ors.: MANU/SC/0109/2001 : (2001) 3 SCC
341 , the Supreme Court considered the question whether a decision
of the arbitral tribunal regarding the venue of the arbitral
proceedings could be assailed in an appeal under Section 34 of the
Act. It is relevant to note that in that case, the petitioner had
contended that the decision on the venue of the arbitration
proceedings was vital as the rules for resolving the disputes would
also be dependent on the said decision and if the court did not
entertain the petition, the petitioner would be rendered remediless.
27. The Supreme Court did not accept the contention that such
decisions could be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. The
Court also repelled the contention that the petitioner would be
rendered remediless in the following words:-
"But the further contention that an aggrieved party has no
right to assail the same, once the said decision is not
assailed at this stage, does not appear to be correct. The
ultimate arbitral award could be assailed on the grounds
indicated in sub-section (2) of Section 34 and an erroneous
decision on the question of venue, which ultimately
affected the procedure that has been followed in the
arbitral proceeding could come within the sweep of
Section 34 (2) and as such it cannot be said that an
aggrieved party has no remedy at all."
28. In Harinarayan G. Bajaj v. Sharedeal Financial Consultants
Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.: MANU/MH/0864/2002 : AIR 2003 Bom 296 ,
the Bombay High Court, inter alia, considered the issue as to
whether an application under Section 34 of the Act would be
maintainable against the decision of the arbitral tribunal rejecting
an application filed by the petitioner under Section 27 of the Act,
inter alia, praying that the arbitral tribunal apply to the Court for
assistance in taking evidence on certain documents. The arbitral
tribunal (in that case) rejected the said application on the ground
that the petitioner had not brought out any evidence to establish
that the said documents were necessary for adjudication of the
subject disputes. In this context, the Court held as under:-
"It is, therefore, clear that every order or decision is not an
Award. An order or decision in the course of proceedings
which are continuing and in respect of which no remedy is
provided under the Act could normally be challenged
while challenging the Award under section 34, provided
the challenge was available under section 34(2) of the Act.
In the instant case the order rejecting the application under
section 27 is a decision and/or order. It is not definitely an
interim award. It would, therefore, be open to the
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petitioner if finally aggrieved by an award to challenge the
Award in which the order has merged, under section 34(2)
if in law a challenge would be available under section
34(2) of the Act."
29. In Ranjiv Kumar and Ors. v. Sanjiv Kumar and Ors.: A.P.
679 of 2017 , decided on 13.02.2018, the Calcutta High Court
rejected the contention that an order passed by an arbitrator in
respect of admissibility of the documents could be considered as an
interim award. In this context, the Court observed as under:-
"it can safely be concluded that a decision of an arbitral
tribunal can be held to be an 'interim award', within the
meaning of Section 2(1)(c) of the Act of 1996, when the
decision finally decides an issue, at an intermediate stage
of the arbitral proceeding, relating to the claim or counter-
claim of the respective parties to the arbitral proceeding.
Therefore, any decision of an arbitral tribunal in exercise
of power under sub-Section (4) of Section 17 of the Act of
1996 with regard to the procedural aspects of the arbitral
proceeding, including any decision with regard to
admissibility of a document in evidence cannot be held to
be an "interim award" within the meaning of Section
2(1)(c) of the same Act."
30. There are several types of orders against which a remedy is
specifically provided under the Act. In case of a challenge to the
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, the decision rejecting such
challenge is not immediately amenable to judicial review and the
party raising such challenge has to necessarily await the final
award to pursue the said challenge, albeit against the arbitral
award. However, an order accepting the said challenge is
appealable under Section 37(2) of the Act. Similarly, a decision of
the arbitral tribunal rejecting the challenge under Section 12(1) of
the Act cannot be immediately assailed and the party challenging
the arbitrator(s) has to necessarily follow the discipline of Section
13 of the Act. If such challenge is rejected, the arbitral tribunal is
required to continue with the proceedings and make an arbitral
award. The party raising the challenge to the appointment of an
arbitrator would, subject to provision of Section 34(2) of the Act,
be at liberty to challenge the arbitral award.
31. Mr. Alag had relied upon the observations made by the
Division Bench of this Court in National Highways Authority of
India v. Baharampore-Farakka Highways Ltd.:
FAO(OS)(COMM) 47/2017 , decided on 02.03.2017. In that case, a
Division Bench had observed that any adjudication of the
contentions of parties other than orders that are referred to in
Section 31(2) constitutes an award. In that case, the Court observed
as under:-
"27. ....Any adjudication of the contentions of the parties
constitutes an award, orders are those issued under Section
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31(2)[sic Section 37(2)] and/or ministerial orders in the
nature of directions which do not adjudicate any rights or
contentions...."
32. The said decision is per incuriam as it ignores the earlier
decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Progressive Career
Academy Pvt. Ltd. v. FIITJEE Ltd.: MANU/DE/2194/2011 : 180
(2011) DLT 714 . It appears that the said decision was not been
brought to the notice of the Court. In that case, the Division Bench
of this Court had held as under:-
"16. On a reading of Section 13(5), the legislative intent
becomes amply clear that Parliament did not want to
clothe the Courts with the power to annul an Arbitral
Tribunal on the ground of bias at an intermediate stage.
The Act enjoins the immediate articulation of a challenge
to the authority of an arbitrator on the ground of bias
before the Tribunal itself, and thereafter ordains that the
adjudication of this challenge must be raised as an
objection under Section 34 of the Act. Courts have to give
full expression and efficacy to the words of the Parliament
especially where they are unambiguous and unequivocal.
The golden rule of interpretation requires Courts to impart
a literal interpretation and not to deviate therefrom unless
such exercise would result in absurdity.
20. A comparison of the provisions dealing with the
challenge to the arbitrator's authority in the A&C Act and
the UNCITRAL Model Law discloses that there are
unnecessary and cosmetic differences in these provisions,
except for one significant and far-reaching difference. The
UNCITRAL Model Law, in Article 13(3), explicitly
enables the party challenging the decision of the Arbitral
Tribunal to approach the Court on the subject of bias or
impartiality of the Arbitral Tribunal. However, after
making provisions for a challenge to the verdict of
Arbitral Tribunal on the aspect of bias, the UNCITRAL
Model Law prohibits any further Appeal. It seems to us,
therefore, that there is no room for debate that the Indian
Parliament did not want curial interference at an
interlocutory stage of the arbitral proceedings on
perceived grounds of alleged bias. In fact, Section 13(5) of
the A&C Act indicates that if a challenge has been made
within fifteen days of the concerned party becoming aware
of the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal or within
fifteen days from such party becoming aware of any
circumstances pointing towards impartiality or
independence of the Arbitral Tribunal, a challenge on this
score is possible in the form of Objections to the Final
Award under Section 34 of the A&C Act. Indeed, this is a
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significant and sufficient indicator of Parliament's resolve
not to brook any interference by the Court till after the
publication of the Award. Indian Law is palpably different
also to the English, Australia and Canadian Arbitration
Law. This difference makes the words of Lord Halsbury in
Eastman Photographic Materials Co. all the more pithy
and poignant.
21. .....Relief against possible mischief has been provided
by making clarification in Section 13(5) that apart from
the challenges enumerated in Section 13(4), an assault on
the independence or impartiality of the Arbitral Tribunal is
permissible by way of filing Objections on this aspect
after the publishing of the Award.......”
33. It is also relevant to refer to the decision in the case of S.B.P.
and Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and Another:
MANU/SC/1787/2005 : (2005) 8 SCC 618 . In that case, the
Supreme Court had observed as under:-
"45. ... Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an
avenue for ventilating its grievances against the award
including any in-between orders that might have been
passed by the Arbitral Tribunal acting under Section 16 of
the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the Arbitral
Tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of
the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the
Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
46. The object of minimizing judicial intervention while
the matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will
certainly be defeated if the High Court could be
approached under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against
every order made by the Arbitral Tribunal. Therefore, it is
necessary to indicate that once the arbitration has
commenced in the Arbitral Tribunal, parties have to wait
until the award is pronounced unless, of course, a right of
appeal is available to them under Section 37 of the Act
even at an earlier stage."
34. It is also apparent that the several rulings, which pertain to the
distinction between an order and an award, were not brought to the
notice of the Division Bench in National Highway Authority of
India v. Baharampore-Farakka Highways Ltd. (supra).
35. The reliance placed by Mr. Alag in the case of M/s. Indian
Farmers Fertilizer Co-operative v. M/s. Bhadra Products (supra) is
also misplaced. In that case, the Court held that the decision of the
arbitral tribunal on the issue of limitation could be considered as an
arbitral award. Indisputably, whether the claims are barred by
limitation is a decision on a matter at which the parties are at issue.
The decision on the issue of limitation is indisputably a decision on
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the disputes and is a matter on which a final award can be entered.
A plain reading of the decision of the Supreme Court also indicates
that the Court had observed that the award had finally determined
one of the issues between the parties, which could not be re-
adjudicated all over again. The Court, after referring to various
decisions and principles, observed as under:-
"15. Tested in the light of the statutory provisions and the
case law cited above, it is clear that as the learned
Arbitrator has disposed of one matter between the parties
i.e. the issue of limitation finally, the award dated 23 rd
July, 2015 is an "interim award" within the meaning of
Section 2(1)(c) of the Act and being subsumed within the
expression "arbitral award" could, therefore, have been
challenged under Section 34 of the Act."
36. The aforesaid decision is not an authority for the proposition
that any order adjudicating any contention would be an arbitral
award within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c) of the Act.
(emphasis added)
47. Insofar as the reliance placed by the Petitioner on Cinevistaas
Ltd. ( supra ) is concerned, this Court finds the said judgment to be
clearly distinguishable on facts. In that case, the learned Arbitral
Tribunal had rejected certain substantive claims on the ground that
they had been raised beyond the prescribed period of limitation,
thereby rendering a determination which attained finality qua those
claims and effectively adjudicated upon the rights of the parties in
respect thereof.
48. In the present case, however, the learned Arbitral Tribunal has
merely rejected the applications seeking production of additional
documents and leave to amend the SOD-CC on the grounds of delay
and absence of due diligence. Such rejection does not amount to an
adjudication of the substantive claims or counterclaims on the merits,
nor does it determine any rights or liabilities of the parties in a final or
conclusive manner. As such, the Impugned Order remains procedural
in nature and cannot be equated with a determination that possesses
the attributes of an interim award.
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49. The disputes between the parties continue to remain pending
adjudication before the learned Tribunal, and, therefore, the ratio of
Cinevistaas Ltd. ( supra ) would have no applicability to the present
controversy.
50. It is pertinent to note that, in the Impugned Order herein, the
learned Arbitral Tribunal, particularly in paragraph nos. 72 and 84, has
expressly clarified that it has not expressed any opinion on the merits
of the disputes between the parties. The learned Tribunal has,
therefore, consciously refrained from adjudicating upon any of the
claims or counterclaims which form the substantive subject matter of
the arbitral proceedings.
51. In view of the aforesaid distinction, and having regard to the
settled principles governing the scope and characteristics of an
“ interim award ” under the A&C Act, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the Impugned Order squarely falls within the ambit of
procedural and case-management jurisdiction exercised by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal. The said order neither conclusively determines the
substantive claims or counterclaims of the parties, nor does it render
the learned Tribunal f unctus officio qua the disputes sought to be
canvassed in the present petition.
52. The arbitral proceedings, along with the underlying claims and
counterclaims, continue to remain pending adjudication before the
learned Tribunal. Consequently, the Impugned Order does not acquire
the character of an “ interim award ” so as to render it susceptible to
challenge under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
CONCLUSION:
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BHATIA
Signing Date:16.05.2026
13:28:14
O.M.P. (COMM) 67/2025 Page 27 of 28
53. In view of the aforesaid discussion and for the reasons recorded
hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present
petition preferred under Section 34 of the A&C Act is not
maintainable, as the Impugned Order does not partake the character of
either an arbitral award or an interim award within the meaning of the
Act.
54. Consequently, O.M.P. (COMM) 67/2025 , instituted to assail the
Impugned Order dated 13.01.2025 passed by the learned Arbitral
Tribunal, is accordingly dismissed.
55. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the disputes inter se the parties and all rights and
contentions of the parties before the learned Arbitral Tribunal are left
open to be adjudicated in accordance with law.
56. Present Petition, along with all pending applications, if any,
stands dismissed.
57. There shall be no order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
MAY 12, 2026/nd/kr
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:16.05.2026
13:28:14
O.M.P. (COMM) 67/2025 Page 28 of 28