THE COMMISSISONER MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, BILASPUR vs SUSHIL SAMNANI

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2026:CGHC:21528-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally
signed by
BABLU
RAJENDRA
BHANARKAR
Date:
2026.05.08
16:59:24
+0530
BABLU
RAJENDRA
BHANARKAR
WA No. 397 of 2026
1 - The Commissisoner Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur District Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - The Estate Officer Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, Vikas Bhawan,
Near Nehru Chowk, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
... Appellants
versus
1 - Sushil Samnani S/o Bhagwan Das Aged About 53 Years R/o Behind
Guru Ghasidas School, Kasturba Nagar, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh
2 - Smt. Rani Samnani W/o Sushil Sanmani Aged About 50 Years R/o
Behind Guru Ghasidas School Kasturba Nagar, Bilaspur, District
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Urban Administration
And Development Department, Mahanadi Bhavan, Mantralaya, Nawa
Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
4 - The Collector Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
5 - Mayor - In - Council Through Its Chairperson, Municipal Corporation,
Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
6 - Bilaspur Smart City Limited Registered Office 3rd Floor, Integrated
Command And Control Center, Tarbahar Chowk, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh,
Through Its Chairman.
... Respondents

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For Appellants : Mr.R.S.Marhas, Senior Advocate assisted by
Mr.Samrath Singh Marhas, Advocate
For Respondents
:
Mr.Gautam Khetrapal, Advocate
No.1 and 2
For Respondents
:
Mr.Nitansh Jaiswal, Deputy Government
No.3 and 4/State
Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice
8.5.2026
1. Heard Mr.R.S.Marhas, learned Senior Advocate assisted by
Mr.Samrath Singh Marhas, learned counsel for the appellants as
well as Mr.Gautam Khetrapal, learned counsel appearing for
respondents No.1 & 2 and Mr.Nitansh Jaiswal, learned Deputy
Government Advocate appearing for respondents No.3 & 4/State
on I.A.No.01/2026, which is an application for condonation of
delay of 95 days in filing the present appeal.
2. On due consideration, I.A.No.01/2026 is allowed. Delay is
condoned.
3. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is
heard finally.
4. The appellants have filed this writ appeal against the order dated
28.10.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPC No. 4503
of 2025 by which the learned Single Judge has disposed of the
writ petition filed by respondents No.1 and 2 herein/writ petitioners

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therein.
5. Brief facts necessary for disposal of the case are that the subject
land bearing Khasra No. 488, Juna Bilaspur, is Nazul land owned
by the State Government. The Municipal Corporation has merely
been placed in possession of the land for “Vyavasthadin”
(management) purposes and the land has neither been formally
allotted nor conveyed to the Corporation. The Appellants
conducted verification of 88 shopkeepers of the old bus stand and
categorised them into Category “A” (holders of live and valid
leases), Category “B” (holders of expired leases), and Category
“C” (persons having no documents). The original petitioners were
placed in Category “A”.
6. A conscious policy decision was taken by the Mayor-in-Council
that all allotments in New Imlipara Commercial Complex shall be
made only for a maximum period of three years through a
transparent lottery/allotment process. The said policy is in
consonance with the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Transfer
of Immovable Property) Rules, 1994, and also with the legal
position that the Corporation has no authority to grant long-term
leases in respect of Nazul land. Vide letter dated 31.07.2025, the
original petitioners were invited to participate in the
lottery/allotment process. However, instead of participating, their
son-in-law refused to do so on the ground that they were seeking a
“permanent lease” up to the year 2037–38.

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7. Learned Single Judge, while observing in paragraph 25 of the
impugned order that “the Corporation cannot execute leases
beyond the permissible period of three years” since the land in
question is Nazul property, has paradoxically directed in
paragraphs 26 and 27 that the shop be allotted to the respondents
for the entire period up to 2037–38 and that the conditions be
altered accordingly. The said direction is wholly unsustainable in
law. The directions contained in paragraphs 25, 26, and 27 of the
impugned order create an anomalous and legally untenable
situation by conferring rights upon the respondents beyond the
permissible period prescribed under the statutory provisions,
thereby rendering the impugned directions contrary to law. Hence,
this writ appeal.
8. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants submits
that the impugned order is self-contradictory on the face of the
record. The learned Single Judge, in paragraph 25 of the
impugned order, has categorically observed that the Municipal
Corporation “cannot execute leases beyond the permissible period
of three years” in respect of Nazul land; however, in paragraphs 26
and 27, the learned Single Judge has nevertheless directed the
Appellants to allot the shop to the respondents up to the year
2037–38 and to alter the applicable conditions accordingly. Such
mutually inconsistent directions are legally unsustainable and
liable to be set aside. He further submits that the Municipal
Corporation has no statutory authority whatsoever to grant a lease

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exceeding three years in respect of Nazul land, ownership whereof
vests exclusively in the State Government. The Chhattisgarh
Municipal Corporation (Transfer of Immovable Property) Rules,
1994 prescribe that disposal of such property can be undertaken
only through public auction or with prior approval of the State
Government. Admittedly, no approval for grant of any long-term
lease has been obtained from the State Government. Therefore,
the direction issued by the learned Single Judge to “alter the
conditions” and execute a long-term lease is wholly without
jurisdiction and contrary to the statutory framework. He also
submits that the policy decision taken by the Mayor-in-Council,
which has been extracted even in the writ petition, was a
conscious and reasoned decision arrived at after due deliberation.
The said policy uniformly provided that allotments in New Imlipara
Commercial Complex would be made only for a maximum period
of three years through a transparent lottery process applicable to
all 88 eligible shopkeepers. The learned Single Judge has erred in
overriding the said policy decision and granting a special and
preferential treatment to the writ petitioners alone, thereby violating
the principles of equality and uniformity embodied under Article 14
of the Constitution of India.
9. Learned Senior Advcoate contended that the original petitioners
voluntarily declined to participate in the transparent
lottery/allotment process despite being specifically invited vide
communication dated 31.07.2025. Having consciously refused the

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opportunity extended to them, they cannot subsequently invoke
writ jurisdiction to claim a preferential long-term lease. The
doctrine of approbate and reprobate squarely applies, and the
respondents cannot be permitted to accept and reject the same
process simultaneously. He further contended that no fundamental
or vested legal right exists in favour of the respondents to compel
the Municipal Corporation to execute a lease beyond the
permissible period of three years. The earlier lease pertained to
the old shop situated at the demolished old bus stand, whereas
the proposed allotment in the newly constructed Imlipara
Commercial Complex constitutes an entirely fresh allotment
governed by a new policy framework. Mere existence of an earlier
lease up to 2037–38 does not create any enforceable right to
claim a similar long-term lease in the new commercial complex. He
also cotended that the impugned order seriously prejudices public
interest. Imlipara Commercial Complex forms part of the Bilaspur
Smart City Project, and the decision to restrict allotments to a
period of three years was taken consciously to maintain
administrative flexibility, ensure transparency, and maximize public
revenue. The direction to grant long-term leases in favour of the
respondents would unjustifiably bind the Corporation for decades
without any statutory authority and contrary to public interest.
10. He lastly submits that the findings and directions contained in
paragraphs 25 to 27 of the impugned order are perverse, contrary
to the pleadings and unsupported by the material available on

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record, including the resolution of the Mayor-in-Council and the
communication dated 31.07.2025 addressed to the respondents.
The impugned findings therefore deserve to be interfered with by
this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
11. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondents
No.1 and 2 opposes the submissions made by learned Senior
Advocate for the appellants and submits that the learned Single
Judge considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly
disposed of the writ petition filed by respndents No.1 and 2, which
warrants no interference by this Court.
12. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,
considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also
went through the records with utmost circumpsection.
13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and upon
perusal of the record, this Court is of the considered opinion that
no interference is warranted with the order passed by the learned
Single Judge.
14. The learned Single Judge has rightly taken into consideration the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the
admitted position that the respondents/writ petitioners were holders
of a valid subsisting lease in respect of the original premises up to
the year 2037–38 and were duly included in Schedule “A” by the
Municipal Corporation itself. The categorisation made by the
Corporation clearly acknowledges the continuing legal status and

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entitlement of the writ petitioners.
15. This Court further finds that the learned Single Judge has not
granted any blanket or unconditional direction contrary to the
statutory provisions governing Nazul land. In paragraph 25 of the
impugned order, the learned Single Judge has specifically
observed that the land in question is Nazul property and that the
Municipal Corporation cannot execute leases beyond the
permissible period of three years without adherence to the
applicable statutory framework. The subsequent directions
contained in paragraphs 26 and 27 are therefore required to be
read harmoniously with the aforesaid observation.
16. The directions issued by the learned Single Judge merely protect
the legitimate expectation and preferential entitlement of the writ
petitioners arising out of the subsisting lease and earlier
assurances extended by the Corporation during previous
proceedings. The learned Single Judge has consciously directed
that the allotment process be undertaken in accordance with
statutory provisions and subject to any approval, clarification, or
permission required from the State Government. Thus, the
impugned order cannot be construed as compelling the Municipal
Corporation to act dehors the statute or in excess of its jurisdiction.
17. This Court is also not persuaded by the contention of the
Appellants that the respondents forfeited their rights by not
participating in the lottery process. The material on record

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demonstrates that the respondents sought protection of their
existing contractual and legal rights flowing from the earlier lease
agreement, and their refusal to participate in a general lottery
process cannot be treated as abandonment of such rights.
18. The learned Single Judge has rightly balanced the equities by
directing preferential allotment in favour of the respondents while
simultaneously ensuring adherence to statutory requirements and
transparency in the allotment process. The apprehension
expressed by the Appellants regarding violation of the Chhattisgarh
Municipal Corporation (Transfer of Immovable Property) Rules,
1994 is therefore misconceived, as the order itself mandates
compliance with statutory provisions and any requisite
governmental approval.
19. No perversity, jurisdictional error, or patent illegality is found in the
findings recorded by the learned Single Judge warranting
interference in intra-court appellate jurisdiction. The impugned
order is reasoned, equitable, and based upon the material
available on record.
20. Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be
and is hereby dismissed . No order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Bablu