Abhishek Lomesh vs Union Bank Of India & Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
Date of decision: 18 NOVEMBER, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
# CNR No. DLHC010292232026
+ W.P.(C) 9121/2026 & CM APPL. 42773/2026
ABHISHEK LOMESH .....Petitioner
Through: Appearance not given.
versus
UNION BANK OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Santosh Kumar Rout, SC for
UBI/Respondent Bank.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
JUDGMENT
1. The challenge in the present Writ Petition is to the Order dated
21.04.2026 passed by the Ld. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Delhi
[‘DRAT’] in Misc. Appeal No.28/2026, rejecting the Appeal filed by the
Petitioner herein under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy
Act, 1993 [‘RDB Act’] . The Petitioner in the said Appeal had challenged an
Order dated 13.11.2025 passed by the Ld. Debts Recovery Tribunal-II,
Delhi [‘DRT’] in IA No.4147/2023 filed in TA/1366/2022, refusing to
condone the delay in filing the written statement.
2. The facts, in brief, leading to the filing of the present Writ Petition are
that the Respondent No.1/Bank had filed an O.A. No.596/2018 before the
Ld. DRT against the Petitioner and Respondent Nos.2 and 3, stating that the
Petitioner and one stranger Ms. Deepti, Respondent No.2 herein, had taken
loan from the Respondent No.1/Bank and they have failed to maintain the
financial discipline. It is stated that on receipt of summons, the Petitioner
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engaged a lawyer who appeared on his behalf on 11.09.2019 and 19.11.2019
and thereafter, filed his Vakalatnama . It is stated that on 19.11.2019, the
Petitioner was given four weeks’ time to file his written statement but due to
COVID-19, the written statement could not be filed within the said period
and the same was filed on 23.05.2023. An application being I.A.
No.4147/2023 was filed by the Petitioner seeking condonation of delay in
filing of the written statement.
3. The Ld. DRT vide Order dated 13.11.2025 rejected the said
application on the ground that the written statement has been filed beyond
the time prescribed under Section 19(5) of the RDB Act and, therefore, the
delay cannot be condoned. An Appeal against the said Order dated
13.11.2025 was also filed by the Petitioner which was dismissed by the Ld.
DRAT vide the Impugned Order dated 21.04.2026 which led to the filing of
the present writ petition by the Petitioner.
4. The short question which, therefore, arises for consideration before
this Court is whether the time prescribed under Section 19(5) of the RDB
Act within which the written statement has to be filed is directory or
mandatory in nature, and whether the Court vests with the power to condone
the delay or not.
5. This Court vide Judgment dated 23.09.2026 passed in W.P.(C)
13671/2026 in the case of “Nikhil Poddar through his duly constituted
Attorney Mr. Devender Kumar Sharma vs. Punjab National Bank through its
Authorized Representative” has held that the delay in filing written
statement beyond the period prescribed under Section 19(5) of the RDB Act
cannot be condoned. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced
asunder:
“5. For the sake of reference, Section 19(5)(i) of the
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RDBA Act is reproduced to read as under:
“19(5)(i) the defendant shall within a
period of thirty days from the date of service of
summons, present a written statement of his
defence including claim for set-off under sub-
section (6) or a counter-claim under sub-section
(8), if any, and such written statement shall be
accompanied with original documents or true
copies thereof with the leave of the Tribunal,
relied on by the defendant in his defence:
Provided that where the defendant fails to
file the written statement within the said period of
thirty days, the Presiding Officer may, in
exceptional cases and in special circumstances to
be recorded in writing, extend the said period by
such further period not exceeding fifteen days to
file the written statement of his defence;”
6. A court‟s power to condone delay is prescribed
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act specifies that where any
special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different from the
period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation
Act, the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act
shall apply, as if such period were the period
prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application by any special or local law,
the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive)
shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which,
they are not expressly excluded by such special or
local law.
7. The RDBA Act is a special code in itself which
provides for separate hierarchy of Tribunals as well as
separate period of limitation and, therefore, Section 29
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of the Limitation Act is squarely applicable to the
present case and provisions under Section 5 cannot be
resorted to by the Court to condone the delay.
8. A reading of the Section 19 of the RDBA Act
indicates that the maximum period that can be
permitted for filing a written statement is only 45 days,
which includes the fifteen-days‟ grace provided in the
proviso.
9. Analogous provisions have been examined by
the Apex Court in several judgments. The Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 had similar provisions. Section
13(1) and 13(2) of the said Act which lays down the
period of filing the reply on receipt of a complaint
relates to any defective goods. Section 13 of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is reproduced as
under:
“13. Procedure on receipt of complaint.—(1)
The District Forum shall, on receipt of a
complaint, if it relates to any goods,—
(a) refer a copy of the complaint to the
opposite party mentioned in the complaint
directing him to give his version of the case
within a period of thirty days or such extended
period not exceeding fifteen days as may be
granted by the District Forum ;
(b) where the opposite party on receipt of a
complaint referred to him under clause (a) denies
or disputes the allegations contained in the
complaint, or omits or fails to take any action to
represent his case within the time given by the
District Forum, the District Forum shall proceed
to settle the consumer dispute in the manner
specified in clauses (c)-(g);
(c)-(g) *
(2) The District Forum shall, if the complaint
received by it under Section 12 relates to goods in
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respect of which the procedure specified in sub-
section (1) cannot be followed, or if the complaint
relates to any services,—
(a) refer a copy of such complaint to the
opposite party directing him to give his version of
the case within a period of thirty days or such
extended period not exceeding fifteen days as
may be granted by the District Forum ;
(b) where the opposite party, on receipt of a
copy of the complaint, referred to him under
clause (a) denies or disputes the allegations
contained in the complaint, or omits or fails to
take any action to represent his case within the
time given by the District Forum, the District
Forum shall proceed to settle the consumer
dispute,—
(i) on the basis of evidence brought to its
notice by the complainant and the opposite party,
where the opposite party denies or disputes the
allegations contained in the complaint, or
(ii) on the basis of evidence brought to its
notice by the complainant where the opposite
party omits or fails to take any action to represent
his case within the time given by the Forum.
(3) No proceedings complying with the
procedure laid down in sub-sections (1) and (2)
shall be called in question in any court on the
ground that principles of natural justice have not
been complied with.
(4) For the purposes of this section, the
District Forum shall have the same powers as are
vested in a civil court under Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit in respect of
the following matters, namely—
(i) the summoning and enforcing attendance of
any defendant or witness and examining the
witness on oath;
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(ii) the discovery and production of any
document or other material object producible as
evidence;
(iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits;
(iv) the requisitioning of the report of the
concerned analysis or test from the appropriate
laboratory or from any other relevant source;
(v) issuing of any commission for the
examination of any witness; and
(vi) any other matter which may be
prescribed.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. The said provision is also similar to Section
19(5) of the RDBA Act. The Apex Court in J.J.
Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi, (2002) 6 SCC 635,
while construing as to whether the said provision is
directory or mandatory, has observed as under:
“13. The National Commission or the State
Commission is empowered to follow the said
procedure. From the aforesaid section it is
apparent that on receipt of the complaint, the
opposite party is required to be given notice
directing him to give his version of the case
within a period of 30 days or such extended
period not exceeding 15 days as may be granted
by the District Forum or the Commission. For
having speedy trial, this legislative mandate of
not giving more than 45 days in submitting the
written statement or the version of the case is
required to be adhered to. If this is not adhered
to, the legislative mandate of disposing of the
cases within three or five months would be
defeated.
xxx
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15. Under this Rule also, there is a legislative
mandate that written statement of defence is to be
filed within 30 days. However, if there is a failure
to file such written statement within the stipulated
time, the court can at the most extend further
period of 60 days and no more. Under the Act, the
legislative intent is not to give 90 days of time but
only maximum 45 days for filing the version by
the opposite party. Therefore, the aforesaid
mandate is required to be strictly adhered to .”
(emphasis supplied)
11. In Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.,
(2001) 8 SCC 470 , the Apex Court while dealing with a
petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, 1996, which also provided for a
special period of limitation wherein the words “but not
thereafter” were used in relation to the power of the
court to condone the delay in challenging the award
beyond the period prescribed under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, observed as under:-
“ 12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the
1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are
“but not thereafter” used in the proviso to sub-
section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would
amount to an express exclusion within the
meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
and would therefore bar the application of
Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to
go further. To hold that the court could entertain
an application to set aside the award beyond the
extended period under the proviso, would render
the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly otiose. No
principle of interpretation would justify such a
result.
16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that
recourse to a court against an arbitral award may
be made only by an application for setting aside
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such award “in accordance with” sub-section (2)
and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to
grounds for setting aside an award and is not
relevant for our purposes. But an application filed
beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-
section (3) would not be an application “in
accordance with” that sub-section. Consequently
by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court
against an arbitral award cannot be made
beyond the period prescribed. The importance of
the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised
by the provisions of Section 36 which provide
that
“where the time for making an application to set
aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has
expired … the award shall be enforced under the
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 in the same manner
as if it were a decree of the court ”.
This is a significant departure from the provisions
of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act,
after the time to set aside the award expired, the
court was required to “proceed to pronounce
judgment according to the award, and upon the
judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow”
(Section 17). Now the consequence of the time
expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that
the award becomes immediately enforceable
without any further act of the court . If there were
any residual doubt on the interpretation of the
language used in Section 34, the scheme of the
1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of
curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion
of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. Similarly, the Apex Court in Singh Enterprises v.
Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur, (2008) 3
SCC 70, while interpreting analogous provision in the
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Central Excise Act, 1994, the Apex Court has observed
as under:-
“8. The Commissioner of Central Excise(appeals)
as also the Tribunal being creatures of statute are
not vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay
beyond the permissible period provided under the
statute. The period up to which the prayer for
condonation can be accepted is statutorily
provided. It was submitted that the logic of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short
“the Limitation Act”) can be available for
condonation of delay. The first proviso to
Section 35 makes the position clear that the
appeal has to be preferred within three months
from the date of communication to him of the
decision of order. However, if the Commissioner
is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from presenting the appeal
within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can
allow it to be presented within a further period of
30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that
the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in
terms of the proviso further 30 days time can be
granted by the appellate authority to entertain
the appeal. The proviso to sub-section(1) of
Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that
the appellate authority has no power to allow the
appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30
days. The language used makes the position
clear that the legislature intended the appellate
authority to entertain the appeal by condoning
delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60
days which is the normal period for preferring
appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner
and the High Court were therefore justified in
holding that there was no power to condone the
delay after the expiry of 30 days' period.”
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(emphasis supplied)
13. After referring to the above decision, the Apex
Court in Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India
Private Limited, (2009) 5 SCC 791, has observed as
under:-
“ 30. In the earlier part of our order, we have
adverted to Chapter VI-A of the Act which
provides for appeals and revisions to various
authorities. Though Parliament has specifically
provided an additional period of 30 days in the
case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent
about the number of days if there is sufficient
cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate
Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in
the case of revision by the Central Government
has been provided. However, in the case of an
appeal to the High Court under Section 35-G and
reference application to the High Court under
Section 35-H, Parliament has provided only 180
days and no further period for filing an appeal
and making reference to the High Court is
mentioned in the Act.
xxx
32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in
Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes
the position clear that an appeal and reference to
the High Court should be made within 180 days
only from the date of communication of the
decision or order. In other words, the language
used in other provisions makes the position clear
that the legislature intended the appellate
authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the
delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days
which is the preliminary limitation period for
preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause
condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause
after the prescribed period, there is complete
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exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The
High Court was, therefore, justified in holding
that there was no power to condone the delay
after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.
xxx
35. It was contended before us that the words
“expressly excluded” would mean that there
must be an express reference made in the special
or local law to the specific provisions of the
Limitation Act of which the operation is to be
excluded. In this regard, we have to see the
scheme of the special law which here in this case
is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the
remedy provided therein is such that the
legislature intended it to be a complete code by
itself which alone should govern the several
matters provided by it. If, on an examination of
the relevant provisions, it is clear that the
provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein
cannot be called in aid to supplement the
provisions of the Act. In our considered view,
that even in a case where the special law does
not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of
the Limitation Act by an express reference, it
would nonetheless be open to the court to
examine whether and to what extent, the nature
of those provisions or the nature of the subject-
matter and scheme of the special law exclude
their operation. In other words, the applicability
of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore,
is to be judged not from the terms of the
Limitation Act but by the provisions of the
Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference
application to the High Court. ”
(emphasis supplied)
14. While explaining the provisions of Section 421
of the Companies Act, 2013, the Apex Court in
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Druggists Association v. Kalyan Chowdhury, (2018) 3
SCC 41, has observed as under:-
“ 3. Before coming to the judgments of this Court,
it is important to first set out Section 421(3) and
Section 433 of the Act. These provisions read as
follows:
“ 421. Appeal from orders of Tribunal .—(1)-(2)
*
(3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be
filed within a period of forty-five days from the
date on which a copy of the order of the Tribunal
is made available to the person aggrieved and
shall be in such form, and accompanied by such
fees, as may be prescribed:
Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may
entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said
period of forty-five days from the date aforesaid,
but within a further period not exceeding forty-
five days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from filing the
appeal within that period. …
*
433. Limitation .—The provisions of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) shall, as far as
may be, apply to proceedings or appeals before
the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal, as the
case may be.”
4. A cursory reading of Section 421(3) makes it
clear that the proviso provides a period of
limitation different from that provided in the
Limitation Act, and also provides a further period
not exceeding 45 days only if it is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from
filing the appeal within that period. Section 433
obviously cannot come to the aid of the appellant
because the provisions of the Limitation Act only
apply “as far as may be”. In a case like the
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present, where there is a special provision
contained in Section 421(3) proviso, Section 5 of
the Limitation Act obviously cannot apply.
5. Another very important aspect of the case is
that 45 days is the period of limitation, and a
further period not exceeding 45 days is provided
only if sufficient cause is made out for filing the
appeal within the extended period. According to
us, this is a peremptory provision, which will
otherwise be rendered completely ineffective, if
we were to accept the argument of the learned
counsel for the appellant. If we were to accept
such argument, it would mean that
notwithstanding that the further period of 45
days had elapsed, the Appellate Tribunal may, if
the facts so warrant, condone the delay. This
would be to render otiose the second time-limit
of 45 days, which, as has been pointed out by us
above, is peremptory in nature. ”
(emphasis supplied)
15. Further, the Apex Court in New India Assurance
Company Limited v. Hili Multipurpose Cold Storage
Private Limited, (2020) 5 SCC 757, has observed as
under:-
“ 20. The legislature in its wisdom has provided
for filing of complaint or appeals beyond the
period specified under the relevant provisions of
the Act and Regulations, if there is sufficient
cause given by the party, which has to be to the
satisfaction of the authority concerned. No such
discretion has been provided for under Section
13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act for filing
a response to the complaint beyond the extended
period of 45 days (30 days plus 15 days). Had the
legislature not wanted to make such provision
mandatory but only Directory, the provision for
further extension of the period for filing the
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response beyond 45 days would have been
provided, as has been provided for in the cases of
filing of complaint and appeals. To carve out an
exception in a specific provision of the statute is
not within the jurisdiction of the courts, and if it
is so done, it would amount to legislating or
inserting a provision into the statute, which is
not permissible.
xxx
25. The contention of the learned counsel for the
respondent is that by not leaving a discretion with
the District Forum for extending the period of
limitation for filing the response before it by the
opposite party, grave injustice would be caused as
there could be circumstances beyond the control
of the opposite party because of which the
opposite party may not be able to file the response
within the period of 30 days or the extended
period of 15 days. In our view, if the law so
provides, the same has to be strictly complied, so
as to achieve the object of the statute. It is well
settled that law prevails over equity, as equity
can only supplement the law, and not supplant it.
xxx
27. It is thus settled law that where the provision
of the Act is clear and unambiguous, it has no
scope for any interpretation on equitable
ground .”
(emphasis supplied)
16. Lastly, a Coordinate Bench of this Court in
Anita Garg and Ors. vs. State Bank of India, 2021 SCC
OnLine Del 4311, has also examined the aforesaid
aspect and has observed as under:-
“ 28. The Statement of Objects and Reasons and
Preamble to the 1993 Act reads as under:
“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
Banks and financial institutions at present
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experience considerable difficulties in
recovering loans and enforcement of securities
charged with them. The existing procedure for
recovery of debts due to the banks and financial
institutions has blocked a significant portion of
their funds in unproductive assets, the value of
which deteriorates with the passage of time. The
Committee on the Financial System headed by
Shri. M. Narasimham has considered the setting
up of the Special Tribunals with special powers
for adjudication of such matters and speedy
recovery as critical to the successful
implementation of the financial sector reforms.
An urgent need was, therefore, felt to work out a
suitable mechanism through which the dues to the
banks and financial institutions could be realized
without delay. In 1981, a Committee under the
Chairmanship of Shri. T. Tiwari had examined the
legal and other difficulties faced by banks and
financial institutions and suggested remedial
measures including changes in law. The Tiwari
Committee had also suggested setting up of
Special Tribunals for recovery of dues of the
banks and financial institutions by following a
summary procedure. The setting up of Special
Tribunals will not only fulfill a long-felt need, but
also will be an important step in the
implementation of the Report of Narasimham
th
Committee. Whereas on 30 September, 1990
more than fifteen lakhs of cases filed by the public
sector banks and about 304 cases filed by the
financial institutions were pending in various
courts, recovery of debts involved more than Rs.
5622 crores in dues of Public Sector Banks and
about Rs. 391 crores of dues of the financial
institutions. The locking up of such huge amount
of public money in litigation prevents proper
utilisation and recycling of the funds for the
development of the country. The Bill seeks to
provide for the establishment of Tribunal and
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Appellate Tribunals for expeditious adjudication
and recovery of debts due to banks and financial
institutions. ”
(emphasis supplied)
“Preamble
An Act to provide for the establishment of
Tribunals for expeditious adjudication and
recovery of debts due to banks and financial
institutions (insolvency resolution and bankruptcy
of individuals and partnerships firms) and for
matters connected therewith or incidental
thereto.”
(emphasis supplied)
29. Section 19(5)(i. of the Act reads as under.
“The defendant shall within a period of thirty
days from the date of service of summons, present
a written statement of his defence including claim
for set-off under sub-section (6) or a counter-
claim under subsection (8), if any , and such
written statement shall be accompanied with
original documents or true copies thereof with the
leave of the Tribunal, relied on by the defendant
in his defence:
Provided that where the defendant fails to file the
written statement within the said period of thirty
days, the Presiding Officer may, in exceptional
cases and in special circumstances to be recorded
in writing, extend the said period by such further
period not exceeding fifteen days to file the
written statement of his defence ;”
(emphasis supplied)
30. The objective of the 1993 Act is expeditious
disposal of cases for recovery of debts due to
banks and financial institutions. A reading of
19(5) clearly shows that the written
statement/counter-claim is required to be filed
mandatorily within 30 days from the „date of
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service of summons‟. Another period of 15 days
maximum can be granted, only in exceptional
cases and in special circumstances, which are to
be found and recorded in writing by the Presiding
Officer while granting extension by upto 15 days.
These strict timelines of 30 days, and 15 days
thereafter, as mandated in section 19(5) are in
consonance with the objective sought to be
achieved by the Recovery of Debts and
Bankruptcy Act, 1993. The strict timelines for
filing written statement and counter claim is
account of the fact that DRT is adjudicating on
disputes involving huge amounts of public money,
and if any delay is permitted in the adjudication of
those disputes, the same will result in locking up
of huge amounts of public money which further
would prevent utilization and recycling of those
funds for the development of the country. The use
of the pre-emptory words “not exceeding fifteen
days” in the proviso of Section 19(5)(i), limits the
discretion of the DRT to extend the time for filing
the written-statement/counter claim, not beyond
fifteen days and, that too, in strict compliance of
the conditions viz. “in exceptional cases and in
special circumstances to be recorded in writing”.
The condition has been laid down, so as to guide
the DRT not to condone the delay in a routine
manner, liberally or casually only “in the interest
of justice”. The bar set by the Parliament for
exercise of discretion by the Presiding Officer to
condone delay in filing the written
statement/counter-claim/set-off is higher than
mere existence of “sufficient cause”.
(emphasis supplied)
17. The Apex Court, therefore, held that even for
extension of beyond 15 days, exceptional
circumstances has to be shown otherwise delay cannot
be condoned. Meaning thereby, there is no power to
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condone the delay beyond 15 days.
6. Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner places reliance upon the
Judgments passed by the Apex Court in C.N. Ramappa Gowda v. C.C.
Chandregowda, (2012) 5 SCC 265 and Salem Advocate Bar Association,
Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344, and a Judgment dated
06.03.2026 passed by a Division Bench of High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP-26365-2019 and CWP-25611-2022 in the
case of “Shri Shri Ram Gupta and Others vs. Debt Recovery Appellate
Tribunal and Others etc.” wherein the Division Bench has taken recourse to
Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC.
7. Undoubtedly, the Apex Court in the aforesaid Judgments has held that
provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC, which stipulates limitation period
of filing written statement, is directory and not mandatory in nature,
however, in the opinion of this Court, Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC would not
have any application while considering Section 19(5) of the RDB Act for the
reason that RDB Act is a special statute having its own period of limitation
and thereby, Section 5 of the Limitation Act will have no application.
Section 34 of the RDB Act states that RDB Act will have overriding effect
over any other law for the time being in force. Section 34 of the RDB Act is
reproduced as under:
“Section 34: Act to have overriding effect.— (1) Save
as provided under sub-section (2), the provisions of
this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for
the time being in force or in any instrument having
effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.
(2) The provisions of this Act or the rules made
thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in
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derogation of, the Industrial Finance Corporation Act,
1948 (15 of 1948), the State Financial Corporations
Act, 1951 (63 of 1951), the Unit Trust of India Act,
1963 (52 of 1963), the Industrial Reconstruction Bank
of India Act, 1984 (62 of 1984), 1[,the Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (1 of 1986)
and the Small Industries Development Bank of India
Act, 1989 (39 of 1989)].
8. The Apex Court in S. Prakash v. K.M. Kurian, (1999) 5 SCC 624 has
observed as under:
“8. Before appreciating the rival contentions, we
would first refer to the established principles for
interpreting the effect of amendment in Rule 5 of the
General Rules vis-à-vis the Special Rules for
recruitment, which prescribes the ratio or percentage
of appointment by direct recruitment and by transfer.
The law on this point is well settled to the effect that
from the consideration of the general enactment if the
intention of the legislature was to establish a rule of
universal application, in such cases, a special
provision must give way to the general provision. (Re:
Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Union of India
[AIR 1963 SC 953 : 1963 Supp (2) SCR 515, 531] SCR
at p. 531.) Dealing with a similar situation in the case
of Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. CIT [AIR 1958 SC
816 : 1959 SCR 729, 737] (SCR at p. 737) this Court
observed:
“Now the rule of construction expressed in the
maxim generaliaspecialibus non derogant is well
settled, and we shall also assume in favour of the
appellant that the agreement, Ex. A, is a special law in
the nature of a private Act passed by the British
Parliament, and that accordingly Section 3 of the
Ordinance should not be construed, unless the contrary
appears expressly or by necessary implication, as
repealing the provisions of Ex. A. But ultimately, the
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question is what does the language of the enactment
mean?”
(emphasis supplied)
If the language is clear and unqualified, the general
rule would prevail.
9. Similarly, in the case of Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v.
Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 127, 153 : 1984 SCC
(L&S) 355] (SCC 127 at p. 153) the Court dealt with
the rule of interpretation with regard to the general
law as well as the special law and held as under: (SCC
p. 153, para 38)
“The general rule to be followed in case of conflict
between two statutes is that the later abrogates the
earlier one. In other words, a prior special law would
yield to a later general law, if either of the two
following conditions is satisfied:
(i) The two are inconsistent with each other.
(ii) There is some express reference in the later to the
earlier enactment.
If either of these two conditions is fulfilled, the later
law, even though general, would prevail.”
The Court further held: (SCC pp. 153-54, para 39)
“39. From the text and the decisions, four tests are
deducible and these are: (i) The legislature has the
undoubted right to alter a law already promulgated
through subsequent legislation, (ii) A special law may
be altered, abrogated or repealed by a later general
law by an express provision, (iii) A later general law
will override a prior special law if the two are so
repugnant to each other that they cannot co-exist
though no express provision in that behalf is found in
the general law, and (iv) It is only in the absence of a
provision to the contrary and of a clear inconsistency
that a special law will remain wholly unaffected by a
later general law. See in this connection, Maxwell on
the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edn., pp. 196-
198.”
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10. Further, in the case of R.S. Raghunath v. State
of Karnataka [(1992) 1 SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (L&S)
286 : (1992) 19 ATC 507] the Court dealt with the
Karnataka General Services (Motor Vehicle Branch)
(Recruitment) Rules, 1976. In a concurring judgment,
Kuldip Singh, J. observed: (SCC p. 338)
“Even the general law later in time, prevails over
the earlier special law if it clearly and directly
supersedes the said special law — is an
unexceptionable proposition of law.”
(emphasis supplied)
11. In the aforesaid case, Jayachandra Reddy, J.
referred to the decision in Reserve Bank of India v.
Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd.
[(1987) 1 SCC 424] wherein the Court observed “that
interpretation is best which makes the textual
interpretation match the contextual” and relied upon
the following para 33 of the said judgment: (SCC p.
450)
“33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the
context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may
well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives
the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important.
That interpretation is best which makes the textual
interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best
interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With
this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a
whole and then section by section, clause by clause,
phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is
looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the
glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context,
its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words
may take colour and appear different than when the
statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the
context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a
whole and discover what each section, each clause,
each phrase and each word is meant and designed to
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say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part
of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed
in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every
word has a place and everything is in its place.”
9. While adjudicating an industrial dispute, the question of conflict
between the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act) and the Life Insurance
Corporation Act, 1956 (LIC Act) was considered by the Apex Court in LIC
v. D.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315, wherein the Apex Court has observed
as under:
“ 50 . The crucial question which demands an answer
before we settle the issue is as to whether the LIC Act
is a special statute and the ID Act a general statute so
that the latter pro tanto repeals or prevails over the
earlier one. What do we mean by a special statute and,
in the scheme of the two enactments in question, which
can we regard as the special Act and which the
general? An implied repeal is the last judicial refuge
and unless driven to that conclusion, is rarely resorted
to. The decisive point is as to whether the ID Act can
be displaced or dismissed as a general statute. If it can
be and if the LIC Act is a special statute the
proposition contended for by the appellant that the
settlement depending for its sustenance on the ID Act
cannot hold good against Section 11 and Section 49 of
the LIC Act, read with Regulation 58 thereunder. This
exercise constrains me to study the scheme of the two
statutes in the context of the specific controversy I am
dealing with.
51 . There is no doubt that the LIC Act, as its long title
suggests, is an Act to provide for the nationalisation of
life insurance business in India by transferring all such
business to a corporation established for the purpose
and to provide for the regulation and control of the
business of the Corporation and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto. Its primary purpose
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was to nationalise private insurance business and to
establish the Life Insurance Corporation of India.
Inevitably, the enactment spelt out the functions of the
Corporation, provided for the transfer of existing life
insurance business to the Corporation and set out in
detail how the management, finance, accounts and
audit of the Corporation should be conducted.
Incidentally, there was provision for transfer of service
of existing employees of the insurers to the
Corporation and, sub-incidentally, their conditions of
service also had to be provided for. The power to make
regulations covering all matters of management was
also vested in appropriate authorities. It is plain and
beyond dispute that so far as nationalisation of
insurance business is concerned, the LIC Act is a
special legislation, but equally indubitably, is the
inference, from a bare perusal of the subject, scheme
and sections and understanding of the anatomy of the
Act, that it has nothing to do with the particular
problem of disputes between employer and employees,
or investigation and adjudication of such disputes. It
does not deal with workmen and disputes between
workmen and employers or with industrial disputes.
The Corporation has an army of employees who are
not workmen at all. For instance, the higher echelons
and other types of employees do not fall within the
scope of workmen as defined in Section 2(s) of the ID
Act. Nor is the Corporation's main business
investigation and adjudication of labour disputes any
more than a motor manufacturer's chief business is
spraying paints!
52 . In determining whether a statute is a special or a
general one, the focus must be on the principal subject-
matter plus the particular perspective. For certain
purposes, an Act may be general and for certain other
purposes it may be special and we cannot blur
distinctions when dealing with finer points of law. In
law, we have a cosmos of relativity, not absolutes — so
too in life. The ID Act is a special statute devoted
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wholly to investigation and settlement of industrial
disputes which provides definitionally for the nature of
industrial disputes coming within its ambit. It creates
an infrastructure for investigation into, solution of and
adjudication upon industrial disputes. It also provides
the necessary machinery for enforcement of awards
and settlements. From alpha to omega the ID Act has
one special mission — the resolution of industrial
disputes through specialised agencies according to
specialised procedures and with special reference to
the weaker categories of employees coming within the
definition of workmen. Therefore, with reference to
industrial disputes between employers and workmen,
the ID Act is a special statute, and the LIC Act does not
speak at all with specific reference to workmen. On the
other hand, its powers relate to the general aspects of
nationalisation, of management when private
businesses are nationalised and a plurality of problems
which, incidentally, involve transfer of service of
existing employees of insurers. The workmen qua
workmen and industrial disputes between workmen
and the employer as such, are beyond the orbit of and
have no specific or special place in the scheme of the
LIC Act. And whenever there was a dispute between
workmen and management the ID Act mechanism was
resorted to.
53 . What are we confronted with in the present case, so
that I may determine as between the two enactments
which is the special? The only subject which has led to
this litigation and which is the bone of contention
between the parties is an industrial dispute between the
Corporation and its workmen qua workmen. If we
refuse to be obfuscated by legal abracadabra and see
plainly what is so obvious, the conclusion that flows, in
the wake of the study I have made, is that vis-a-vis
“industrial disputes” at the termination of the
settlement as between the workmen and the
Corporation, the ID Act is a special legislation and the
LIC Act a general legislation. Likewise, when
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compensation on nationalisation is the question, the
LIC Act is the special statute. An application of the
generalia maxim as expounded by English textbooks
and decisions leaves us in no doubt that the ID Act
being special law, prevails over the LIC Act which is
but general law.
57 . What is special or general is wholly a creature of
the subject and context and may vary with situation,
circumstances and angle of vision. Law is no
abstraction but realises itself in the living setting of
actualities. Which is a special provision and which
general, depends on the specific problem, the topic for
decision, not the broad rubric nor any rule of thumb.
The peaceful coexistence of both legislations is best
achieved, if that be feasible, by allowing to each its
allotted field for play. Sense and sensibility, not
mechanical rigidity gives the flexible solution. It is
difficult for me to think that when the entire industrial
field, even covering municipalities, universities,
research councils and the like, is regulated in the
critical area of industrial disputes by the ID Act,
Parliament would have provided an oasis for the
Corporation where labour demands can be unilaterally
ignored. The general words in Sections 11 and 49 must
be read contextually as not covering industrial disputes
between the workmen and the Corporation. Lord
Haldane had, for instance, in 1915 AC 885 (891)
[Watney Combe Reid & Co. v. Berners, 1915 AC 885 :
84 LJ KB 1561 : 113 LT 518] observed that: [ Cited in
The Political Tradition : The Lord Chancellors, 1912-
1940, p. 221]
“General words may in certain cases properly be
interpreted as having a meaning or scope other
than the literal or usual meaning. They may be so
interpreted where the scheme appearing from the
language of the legislature, read in its entirety,
points to consistency as requiring modification of
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what would be the meaning apart from any
context, or apart from the general law.”
To avoid absurdity and injustice by judicial servitude
to interpretative literality is a function of the court and
this leaves me no option but to hold that the ID Act
holds where disputes erupt and the LIC Act guides
where other matters are concerned. In the field of
statutory interpretation there are no inflexible
formulae or foolproof mechanisms. The sense and
sensibility, the setting and the scheme, the perspective
and the purpose — these help the Judge navigate
towards the harbour of true intendment and meaning.
The legal dynamics of social justice also guide the
court in statutes of the type we are interpreting. These
plural considerations lead me to the conclusion that
the ID Act is a special statute when industrial disputes,
awards and settlements are the topic of controversy, as
here. There may be other matters where the LIC Act
vis-a-vis the other statutes will be a special law. I am
not concerned with such hypothetical situations now.”
10. Applying the said rationale to the facts of the present case, the RDB
Act is a special Act which contains specific sections which states that the
provisions of RDB Act would over-ride all other enactments inconsistent
with the RDB Act. RDB Act applies to recovery proceedings initiated by
banks and, therefore, is a special enactment. Keeping in view the object of
the legislation it would necessarily over-ride the provisions of CPC.
11. The provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC and its interpretation by
the Apex Court cannot, therefore, be made applicable to the RDB Act,
which is a special statute. This Court is, therefore, not in a position to agree
with the judgment passed by the Division Bench of High Court of Punjab
and Haryana in Shri Shri Ram Gupta (Supra).
12. Undoubtedly, in the present case, the written statement has been filed
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on 23.05.2023 with a delay of 1,200 days which is beyond the time
prescribed under Section 19(5) of the RDB Act. Even taking into account
the Order dated 10.01.2022 passed by the Apex Court in Suo Motu Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 3/2020 - In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation,
whereby the Apex Court clarified that the period of 15.03.2020 to
28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for all limitation calculations, the written
statement has still been filed beyond the time prescribed under Section 19(5)
of the RDB Act.
13. In view of the above, the Writ Petition stands dismissed, along with
pending Application(s), if any.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
RENU BHATNAGAR, J
NOVEMBER 18, 2026
S. Zakir
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