ASHIMA SANJEEV MINOCHA vs STATE OF GUJARAT

R/SCR.A/11695/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 30/10/2026
(GJHC240604732026)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (DIRECTION) NO. 11695 of 2026
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER

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Approved for Reporting Yes No
NO
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ASHIMA SANJEEV MINOCHA
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
LD.SR.ADV. MS. MEGHA JANI WITH MR ISHAN G. JOSHI AND MR
DHANESH DESAI FOR SINGHI & CO(2725) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
LD.P.P. MR HARDIK DAVE WITH MR JAY MEHTA, ADDL.PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER

Date : 30/10/2026

JUDGMENT
1 The present petition is filed under Articles 21 and 226
of the Constitution of India, read with Section 528 of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023,
seeking a direction to quash and set aside the
communication dated 27.04.2026 issued by
respondent No. 2 and the report dated 02.04.2026
prepared by respondent No. 3. The petitioner has
also sought a direction to transfer the investigation
arising out of the complaint dated 29.05.2025 filed
by the petitioner from respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to an
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independent investigating agency outside Anand
District, in order to ensure a de novo investigation
into the incident dated 28.05.2025. The petitioner
has further sought a direction to the respondents to
preserve the records, documents and CCTV camera
footage pertaining to the complaint dated 29.05.2025
filed by the petitioner.
Factual Matrix:
2 The petitioner completed her Master’s in Business
Administration from the Institute of Rural
Management, Anand. Thereafter, upon successfully
completing the selection process, she was appointed
as a Senior Executive (Sales) on 18.04.2018 with the
Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation
Limited (‘the GCMMF’ referred hereinafter), which
markets the brand Amul, at Ludhiana, Punjab.
Subsequently, she was transferred to the Marketing
Department at Anand, Gujarat, on 04.08.2018 and
was promoted to the post of Assistant Manager
(Marketing) on 29.10.2021. It is the case of the
petitioner that, on 28.05.2025, at about 07:30 p.m.,
while she was present in the office and taking a short
break by getting up from her seat and moving
towards the gate near the first floor, she noticed the
Managing Director of GCMMF Limited, Mr. Jayen
Mehta, Ms. Shefali Vijay Wargiya, Deputy Managing
Director, Marketing Department, and Mr. Rohit
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Divakar standing and talking to one another. Upon
noticing the senior officers, the petitioner returned to
her desk. Thereafter, while she was checking
messages on her mobile phone, Mr. Jayen Mehta
approached her, grabbed her right hand and forcibly
twisted it. It is alleged that, despite the petitioner
shouting and requesting him to release her hand, and
despite office staff reaching the place, no one came
forward to rescue her. Upon managing to escape, the
petitioner ran out of the office and reached her
home.
2.1 Thereafter, the petitioner sent a handwritten
complaint through WhatsApp to the Chairman,
Vice-Chairman and Chief General Manager of
GCMMF, using her mother’s mobile phone.
Subsequently, she went to Shri Krishna Hospital,
Karamsad, accompanied by her colleague. She
also sent an email reporting the entire incident to
the Chairman and Chief General Manager of
GCMMF and to the Head of the Workman
Harassment Cell, Mrs. Moitrayi Datta. On
29.05.2025, the petitioner conveyed the details of
the incident during a telephonic conversation and
also submitted a written complaint. It is further
alleged that, on 29.05.2025, at around 12:00 p.m.,
officers of the Local Crime Branch (LCB), Anand,
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suddenly arrived at the petitioner’s quarter, placed
a laptop, office diary and other articles there, and
directed her to visit the police station. The
petitioner was asked to unlock her mobile phone,
which was then in the possession of Mr. Jayen
Mehta. However, she refused to do so and stated
that she would unlock it after consulting her
advocate. It is alleged that the police officers
threatened her.
2.2 On 30.05.2025, the petitioner received a call
from the LCB, Anand, asking her to attend the
police station for the purpose of recording her
statement in connection with the complaint filed
by her against Mr. Jayen Mehta and Ms. Shefali
Vijay Wargiya. Upon visiting the police station, the
petitioner was allegedly interrogated in relation to
an application filed by Mr. Jayen Mehta and was
pressurised and coerced into signing a fabricated
statement. It is further alleged that an LCB officer
compelled the petitioner to unlock her mobile
phone, which she eventually did, but the officers
refused to return the phone. Thereafter, she was
also compelled to unlock her office laptop. The
petitioner further alleges that she had lodged a
complaint regarding the molestation at the hands
of Mr. Jayen Mehta and had requested that the
CCTV footage be collected. On 04.06.2025, she
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addressed a complaint to the Inspector General of
Police, Ahmedabad Range, seeking registration of
an FIR and proper investigation into the incident
dated 28.05.2025. On the same date, she also
submitted a complaint before the State Income Tax
Commissioner, bringing to the notice of the
authority the alleged harassment and misconduct
on the part of Mr. Jayen Mehta.
2.3 It is contended that, owing to the inaction of the
police authorities in relation to the complaint dated
29.05.2025, the petitioner filed Special Criminal
Application No. 10738 of 2025, seeking
registration of an offence against the private
parties. The said petition came to be disposed of
with a direction to the respondent authority to
decide the representation dated 29.05.2025 within
the stipulated period. However, the representation
remained undecided. In the meantime, an Internal
Complaints Committee (ICC) came to be
constituted under the Sexual Harassment of
Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and
Redressal) Act, 2013. The ICC submitted its report
on 29.05.2025, recording that no sexual
harassment had been committed against the
petitioner. The report further recorded that, upon
perusal of the CCTV footage, no evidence of
manhandling by Mr. Jayen Mehta or Ms. Shefali
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Vijay Wargiya was found.
2.4 Aggrieved by the said report, the petitioner
approached the Apex Court by filing Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 2392 of 2026. During the
pendency of the aforesaid proceedings, the
petitioner came to be terminated from service.
Challenging her termination, she filed Special Civil
Application No. 2281 of 2026 on 11.02.2026, which
is pending adjudication. Thereafter, the petitioner
received the communication dated 27.04.2026
from respondent No. 2, concluding the
investigation with the observation that no
cognizable offence was made out. The said
communication, along with the report dated
02.04.2026 prepared by respondent No. 3, is the
subject matter of challenge in the present petition.
3 Heard the learned senior advocate Ms. Megha Jani
with learned advocate Mr. Ishan G. Joshi with learned
advocate Mr. Dhanesh Desai for the petitioner and
learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Hardik Dave with
learned APP Mr. Jay Mehta for the respondent-State.
4 Learned senior advocate Ms. Megha Jani submits that
the impugned communication and report suffer from
manifest errors, non-application of mind and
perversity. It is submitted that the Investigating
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Officer completely failed to consider the medical
evidence reflecting the injuries sustained by the
petitioner on the night of the incident. It is further
submitted that the conclusion has been arrived at
solely on the basis of the CCTV footage, which has
also not been considered in its proper perspective.
On the contrary, on perusal of the very same
footage, it is evident that the petitioner was
manhandled, her arm was twisted and her mobile
phone was forcibly snatched by the accused.
However, a contrary conclusion has been recorded by
the authority, which suggests that the investigation
was not carried out in a reasonable and fair manner.
4.1 It is further submitted by the learned senior
advocate Ms. Jani that the conduct of the
respondent authorities indicates that the
investigation was carried out with a predetermined
approach. Despite the complaint dated
29.05.2025, which disclosed cognizable offences,
no FIR was registered. Instead, the complainant
was summoned and an attempt was made to
convert her into an accused at the instance of the
very person against whom she had lodged the
complaint. It is submitted that the petitioner was
detained at the LCB Police Station for
approximately six hours under threat and was
compelled to sign a pre-typed confessional
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statement. Each of these circumstances, as well as
their cumulative effect, indicates a mala fide and
biased approach on the part of the respondent
authorities. It is further submitted that the
Investigating Authority travelled beyond the scope
of the petitioner’s complaint and placed reliance
solely upon the report of the ICC constituted under
the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.
The standard of proof, purpose and manner of
conducting proceedings before the ICC are distinct
from those applicable to a criminal investigation. In
that background, arriving at a conclusion solely on
the basis of the ICC report indicates a closed and
biased approach on the part of the Investigating
Authority.
4.2 It is submitted by the learned senior advocate
Ms. Jani that the persons arraigned as accused by
the petitioner include the Managing Director of
Amul, one of the largest and most influential
cooperative enterprises in the country. The
petitioner apprehends, on the basis of reasonable
and objective grounds, that, being a dominant
institution within Anand District, its Managing
Director commands considerable local influence,
and, therefore, a fair and impartial investigation
cannot be secured at the hands of the Anand
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District Police. It is further submitted that a fair,
impartial and independent investigation is an
integral facet of the right to life and personal
liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, and the same is available not
merely for the benefit of the accused but equally
for the victim and the complainant. The impugned
communication and the proceedings undertaken
during the investigation demonstrate that the
investigation was neither fair nor impartial nor
independent. In that background, it is submitted
that the investigation is required to be carried out
in a fair, transparent and judicious manner.
4.3 It is submitted by the learned senior advocate
Ms. Jani that the refusal to register an FIR on the
basis of the complaint dated 29.05.2025 was the
reason that compelled the petitioner to approach
this Court. In the aforesaid circumstances, the
present case is a fit case for entrusting the
investigation to an independent agency outside
Anand District, so as to ensure a fair, honest and
complete investigation and to preserve public
confidence in the administration of criminal justice.
It is further submitted that the investigation is
tainted and lacks credibility, thereby vitiating its
very foundation. Therefore, the extraordinary
power to direct a de novo investigation, which is
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vested in the constitutional courts under Articles
226 and 32 of the Constitution of India, is required
to be exercised in the present exceptional case.
4.4 In view of the above submissions, learned senior
advocate Ms. Jani submits that the petition
deserves to be allowed by quashing and setting
aside the communication dated 27.04.2026 and
the report dated 02.04.2026, and by transferring
the investigation arising out of the complaint dated
29.05.2025 to an independent investigating
agency other than the Anand District Police.
5 Learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Hardik Dave submits
that the impugned report is not based solely on the
report of the ICC. It is submitted that the
Investigating Authority independently examined the
statements of witnesses, namely, Mr. Manish
Chorasiya, Mrs. Moitrayi Datta, Mr. Surendrapal
Singh, Mr. Rohit Diwakar, etc., who are employees of
the enterprise. The Investigating Authority also
minutely examined the medical certificate issued by
Dr. Darshan Dharaiya and the CCTV footage. It is
submitted that, after considering the petitioner’s
case from all angles, the Investigating Authority did
not find any incriminating material disclosing the
commission of a cognizable offence. In that
background, it is submitted that this Court may not
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exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction either to direct
registration of an FIR or to order a de novo
investigation into the complaint filed by the
petitioner.
5.1 It is further submitted by the learned Public
Prosecutor Mr. Dave that, apart from the complaint
filed by the petitioner, the Superintendent of
Police, Anand, also submitted a report to the
Registrar (Legal) of the State Human Rights
Commission, Gandhinagar, pursuant to which an
interim report came to be submitted. It is
submitted that, during the course of the
investigation, certain anonymous letters addressed
to the Chairman of GCMMF, containing
photographs, were found in the petitioner’s mobile
phone. It is submitted that the said material
suggests the petitioner’s involvement in making
allegations regarding alleged illicit relations
between the Managing Director and his co-
employees. It is further submitted that, upon
examination of the CCTV footage forwarded to the
Registrar (Legal), the interim investigation also
exonerated the accused of the allegations levelled
against him by the petitioner.
5.2 In view of the above submissions, it is submitted
by the learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Dave that the
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petitioner has failed to make out any extraordinary
circumstances warranting exercise of the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
Accordingly, learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Hardik
Dave prays that the present petition be dismissed.
6 Having considered the submissions made by the
learned advocates for the respective parties, before
examining the merits of the case, this Court would
like to profitably refer to certain decisions of the Apex
Court, which lay down the guidelines governing the
exercise of powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India for issuing directions for a de
novo investigation or for registration of an FIR.
6.1 In the case of Sakiri Vasu vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh , reported in 2008 (2) SCC 409 the Apex
Court has held as under:
“11. In this connection we would like to state that if a
person has a grievance that the police station is not
registering his FIR under Section 154 CrPC, then he can
approach the Superintendent of Police under Section
154(3) CrPC by an application in writing. Even if that
does not yield any satisfactory result in the sense that
either the FIR is still not registered, or that even after
registering it no proper investigation is held, it is open
to the aggrieved person to file an application under
Section 156(3) CrPC before the learned Magistrate
concerned. If such an application under Section 156(3)
is filed before the Magistrate, the Magistrate can direct
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the FIR to be registered and also can direct a proper
investigation to be made, in a case where, according to
the aggrieved person, no proper investigation was made.
The Magistrate can also under the same provision
monitor the investigation to ensure a proper
investigation.
12. Thus in Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan this Court
observed: (SCC p. 631, para 11)
"11. The clear position therefore is that any
Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of
the offence, can order investigation under Section
156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to
examine the complainant on oath because he was
not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For
the purpose of enabling the police to start
investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct
the police to register an FIR. There is nothing
illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR
involves only the process of entering the substance
of the information relating to the commission of
the cognizable offence in a book kept by the
officer in charge of the police station as indicated
in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate
does not say in so many words while directing
investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code
that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of
the officer in charge of the police station to
register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence
disclosed by the complainant because that police
officer could take further steps contemplated in
Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter."
13. The same view was taken by this Court in Dilawar
Singh v. State of Delhi (JT vide para 17). We would
further clarify that even if an FIR has been registered
and even if the police has made the investigation, or is
actually making the investigation, which the aggrieved
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person feels is not proper, such a person can approach
the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC, and if the
Magistrate is satisfied he can order a proper
investigation and take other suitable steps and pass such
order(s) as he thinks necessary for ensuring a proper
investigation. All these powers a Magistrate enjoys
under Section 156(3) CrPC.
14. Section 156(3) states:
"156. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under
Section 190 may order such an investigation as
abovementioned."
The words "as abovementioned" obviously refer to
Section 156(1), which contemplates investigation
by the officer in charge of the police station.
15. Section 156(3) provides for a check by the
Magistrate on the police performing its duties under
Chapter XII CrPC. In cases where the Magistrate finds
that the police has not done its duty of investigating
the case at all, or has not done it satisfactorily, he can
issue a direction to the police to do the investigation
properly, and can monitor the same.
16. The power in the Magistrate to order further
investigation under Section 156(3) is an independent
power and does not affect the power of the
investigating officer to further investigate the case even
after submission of his report vide Section 173(8).
Hence the Magistrate can order reopening of the
investigation even after the police submits the final
report, vide State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha (SCC: AIR
para 19).
17. In our opinion Section 156(3) CrPC is wide enough
to include all such powers in a Magistrate which are
necessary for ensuring a proper investigation, and it
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includes the power to order registration of an FIR and
of ordering a proper investigation if the Magistrate is
satisfied that a proper investigation has not been done,
or is not being done by the police. Section 156(3) CrPC,
though briefly worded, in our opinion, is very wide and
it will include all such incidental powers as are
necessary for ensuring a proper investigation.
18. It is well settled that when a power is given to an
authority to do something it includes such incidental or
implied powers which would ensure the proper doing of
that thing. In other words, when any power is expressly
granted by the statute, there is impliedly included in
the grant, even without special mention, every power
and every control the denial of which would render the
grant itself ineffective. Thus where an Act confers
jurisdiction it impliedly also grants the power of doing
all such acts or employ such means as are essentially
necessary for its execution.
19. The reason for the rule (doctrine of implied power)
is quite apparent. Many matters of minor details are
omitted from legislation. As Crawford observes in his
Statutory Construction (3rd Edn., p. 267):
"... If these details could not be inserted by
implication, the drafting of legislation would be
an interminable process and the legislative intent
would likely be defeated by a most insignificant
omission."
20. In ascertaining a necessary implication, the court
simply determines the legislative will and makes it
effective. What is necessarily implied is as much part of
the statute as if it were specifically written therein.
21. An express grant of statutory powers carries with it
by necessary implication the authority to use all
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reasonable means to make such grant effective. Thus in
ITO v. M.K. Mohammad Kunhis this Court held that the
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal has implied powers to
grant stay, although no such power has been expressly
granted to it by the Income Tax Act.
22. Similar examples where this Court has affirmed the
doctrine of implied powers are Union of India v. Paras
Laminates (P) Ltd., RBI v. Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd. (AIR at p. 656), CEO & Vice-
Chairman, Gujarat Maritime Board v. Haji Daud Haji
Harun Abus, J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. CCE, State of
Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop.
Society 10 (SCC at p. 432), etc.
23. In Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat this Court held
that the power conferred on the Magistrate under
Section 125 CrPC to grant maintenance to the wife
implies the power to grant interim maintenance during
the pendency of the proceeding, otherwise she may
starve during this period.
24. In view of the abovementioned legal position, we
are of the view that although Section 156(3) is very
briefly worded, there is an implied power in the
Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC to order
registration of a criminal offence and/or to direct the
officer in charge of the police station concerned to hold
a proper investigation and take all such necessary steps
that may be necessary for ensuring a proper
investigation including monitoring the same. Even
though these powers have not been expressly mentioned
in Section 156(3) CrPC, we are of the opinion that they
are implied in the above provision.
25. We have elaborated on the above matter because
we often find that when someone has a grievance that
his FIR has not been registered at the police station
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and/or a proper investigation is not being done by the
police, he rushes to the High Court to file a writ
petition or a petition under Section 482 CrPC. We are
of the opinion that the High Court should not
encourage this practice and should ordinarily refuse to
interfere in such matters and relegate the petitioner to
his alternating remedy, first under Section 154(3) and
Section 36 CrPC before the police officers concerned,
and if that is of no avail, by approaching the Magistrate
concerned under Section 156(3).
26. If a person has a grievance that his FIR has not
been registered by the police station his first remedy is
to approach the Superintendent of Police under Section
154(3) CrPC or other police officer referred to in Section
36 CrPC. If despite approaching the Superintendent of
Police or the officer referred to in Section 36 his
grievance still persists, then he can approach a
Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC instead of rushing
to the High Court by way of a writ petition or a
petition under Section 482 CrPC. Moreover, he has a
further remedy of filing a criminal complaint under
Section 200 CrPC. Why then should writ petitions or
Section 482 petitions be entertained when there are so
many alternative remedies?23. In Savitri v. Govind
Singh Rawat this Court held that the power conferred
on the Magistrate under Section 125 CrPC to grant
maintenance to the wife implies the power to grant
interim maintenance during the pendency of the
proceeding, otherwise she may starve during this
period.
27. As we have already observed above, the Magistrate
has very wide powers to direct registration of an FIR
and to ensure a proper investigation and for this
purpose he can monitor the investigation to ensure that
the investigation is done properly (though he cannot
investigate himself). The High Court should discourage
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the practice of filing a writ petition or petition under
Section 482 CrPC simply because a person has a
grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the
police, or after being registered, proper investigation
has not been done by the police. For this grievance, the
remedy lies under Sections 36 and 154(3) before the
police officers concerned, and if that is of no avail,
under Section 156(3) CrPC before the Magistrate or by
filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 CrPC and
not by filing a writ petition or a petition under Section
482 CrPC.
28. It is true that alternative remedy is not an absolute
bar to a writ petition, but it is equally well settled that
if there is an alternative remedy the High Court should
not ordinarily interfere.
29. In Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja¹2 (SCC vide
para 13) it has been observed by this Court that a
Magistrate cannot interfere with the investigation by the
police. However, in our opinion, the ratio of this
decision would only apply when a proper investigation
is being done by the police. If the Magistrate on an
application under Section 156(3) CrPC is satisfied that
proper investigation has not been done, or is not being
done by the officer in charge of the police station
concerned, he can certainly direct the officer in charge
of the police station to make a proper investigation and
can further monitor the same (though he should not
himself investigate).
30. It may be further mentioned that in view of Section
36 CrPC if a person is aggrieved that a proper
investigation has not been made by the officer in charge
of the police station concerned, such aggrieved person
can approach the Superintendent of Police or other
police officer superior in rank to the officer in charge of
the police station and such superior officer can, if he so
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wishes, do the investigation vide CBI v. State of
Rajasthan 13 (SCC vide para 11), R.P. Kapur v. Sardar
Pratap Singh Kairon14, etc. Also, the State Government
is competent to direct the Inspector General, Vigilance
to take over the investigation of a cognizable offence
registered at a police station vide State of Bihar v. A.C.
Saldanha.
31. No doubt the Magistrate cannot order investigation
by CBI vide CBI v. State of Rajasthan 13 but this Court
or the High Court has power under Article 136 or
Article 226 to order investigation by CBI. That,
however, should be done only in some rare and
exceptional case, otherwise, CBI would be flooded with
a large number of cases and would find it impossible to
properly investigate all of them.
32. In the present case, there was an investigation by
GRP, Mathura and also two courts of inquiry held by
the army authorities and they found that it was a case
of suicide. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court was
justified in rejecting the prayer for a CBI inquiry.
33. In Secy., Minor Irrigation & Rural Engg. Services,
U.P. v. Sahngoo Ram Arya15 (SCC vide para 6) this
Court observed that although the High Court has power
to order a CBI inquiry, that power should only be
exercised if the High Court after considering the
material on record comes to a conclusion that such
material discloses prima facie a case calling for
investigation by CBI or by any other similar agency. A
CBI inquiry cannot be ordered as a matter of routine or
merely because the party makes some allegation.”
6.2 In the case of Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe vs.
Hemant Yaswant Dhage , reported in 2016 (6)
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SCC 277 the Apex Court has held as under:
“3. We are of the opinion that if the High Courts
entertain such writ petitions, then they will be flooded
with such writ petitions and will not be able to do any
other work except dealing with such writ petitions.
Hence, we have held that the complainant must avail of
his alternate remedy to approach the Magistrate
concerned under Section 156(3) CrPC and if he does so,
the Magistrate will ensure, if prima facie he is satisfied,
registration of the first information report and also
ensure a proper investigation in the matter, and he can
also monitor the investigation.
4. In view of the settled position in Sakiri Vasu case,
the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be
sustained and is hereby set aside. The Magistrate
concerned is directed to ensure proper investigation into
the alleged offence under Section 156(3) CrPC and if he
deems it necessary, he can also recommend to the
SSP/SP concerned a change of the investigating officer,
so that a proper investigation is done. The Magistrate
can also monitor the investigation, though he cannot
himself investigate (as investigation is the job of the
police). Parties may produce any material they wish
before the Magistrate concerned. The learned Magistrate
shall be uninfluenced by any observation in the
impugned order of the High Court.”
6.3 In the case of M. Subramaniam v. S. Janaki,
reported in (2020) 16 SCC 728 , after discussing
the decisions in Sakiri Vasu (supra) and Sudhir
Bhaskarrao Tambe (supra) , the Apex Court held
that the High Court had committed an error in
issuing directions for registration of an FIR and
investigation into the matter by the police. It was
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held that the Magistrate has wide powers under
Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
to issue appropriate directions. If the Magistrate
deems it necessary, he may also recommend to
the concerned Superintendent of Police a change
of the Investigating Officer to ensure a proper
investigation. It was further held that the
Magistrate can monitor the investigation, though
he cannot investigate the matter himself, and that
the parties are also at liberty to produce relevant
material before the learned Magistrate.
6.4 In the recent decision rendered by the Apex
Court in Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of
Maharashtra , reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC
798 , the Apex Court, while dealing with similar
circumstances, held that where an alternative
remedy is available to the parties before the
competent forum, the writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not
ordinarily be exercised, as the machinery for
granting such relief has already been provided
under the concerned statute and the same ought
not to be bypassed. The relevant paragraph of the
said decision is reproduced hereinbelow:
“5. At the outset, it would be apposite to reiterate the
settled principle of law governing the exercise of writ
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jurisdiction. While the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is wide, it
is well established that such jurisdiction is
extraordinary, discretionary and subject to certain self-
imposed restrictions. In Radha Krishan Industries v.
State of H.P., a co-ordinate Bench of this Court has
summarized the principles governing the exercise of writ
jurisdiction by the High Court in the presence of an
alternative remedy and held as under:
"27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
27.1. The power under Article 226 of the
Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not
only for the enforcement of fundamental rights,
but for any other purpose as well.
27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to
entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions
placed on the power of the High Court is where
an effective alternate remedy is available to the
aggrieved person.
27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy
arise where: (a) the writ petition has been filed
for the enforcement of a fundamental right
protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there
has been a violation of the principles of natural
justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly
without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a
legislation is challenged.
27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not
divest the High Court of its powers under Article
226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case
though ordinarily. a writ petition should not be
entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy
is provided by law.
27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which
itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for
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enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had
to that particular statutory remedy before invoking
the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory
remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion.
27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions
of fact, the High Court may decide to decline
jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the
High Court is objectively of the view that the
nature of the controversy requires the exercise of
its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not
readily be interfered with."
(emphasis supplied)
[See also: Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of
Taxes and Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of
Trade Marks]
5.1. Similarly, very recently this Court in Rikhab Chand
Jain v. Union of India held as under:
"10. We may profitably refer, in this context, to
the Constitution Bench decision in Thansingh
Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes [(1964) 15
STC 468 (SC): 1964 SCC OnLine SC 13: AIR 1964
SC 1419]. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent
of Taxes [(1964) 15 STC 468 (SC): 1964 SCC
OnLine SC 13: AIR 1964 SC 1419.], this court had
the occasion to lay down a principle of law which
is salutary and not to be found in any other
previous decision rendered by it. The principle,
plainly, is that, if a remedy is available to a party
before the High Court in another jurisdiction, the
writ jurisdiction should not normally be exercised
on a petition under article 226, for, that would
allow the machinery set up by the concerned
statute to be bye-passed. The relevant passage
from the decision reads as follows (page 474 in 15
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STC):
"... The jurisdiction of the High Court under
article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide
terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to
any restrictions except the territorial restrictions
which are expressly provided in the article. But
the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it
is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do
so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction
demands that it will ordinarily be exercised
subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort
to that jurisdiction is not intended as an
alternative remedy for relief which may be
obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by
statute. Ordinarily the court will not entertain a
petition for a writ under article 226. where the
petitioner has an alternative remedy, which,
without being unduly onerous. provides an equally
efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not
generally enter upon a determination of questions
which demand an elaborate examination of
evidence to establish the right to enforce which
the writ is claimed. The High Court does not
therefore act as a court of appeal against the
decision of a court or Tribunal, to correct errors
of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction
under article 226 trench upon an alternative
remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief.
Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to
move another Tribunal, or even itself in another
jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner
provided by a statute, the High Court normally
will not permit, by entertaining a petition under
article 226 of the Constitution, the machinery
created under the statute to be by-passed, and
will leave the party applying to it to seek resort
to the machinery so set up."
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(emphasis ours)
12. That apart, the majority view in a previous
Constitution Bench in A.V. Venkateswaran,
Collector of Customs v. Ramchand Sobhraj
Wadhwani [1961 SCC OnLine SC 16: AIR 1961 SC
1506.] reads thus: "14..., we must express our
dissent from the reasoning by which the learned
judges of the High Court held that the writ
petitioner was absolved from the normal
obligation to exhaust his statutory remedies before
invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under
article 226 of the Constitution. If a petitioner has
disabled himself from availing himself of the
statutory remedy by his own fault in not doing so
within the prescribed time, he cannot certainly be
permitted to urge that as a ground for the court
dealing with his petition under article 226 to
exercise its discretion in his favour. Indeed, the
second passage extracted from the judgment of
the learned C.J. in State of U.P. v. Mohammad
Nooh [1957 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1958 SC 86.]
with its reference to the right to appeal being lost
'through no fault of his own' emphasizes this
aspect of the Rule."
(emphasis ours)
In essence, this court was of the opinion that
once a petitioner has
due to his own fault disabled himself from
availing a statutory remedy, the discretionary
remedy under article 226 may not be available."
6. In the same vein, this Court has duly considered the
question as to whether the remedy under Article 226
can be availed of if there exists inaction and/or
nonaction by the police in registering the FIR relating
to a cognizable offence. We may refer to few such
pronouncements:
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6.1. In Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P.10, a co-ordinate
Bench of this Court observed:
"11. In this connection we would like to state
that if a person has a grievance that the police
station is not registering his FIR under Section
154 CrPC, then he can approach the
Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3)
CrPC by an application in writing. Even if that
does not yield any satisfactory result in the sense
that either the FIR is still not registered, or that
even after registering it no proper investigation is
held, it is open to the aggrieved person to file an
application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the
learned Magistrate concerned.
25.... we often find that when someone has a
grievance that his FIR has not been registered at
the police station and/or a proper investigation is
not being done by the police, he rushes to the
High Court to file a writ petition or a petition
under Section 482 CrPC. We are of the opinion
that the High Court should not encourage this
practice and should ordinarily refuse to interfere
in such matters and relegate the petitioner to his
alternating remedy...
26. If a person has a grievance that his FIR has
not been registered by the police station his first
remedy is to approach the Superintendent of
Police under Section 154(3) CrPC or other police
officer referred to in Section 36 CrPC. If despite
approaching the Superintendent of Police or the
officer referred to in Section 36 his grievance still
persists, then he can approach a Magistrate under
Section 156(3) CrPC instead of rushing to the
High Court by way of a writ petition or a petition
under Section 482 CrPC. Moreover, he has a
further remedy of filing a criminal complaint
under Section 200 CrPC. Why then should writ
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petitions or Section 482 petitions be entertained
when there are so many alternative remedies?
27. As we have already observed above, the
Magistrate has very wide powers to direct
registration of an FIR and to ensure a proper
investigation and for this purpose he can monitor
the investigation to ensure that the investigation
is done properly (though he cannot investigate
himself). The High Court should discourage the
practice of filing a writ petition or petition under
Section 482 CrPC simply because a person has a
grievance that his FIR has not been registered by
the police, or after being registered, proper
investigation has not been done by the police.
28. It is true that alternative remedy is not an
absolute bar to a writ petition, but it is equally
well settled that if there is an alternative remedy
the High Court should not ordinarily interfere."
(emphasis supplied)
[See also: All India Institute of Medical Sciences
Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India:
Aleque Padamsee v. Union of India: M.
Subramaniam v. S. Janaki and Anurag Bhatnagar
v. State (NCT of Delhi)]
6.2. Following the law laid in Sakiri Vasu (supra), this
Court in Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant
Dhages observed as under:
"2. This Court has held in Sakiri Vasu v. State of
U.P. [Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., (2008) 2 SCC
409 (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 440 AIR 2008 SC 907],
that if a person has a grievance that his FIR has
not been registered by the police, or having been
registered, proper investigation is not being done,
then the remedy of the aggrieved person is not to
go to the High Court under Article 226 of the
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Constitution of India. but to approach the
Magistrate concerned under Section 156(3)
CrPC. ... We have said this in Sakiri Vasu case
[Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., (2008) 2 SCC 409:
(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 440 AIR 2008 SC 907] because
what we have found in this country is that the
High Courts have been flooded with writ petitions
praying for registration of the first information
report or praying for a proper investigation.
3. We are of the opinion that if the High Courts
entertain such writ petitions, then they will be
flooded with such writ petitions and will not be
able to do any other work except dealing with
such writ petitions. Hence, we have held that the
complainant must avail of his alternate remedy to
approach the Magistrate concerned under Section
156(3) CrPC and if he does so, the Magistrate will
ensure, if prima facie he is satisfied, registration
of the first information report and also ensure a
proper investigation in the matter, and he can
also monitor the investigation."
(emphasis supplied)
7. Keeping in view the above exposition of law, we find
that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India ought not to have been
invoked when alternative equally efficacious statutory
remedies were available. If a person has a grievance
that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or
having been registered, proper investigation is not being
conducted, then the remedy does not ordinarily lie in
invoking the writ jurisdiction in the first instance, but
in seeking recourse to the statutory framework, unless
of course the urgency of the circumstances warrant
otherwise.”
7 Considering the aforesaid guidelines laid down by the
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Apex Court, the moot question that arises for
consideration is whether the petitioner has made out
a case warranting exercise of the extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India and whether the circumstances
of the case warrant a direction for a de novo
investigation or registration of an FIR.?
8 To determine the aforesaid question, if one were to
examine the facts of the present case, it emerges
that, as per the allegations made by the petitioner,
who has been working as an Assistant Manager
(Marketing) since 29.10.2021, the Managing Director
and his co-employees physically and verbally
assaulted her at about 07:30 p.m. on 28.05.2025. It
is alleged that the said persons snatched the
petitioner’s mobile phone from her hand and
confiscated the same. In connection with the said
incident, the petitioner addressed a written complaint
by email on 29.05.2025 at about 01:30 a.m. to the
Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Chief General Manager
and Head of the Women Grievance Cell. The
petitioner also lodged a complaint with the
Superintendent of Police, Anand, who entrusted the
investigation of the complaint to the Police Inspector,
Anand Town.
8.1 It is further alleged that, after submitting the
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complaint through the official email, the petitioner
contacted her friend, who took her to the hospital
for medical examination. However, on perusal of
the medical report, it emerges that the petitioner
had not given any history of assault. On the
contrary, it is recorded that she had developed
certain symptoms in the evening at around 07:00
p.m. due to stress, as disclosed to the Medical
Officer. The petitioner reached the doctor at
around 01:00 a.m. The doctor recorded that her
speech was of normal tone, volume, rate, rhythm
and amount, and that she was conscious,
cooperative and communicating. The doctor did
not notice any of the injuries alleged by the
petitioner, not even a bruise mark. Thereafter, the
petitioner received a summons at about 01:45
p.m. on 29.05.2025, calling upon her to remain
present at the LCB Police Station, Anand, in
connection with the complaint lodged by Mr. Jayen
Mehta, Managing Director. Subsequently, the
petitioner sought registration of an FIR against Mr.
Jayen Mehta and Ms. Shefali Vijay Wargiya. It is
contended that, owing to the inaction on the part
of the police authorities in registering an FIR, the
petitioner addressed a complaint dated
04.06.2025 to the Inspector General of Police,
Ahmedabad Range, seeking registration of an FIR
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and initiation of a proper investigation into the
incident dated 28.05.2025. The petitioner also
levelled allegations of harassment and misconduct
against the LCB Police, Anand.
8.2 On 11.06.2025, the petitioner addressed a letter
to the Human Rights Department, with copies
marked to the Head of the ICC/POSH Committee,
requesting an inquiry into her complaint against
Mr. Jayen Mehta and Ms. Shefali Vijay Wargiya. On
the other hand, Ms. Shefali Vijay Wargiya also
lodged a complaint dated 03.06.2025 before the
ICC against the petitioner, alleging that certain
letters/pamphlets containing defamatory
allegations, along with her photographs and
insinuations regarding alleged illicit relations
between her and Mr. Jayen Mehta, were being
circulated. It was further alleged that the petitioner
had been caught red-handed taking her
photographs on her mobile phone and that the
complaint lodged by the petitioner was, therefore,
false.
9 It is also not in dispute that the ICC submitted its
report, concluding the complaints filed by the
petitioner by holding that the petitioner had made
allegations of sexual harassment which were found to
be false and incorrect, and that she had concealed
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material facts from the Committee and had not
provided a true narration of the entire episode. The
said report was challenged before this Court by filing
Special Civil Application No. 3285 of 2026, which
came to be dismissed on the ground of availability of
an alternative remedy. The matter was carried further
by filing Letters Patent Appeal No. 391 of 2026, which
also came to be dismissed on 22.06.2026 on the
ground of availability of an alternative remedy,
thereby affirming the view taken by the learned
Single Judge. In the aforesaid background, the
statements made by the petitioner appear to be false
and misleading in nature. At the same time, the
complaint lodged by Ms. Shefali Vijay Wargiya was
concluded with the observation that photographs of
Ms. Shefali Vijay Wargiya, which had been circulated
through letters/pamphlets, were found in the
petitioner's mobile phone. Accordingly, the ICC
decided to admit the complaint filed against the
petitioner.
9.1 On referring to the complaint filed by the
petitioner, it is alleged that on 28.05.2025, at
around 07:30 p.m., while she was working in the
office, she stood up from her seat to take a short
break and moved towards the gate near the first
floor, where the Managing Director of GCMMF
Limited, Mr. Jayen Mehta, Ms. Shefali Vijay Wargiya
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and Mr. Rohit Diwakar were standing and talking to
each other. On seeing them, she turned around
and returned to the nearest desk. Thereafter, while
she was checking messages on her OnePlus mobile
phone, the Managing Director allegedly grabbed
her right hand tightly and started twisting it
forcefully. It is further alleged that the Managing
Director touched her breast and other parts of her
body inappropriately and pushed her down onto an
adjacent chair. Thereafter, Ms. Shefali Vijay
Wargiya allegedly asked someone to hold the
petitioner's hand and snatched the petitioner's
mobile phone from her possession. It is alleged
that the incident was captured in the CCTV footage
of the office premises and that, thereafter, the
petitioner ran away from the office, fearing further
harassment. The petitioner claims to have sent a
complaint to various authorities using her mother's
mobile phone and, with the assistance of a
colleague, visited Shri Krishna Hospital, Karamsad.
She also sent an email reporting the entire incident
to the Chairman, the Chief General Manager and
the Head of the Women Harassment Cell, followed
by a written complaint on 29.05.2025.
9.2 It is further alleged that on 29.05.2025, at
around 12:00 p.m., officers of the LCB, Anand,
arrived at her quarter and, without any search
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warrant, threatened the petitioner and asked her
to accompany them to the police station. They also
allegedly took away her laptop and office diaries. It
is further alleged that she was not permitted to
consult her lawyer and that, on 30.05.2025, she
was called by a police officer for the purpose of
recording her statement, during which she was
interrogated by being shown the pamphlets and
other articles. The petitioner further alleges that
the LCB police officers forced her to unlock her
mobile phone and accessed her personal
photographs, private chats and other data.
9.3 This Court has referred to the narration of the
CCTV footage contained in the ICC report, which
reveals as under:
“11. It is stated by Ms. Ashima Minocha that the entire
incident of “sexual harassment” is captured in the
CCTV footage of the area, ICC had directed GCMMF
Administration Department to produce the office CCTV
footage of 28.05.2025, which was viewed by all the
members on 12.08.2025. These CCTV footages were
subsequently shown to Ms. Ashima Minocha on
02.09.2025.
12. It is noted that there are three (03) concerned CCTV
footages which record the incident of 28.05.2025. Of
these 03 CCTV footages, only one has captured both
audio and video and the other two CCTV footages only
have video with no audio. ICC has considered all the 3
recordings to arrive at its conclusion.
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13. In order to understand the entire sequence of
events, committee members have viewed the footages
multiple times and have scrutinized the same. For ease
of identifying and referring, the 03 CCTV footage has
been referred to in this report as under:
a. CCTV Footage 01 which captures the common area
near the staircase of Marketing Floorb.
b.CCTV Footage 02 that captures the area where Ms.
Ashima Minocha's workstation is situated in Marketing
Floor.
c. CCTV Footage 03 which captures the area adjoining
the common area and workstation, separated by glass
doors and glass partition in Marketing Floor.
14. This Committee has viewed the CCTV Footages from
timestamp commencing from 20:06:00 where, in CCTV
Footage 02 it is seen that Ms. Ashima Minocha rises
from her workstation at 20:06:27 and moves toward the
area covered by CCTV Footage 03 i.e., the area
adjoining the common area and workstation, separated
by glass doors and glass partition, with her mobile
phone in her hand.
15. The Committee observes from CCTV Footage 0? that
Ms. Ashima Minocha moves towards the area near the
glass partition and takes a sudden turn to move to a
corner where she is partially visible in CCTV Footage
03, from timestamp 20:06:46 onwards.
16. Simultaneously, ICC has viewed CCTV Footage 01
from timestamp 20:06:14, where it captures the MD Mr.
Jayen Mehta, Ms. Shefali Vijaywargiya and Mr. Rohit
Divekar, standing and engaged in conversation. The
committee observes that there is a difference of
approximately 3 to 4 seconds in CCTV Footage 01 and
CCTV Footage 03. However, simultaneous viewing of
CCTV Footage 01 and CCTV Footage 03 clearly shows
that Ms. Ashima Minocha is standing at the corner near
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the glass partition at timestamp 20:07:11.
17. CCTV Footage 01 shows that during the same time,
Mr. Chandubhai Chavda of GESS crosses the staircase
area and enters the workstation area through the glass
door between timestamp 20:07:05 and 20:07:13. This is
captured in both CCTV Footage 01 and CCTV Footage
02. In CCTV Footage 03, it can be seen that he has
turned around to spot Ms. Ashima Minocha who
continues to stand in the corner and is partially
captured in CCTV Footage 01. This fact has also been
confirmed by Mr. Chandubhai Chavda in his witness
statement.
18. Subsequently, at timestamp 20:07:17 in CCTV
Footage 01, it is seen and observed that Mr. Jayen
Mehta is engaged in conversation facing Ms. Shefali
Vijaywargiya and Mr. Rohit Divekar near the common
staircase area and suddenly and abruptly rushes through
the glass door towards the corner where Ms. Ashima
Minocha who is partly visible in CCTV Footage 03 is
standing. ICC further observes that the action of Mr.
Jayen Mehta, making a sudden rush, is a natural
instinct of reacting to an extraordinary situation which
does not occur in regular course. On further viewing of
CCTV Footage 03 and while simultaneously hearing the
audio from CCTV Footage 01, the first verbal
confrontation made by Mr. Jayen Mehta is to say:
"Phone dedo. Please phone mujhe dedo".
Ms. Ashima Minocha is also heard shouting
"Sir aap kya kar rahe hai" to which Mr. Jayen Mehta
has responded by saying
"I am taking the phone."
19. Immediately thereafter, within fraction of a few
seconds, Mr. Jayen Mehta is also heard shouting out to
Mr. SP Singh, asking him to call the police. The exact
expression used by Mr. Jayen Mehta is"Take her phone
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- from her hand - Call police - SP Idhar aao - SP - SP
Idhar aao - Call police - SP Call police".Simultaneously
Ms. Ashima Minocha is also heard saying"this is an
assault" "this is an assault".
20. It is noted that the event recorded in CCTV Footage
V3 from timestamp 20:07:39 to 20:08:47, Mr. Jayen
Mehta can be seen holding Ms. Ashima Minocha's left
hand near her wrist with his left hand. The committee
also notes that within 05 to 06 seconds, Ms. Shefali
Vijaywargiya is seen to have joined Mr. Jayen Mehta in
forcefully taking the phone from Ms. Ashima Minocha.
Further, the Committee notes that Ms. Ashima Minocha,
resisted the attempts by Mr. Jayen Mehta and Ms.
Shefali Vijaywargiya, to take away her phone and
refused to let go of the phone in her hand.
21. It was observed that Ms. Shefali Vijaywargiya is
seen making a forceful attempt of taking the phone
from Ms. Ashima Minocha. At timestamp 20:08:40 in
Footage 01, Mr. Jayen Mehta is heard saying
"Madam I have seen you taking photograph"
to which Ms. Ashima Minocha is heard continuously
saying
"Sir this is not fair"to which Mr. Jayen Mehta has
responded by saying
"Haan it is not fair. You were taking photograph of me.
I saw you"
Similar verbal exchanges are recorded at 20:09:04 in
CCTV Footage 01.
22. During the entire time when Mr. Jayen Mehta held
N.S. Ashima Minocha's hand near her wrist, it is seen
from his gesture and actions that the intent is to assist
Ms. Shefali Vijaywargiya in forcefully taking the phone
from the hand of Ms. Ashima Minocha, who is seen to
be using her body to resist the phone being taken: "ay
from her. It is observed that during this se: ffle, Mr.
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Jayen Mehta has only used his one hand to hold Ms.
Ashima Minocha's wrist area and throughout the episode
his posture is straight and there is distance between his
body and body of Ms. Ashima Minocha. Subsequently,
the phone is taken from Ms. Ashima Minocha's hand by
Ms. Shefali Vijaywargiya at timestamp 20:08:42 Footage
03 and handed over to Mr. SP Singh who then hands it
over to Mr. Jayen Mehta.
23. The Committee further observes that the moment
the phone is taken from Ms. Ashima Minocha's custody,
Mr. Jayen Mehta releases his grip and lets go of Ms.
Ashima Minocha's hand/wrist, which supports the
observation that the intent of Mr. Jayen Mehta in
physically holding Ashima Minocha's hand/wrist is only
with the objective to take her phone, which he believed
was used for clicking his photograph while he was
standing in the corridor with Ms. Shefali Vijaywargiya
an: Mr. Rohit Divckar.
24. It is observed that Ms. Ashima Minocha repeatedly
requests for her phone to be given back to her to which
Mr. Jayen Mehta says that he will hand over the phone
at the police station and will not go through it himself.
Mr. Jayen Mehta can be heard asking Ms. Ashima
Minocha to come along with him and the others present
to the Police Station. Ms. Ashima Minocha refuses to
accompany them and persists in her requests for her
phone to be given back to her.
25. At timestamp 20:10:44, Mr. Jayen Mehta is seen
moving towards the sofa near the staircase, as captured
in CCTV Footage 01 and can be heard speaking to
someone over phone in Gujarati that he caught the lady
taking pictures of him and has confiscated her phone.
Simultaneously, Ms. Ashima Minocha can be heard
repeating that she will not accompany Mr. Jayen Mehta
to the police station and demands for her phone to be
returned to her. Mr. Jayen Mehta then responds by
saying that the phone is the root cause and unless Ms.
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Ashima Minocha tells the truth about the photographs
she was taking, he will not give her phone back to her.
26. After this, Mr. Jayen Mehta accompanied by Ms.
Shefali Vijaywargiya, Mr. S.P. Singh and Mr Rohit
Divekar can be seen exiting the floor in CCTV Footage
01 at timestamp 20:11:57 to 20:12:14.
27. The Committee has minutely observed all the 3
CCTV Footages of the incident. On a frame-by-frame
examination of the all the CCTV footages, the
committee has not observed any instance of physical
contact of the nature alleged, particularly Mr. Jaycn
Mehta touching Ms. Ashima Minocha's chest or placing
his hands between her legs. The Committee also
observed that throughout the relevant duration captured
on the CCTV Footage 03, the movements of Mr. Jaycn
Mehta, Ms. Ashima Minocha and Ms. Shefali
Vijaywargiya are clearly visible. At no point in the
CCTV Footage 03, it looks like Ms. Ashima Minocha is
being subjected to inappropriate touching in the manner
described in her complaint. The ... CCTV Footage 03,
which captures the events continuously at the relevant
location, does not depict such acts.”
On referring to the report submitted by the
Police Inspector, Anand Town, it also appears that,
apart from examining the CCTV footage,
statements of various employees, namely, Mr.
Manish Chorasiya, Mrs. Moitrayi Datta, Mr.
Surendrapal Singh and Mr. Rohit Diwakar, who
were present at the relevant time, were recorded.
However, their statements did not support the
case of the petitioner.

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9.4 On referring to the report submitted by the
office of the Superintendent of Police before the
Gujarat State Human Rights Commission, it
appears that the petitioner had accompanied her
advocate, namely, Mr. N. J. Mackwan, to the police
station. The statement of the said advocate was
recorded by the office of the Superintendent of
Police, wherein he confirmed that, in his presence,
the petitioner had not made any allegations
against the LCB Police Officers on 31.05.2025. It
further appears that the Administrative
Department of GCMMF Limited, Anand, had
informed the petitioner that the police authorities
had returned her mobile phone and that she could
collect the same from the Administrative
Department. In response, the petitioner stated that
she would not accept the mobile phone without a
certificate ruling out all possibilities of tampering
with the same.
10 Considering the overall circumstances, this Court
finds that no case is made out for entertaining the
present petition by invoking the exceptions to the
rule of availability of an alternative remedy, namely,
enforcement of fundamental rights, failure of natural
justice, and proceedings that are wholly without
jurisdiction or where the action impugned is beyond
the pale of the law. In the aforesaid circumstances,
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no interference is warranted by this Court. However,
as observed by the Apex Court, the learned
Magistrate has ample powers under Section 156(3) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Accordingly,
liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioner to avail
of the alternative remedy available in accordance
with law, if so advised.
11At the same time, it is clarified that the observations
made herein are confined to the consideration of the
present petition and shall not come in the way of the
petitioner while availing of the alternative remedy.
Resultantly, the present petition stands dismissed.
(M. K. THAKKER,J)
M.M.MIRZA
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