D. Chellakumar(Died) vs V.G.P. Rajadas,
- Court
- Madras High Court
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
RESERVED ON : 15.09.2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 18.11.2026
CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. DHANDAPANI
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N. DILIP KUMAR
SA(MD) Nos. 561 and 562 of 2020
CNR:{HCMD011182892018}
AND
CMP(MD) No. 6088 and 6089 of 2020 and
CMP(MD) No. 2823 of 2020
In S.A.(MD) No.561 of 2020:-
1. D. Chellakumar (Died)
2. P.Narayanan
3. P.Paichmuthu
nd
(2 Appellant is impleaded vide court order dated
12.08.2026)
rd
(3 Appellant is impleaded vide court order dated
18.11.2026)
..Appellant(s)
Vs
1. V.G.P. Rajadas,
2. Lisi Edward,
3. Stella,
4. Stephen,
5. Subbaiah Konar,
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6. V.G.Santhosam,
7. V.G.Paneerdas and Company,
V.G.P.Square, Saidapet, Chennai - 15. Through
its registered shareholder V.G.P.Rajadas,
..Respondent (s)
PRAYER: To submit this Memorandum of Second Appeal before this
Honourable Court against the Judgment and Decree dated 20.03.2018
passed in A.S.No.8 of 2013 on the file of the III Additional District
Court, Tirunelveli confirming the Judgment and Decree dated 05.04.2010
passed in O.S.No.334 of 2003 on the file of the Additional Sub Judge,
Tirunelveli for the following among other Grounds.
For Appellant(s): Mr G.Prabhu Rajadurai for
nd
2 substituted appellant, Narayanan
Mr.S.Mukund Senior Counsel for
Mr.J.Avinash Dhandapani for
rd
3 substituted appellant,
P.Paichmuthu
For Respondent(s): Mr.S.Meenakshi Sundaram
Senior counsel for Mr.N.G.A.Natraj
for R1 and R6 & R7
In S.A.(MD) No.562 of 2020:-
1. D. Chellakumar(Died)
2. P.Narayanan,
nd
2 Appellant is brought on record as LR of the
deceased Sole Appellant vide court order dated
12.08.2026
..Appellant(s)
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Vs
1. V.G.Panneerdas and Company,
VGP Square, Saidapet, Chennai 15, through its
registered shareholder V.G.P. Rajadas
2. V.G.Santhosam
3. V.G.P.Rajadas
4. A.Kingwin Royan
5. Nicewin Royan
6. Joywin Royan
7. Coolwin Royan
Kalaiselvan (died)
8. K.Amutharani
9. K.Shanmugaraja
10.K.Chandrababu
11.K.Sathishkumar
12.K.Sankari
(cause title accepted vide order dated 13.03.2019)
..Respondent (s)
PRAYER: To submit this Memorandum of Second Appeal before this
Court against the Judgment and Decree dated 20.03.2018 passed in
A.S.No.9 of 2013 on the file of the III Additional District Court,
Tirunelveli confirming the Judgment and Decree dated 05.04.2010 passed
in O.S.No.423 of 2003 on the file of the Additional Sub Judge,
Tirunelveli.
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For Appellant(s): Mr G.Prabhu Rajadurai for
nd
2 substituted appellant, Narayanan
For Respondents(s): Mr.S.Meenakshi Sundaram
Senior counsel for Mr .N.G.A.Natraj
for R1 to R3
No appearance for R4 to R12
COMMON JUDGMENT
(Judgment of the Court was delivered by N. DILIP KUMAR J.)
These second appeals were filed by the original plaintiff, viz., D.
Chellakumar, challenging the decrees and common judgment passed
against him by the learned III Additional District Judge, Tirunelveli,
dated 20.03.2018 in his Appeal Suits bearing numbers 8 and 9 of 2013,
which were filed by him against the dismissal of his original suits bearing
numbers 334 and 423 of 2003 vide common judgment and decree by the
learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli on 05.04.2010.
For the sake of convenience the parties are referred as they stood in the
trial court in OS 334 of 2003 as the context requires.
OS 334 of 2003
2. The case of D. Chellakumar as narrated in his plaint in O.S.
No. 334 of 2003 is that the suit schedule and other properties
originally belonged to his paternal uncle, Ebenezar Nadar. He
executed a registered deed of gift dated 14.11.1969 (Ex.A.1) in respect
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of the suit schedule and other properties in favor of his brother,
Dharmakkan Nadar. Dharmakkan Nadar is the father of the plaintiff.
Dharmakkan Nadar died intestate on 24.10.1970, leaving behind the
plaintiff as his only legal heir. Accordingly, the plaintiff got title,
possession, and interest over the suit schedule and other properties.
2.1. The plaintiff appointed V.G. Santhosam, a partner of M/s.
V.G. Panneerdas and Company, a registered partnership firm, as his
power agent vide the registered power of attorney dated 21.01.1978,
(Ex. B1) bearing Doc.No. 24 of 1978.
2.2. The plaintiff specifically contended that there was no
independent right, interest, or possession available to V.G. Santhosam
in respect of the suit schedule and other properties, other than that of
his fiduciary status as the power agent of the plaintiff; this power deed
was cancelled on 21.01.2003, and the cancellation was also registered
on 20.08.2003 (Ex.A.21). The plaintiff appointed R. Vijayakumar as
his power agent on 22.01.2003 (Ex.A.6).
2.3. The plaintiff specifically pleaded that he had not executed
any power of attorney in favor of the registered partnership firm by the
name of M/s. V.G. Panneerdas and Company. He also denied that
V.G. Santhosam has any right of delegation under the power of
attorney. The plaintiff denied the power of attorney dated 22.01.1978
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said to have been executed by V.G. Santhosam in favor of M/s. V.G.
Panneerdas and Company. He disputed the validity of the four sale
deeds executed by V.G.P. Rajadoss who claimed to represent M/s.
V.G. Panneerdas and Company, the partnership Firm in its capacity as
the power agent of the plaintiff in favor of the Lisi Edward (Ex.A.7
dated 23.05.2003) in respect of the first item of the suit schedule
property described as Plot No.53 in S.No. 39/1, admeasuring 4028
square feet ; in favor of Stella (Ex.A.8 dated 23.05.2003) in respect of
the second item of the suit schedule property described as Plot No. 62
in S.Nos.38/1 and 38/2, admeasuring 3240 square feet ; in favor of
Stephen (Ex.A.9 dated 23.05.2003) in respect of the third item of the
suit schedule property described as Plot No. 63, admeasuring 3447
square feet, in S.Nos.38/1 and 38/2 ; and lastly, in favor of Subbiah
Konar (Ex.A.10 dated 05.06.2003) in respect of the fourth item of the
suit schedule property described as Plot No.84 in S.No.37/1,
admeasuring 3200 square feet . (The detailed mentioning of the suit
schedule is very much relevant, upon which we will be discussing
later, in detail.)
2.4. He sought a declaration and recovery of possession in
respect of these four individual plots.
2.5. The plaintiff disputed the sale agreement mentioned in the
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reply notice dated 14.08.2003 (Exhibit A-19). The plaintiff denied
having agreed to sell an extent of 21.20 acres of land comprised in
Survey Nos.37/1, 38/1, 38/2, 39/1, 40/1 and 40/4, either on 23.05.1975
or on 19.01.1978. He also denied executing any stamped receipt dated
21.01.1978 (Ex.B.5) referred to in the reply notice dated 14.08.2003.
2.6. In effect, the plaintiff denied executing any power of
attorney in favour of M/s. V.G. Panneerdas and Company, a registered
partnership firm; entering into any agreement of sale in its favour, for
a sale consideration of Rs. 21,200/-; and receiving any amount
towards the alleged sale consideration from M/s. V.G. Panneerdas and
Company or issuing any stamped receipt, in proof of it.
st
3.In the said suit, V.G.P. Rajadoss was the 1 defendant; V.G.
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Santhosam was the 6 defendant and M/s. V.G. Panneerdas and
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Company, a registered partnership firm, was arrayed as the 7
defendant. Lisi Edward, Stella, Stephen and Subbiah Konar who
respectively purchased the suit schedule properties - items 1-4 were
respectively arrayed as defendants 2-5.
3.1. In O.S. No. 334 of 2003, the sixth defendant, V.G.
Santhosam, whom the plaintiff admitted to have appointed as his
power of attorney, did not file a written statement. The first defendant,
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VGP Rajadoss, who had executed the impugned sale deeds in favour
of defendants 2 to 5 as a representative of M/s. V.G. Panneerdas and
Company, did not file a written statement.
3.2. The purchasers, namely, defendants 2 to 5, did not file
separate written statements but adopted the written statement filed by
the seventh defendant, as evidenced by the endorsement below the
verification portion of the pleadings. However, the trial Court
erroneously recorded that no written statement had been filed on
behalf of these defendants.
3.3. The seventh defendant filed a written statement. They
admitted the plaintiff's title, right, and possession over the suit
schedule property and the other properties. They admitted the
execution of the power of attorney dated 21.01.1978 in favour of the
th th
6 defendant; but, claimed that the 6 defendant had not been
appointed in his individual capacity, but had acted only as the
representative of the seventh defendant partnership firm in such GPA.
3.4. The seventh defendant disputed the validity of the
cancellation of the power of attorney. It contended that the seventh
defendant had become the owner of the properties, a long time back,
upon payment of the entire sale consideration, as evidenced from the
stamped receipt dated 21.01.1978.
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3.5. According to the seventh defendant, the plaintiff had
received the entire sale consideration in respect of the alienation of the
suit schedule and other properties and had thereby divested himself of
his rights over them. Consequently, the seventh defendant maintained
that the sale deeds executed by the first defendant in favour of
defendants 2 to 5 are valid and binding.
3.6. The defendants also sought to explain their admission in the
th
reply notice dated 14.08.2003, wherein 6 defendant was described as
the individual power of attorney. They contended that the power of
attorney was executed in favour of the seventh defendant partnership
firm and that it was irrevocable, because the plaintiff had already
received the entire sale consideration before its execution.
3.7. They further claimed that, acting under the power of
attorney, they had converted the properties into house plots after
obtaining approval from the competent authorities and had sold the
individual plots to various third parties.
3.8. According to them, possession and enjoyment of the
properties had remained with the defendants since 21.01.1978.
3.9. In the additional written statement, the seventh defendant
also referred to an agreement of sale dated 25.03.1975 between the
plaintiff and the seventh defendant and a power of attorney dated
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22.03.1976 executed in favour of one Mr. John to sell the suit schedule
properties to the partnership firm.
OS 423 of 2003
4. D. Chellakumar instituted another suit in O.S. No. 423 of
2003, claiming title over the suit property.
4.1. His plaint averments are similar to his earlier suit to a larger
extent.
4.2. D. Chellakumar set up another nemesis in this case. He
pleaded that the power of attorney dated 02.02.1999 claimed in favour
of Arul Raj (Ex.B.22) is fraudulent and is falsely represented to have
been executed by him. He denied the validity of the sale deed dated
24.02.1999 executed by Arulraj as his GPA in favour of Jayakumar
Ruban in respect of the suit schedule properties.
4.3. According to him, Jayakumar Ruban without any title,
falsely conveyed the first item of the suit schedule property,
measuring 2 acres and 11 cents in Survey No.40/1A , in favour of the
Kingwin Royan, Nicewin Royan, Joywin Royan, Coolwin Royan
under a sale deed dated 24.01.2000; and another sale deed dated
08.03.2000 (Ex.B.24) in respect of the second and third items of the
property, comprising 43 cents in Survey No. 40/1C and 25 cents in
Survey No. 40/4 , in favour of Kalaiselvan. (The detailed mentioning of
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the suit schedule is very much relevant, upon which we will be
discussing in detail.)
4.4. The plaintiff sought a declaration of his title over the suit
properties. He also sought the consequential relief of perpetual
injunction, restraining the defendants from interfering with his
possession; alienating or encumbering the properties; and claiming
any right over them on the strength of documents relied upon by them.
In the said suit, M/s. V.G. Panneerdas and Company, a registered
partnership firm, was arrayed as the first defendant, followed by V.G.
nd rd
Santhosam, V.G.P. Rajadoss as 2 and 3 defendants, respectively.
The purchasers of the first item of the properties, Kingwin Royan,
Nicewin Royan, Joywin Royan, Coolwin Royan were impleaded as
defendants 4 to 7 (Royan family) and the purchaser of the second and
third items, Kalaiselvan was impleaded as the eighth defendant.
4.5. M/s. V.G. Panneerdas and Company, the first defendant in
O.S. No. 423 of 2003, filed a written statement, which was adopted by
the second defendant, V.G. Santhosam, and the third defendant, VGP
Rajadoss. They contended that the plaintiff had executed a registered
power of attorney dated 21.01.1978 in favour of V.G. Santhosam, who
had represented the registered partnership firm.
4.6. They further contended that the plaintiff had earlier
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executed a power of attorney in favour of John, authorising the sale of
the suit schedule properties to the registered partnership firm. They
contended that the entire sale consideration had already been paid to
the plaintiff and, consequently, the power of attorney dated 21.01.1978
was irrevocable. They disputed the validity of the cancellation dated
21.01.2003 and its subsequent registration.
4.7. They specifically pleaded that the plaintiff had entered into
an agreement of sale dated 25.03.1975 with the first defendant and had
issued a stamped receipt acknowledging receipt of the entire sale
consideration. They denied obtaining any blank signed stamp papers
from the plaintiff and asserted that the possession and enjoyment of
the properties remain with them.
4.8. Defendants 4 to 7 in their written statement claimed that the
power of attorney dated 02.02.1999 executed by the plaintiff in favour
of Arulraj was genuine and that the subsequent alienation made by
Arulraj in favour of their vendor, Jayakumar Ruban was valid. They
claimed that they had filed an independent suit in O.S. No. 534 of
2003 before the same Court to protect their interests.
4.9. The purchaser of the second and third items of the suit
schedule properties, Kalaiselvan, the eighth defendant in O.S. No. 423
of 2003, raised similar contentions and asserted his rights over the
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properties purchased by him, viz., items 2 and 3.
5.The suit instituted by defendants 4 to 7 in O.S. No. 534 of 2003
was subsequently renumbered as O.S. No. 26 of 2007. All three suits,
viz., O.S. Nos. 334 of 2003, 423 of 2003, and 26 of 2007, were taken up
together for a common trial.
6.During the common trial, the plaintiff, D. Chellakumar
examined himself as P.W.2, his power of attorney, R.Vijayakumar, as
P.W.1, V. Karthik as P.W.3. On the defendants' side, V.G. Santhosam
was examined as D.W.1, V.G.P. Rajadoss as D.W.2, and an officer
from the Income Tax Department, Mr. G. Chandrababu, as D.W.3. The
eighth defendant, Mr. Kalaiselvan, examined himself as D.W.5. One
P.J. Edward, the husband of the second defendant, Lisi Edward, in O.S.
No. 334 of 2003 was examined as D.W.4.
7.The learned trial Judge framed the following issues in O.S. No.
334 of 2003:-
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1. Whether the power of attorney dated 21-01-1978
executed by plaintiff in favour of D.6 is revocable
or irrevocable?
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of
declaration and recovery of possession as prayed
for?
3. To what relief for him?
8.The learned trial Judge framed the following issues in
O.S. No. 423 of 2003:
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that
the suit properties exclusively belong to him?
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of
perpetual injunction restraining the defendants and
their agents from interfering with his possession and
enjoyment of the suit properties?
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of
perpetual injunction restraining defendants 1 to 3
from creating any alienation or encumbrance over
the suit properties?
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of
perpetual injunction restraining defendants 4 to 8
from claiming any right over the properties on the
basis of the documents relied upon by them?
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5. To what other reliefs, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?
9.During the trial, the learned Judge noted that the plaintiff had
denied executing the agreement of sale dated 25.03.1975, marked as
Exhibit B-3, and the stamped receipt dated 21.01.1978, marked as
Exhibit B-5; that these documents were marked subject to the
objections, raised by the plaintiff; that the power of attorney executed in
favour of the seventh defendant partnership firm had subsequently been
cancelled by the plaintiff under Exhibit A-21.
10.The learned Judge held that after executing the agreement of
sale dated 25.03.1975 and receiving the entire sale consideration, the
plaintiff had issued the stamped receipt dated 21.01.1978 in favour of
the seventh defendant (Ex. B5), and thus, the learned trial Judge held
that the power of attorney dated 21.01.1978 (Ex. B1) is supported by
consideration; thus the power of attorney is coupled with interest and
hence it was irrevocable and that the seventh defendant had acted upon
it, by obtaining the necessary approvals.
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11. By placing reliance on Section 202 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872, the learned trial Judge concluded that the plaintiff had no
authority to cancel the irrevocable power of attorney.
12.The learned trial Judge also held that during cross-
examination, the plaintiff admitted receipt of the sale consideration of
Rs.21,200/; execution of the agreement of sale and power of attorney,
and his signatures on those documents.
13.The learned Judge concluded that the seventh defendant had
acquired rights and interests in the suit properties and had, on that basis,
executed the impugned sale deeds in favour of defendants 2 to 5 in O.S.
No. 334 of 2003. It is necessary to note here that the issue framed was
th
“whether the power of attorney executed in favour of the 6 defendant
is irrevocable”, but the Judge concluded that the power of attorney
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issued in favour of the 7 defendant is irrevocable, making it evident
th th
that the trial Judge treated the 6 and 7 defendants as one and the
same.
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14. The learned Judge found that the defendants had been in
possession and enjoyment of the properties for more than 30 years. He
accordingly dismissed the suit.
15.Insofar as O.S. No. 423 of 2003, the learned trial Judge held
that, in view of the power of attorney dated 21.01.1978 and the payment
of the entire sale consideration, the plaintiff could not maintain a claim
over the suit schedule properties. The Court, accordingly, concluded
that the plaintiff had failed to establish his title and dismissed the suit.
16.With regard to the fourth issue in O.S. No. 423 of 2003,
concerning the alienation in favour of defendants 4 to 7 and the eighth
defendant, the learned Judge held that defendants 4 to 7 could not claim
any right or interest in the properties on the strength of the sale deeds
relied upon by them.
17.The Learned Trial Judge concluded that the power of attorney
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executed in favour of the 7 defendant is irrevocable as it is coupled
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with interest. While considering the claim of the eighth defendant, the
learned Judge accepted the power of attorney executed by Plaintiff in
favour of Arulraj and the subsequent sale deeds executed in favour of
Jayakumar Ruban and later by Jayakumar Ruban in favour of
Kalaiselvan.
18.The Judge held that there is no serious objection by the
th
plaintiff against the claim of title by the vendor of the 8 defendant; and
th
holding that the revenue records stand in the name of the 8 defendant
and it was admitted by sixth defendant during his cross examination,
th
the Judge upheld the claim of the 8 defendant in respect of the
properties purchased by him.
19.The learned Judge concluded that the properties purchased by
the eighth defendant are comprised in 43 cents in Survey No. 40/1C and
25 cents in Survey No. 40/4, and these properties did not form part of
any of the documents under which the seventh defendant partnership
firm makes a claim.
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20.The learned Judge, took into consideration the revenue
records, which did not reflect the grant of any patta in favour of VGP
th
group, the availability of a patta in favour of the 8 defendant and the
th
fact that the transaction in favour of the 8 defendant was executed on
th
8 March 2000, much earlier to the revocation of the power of attorney-
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concluded that the 8 defendant had valid title and possession of the
th
property. Accordingly, this issue was answered in favour of the 8
defendant. The suit filed by Royan family in O.S. No. 534 of 2003,
subsequently renumbered as O.S. No. 26 of 2007 was dismissed and it
was not appealed further.
21.Aggrieved by the dismissal of his suits, the plaintiff, D.
Chellakumar filed A.S. No. 8 of 2013 against the judgment in O.S. No.
334 of 2003 and A.S. No. 9 of 2013 against the judgment in O.S. No.
423 of 2003. Both the appeals were taken up together by the learned
appellate Judge and dismissed under the impugned judgment and decree
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dated 20 March 2018.
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22.The learned first appellate Judge framed the following issues
for consideration:
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1. Whether Exhibit B1, dated 21 January 1978, is an
irrevocable power of attorney?
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs of
declaration and recovery of possession in O.S. No.
334 of 2003?
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of
declaration in O.S. No. 423 of 2003?
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of
perpetual injunction in O.S. No. 423 of 2003?
5. Whether the appeals are liable to be allowed?
23.The first appellate Judge noted that the primary dispute between
the parties is “Who is the agent under the power of attorney, whether, as
claimed by the plaintiff, the power of attorney was executed by
nominating an individual, namely, V.G. Santhosam, as the agent or the
th
power of attorney nominates the 7 defendant partnership firm as the
agent as claimed by the seventh defendant”; and also “Whether the power
of attorney is coupled with interest thereby making it irrevocable as
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claimed by 7 defendant”.
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24.The learned first appellate Judge observed that Ex. B3, the sale
agreement was executed in favour of VGP Housing Private Limited,
represented by its Managing Director, V.G. Panneerdas. The learned
nd
appellate Judge also referred to the power of attorney dated 22 March
1976 executed by the plaintiff in favour of John.
25.By referring to the land acquisition proceedings and the
connected records, as well as the layout approval documents marked as
Ex. B6 to Ex. B8 and Ex. B10 to Ex. B16, the learned Judge concluded
th
that since these documents stood in the name of the 7 defendant, it could
not be held that Exhibit B1 had been executed nominating an individual
as the power of attorney. Accordingly, the learned Judge construed the
th
power of attorney as having been executed in favour of the 7 defendant.
26.With regard to the irrevocability of Ex. B1, the learned first
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appellate Judge referred to the sale agreement dated 25 March 1975
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entered into between the plaintiff and the 7 defendant, as mentioned in
Ex. B1, and the availability of Ex. B4, the power of attorney executed by
the plaintiff in favour of John authorising him to execute documents
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relating to the properties in favour of M/s. V.G. Panneerdas and
Company. On these materials, the learned first appellate Judge concluded
that Ex. B3, the sale agreement was executed by the plaintiff.
27.The learned first appellate Judge further concluded that the
st
plaintiff's denial of the stamped receipt dated 21 January 1978 was not
credible, since in his chief examination, the plaintiff had stated that, at the
time of executing the power of attorney, his signatures had been obtained
on three blank sheets of paper and therefore, he admitted his signature on
the stamped receipt. Upon this admission and the fact that the original
title documents, together with the power of attorney executed in favour of
John, had been handed over to the VGP group, the learned first appellate
Judge concluded that the stamped receipt was genuine and that the
plaintiff had received the sale consideration.
28.With regard to the argument concerning the admissibility of the
statement made before the police authorities, the first appellate Judge
extracted a portion of the evidence of P.W.2 and held that the plaintiff
had admitted the relevant transaction.
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29.The learned first appellate Judge also took exception to the
plaintiff's reliance on the dismissal of O.S. No.553 of 2004. The first
appellate Judge noted that the said suit had been dismissed for non-
prosecution and that the alienation in respect of which O.S. No. 553 of
2004 had been instituted had taken place before the cancellation of the
st
power of attorney on 21 January 2003.
30.Accordingly, the learned first appellate Judge concluded that the
alienation covered by the proceedings should be presumed to have been
made on the strength of the power of attorney executed in favour of the
VGP group, V.G. Santhosam, V.G. Panneerdas, and the other concerned
parties.
31.The learned first appellate Judge also considered the objection
that the alienation involved in O.S. No. 334 of 2003 were made after the
st
issuance of the letter cancelling the power of attorney on 21 January
2003. However, the learned first appellate Judge held that the
th
cancellation was registered only on 20 August 2003 and that the reasons
assigned by the plaintiff for cancelling the power of attorney were vague
and flimsy.
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32.The learned first appellate Judge further held that the power of
attorney itself mentions that it is irrevocable, and considering the fact that
the plaintiff had not disputed its execution for more than 25 years, the
learned first appellate Judge concluded that the power of attorney was
irrevocable.
33.The learned first appellate Judge also considered the objections
th
raised by the VGP group and the 7 defendant, who contended that the
th
conclusion in favour of the 8 defendant was contrary to their case; that
the suits were concerned with the reliefs sought by the plaintiff and that,
since the plaintiff had failed to establish his entitlement to those reliefs,
they could not be granted. He held that the suit does not concern the
th
availability of title with the 8 defendant. Accordingly, the learned first
appellate Judge affirmed the judgments of the trial Court.
34.Challenging the concurrent findings of the courts below, the
unsuccessful plaintiff, Mr. D. Chellakumar filed the present second
appeals. He died during the pendency of these second appeals. Despite
specific orders from this Court, his children who are the available
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natural legal heirs are not brought on record . Upon his demise, both
these appeals stood abated. The impact of such abatement and the extent
to which the substituted appellant can contest these appeals in the place
of the original plaintiff will be determined at the relevant place.
35.These Second Appeals were admitted on the following
substantial questions of law:
1. Whether the Courts below are correct in law in
assuming that a sale agreement will create an
interest in property and therefore a subsequently
executed power of attorney becomes one coupled
with interest?
2. Whether the power of attorney dated 21.01.1978
has created an agency coupled with interest, in
terms of Section 202 of the Indian Contract Act?
3. Whether the power of attorney dated 21.01.1978 is
an irrevocable instrument and whether the
defendant can deal with the property on the basis
of the power of attorney?
4. Whether Ex.B.3 and Ex.B.5 are proved in the
manner known to law?
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5. Whether the first appeal and the second appeal
filed by the original plaintiff are maintainable,
since he sold the property to the newly impleaded
appellant?
36.Mr. G. Prabhu Raja Durai, the learned counsel for Narayanan
and Mr. S. Mukundh, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for
Paichmuthu, for the newly substituted appellants made the following
submissions :-
36.1. That the power of attorney is not irrevocable. The transfer
of title of an immovable property can be made only under a registered
deed of conveyance like sale deed and not by execution of sale
agreement coupled with a power of attorney; a mere statement in the
power of attorney, that it is irrevocable, will not make the power of
attorney, irrevocable; unless it is satisfied that the power of attorney is
coupled with interest created in favour of the agent himself, the
question of treating the power of attorney as irrevocable and extending
the benefits of Section 202 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, does not
arise.
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36.2.They relied upon the judgment of the Honourable Supreme
Court of India in Ananda Murthy vs Manjula reported in (2025) 10
SCC 596 and also the judgment in Ramesh Chand case reported in
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1879 , which relies upon Suraj lamps reported in
(2012) 1 SCC 656 . By relying upon the propositions laid down in the
above judgments, they would contend that there cannot be a completed
sale transaction, upon execution of a power of attorney and a sale
agreement on the same date.
th
36.3.The power of attorney is executed not in favour of the 7
defendant (a registered partnership firm) but in favour of a single
individual; this is evident from a bare reading of the power of attorney;
th
this is also admitted by the 7 defendant in their reply notice marked as
Exhibit.A.19. It is also admitted by DW1 that the Power of attorney
was executed only in his favour.
36.4.That the argument made by the defendants that the private
limited company, the individual and a registered partnership firm are all
representing different businesses of the same family and they should be
treated as one single entity and the rights and liabilities of the different
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legal entities are interchangeable is not only fanciful, but contrary to
law. According to them, even DW1, in his cross-examination, has
conceded that these are separate legal entities.
36.5.That the stamped receipt marked as Exhibit B5 is not proved
in the manner known to law. Once the Plaintiff had denied the
execution of the said document, it is not permissible for the defendant
to claim any presumed validity to the stamped receipt and it is the
bounden duty of the defendant to prove the admissibility and contents
of the said stamped receipt.
36.6.They relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in Narbada
Devi Gupta reported in (2003) 8 SCC 745 and Ramji Dayawala and
sons vs Invest Import reported in (1981) 1 SCC 80 in support of the
said argument. They further argued that the stamped receipt and sale
agreement were marked only subject to objection on the side of the
plaintiff, not only to the signature but also to the contents; despite
accepting that several payments were made by cheques and such
transactions will be reflected in their bank statement, no bank statement
was produced by the defendant to prove the passing of the
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consideration; further DW1 during his cross examination had denied
any knowledge to the execution of the stamped receipt and also to the
preparation of such receipt; despite the availability of signature of two
witnesses to the stamped receipt and even after a specific denial by the
plaintiff to the execution of the document and despite objection having
been raised on the side of the plaintiff to the admissibility of the
document, the defendant had not examined anyone of the witnesses to
the document and applying the ratio of the Supreme Court in ITC
Limited Versus Ashana Roy reported in (2026) 5 SCC 140 , it has to be
held that the stamped receipt is not proved; further there are serious
interpolations made by hand as if several payments were made by
cheques and also an entry regarding cash payment is made by insertion
in handwriting; none of these infirmities are explained by the defendant
either in their written statement or in their evidence; even the power
agent had denied knowledge of the execution of the stamped receipt or
about the handing over of cash payments and therefore Exhibit B5 is to
be held as not proved in the manner known to law.
36.7.They would argue that the substituted appellants are
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subsequent purchasers and are therefore entitled to be brought on record
in the place of the deceased plaintiff and relied upon the judgment of
the Supreme Court of India in Sharadama Vs Muhammad Pyrejan
reported in (2016) 1 SCC 730 and K. Naina Mohammed Versus A.M.
Vasudevan reported in (2010) 7 SCC 603 . They accordingly prayed for
allowing of the second appeals.
37. Mr. S. Meenakshi Sundaram, the learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondents 1, 6 and 7 made the following
submissions: -
37.1. That this Court in exercise of the power under Section 100
of the Code of Civil Procedure will not ordinarily interfere with the
concurrent findings on facts rendered by the trial court and the first
appellate court, and this court cannot re-appreciate the evidence.
st
37.2. That the power of attorney dated 21 January 1978 - Exhibit
B-1 was executed on the basis of Sale agreement, viz., Exhibit B3 dated
th st
25 March 1975 and the stamped receipt dated 21 January 1978. The
receipt of the entire sale consideration by Chellakumar is accepted by
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him and only thereafter the power of attorney was executed and
therefore the first substantial question of law does not arise for
consideration;
37.3. Exhibit B.1, i.e., the Power of attorney is coupled with
interest; it is evident from a cumulative reading of the same along with
the Sale agreement and Stamped receipt; he relied upon the following
judgments in support of the proposition that once the agency is coupled
with interest, it is not revocable unilaterally:-
“ (a) Seth Loon Karan Sethiya Vs Ivan E. John
reported in AIR 1969 SC 73;
(b) M. Chinnathambi Vs Kannaiyan reported in 2024
(2) CTC 312;
(c) Sakthi Durga Builders Vs. P.S. Raman reported in
2022 (5) CTC 84;
(d) K.A. Meeran Mohideen Vs. Shiek Amjad reported
in 2024 (5) CTC 613 ; and
(e) S. Lakshmi Vs N. Rangasamy reported in (2026) 3
MLJ 120. ”
37.4. He further argued that the defendant had improved and
developed the land, which is evident from Exhibits B-6, B7, B8, and
B9. The availability of possession of the properties with the VGP
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company is also evident from the land acquisition proceedings marked
in Exhibits B.10 to B.16 along with the availability of Patta (Ex.B.17)
in favour of VGP and company.
37.5. The statement given before the police, which is marked as
Exhibit B.18 shows that the plaintiff admitted the receipt of the sale
consideration and also the existence of a sale transaction in favour of
VGP Company and hence the power of attorney is one coupled with
interest and thus it is an irrevocable instrument.
37.6. In reference to the substantial questions of law regarding
whether Exhibits B3 and B5 are proved in the manner known to law, it
was argued by the learned Senior counsel that Chellakumar had
admitted the execution of the sale agreement in the power of attorney.
Thus the Sale agreement should be deemed to have been admitted. In
the sale agreement, Chellakumar had admitted to execute an irrevocable
power of attorney upon receipt of the sale consideration. Because
Chellakumar executed a power of attorney mentioning that it is
st
irrevocable, it could only mean that the stamped receipt dated 21
January 1978 is proved.
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37.7.He would argue that it is impossible for the defendant to
prove the correctness of Exhibit B5 after 25 years, since Exhibit B5 was
executed in 1978 and the suit was filed in 2003; he would attribute mala
fide and fraudulent intention on the part of Chellakumar in filing the
suit.
37.8.He would further argue that the proposition in Suraj lamps is
not applicable to the facts of the present case, as the subject power of
attorney was executed on 21.01.1978, which is long before the cut-off
date prescribed in Suraj Lamps. To his support he relied upon the Apex
Court Judgment in Maya Devi Vs. Lalta Prasad reported in (2015) 5
SCC 588 .
37.9.The learned Senior counsel argued that the original plaintiff
died during the pendency of the Second Appeals. After the alienation of
the properties, Chellakumar is not entitled to file these second appeals
or continue to contest them and the whole proceeding is vexatious.
37.10.With reference to the locus of the substituted appellants,
the senior counsel would argue that they are only subsequent purchasers
who will have to independently agitate the correctness of the judgment
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and decree of the original suit in an individual first appeal and later in a
separate second appeal and cannot implead themselves as party to the
proceedings; they never filed any such application during the lifetime of
the original plaintiff; he attributes lack of bona fide against the
substituted appellants and argues that the substituted appellants are
guilty of lack of vigilant conduct.
37.11.In reference to their right to continue with the appeal suits,
the learned Senior counsel argues that unless the substituted appellants
demonstrate that their claim is in full conformity with that of the
original plaintiff, they cannot be allowed to contest the second appeals,
as it cannot be continued in part, leaving the remaining portion of the
decree unchallenged and it would lead to conflicting decrees. He
pointedly argued that the appellant Narayanan had failed to bring the
children/natural heirs of Chellakumar as parties to these second appeals,
despite specific orders and this is fatal to their continuation of the
second appeals.
37.12.He argued that the failure of substituted appellant to
challenge the correctness of the judgment and decree granted against
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Chellakumar in OS 553 of 2004, which is marked as Exhibit B22 and
B23 is fatal and would therefore seriously dispute the eligibility of the
substituted appellants to continue with the present second appeals.
37.13.He accordingly prayed for the dismissal of the second
appeals.
38.Before we dwell upon the questions of law, it is necessary to
record the minimum facts for an effective adjudication of these two
second appeals.
38.1. Admitted Facts : The availability of title and ownership over
the suit schedule and other properties covered in both the civil suits
with D. Chellakumar, the original plaintiff is admitted; and the
execution of a general power of attorney by D. Chellakumar, the
plaintiff in favor of V.G. Santhosam, is admitted.
39.The following are the seriously disputed between the parties:-
39.1.According to VGP group, it is their case that there was an
earlier sale agreement dated 25.03.1975 executed by the plaintiff in
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favour of the seventh defendant; that under the sale agreement, the
plaintiff had agreed to alienate 21.20 acres of land for a total sale
consideration of Rs.21,200/-; that the entire sale consideration was paid
by the seventh defendant to the plaintiff, on various dates and upon
completion of payment of the sale consideration, the plaintiff issued a
st
stamped receipt signed on 21 January 1978; that the payment of the
entire sale consideration created an interest in favour of the seventh
defendant and to protect this interest, since they were unable to identify
the purchasers of the divided plots, an irrevocable power of attorney
came to be executed in favour of the seventh defendant, represented by
st
their partner V.G. Santhosam, vide the power of attorney dated 21
January 1978, marked as Exhibit B1; that the power of attorney is
coupled with interest; it is also specifically mentioned as irrevocable
and stands substantiated with the aid of Section 202 of the Indian
Contract Act (9 of 1872); that the subsequent cancellation of the power
of attorney is not sustainable and all alienation made by them are
legally valid; that upon the receipt of the sale consideration, D.
Chellakumar is divested of his right and title over the suit and other
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properties in favour of the seventh defendant.
39.2. Rather the plaintiff specifically denied the execution of a
th
sale agreement marked as Exhibit B-3, dated 25 March 1975; he
denied the signature and also the contents available in the stamped
receipt dated 21.01.1978; the plaintiff contends that these documents
Ex.B3 and Ex.B5 are fabricated and falsely created; the plaintiff denied
the receipt of the sale consideration and would only admit the GPA.
39.3. The plaintiff disputed the execution of any power of
attorney in favor of Arul Raj and accordingly denied the validity of the
sale deeds executed by Arul Raj in favor of Jayakumar Ruban and the
subsequent alienation by Jayakumar Ruban in favour of Royan family
and Kalaiselvan.
40. Generally, in any case, where there is a plea regarding
abatement of suit or appeal, because of death of anyone of the parties,
either the plaintiff or the defendant, the Court shall first decide whether
the suit/appeal can be continued by the surviving party or by the person
proposing to bring himself on record in the place of the deceased party.
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Unless the said question is decided in favour of the party seeking to
continue the lis, the merits of the case cannot be touched.
41.Hence, it is necessary to first answer the last question raised
by the senior Counsel for the defendants 1, 6 & 7, i.e., whether the
substituted appellants can be allowed to continue with these second
appeals?
42.At this juncture, it is essential to extract the entire order made
on 25.10.2025 which is as follows:
“ All the aforementioned Civil Miscellaneous Petitions
have been filed in the two second appeals to bring on record a
subsequent purchaser of the property in the place of the
appellant Chellakumar, who died pending the appeals. But,
however, all the applications have been filed invoking Order 22
Rule 3 of C.P.C. The correct provision should have been Order
22 Rule 10 of C.P.C. But any way we do not stand on
technicality. But it is imperative that class-I legal heirs of
Chellakumar are also impleaded and therefore, separate
applications may be taken out to implead the class-I legal heirs
of deceased Chellakumar, which would be an application under
Order 22 Rule 3 of C.P.C.
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2. The said application should be brought up
before this Court by 13.11.2025.”
43. Despite providing an opportunity, no such application is filed
to bring the natural legal heirs of the deceased Chellakumar as parties to
these second appeals. Narayanan had admitted that the natural legal
heirs/children of the plaintiff are available, but have since settled in
foreign countries, and hence, he is unable to bring them on record. We
have allowed Narayanan and Paichmuthu to come on record in order to
ensure that there is some representation for the estate of the deceased
plaintiff in these second appeals. It is also not denied by the rival parties
that these substituted parties in the place of the original appellant had
purchased portions of properties from the plaintiff and they have some
interest in this civil suit.
44.It is necessary to consider Order 22 CPC and the relevant
portion is extracted hereunder:-
ORDER XXII
D EATH , M ARRIAGE AND I NSOLVENCY OF P ARTIES
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1. No abatement by party's death if right to sue
survives:- The death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause
the suit to abate if the right to sue survives.
3. Procedure in case of death of one of several
plaintiffs or of sole plaintiff:-
(1) Where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the
right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or
plaintiffs alone, or a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff
dies and the right to the sue survives, the Court, on an
application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal
representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and
shall proceed with the suit.
(2) Where within the time limited by law no application
is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate so far as the
deceased plaintiff is concerned, and, on the application of the
defendant, the Court may award to him the costs which he may
have incurred in defending the suit, to be recovered from the
estate of the deceased plaintiff.
9. Effect of abatement or dismissal:- (1) Where a suit
abates or is dismissed under this Order, no fresh suit shall be
brought on the same cause of action.
(2) The plaintiff or the person claiming to be the legal
representative of a deceased plaintiff or the assignee or the
receiver in the case of an insolvent plaintiff may apply for an
Order to set aside the abatement or dismissal; and if it is
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proved that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from
continuing the suit, the Court shall set aside the abatement or
dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks
fit.
(3) The provisions of section 5 of the 1[Indian Limitation
Act, 1877 (15 of 1877)] shall apply to applications under sub-
rule (2).
10. Procedure in case of assignment before final Order
in suit:- (1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or
devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, may,
by leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to
or upon whom such interest has come or devolved.
(2) The attachment of a decree pending an appeal
therefrom shall be deemed to be an interest entitling the person
who procured such attachment to the benefit of sub-rule (1).
11. Application of Order to appeals:- In the application
of this Order to appeals, so far as may be, the word "plaintiff
shall be held to include an appellant, the word "defendant" a
respondent, and the word "suit" an appeal.”
45. Rule 1 provides that if the right to sue survives, the death will
not cause abatement. Rule 2 provides that if the right to sue survives on
the surviving party (either the plaintiff or defendant) the suit can
continue, despite the death of the party, after causing an entry to that
effect in the records. Under Rule 3, if the right to sue does not survive
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solely on the surviving plaintiff, then the legal representatives of the
deceased plaintiff shall be made a party to the suit and the court shall
then proceed with the suit, and in case of default to file application, the
suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned. Under Rule
4, if the right to sue survives not only on the surviving defendants, the
legal representatives shall be brought on record and then the suit shall
be proceeded. The defense of the impleaded legal representatives shall
be in consonance with that of the deceased. On failure to file an
application under Rule 4, the suit abates against the deceased defendant.
Sub-Rule 4 of Rule 4 provides that it is not necessary to implead a
deceased defendant who had not filed any written statement or who,
after filing a written statement did not contest the case. Sub-Rule 4-A
enables the Court to appoint an officer or other person in case of
absence of any legal representative. Under Rule 5, it is permissible for
the Court to determine the question, as to who is the eligible legal
representative. Rule 6 prescribes that there shall be no abatement by
reason of death, after the completion of the hearing and before the
pronouncement of the judgment. Rule 7 talks about the impact of
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marriage of a female party and Rule 8 talks about the insolvency of a
plaintiff and the procedure to be adopted by the assignee or receiver to
bring themselves on record. Rule 9 provides the effect of abatement or
dismissal and prohibits the institution of any fresh suit on the same
cause of action. Rule 10 provides that in other cases of assignment
(than insolvency) or creation or devolution of any interest, during the
pendency of the suit, in any person, the suit, with the leave of the Court
can be continued by or against the person, upon whom such interest has
devolved. Sub Rule 10-A mandates certain duty on the part of the
pleader to communicate to the court about the death of a party. Rule 11
extends the provision to pending appeals as well. Rule 12 prescribes the
manner of application of the order to other proceedings and also the
restrictions in reference to the application of the order to execution
proceedings.
46. A recording of the bird’s eye view of the provisions
contained in Order 22 establishes that the availability of a right to sue,
the nature of cause of action, the surviving right of the parties, and also
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the exclusive availability of right to sue, are all matters of
consideration.
47. It is necessary to ascertain the meaning of the term “Right to
Sue”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Phool Rani vs Naubat
Rai Ahluwalia reported in ( 1973) 1 SCC 688 held that the term “Right
to Sue” means the right to bring a suit asserting a right to the same
relief, which the deceased plaintiff asserted at the time of his death.
48. The right to sue occurring in Order 22 is the legal threshold
that determines whether the second appeal survives the plaintiff’s death
at all. And critically, whether that right survives in favour of the
pendente lite purchasers alone, or partially and whether it is then
divisible/separable or not, warranting the presence of the natural heirs
of the deceased are the determining factors.
49. The core principle is the surviving right to sue . The death of a
plaintiff or appellant does not cause the appeal to abate, if the right to
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sue survives. In the present case, the dispute involves proprietary rights
over immovable property and the validity of a power of attorney
affecting the title. It is more than a purely personal right like
defamation or personal service. The subject involves a substantive right
to property which gives rise to the right to sue and certainly does
survive the plaintiff’s death.
50. Unfortunately, for the substituted appellants, upon the death
of the plaintiff, the surviving right to sue does not automatically vest in
one single person. Instead, it splits along the lines of the property
ownership. The table given below demonstrates that the right to sue
devolved upon the pendente lite purchasers, during the plaintiff's
lifetime by assignment under Order 22 Rule 10 of CPC, only with
regard to the portion of the property purchased by the substituted
appellants. This does not encompass the entire portion of the suit
scheduled properties. And for the remaining portion of the property
forming part of the suit schedule, which is not purchased by these
substituted appellants, the right to sue survives in favour of the other
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assignees or the deceased plaintiff’s children who are his natural legal
heirs entitled to be brought on record under Order 22 Rule 3 of CPC.
51. Under Order 22 Rule 3 CPC, upon the sole appellant’s death
and when the right to sue survived, the Court can bring his natural heirs
as the legal representatives on record along with the pendente lite
purchasers.
52. Both these second appeals abated on the death of the original
th
plaintiff, Chellakumar on 6 May 2021 and soon upon the failure to file
appropriate applications within time to bring the legal representatives
on record, such abatement attained finality.
53. Now we shall consider whether the abatement of the appeal
leads to conflicting decrees. To appreciate the same, it is necessary to
verify the properties that are dealt with in the title deed of the Plaintiff,
the power of attorney in favor of the sixth defendant, the power of
attorney in favor of G. John, the sale agreement, the Suit schedule
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properties in both the civil suits and also in OS 553 of 2004 and also
properties purchased by the substituted appellants. They are produced
in the table hereunder:-
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Description GPA
(to D6)
Gift Deed
Sale
Agreement
GPA
(to John)
Schedule in
Schedule in
Schedule in
Property
purchased by
Property purchased by
Ex.B2
O.S. No.
334 of 2003
O.S.No.
423 of 2003
O.S.No.
553 of 2004
Paichmuthu
Ex.B1
Ex.B3
Ex.B4
Narayanan
Date 21.01.1978 14.11.1969 25.03.1975 22.03.1976 - - - 17.10.2007 and
11.02.2008
11.02.2008
37/1
(individual
37/1
(5.30 acres)
37/1
(5.30 acres)
37/1
(5.30 acres)
Item 4-
Plot 84
Sy.No.37/1
(7.35 cents)
- 37/1
(5.30 acres)
11.02.2008 –
Doc.No.2052/2008
extent not
mentioned)
37/1
(5.1290 acres)
38/1 38/1
(4.91 acres)
38/1
(4.91 acres)
38/1
(4.91 acres)
Item 3-
Plot 63-
Sy.Nos.
38/1 + 38/2
(7.43 cents)
- 38/1
(4.91 acres)
17.10.2007 –
Doc.No.7584/2007
-
38/1
(4.8311 acres)
Property
38/2 38/2
(2.81 acres)
38/2
(2.81 acres)
38/2
(2.81 acres)
- 38/2
(2.81 acres)
11.02.2008 –
Doc.No.2021/2008
-
&
Item 2-
Plot 62 -
38/2
(2.6968 acres)
Sy.Nos.
38/1 + 38/2
(7.91 cents)
39/1 39/1
(4.67 acres)
39/1
(4.67 acres)
39/1
(4.67 acres)
Item 1 -
- 39/1
(4.67 acres)
17.10.2007 –
Doc.No.7540/2007
-
Plot 53-
Sy.No.
39/1C
(3.2795 acres)
39/1
(9.25 cents)
40/1A
40/1
(3.26 acres)
40/1
(3.26 acres)
40/1
(3.26 acres)
- Item 1
-
-
+
40/1C
40/1A
(2.11 acres)
+
Item 2
11.02.2008 –
Doc.No.2020/2008
40/1C
(0.43 acres)
40/1C
(0.43 acres)
40/4 40/4
(0.25 acres)
40/4
(0.25 acres)
40/4
(0.25 acres)
- Item 3
- 11.02.2008 –
Doc.No.2020/2008
-
40/4
(0.25 acres)
40/4
(0.25 acres)
Total
Extent
21.20 acres 21.20 acres 21.20 acres 21.20 acres 31.94 cents 2.79 acres 7.58 acres
out of this
17.69 acres
11.4874 acres 5.1290 acres
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54. The above table demonstrates that the properties inherited by
the original plaintiff is the same as mentioned in the sale agreement, the
power of attorney appointing the sixth defendant as his power agent and
also the power of attorney appointing G. John as the power agent. The
schedule of properties vary across his three suits in OS 334, 423 and
553 and even together, they do not encompass all his properties.
Narayanan and Paichmuthu together had not purchased the entire
properties of the plaintiff. They had not demonstrated before us that
what they had purchased, encompasses the entire suit schedule property
in OS 334 and 423 of 2003. They also do not claim to have exactly
purchased the suit schedule. While in the suit survey numbers, the
original plaintiff possesses a larger extent, only a lesser extent is sold to
Narayanan and Paichmuthu, which is evident from the table above.
55. In OS 423 of 2003 , we can see that against item 1 –
Sy.No.40/1A admeasuring 2.11 acres none of the substituted appellants
make any claim. Items 2 and 3 in OS 423 in Sy.Nos.40/1C – 0.43 acres
and 40/4 – 0.25 acres purchased by Narayanan is in consonance with
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the suit schedule and also that of the extent available in the title deed of
the plaintiff.
56. In so far as OS 334 of 2003, we can see that against Item 4 of
the suit schedule of 0.0735 acres in Sy.No.37/1, plaintiff had right over
5.30 acres, whereas Paichmuthu had purchased 5.1290 acres. This is
lesser by 0.171 acres available with Chellakumar. This 0.171 acres is
larger than the suit extent of 0.0735 acres. Similarly against Items 2
and 3 of the suit schedule of 0.1544 acres in Sy.Nos.38/1 & 38/2,
plaintiff had right over 4.91 and 2.81 acres respectively in Sy.Nos.38/1
& 38/2, whereas Narayanan purchased only 4.8311 acres and 2.6968
acres respectively. This is lesser by 0.1921 acres than what was
available with the plaintiff. This is greater than the suit schedule extent
of 0.1544 acres. Against Item 1 of the suit schedule of 0.0925 acres in
Sy.No.39/1, plaintiff had right over 4.67 acres, whereas Narayanan had
purchased Sy.No.39/1C admeasuring 3.2795 acres. This is way lesser
by 1.3905 acres available with Chellakumar. This 1.3905 acres is larger
than the suit extent of 0.0925 acres. Narayanan and Paichmuthu had
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not even pleaded in their respective affidavits that they had purchased
the suit schedule properties .
57. Further the sale deeds in favor of Paichmuthu and also
Narayanan mention that what is being sold to them, is after omitting a
part of the property that is already sold by Chellakumar. This shows
that Chellakumar is admitting alienation in respect of a portion of his
property.
58. When an appeal would abate in its entirety for non-
substitution of legal representatives of a deceased party depends upon
the facts and circumstances of an individual case. The term “legal
representative” is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure as follows: -
“Section 2 (11) “legal representative” means a person who in law
represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person
who inter-meddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party
sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the
estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued”.
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59. In this regard it will be useful to refer to the decision of the
Apex Court in Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) by LRs v. Pramod
Gupta (Smt.) (Dead) by Lrs reported in (2003) 3 SCC 272 wherein it is
held as follows: -
“21... (a) In case of “joint and indivisible decree”, “joint
and inseverable or inseparable decree”, the abatement of
proceedings in relation to one or more of the appellant(s) or
respondent(s) on account of omission or lapse and failure to
bring on record his or their legal representatives in time would
prove fatal to the entire appeal and require to be dismissed in
toto, as otherwise inconsistent or contradictory decrees would
result and proper reliefs could not be granted, conflicting with
the one which had already become final with respect to the same
subject-matter vis-à-vis the others;
(b) the question as to whether the court can deal with an appeal
after it abates against one or the other would depend upon the
facts of each case and no exhaustive statement or analysis could
be made about all such circumstances wherein it would or would
not be possible to proceed with the appeal, despite abatement,
partially;
(c) existence of a joint right as distinguished from tenancy-in-
common alone is not the criterion but the joint character of the
decree, dehors the relationship of the parties inter se and the
frame of the appeal, will take colour from the nature of the
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decree challenged;
(d) where the dispute between two groups of parties centered
around claims or was based on grounds common relating to
the respective groups litigating as distinct groups or bodies —
the issue involved for consideration in such class of cases
would be one and indivisible; and
(e) when the issues involved in more than one appeal dealt with
as a group or batch of appeals, are common and identical in all
such cases, abatement of one or the other of the connected
appeals due to the death of one or more of the parties and
failure to bring on record the legal representatives of the
deceased parties, would result in the abatement of all appeals .
(emphasis supplied)”
60. In State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram reported in AIR 1962 SC
89 , the Apex Court enumerated certain tests to determine whether the
whole appeal would abate on account of non-substitution of the legal
representatives of one or some of the deceased parties. In this regard it
was observed:
“6. The question whether a court can deal with such
matters or not, will depend on the facts of each case and
therefore no exhaustive statement can be made about the
circumstances when this is possible or is not possible. It may,
however, be stated that ordinarily the considerations which
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weigh with the court in deciding upon this question are whether
the appeal between the appellants and the respondents other
than the deceased can be said to be properly constituted or can
be said to have all the necessary parties for the decision of the
controversy before the court. The test to determine this has been
described in diverse forms. Courts will not proceed with an
appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the court
coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision
between the appellant and the deceased respondent and
therefore which would lead to court passing a decree which will
be contradictory to the decree which had become final with
respect to the same subject-matter between the appellant and the
deceased respondent. (emphasis supplied).
61. These substituted appellants are only seeking to step into the
shoes of the original plaintiff. They do not have any independent or
other right beyond what is available to their vendor, i.e., the original
plaintiff. Their case relies upon the success of the plaintiff in
demonstrating that no title is conveyed to the purchasers under the
power of attorneys executed by him, first in favor of the sixth defendant
and later in favor of Arul Raj.
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62. The Apex Court recently in Suresh Chandra Vs Parasram
reported in 2025 (5) CTC 196 held as follows:-
“ 7. Having regard to the aforesaid decisions, the law governing
determination of the issue as to whether abatement of an appeal on
non-substitution of a deceased party is partial or whole, can be
summarized as under:
1. The answer to the question whether the entire appeal
abates or it abates partially qua the deceased party alone, will
depend on facts of each case and, therefore, no exhaustive
statement about the circumstances in which the entire appeal
would abate can be made.
2. As a matter of course courts will not proceed with an
appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the
court coming to a decision which is in conflict with the
decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent
which had become final with respect to the same subject-
matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent;
(b) when the appellant could not have brought the action for
the necessary relief against those respondents alone who are
still before the court; and (c) when the decree against the
surviving respondents, if the appeal succeeds, be ineffective
that is to say, it would not be successfully executed.
3. In a case of “joint and indivisible decree” or “joint
and inseverable or inseparable decree”, the abatement of
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appeal in relation to one or more of the appellant(s) or
respondent(s) on account of failure to bring on record his or
their legal representatives in time would prove fatal to the
entire appeal because proceeding qua the surviving party or
parties may give rise to inconsistent or contradictory decrees.
4. The question as to whether the decree is joint and
inseverable, or joint and severable or separable, must be
decided, for the purposes of abatement or dismissal of the
entire appeal, only with reference to the fact as to whether the
judgment/decree passed in the proceedings vis-à-vis the
remaining parties would suffer the vice of contradictory or
inconsistent decrees.
5. A decree can be said to be contradictory or
inconsistent with another decree only when the two decrees
are incapable of enforcement or would be mutually self-
destructive and that the enforcement of one would negate or
render impossible the enforcement of the other which means
that the two decrees are mutually irreconcilable or totally
inconsistent, that is, if laid side by side, the only impression
would be that one is in the teeth of the other.
6. Where the plaintiffs or appellants have distinct,
separate and independent rights of their own i.e., not inter-
dependent upon the other, and for the purpose of convenience,
or otherwise, joined together in a single litigation to vindicate
their rights, the decree passed by the court thereon is to be
viewed in substance as a combination of several decrees in
favour of one or the other parties and not as a joint and
inseverable decree.
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7. Existence of a joint right as distinguished from
tenancy-in-common is not the criterion of a joint or
inseverable or inseparable decree. The joint character of the
decree will take colour from the nature of the decree
challenged.”
63. As had been argued in the subject case, the substantial cause
of action in this appeal is the personal and proprietary right of the
deceased plaintiff and his challenge to the correctness of the claim of
the contesting defendants regarding the irrevocable nature of the power
th
of attorney, admitted to be executed by him in favour of 6 defendant
and the impact of the cancellation of the power of attorney, upon the
sale deeds executed by the power agent and also the power of attorney
dated 02.02.1999 (Ex. B22) in O.S. No. 423 of 2003. The cause of
action is inseparable making the decree joint and indivisible.
64. When the dismissal of the suit in respect of the original
plaintiff insofar as the unrepresented portion, had attained a finality
because of abatement, it is no longer permissible for the substituted
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appellants to seek any other decree which will be of conflict to the
same. When the suit is dismissed against the plaintiff, because of
abatement, it would only mean that plaintiff had failed to prove his case
which revolves on his proving that there is no irrevocable power of
attorney available with the defendants to have alienated the property to
third party purchasers.
65. The allowing of the present second appeals by holding to the
contrary would only lead to irreconcilable conflict. When the sales
under the powers of attorney had attained a finality in respect of abated
portion of the second appeal, it cannot be upheld for the remaining
portion as it would lead to inconsistent decrees.
66. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the substituted
appellants on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sharadamma v. Mohammed Pyrejan (Dead) through LRs and
Another reported in (2016) 1 SCC 730 and K. Naina Mohamed (Dead)
through LRs v. A.M. Vasudevan Chettiar (Dead) through LRs and
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Others reported in (2010) 7 SCC 603 does not advance their case.
Those decisions recognize the right of a pendente lite assignee under
Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to continue an appeal
where the entire subject-matter of the suit has been assigned, or where
the right to sue devolves completely upon the assignee. They do not
apply to a case of partial assignment where the original plaintiff
retained substantial portions of the suit properties—such as Item 1
measuring 2.11 acres in Survey No. 40/1A in O.S. No. 423 of 2003 and
the unpurchased extents in O.S. No. 334 of 2003—and died pending the
second appeals without his Class-I legal heirs being brought on record
under Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, despite a
specific direction of this Court dated 25.10.2025. Where the assignment
is only partial and the appeal has abated in respect of the remaining
unrepresented estate of the deceased sole appellant, a pendente lite
purchaser cannot maintain the appeal in isolation on an indivisible
cause of action.
67. In Hemareddi v. Ramachandra reported in (2019) 6 SCC
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756 , one Govindareddi, the propositus died, leaving behind two sons
and a daughter. The plaintiffs were children of one of the two sons. The
second defendant was the wife of the other son. The suit properties
were alleged to be the properties of the joint family of Govindareddi
and his sons. Suit was filed for injunction as also for declaration that
defendant no. 1 is not the adopted son. Trial court dismissed the suit
and upheld the adoption. Against which, an appeal was filed. During
the pendency of the appeal, one of the plaintiff-appellants died. His LRs
were not brought on record. The High Court took the view that the
entire appeal abated. Upholding the decision of the High Court, the
Apex Court held as under:
“17. ………. The appeal having abated in regard to the
late brother, the decree of the trial court has become final qua
the deceased brother of the appellant. The effect of the same is
that the adoption is found legal. The result of the appeal being
allowed to proceed further and succeed in the appeal would be
the passing of a decree by the High Court. The said decree
would be to the effect that the adoption is invalid. The suit
which was jointly filed by the appellant and his late brother
would have to be decreed whereas the suit filed by the appellant
and his late brother stands dismissed by the trial court. Both the
decrees cannot stand together. There would be irreconcilable
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conflict. The defendants are common. They would be faced with
two decrees regarding the same subject matter which are
irrevocably conflicting.”
68. In Budh Ram v. Bansi reported in (2010) 11 SCC 476 the
plaintiffs instituted a suit for declaration to the effect that they and
proforma defendant no.6 were co-owners and co-sharers in joint
possession to a certain extent of the property in dispute. They also
prayed for permanent prohibitory injunction to restrain the defendants 1
to 5 from ousting them. Defendant no. 6, namely, Smt. Parwatu, did not
enter appearance in the suit. However, defendants 1 to 5, who were
appellants before this Court, contested the suit by claiming title over the
suit land through adverse possession. The trial court decreed the suit in
favour of the plaintiffs and defendant no.6. Against the trial court
decree the defendants 1 to 5 preferred an appeal to the High Court in
which defendant no. 6 was arrayed as one of the respondents. However,
during the pendency of appeal, defendant no. 6 died but no substitution
was brought within time. Later, when substitution application was filed,
it was dismissed for want of sufficient cause for the delay. Consequent
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thereto, the High Court held that as the trial court had passed a joint
decree, the appeal stood abated in toto. Challenging the order of the
High Court, appeal was laid before this Court. Affirming the order of
the High Court, the Apex Court observed as follows:-
“20. The only question remains as to whether the appeal is
abated in toto or only in respect of the share of Smt.
Parwatu. The High Court has rightly reached the
conclusion that there was a possibility for the appellate
court to reverse the judgment of the trial court and in such
an eventuality, there could have been two contradictory
decrees, one in favor of Smt. Parwatu and the other, in
favor of the present appellants. The view taken by the High
Court is in consonance with the law laid down by this court
consistently. The facts of the case do not warrant any
further examination of the matter. (emphasis supplied)”
69. The factor that turns the case, is the right to sue does not
survive to the pendente lite purchasers ALONE . The available materials
carefully brought into the table demonstrates the same.
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70. The extracted table demonstrates that the pendente lite
purchaser is only a partial assignee and not the universal heir of the
plaintiff and the right to sue, to cancel the entire power of attorney,
which is claimed as irrevocable and dispute the correctness of the
alienation made by the defendants 1, 6 and 7, and also the power of
attorney dated 02.02.1999 (Ex. B22) in O.S. No. 423 of 2003, claiming
rights under the alienation made under the said power of attorney, does
not survive to the purchasers/substituted appellants ALONE.
71. The survival of the purchasers’ partial right to sue is legally
frustrated, since the children failed to step forward within 90 days and
despite having been afforded an opportunity, the substituted appellants
failed to bring the children on record.
72. The right to sue regarding the power of attorneys and to
challenge the validity of the alienation regarding the remaining
properties extinguished by abatement leaving the purchasers, with no
standalone right to sue on this foundational issue. This is because the
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purchasers’ right to sue could not survive even in respect of their item
of the properties alone, since the underlying cause of action cannot be
split as it would only lead to conflicting decrees.
73. Even if we proceeded to decide the second appeal on merits
and accept the contentions of the substituted appellants that there is no
Power of attorney executed in favour of the seventh defendant and there
is no right available with the sixth defendant to represent the seventh
defendant in the impugned alienation or that the power of attorney was
th
executed only in favour of the 6 defendant and that it is also not
coupled with interest and therefore it is not irrevocable, it would only
lead to the reversing of the decree given in favour of the defendants
solely for the subsequent substituted appellants/purchasers for their
purchased items of the properties alone, while the decree granted by the
lower courts will stand intact, for the remaining items of the property
creating two irreconcilable decrees on the exact same power of
attorney. This court refuses to create such a judicial chaos and cannot
test whether the substituted appellants have a meritorious claim.
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74. In the absence of all the necessary parties before us, we have
to necessarily hold that the appeal has abated in toto and since the court
loses jurisdiction to touch the merits, we cannot test the correctness of
the merits of the orders of the lower courts, and are bound by law to
resist our temptation to answer the merits or determine the substantial
questions of law, since we are of the conclusive opinion that the appeal
has to be dismissed as abated in its entirety.
75. We therefore have no other option but to dismiss both these
second appeals in their entirety. No costs. Consequently, connected
Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.
(M.D.I.,J.) (N.D.K.,J.)
18-11-2026
Index: Yes/No
Speaking/Non-speaking order
Neutral Citation: Yes/No
MM
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To
1. III Additional District Court, Tirunelveli.
2. The Additional Sub Judge, Tirunelveli
3.The Section Officer, V.R.Section,
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.
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M.DHANDAPANI, J.
AND
N.DILIP KUMAR, J.
MM
SA(MD) No. 561 and 562 of 2020
18.11.2026
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