JRIANG SINGH PHANBUH (SINCE DECEASED) SUBSTITUTED BY SHRI APSHAI SING NEHLANG KHARPURI AND 3 ORS. vs SAIHUNLANG PHANBUH AND ANR.
- Court
- High Court of Meghalaya
2026:MLHC:966
Serial No.02
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Date of Hearing : 24.07.2026
CRP No.31 of 2025 Date of Decision : 02.09.2026
Jriang Singh Phanbuh (Since deceased)
Substituted by:
1. Shri Apshai Sing Nehlang Kharpuri,
Son of (L) Jriang Singh Phanbuh
Resident of Lachumiere, Shillong-
793001, East Khasi Hills District,
Meghalaya.
2. Smt. Buhphanglin Nehlang Kharpuri
Daughter of (L) Jriang Singh Phanbuh
Resident of Lachumiere, Shillong-
793001, East Khasi Hills District,
Meghalaya.
3. Shri Kyntonlang Nehlang Kharpuri,
Son of (L) Jriang Singh Phanbuh
Resident of Lachumiere, Shillong-
793001, East Khasi Hills District,
Meghalaya.
4. Shri Kindonlang Nehlang Kharpuri,
Son of (L) Jriang Singh Phanbuh
Resident of Lachumiere, Shillong-
793001, East Khasi Hills District,
Meghalaya
….. Petitioners
-VERSUS
1. Smti. Saihunlang Phanbuh
Daughter of (L) T.H. Rangad
Resident of Umsohsun, Shillong,
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East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya.
2. Smti. Jopsimon Phanbuh
Daughter of (L) T.H. Rangad
Resident of Umsohsun, Shillong,
East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya.
…..Respondents
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. P. Nongbri, Adv.
Ms. T. Stunga, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. D. Thabah, Adv.
Judgment and Order
1. By this civil revision petition, the petitioners have challenged the order
dated 10.11.2025 passed by the Judge, District Council Court, Shillong in
Misc.Case No. 139 of 2024 arising out of Misc.Civil Appeal No. 10 of 2024
by which the prayer for condonation of delay of 294 days in preferring the
appeal was allowed.
2. This case was heard along with CRP No. 30 of 2025 preferred against
another order dated 10.11.2025 passed by the Judge, District Council Court,
Shillong in Misc.Case No. 136 of 2024 arising out of Misc.Civil Appeal No.
9 of 2024 by which the prayer for condonation of delay of 215 days in
preferring the appeal against the order dated 30.01.2024 of the Trial Court was
allowed.
3. The brief facts of the case are that the respondents as plaintiffs instituted
Title Suit No. 10 of 2022 against the father of the petitioners (now deceased)
in the Court of the Subordinate District Council Court, Shillong praying inter
alia for declaration of right, title and interest over a plot of land known as
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Wahlakhiat situated at Nongkhlaw Syiemship, Eastern West Khasi Hills
District. The said title suit was presented along with an application for grant
of injunction registered as Misc.Case No. 51 of 2022. The petitioners
contested the suit and filed their written statement and show-cause. The
learned Trial Court by order dated 09.06.2023 disposed of the injunction
application by directing the parties to maintain status quo . Subsequently, the
petitioners filed Misc.Case No. 119 of 2023 and Application No. 52 of 2024
alleging violation of status quo by the respondents. The learned Trial Court
vide orders dated 30.01.2024 and 09.01.2024 (sic 09.02.2024) directed the
respondents to strictly maintain status quo and to file show-cause to the
allegation of violation made in the applications. It is only after that, on
03.09.2024 respondents filed Misc.Civil Appeal No. 10 of 2024 before the
Judge, District Council Court, Shillong challenging the order dated
09.06.2023. The appeal was accompanied by an application for condonation
of delay of 294 days registered as Misc.Case No. 139 of 2024. The petitioners
filed their objection against the prayer for condonation of delay. The learned
Appellate Court after hearing the parties by impugned order dated 10.11.2025
condoned the delay. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have filed this instant
civil revision petition against the impugned order dated 10.11.2025 passed in
Misc.Case No. 139 of 2024.
4. Assailing the impugned order, Mr. P. Nongbri, learned counsel for the
petitioners submits that the learned Appellate Court erred in condoning the
delay without there being any cogent or satisfactory explanation by the
respondents. He submits that the learned Appellate Court condoned the delay
on the ground that the respondents should not be punished for the fault of their
lawyer without properly examining the materials on record and the reasons
and justifications shown by the respondents. He submits that inability,
carelessness and negligence of the lawyer cannot be a ground to condone long
and inordinate delay as a litigant is duty bound to remain vigilant and careful
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about his rights. He supports the contention by placing reliance on Rajneesh
Kumar & Anr. V. Ved Prakash, (2024) 12 SCC 336. He submits that though
the Appellate Court apparently acted on the basis of some medical certificates
concerning the lawyer of the respondents, the same were not scrutinized by
the Court to find out the extent of ailment and the period of suffering. Further
by relying on the propositions of law laid down in Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs.
V. Karnataka Housing Board and Others, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1969 , the
learned counsel submits that the Appellate Court could not have allowed the
prayer for condonation of delay in absence of any explanation by the
respondents as to why the appeal could not be preferred within the stipulated
period of 60 days as the law requires that delay in the filing has to be explained
for both the prescribed period of limitation as well as the period after the
expiry of limitation.
5. The learned counsel next submits that the learned Appellate Court
failed to appreciate that there was no ground to demonstrate that the delay was
unavoidable or beyond the control of the respondents and proceeded
mechanically to condone the delay of 294 days without even noticing that the
actual period of delay which was for 392 days. He submits that the
respondents applied for the certified copy of the order dated 09.06.2023, after
130 days on 16.12.2023, obtained the same on 22.02.2024 and filed the appeal
only on 03.09.2024 without assigning any reason as to what took so long for
them to apply and obtain the certified copy of the order. He further submits
that the plea of the respondents that their advocate was unwell is far from truth
as the relevant order sheet reveals that they were present through their
appointed counsel before the Trial Court on several dates after passing of the
impugned order dated 09.06.2023 and subsequent orders dated 30.01.2024
and 09.01.2024 (sic 09.02.2024) and took part in the proceedings from
16.02.2024 onwards till 03.09.2024. Even a list witnesses, he contends, was
filed on 07.06.2024 by the appointed advocate of the respondents before the
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Trial Court. He submits that when it is apparent that there was a gross
negligence on the part of the respondents to present the appeal in time, prayer
for condonation of delay could not have been granted. He, thus, submits that
the impugned order is not tenable in the eye of law and liable to be set aside
and quashed. In support of his contention, he places reliance on the decisions
of Majji Sannemma Alias Sanyasirao V. Reddy Sridevi and other, (2021) 18
SCC 384, Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by Legal Representatives and others
V. Special Duty Collector , (2024) 12 SCC 336 and Postmaster General and
Others V. Living Media India Limited and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 563.
6. On the other hand, Mr. D. Thabah, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents, supports the impugned order and submits that there is no
illegality or infirmity in the decision of the Appellate Court. He submits that
condonation of delay in filing appeal is a matter of discretionary power of the
concerned Court and exercise of such discretion requires no interference
unless found to be perverse or suffers from jurisdictional error. He submits
that the respondents had appointed an advocate to look after their case and
was totally dependent on the advocate as they were not acquainted with the
complexities of law. The delay in preferring the appeal, he submits, was due
to illness of the advocate of the respondents and it is a settled law that inaction
or inability of the lawyer should not make a party suffer. He supports the
contention by placing reliance on the decision of Rafiq & anr. V. Munshilal &
anr., (1981) 2 SCC 788. He submits that the contention of the petitioners that
the counsel for the respondents appeared before the Trial Court is not
supported by pleadings and hence requires no consideration by this Court. He
submits that the plea of sickness of the advocate was well supported by
production of the medical prescriptions dated 19.02.2024, 16.03.2024 and
27.07.2024 and, hence, constituted sufficient ground for condoning the delay.
7. The learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the
impugned order is a reasoned order passed after application of judicious mind
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and, as such, cannot be termed as a casual order. He submits that the juniors
of the appointed advocate of the respondents appeared before the Trial Court
and the list of witnesses submitted before the Court on 07.06.2024 was only
signed by the appointed advocate. He submits that the appeal was filed on
03.09.2024 immediately after the advocate had a little recovery from illness
without any further delay. He submits that the prayer for condonation of delay
requires liberal approach by courts and supports his contention by placing
reliance on the decisions of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & anr. V.
Mst. Kataji & ors., (1987) 2 SCC 107 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Giga
Ram, (2002) 10 SCC 176 . By referring to Section 12(2) of The Limitation Act,
1963 and the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mukesh Ramdevji
Agarwal & anr. V. Balmukund Dhruvanarayan Lohiya (HUF) & ors., SLP
(C) No. 24862/2019 , he submits that time required for obtaining certified copy
is excluded and the Courts are obliged to compute the limitation on the basis
of the endorsement contained in the certified copy. He submits that the
calculation of 294 days as the period of delay in the application seeking
condonation has not been disputed by the petitioners in their show-cause
before the Appellate Court and in absence of any such plea in the pleadings,
the issue is not open for adjudication. The decision of Apex Court in
Allahabad University ETC. V. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & ORS. ETC.,
(2024) INSC 1003 has been referred in support of the contention. He,
therefore, submits that there is no merit in the present revision petition and the
same is liable to be dismissed.
8. Upon hearing the submissions of the rival parties and on perusal of the
materials on record, it is clear that the order dated 09.06.2023 was passed by
the Subordinate District Council Court, Shillong in Misc.Case No. 51 of 2022
filed by the respondents seeking grant of injunction against the petitioners.
Although, the order dated 09.06.2023 was passed directing the parties to
maintain status quo , no immediate appeal was preferred against the order by
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any of the parties including the respondents.
9. Afterwards, the petitioners herein filed Misc.Case No. 119 of 2023 on
06.12.2023 and Application No. 52 of 2024 on 30.01.2024 before the Trial
Court alleging violation of the status quo order dated 09.06.2023 by the
respondents. The learned Trial Court by orders dated 30.01.2024 and
09.01.2024 (sic 09.02.2024) directed the respondents to strictly maintain
status quo and to file show-cause against the allegation of violation of status
quo . Although, the record of the Trial Court is not available before this Court,
the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondents
appeared before the Trial Court after passing of the order dated 30.01.2024
and took part in the proceedings on different dates from 16.02.2024 onwards
till 03.09.2024 has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the
respondents. The only contention raised on behalf of the respondents in this
regard is that the junior of the appointed counsel of the respondents appeared
before the Trial Court and the list of witnesses submitted on 07.06.2024 was
only signed by the appointed counsel. Be that as it may, since the respondents
were represented before the Trial Court after passing of the impugned order
dated 09.06.2023, it cannot be said that the respondents had no knowledge of
passing of the subsequent orders dated 30.01.2024 and 09.01.2024 (sic
09.02.2024).
10. In the above backdrop, it was necessary on the part of the learned
Appellate Court to judge the veracity of the plea of illness/inability of the
lawyer of the respondents and to scrutinize the medical certificates submitted
in support of the plea. Nevertheless, the learned Appellate Court in the
impugned order held that no doubt there were lapses on the part of the
respondents’ counsel, however, the reason of delay based upon the sickness
of the respondents’ counsel should not be totally ignored. Further, the Court
was of the opinion that the respondents had appointed the counsel to handle
their case, so it was the duty of the counsel to inform the client about the steps
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and status of the case. On the basis of the above observation, the prayer for
condonation of delay was allowed.
11. The Apex Court in the case of Rafiq & anr. (supra) while dealing with
a matter where an application sworn on 29.10.1980 was not presented to the
Court till 12.11.1980 without satisfactory explanation, held that contesting
parties should not suffer for lapses on the part of their counsel. However, in
the case of Rajneesh Kumar and Another (supra) at paragraph 10 it was
observed: -
“ It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head
of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the
trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on
the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and
carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even
if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was
careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to
condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty
to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally
vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court
initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be
permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate
and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.”
What appears from the above is that the period of delay is a relevant
factor for consideration of prayer for condonation of delay on the ground of
inability, lapses or inaction on the part of the lawyer of the party. Inability of
lawyer, by itself, cannot be a ground for condoning long and inordinate delay
as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and the judicial
proceedings initiated his instance.
12. In the present case, the delay is not for a period for few days. The delay,
as per the condonation application, is for a period of 294 days i.e. more than
9 (nine) months. Thus, condonation of delay for the entire period by the
learned Appellate Court without taking into consideration the record of the
Trial Court was not proper. It is not a case where a plea was raised that the
respondents were simple ignorant villagers or uneducated having no
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knowledge of the court’s procedure. Therefore, the respondents had a duty to
be vigilant of their own rights and were expected to be equally vigilant about
the title suit and the connected miscellaneous applications initiated at their
instance. Putting the entire blame on the advocate and trying to make it out as
if the respondents were totally unaware of the nature or significance of the
order passed is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been
accepted. The Apex Court in Salil Dutta V. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., (1993)
2 SCC 185 , held that the observation made in Rafiq & anr. (supra) must not
be understood as an absolute proposition.
13. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag & anr. (supra) wherein it was observed that courts
should adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach was rendered in the
context of condonation of delay of only 4 days in filing the appeal. Whereas,
in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. (supra) , the Apex Court observed as
under: -
“126. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate
inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the
maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the
certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.
127. The expression “sufficient cause” must be construed in a
manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the
discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by
sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal
of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in
pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible,
and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned
toward condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a
causal approach is discernible, condonation has been refused.”
In the same case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while observing that
length of the delay may be instructive but not determinative held: -
“132. This is not to say that the length of delay is irrelevant. A
long delay naturally casts a heavier burden on the applicant to
furnish cogent, credible, and convincing explanations. The proof
required becomes stricter in proportion to the delay. The longer
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the time elapsed, the stronger the justification that must be put
forth. Hence, length is instructive in determining the degree of
scrutiny, but it is not determinative of the outcome.”
14. Coming to the matter in hand, as has been observed above, it appears
that the respondents did not raise any grievance against the impugned order
dated 09.06.2023 immediately after passing of the order and were taking part
in the day-to-day proceedings of the Title Suit No. 10 of 2022 and the
connected Miscellaneous Applications. It was only on 03.09.2024 the
respondents preferred two separate appeals against the orders dated
09.06.2023 and 30.01.2024 along with the applications for condonation of
delay. The only ground cited in the application for condonation of delay was
that the counsel for the respondents was not keeping well as his previous
ailment had relapsed and that the respondents should not suffer for the fault
of their counsel. The learned Appellate Court also appears to have accepted
the plea of the respondents without looking into the records of the Trial Court
and without taking notice of the fact that a list of witnesses came to be filed
under the signature of the appointed advocate of the respondents on
07.06.2024 before the Trial Court. Furthermore, there is nothing on record to
show that the respondents’ counsel was bedridden or was totally incapacitated
because of his ailment during the period of delay. Hence, the approach of the
learned Appellate Court in allowing the prayer for condonation of delay was
not proper.
15. Furthermore, the law laid down in the decision of Shivamma (Dead) by
Lrs. (supra) , requires that in case of delay in filing of an appeal or application,
explanation has to be given for the prescribed period of limitation as well as
the period after the expiry of limitation, up to the date of actual filing. The
relevant part of the decision reads as under: -
40. As such, under section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the
“
purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or
application, as the case may be, beyond the stipulated period of
limitation, the delay in the filing has to be explained by
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demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient cause” that resulted in
such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as-well as the
period after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such
appeal or application, as the case may be, or to put it simply,
explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the date
when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the date of actual
filing, for seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of
the Limitation Act.”
16. It is undisputed that the respondents in their application seeking
condonation of delay in filing appeal did not assign any reason for not
preferring the appeal within the stipulated time prescribed by law. No
explanation was also offered in the argument made on their behalf as to what
prevented the respondents from filing the appeal within the period prescribed
by law. In absence of such explanation, it was not appropriate for the learned
Appellate Court to condone the delay for a period of more than 9 (nine)
months. Hence, the impugned cannot be rendered valid in the eye of law.
17. It is correct that the case of Mukesh Ramdevji Agarwal & anr.(supra)
laid down that time required for obtaining certified copy is excluded and the
Courts are obliged to compute the limitation on the basis of the endorsement
contained in the certified copy. However, the proposition laid down therein
does not say that the delay in making application for obtaining certified copy
requires no explanation. The respondents, thus, were duty bound to explain
why there was a delay of 130 days in making an application for obtaining
certified copy of the impugned order dated 09.06.2023. In the absence of any
such explanation, the case of Mukesh Ramdevji Agarwal & anr.(supra) does
not help the respondents’ case.
18. There is no quarrel with regard to the proposition that it is not open for
the High Court to adjudicate on the issue which was never averred or pleaded
by the party in its pleadings as observed by the Apex Court in the case of
Allahabad University ETC. (supra) . However, the said observation does not
absolve the Court of its duty of calculating and determining the actual period
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of delay, particularly, when there is a huge difference between the period
sought to be condoned and the actual period of delay. It is the primary
responsibility of a Court to ascertain the period of delay in filing the appeal or
application before such delay is condoned in accordance with law. In the
present case, there appears to be a difference of 98 days between the period
shown in the application seeking condonation (294 days) and the actual period
of delay which had occurred (392 days). The learned Appellate Court, thus,
was not correct in condoning the entire period of delay without first
ascertaining the actual period.
19. That apart, in absence of any assertion that the respondents are
uneducated simple villagers, the conduct of the respondents in remaining
silent for more than 9 (nine) months (more than 1 year of actual delay)
projects gross negligence, deliberate inaction and casual indifference, more
particularly, because of the fact that the Title Suit No. 10 of 2022 was
instituted by them and the status quo order dated 09.06.2023 in Misc.Case
No.51 of 2022 was passed at their instance.
20. In the view of the discussions made above, the impugned order dated
10.11.2025 passed in Misc.Case No. 139 of 2024 cannot be sustainable in law
and is hereby set aside and quashed. Resultantly, the Misc.Civil Appeal No.
10 of 2024 pending before the Judge, District Council Court, Shillong stands
quashed.
21. The revision petition stands allowed.
Judge
Meghalaya
02.09.2026
“ Abhinandan,PS ”
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ABHINANDAN KUMAR
Date: 2026.09.02 16:33:57 IST
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