Iqbal Singh Grewal @ Iqbal Singh vs State Of Punjab
- Court
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
CRM-M-26431-2026 -1-
201 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-26431-2026
Date of Decision: 16.11.2026
Iqbal Singh Grewal @ Iqbal Singh …Petitioner
vs.
State of Punjab …Respondent
Coram : Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.S.Shekhawat
Present : Mr. Harshit Jain, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Amit Rana, Sr. DAG, Punjab.
*
N.S.Shekhawat J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner has filed the Second petition under Section 483 of
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023/439 of the Cr.P.C. with a prayer to
grant the concession of regular bail to him in case FIR No.41 dated 24.05.2023
registered under Sections 302, 201 of IPC (equivalent to Sections 103(1) and
238 of BNS) at Police Station Jodhan, District Ludhiana.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the FIR in the
present case was registered on the basis of the statement made by Amandeep
Singh @ Amana and the same has been reproduced below:-
“Statement of Amandeep Singh @ Amana son of Gurtej
Singh, resident of Chownkiman Police Station City Jagraon,
District Ludhiana aged about 35 years, mobile number 90415-
84322. Stated that I am resident of aforementioned address and
doing agricultural work. From our family Amandeep Singh, son of
Sarbajit Singh, resident of Chownkiman, who is son of my uncle
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(Chacha), whose age is about 35 years and already married has
gone abroad to Canada. Yesterday on dated 23.05.2023 time would
be around 07:00 PM I along with my uncle's son Amandeep Singh
and Manjot Singh @ Honey son of Iqbal Singh resident of
Chownkiman were standing outside my house and talking on
street. Then Amandeep Singh's Maternal Uncle's son Iqbal Singh
son of Baldev Singh resident of Jodha came there in his white
coloured Swift Car bearing number PB 10 DZ 7623. We four were
standing there and talking. Iqbal Singh asked us let's drink today
on which we four went to the motor in the fields of Amandeep
Singh on the way to Chownkiman to Soniya in Iqbal Singh's swift
car. Where 1, Amandeep Singh and Manjot Singh @ Honey drank
together but Iqbal Singh didn't drink with us. Then after that Iqbal
Singh dropped me and Manjot Singh @ Honey near our house and
took Amandeep Singh @ Amana along with him in his car. Today
morning, Amandeep Singh's mother Kulwant Kaur told me that he
didn't returned to home and his mobile phone is also switched off,
on which I along with Manjot Singh @ Honey, Davinder Singh son
of Jangir Singh and Gurtej Singh son of Bachan Singh resident of
Chownkiman went to Iqbal Singh' House village Jodha. We asked
repeatedly Iqbal Singh about Amandeep Singh but Iqbal Singh
didn't tell anything about Amandeep. We conducted a search for
Amandeep Singh then we found dead body of Amandeep Singh
floating in the canal near the bridge of power house Sudhar. There
are many injuries on his face and head. We searched temporary
track at the side of Canal Bridge Sudhar to Canal Bridge
Narangwal and Canal Bridges. Then we found blood stains on the
temporary track on the left side of Canal Bridge Bhulewal to
Canal Bridge Narangwal. We are fully sure that last night Iqbal
Singh has murdered Amandeep Singh and has thrown his body in
the canal. On which I along with Manjot Singh @ Honey, etc were
coming to you in Police Station for giving intimation, and you met
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on the Narangwal Chownk Jodha, where I had recorded my
statement, read and it is correct SD/- Amandeep Singh, verified.”
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the entire case of
the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence and the chain of
circumstances in the present case is not complete, so as to prove the complicity
of the petitioner in the crime. In fact, it was a case of blind murder and nobody
had witnessed the same. Apart from that, the petitioner, who is admittedly the
cousin of the deceased, was having close relationship with him and there was
no motive on his part to commit such a heinous crime. He further submits that
during the course of investigation, it has been found that the petitioner had
suffered an extra-judicial confession before Sukhdev Singh. In fact, Sukhdev
Singh is an ordinary person and the petitioner had no close relationship with
him. Consequently, he had no reasons to go to him and suffered a statement in
this regard in his presence. Even otherwise, an extra judicial confession is a
very weak type of evidence, which requires corroboration with some
substantive evidence. However, in the present case, there is no other clinching
evidence to connect the petitioner with the alleged crime. He further submits
that the petitioner was arrested in the present case on 24.05.2023 and is in
custody for the last about 03 and a half years. On one hand, the petitioner has
suffered a long period of incarceration, whereas on the other hand, the material
witnesses Amandeep Singh and Manjot Singh have been recorded by the trial
Court. Thus, the custody of the petitioner will not serve any meaningful
purpose.
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4. On the other hand, learned State counsel has vehemently opposed
the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that
the petitioner is the main accused and had brutally killed Amandeep Singh,
since deceased. He further submits that there is sufficient evidence to prove the
involvement of the petitioner in the crime.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of
“Ranjan Dwivedi Vs. CBI, through the Director General, 2012(8) SCC 495;
2012 (4) RCR (Criminal) 880” as follows:-
“14. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (supra), another
Constitution Bench considered the right to speedy trial and opined
that the delay is dependent on the circumstances of each case,
because reasons for delay will vary. This Court held :
"84. The right to a speedy trial is a derivation from a
provision of Magna Carta. This principle has also been
incorporated into the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776
and from there into the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution
of United States of America which reads, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial...". It may be pointed out, in this connection,
that there is a Federal Act of 1974 called 'Speedy Trial Act'
establishing a set of time-limits for carrying out the major
events, e.g., information, indictment, arraignment, in the
prosecution of criminal cases. [See Black's Law Dictionary,
6th Edn. page 1400].
85. The right to a speedy trial is not only an important
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration, to
minimise anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation
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and to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an
accused to defend himself but also there is a societal interest
in providing a speedy trial. This right has been actuated in
the recent past and the courts have laid down a series of
decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. In
fact, lot of cases are coming before the courts for quashing
of proceedings on the ground of inordinate and undue delay
stating that the invocation of this right even need not await
formal indictment or charge.
86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right
to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by
arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all
stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may
result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time
of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a
finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that
the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly
reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary,
AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1360, State of Bihar while dealing
with Article 21 of the Constitution of India has observed
thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
"No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick
trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would
fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that
speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably
expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21.
The question which would, however, arise is as to what
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would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence
is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his
liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in
violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would
he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed from the
charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him
after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after
such trial would constitute violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21."
See also (1) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (I), (2)
Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar,
(3) Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary, State of
Bihar, Patna, (4) Hussainara Khatoon (VI) v. Home
Secretary, State of Bihar, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, (5) Kadra
Pahadia v. State of Bihar (II), (6) T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State
of T.N., and (7) Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.
88. Thus this Court by a line of judicial pronouncements has
emphasised and re-emphasised that speedy trial is one of the
facets of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined
in Article 21 and the law must ensure 'reasonable, just and
fair' procedure which has a creative connotation after the
decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi."
The Court further observed :
"92. Of course, no length of time is per se too long to pass
scrutiny under this principle nor the accused is called upon
the show the actual prejudice by delay of disposal of cases.
On the other hand, the court has to adopt a balancing
approach by taking note of the possible prejudices and
disadvantages to be suffered by the accused by avoidable
delay and to determine whether the accused in a criminal
proceeding has been deprived of his right of having speedy
trial with unreasonable delay which could be identified by
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the factors - (1) length of delay, (2) the justification for the
delay, (3) the accused's assertion of his right to speedy trial,
and (4) prejudice caused to the accused by such delay.
However, the fact of delay is dependent on the
circumstances of each case because reasons for delay will
vary, such as delay in investigation on account of the
widespread ramification of crimes and its designed network
either nationally or internationally, the deliberate absence of
witness or witnesses, crowded dockets on the file of the
court etc."
7. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu and
others v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1978 SC 429 has held as under:-
“Bail or Jail”- at the pre-trial or post-conviction stage - largely
hinged on judicial discretion. The learned Judge held that
personal liberty was too precious a value of our constitutional
system recognised under Article 21 that the crucial power to
negate it was a great trust exercisable not casually but judicially,
with lively concern for the cost to the individual and the
community. It was further held that deprivation of personal
freedom must be founded on the most serious considerations
relevant to the welfare objectives of society specified in the
Constitution. The learned Judge quoted Lord Russel who had said
that bail was not to be withheld as a punishment and that the
requirements as to bail were merely to secure the attendance of the
prisoner at trial. According to V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., the principal
rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of
the applicant to take judgment and serve sentence in the event of
the Court punishing him with imprisonment. After holding that it
makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to
prepare and present his case than one remanded in custody the
learned Judge observed that if public justice is to be promoted
mechanical detention should be demoted.
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8. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc Vs The State of Punjab, AIR
1980 SC 1632 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“Judges have to decide cases as they come before them, mindful of
the need to keep passions and prejudices out of their decisions.
The Court has also observed that in which case bail should be
granted and in which case it should be refused is a matter of
discretion. The court found it interesting to note that as long back
as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra
Vs. King Emperor, AIR 1924 Calcutta 476, that the object of bail
was to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the
proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether
bail should be granted or refused was whether it was probable that
the party would appear to take his trial and that it was
indisputable that bail was not to be withheld as a punishment. The
Supreme Court also referred to the observation of the Allahabad
High Court in K.N. Joglekar Vs. Emperor, AIR 1931 Allahabad
504 , that Section 498 of the Old Code which corresponds to
Section 439 of the New Code, conferred upon the Sessions Judge
or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not
handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497
which corresponds to the present Section 437. The Allahabad High
Court had also observed that there was no hard and fast rule and
no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion
conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was
established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously.
The Supreme Court referred also the decision of the Allahabad
High Court in Emperor Vs. H.L. Hutchinson, AIR 1931
Allahabad 356 , wherein it was held that the principle to be
deduced from the various sections in the Cr.P.C. was that grant of
bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, that as a presumably
innocent person, the accused person is entitled to freedom and
every opportunity to look after his own case and to establish his
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innocence and that an accused person who enjoys freedom is in a
much better position to look after his case and to properly defend
himself than if he were in custody. The High Court had also held
that it would be very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any
particular rules which would bind the High Court, having regard
to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the Court
unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that
may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is
dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that
in particular classes bail may be granted but not in other classes.
The Supreme Court apparently approved the above views and
observations and held (vide paragraph 30) as follows :
"It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or
not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances,
the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial
verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of
universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or
refusal of bail."
9. At this stage, it is observed that the object of the bail is to secure
the presence of the accused at the trial only. It is also observed that the object of
bail is neither punitive nor preventive and deprivation of liberty must be
considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person
will stand his trial when called upon. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has observed
in catena of judgments that when a person is punished by denial of bail in
respect of any matter upon which he has not been convicted it would be
contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution except
in cases where there is reason to believe that he may influence the witnesses. It
is appropriate to say that pre-conviction detention should not be resorted to,
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except in cases of necessity to secure attendance at the trial or upon material
that the accused will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty.
10. In the present case, no doubt the allegations levelled against the
petitioner are serious in nature, however, this Court cannot overlook the fact
that it is a case of circumstantial evidence and the petitioner continuous to be in
custody for the last about 03 and a half years. Further, the prosecution is yet to
lead evidence before the trial Court to prove the involvement of the petitioner in
the crime. The material witnesses have already been examined and there is no
material to show that the petitioner may either tamper with the prosecution
evidence or may abscond from the process of law.
11. At this stage, without commenting on the merits of the case, the
present petition is allowed and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail
subject to his furnishing bail bonds/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial
Court/Duty Magistrate/Chief Judicial Magistrate, concerned.
(N.S.SHEKHAWAT)
16.11.2026 JUDGE
hemlata
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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