Swaran Kaur vs Simarjit Singh
- Court
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
RSA-5779-2018 (O&M) -:1:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-5779-2018 (O&M)
Swaran Kaur
… Appellant
Versus
Simrajit Singh
... Respondent
1. The date when the judgment is reserved. 04.11.2026
2. The date when the judgment is pronounced. 16.11.2026
3. The date when the judgment is uploaded. 18.11.2026
4. Whether only operative part of the judgment is pronounced
or full judgment is pronounced.
Full
5. The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full judgment,
and reasons thereof.
Not applicable
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRINDER AGGARWAL
Argued by :-
Mr. Keshav Pratap Singh, Advocate along with
Mr. Ekteshwar Sidhu, Advocate,
Mr. Nitin Sansanwal, Advocate and
Mr. Parv Jain, Advocate for the appellant.
Mr. S.S. Rangi, Senior Advocate with
Ms. Kawaljit Kaur Dhillon, Advocate
for the respondent
VIRINDER AGGARWAL , J .
1. The present Regular Second Appeal (RSA) has been preferred
by the appellant-defendant assailing the judgment and decree dated
26.09.2018, passed by the Additional District Judge, Kaithal, affirming the
judgment and decree dated 09.09.2017, passed by the Civil Judge (Senior
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Division), Guhla, whereby the suit instituted by the respondent-plaintiff
for specific performance of the agreement to sell was decreed. The
appellant challenges the concurrent findings of the Courts below as legally
unsustainable and contrary to the evidence on record.
2. Brief background of the case is that the respondent-plaintiff
pleaded that the defendant agreed to sell 62 kanals 12 marlas of land vide
agreement dated 23.04.2010, for 14,20,000 per acre, receiving 28 lakh ₹ ₹
as earnest money. The sale deed was to be executed by 30.04.2010. Despite
repeated requests and registered notices, the defendant allegedly evaded
execution. The plaintiff asserted continuous readiness and willingness and
claimed to have remained present before the Joint Sub-Registrar on
18.11.2011 with the requisite amount.
3. The defendant contested the suit, raising preliminary
objections regarding maintainability, locus standi and estoppel. She denied
executing the alleged agreement to sell, asserting that it was fraudulently
procured through collusion with the vendor’s legal heirs, document writer
and witnesses, and sought dismissal of the suit with costs.
4. The respondent-plaintiff filed a replication, controverting the
objections raised in the written statement and reaffirming the averments in
the plaint. Upon consideration of the pleadings, the Trial Court framed the
following issues for adjudication: -
1. Whether defendant had executed agreement to sell dated
23.04.2010 in favour of plaintiff? OPP
2. Whether plaintiff was/is ready and willing to perform his part of
contract by dint of agreement to sell dated 23.04.2010? OPP
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3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a relief of possession by way of
specific performance of agreement dated 23.04.2010 on the
grounds mentioned in the plaint? OPP
4. Whether plaintiff has concealed true and material facts from the
Court? OPD
5. Whether suit is not maintainable? OPD
6. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit?
OPD
7. Whether plaintiff is estopped by his own act and conduct to file the
present suit? OPD
8. Relief.
5. Both parties were afforded adequate opportunity to lead
evidence. Upon appraisal of the material on record, the Trial Court decreed
the suit in favour of the respondent-plaintiff, and the First Appellate Court
affirmed the decree, dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellant-
defendant.
6. Aggrieved by the concurrent judgments and decrees, the
appellant-defendant has preferred the present Regular Second Appeal,
which was admitted for regular hearing. The respondent appeared through
learned Senior Counsel and contested the appeal. The matter was thereafter
heard on the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties.
6.1. The records of the Courts below were requisitioned and duly
examined to facilitate effective adjudication of the controversy.
7. As regards the scope of second appeal, it is now a settled
proposition of law that in Punjab and Haryana, second appeals preferred
are to be treated as appeals under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act,
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1918 and not under Section 100 CPC. Reference in this regard can be made
to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Pankajakshi (Dead)
through LRs and others V/s Chandrika and others, (2016)6 SCC 157 ,
followed by the judgments in the case of Kirodi (since deceased) through
his LR V/s Ram Parkash and others, (2019) 11 SCC 317 and Satender
and others V/s Saroj and others, 2022(12) Scale 92 . Relying upon the law
laid down in the aforesaid judgments, no question of law is required to be
framed.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant-defendant contends that the
concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below suffer from
misappreciation of the pleadings and evidence and are, therefore, legally
unsustainable. It is submitted that the appellant never executed the alleged
agreement to sell dated 23.04.2010, nor was there any privity of contract
between the parties. The agreement is alleged to be a product of fraud and
fabrication, orchestrated by Sharanjit Singh and Kawarjit Singh, in
collusion with the respondent-plaintiff, by surreptitiously obtaining the
appellant’s thumb impressions while executing registered Sale Deed No.
32/1 dated 23.04.2010 in favour of their close relations. It is further
contended that the witness, Angrej Singh, was closely related to the
aforesaid persons and was neither known to the appellant nor the
respondent.
8.1. Learned counsel further submits that the Courts below failed
to appreciate the appellant’s prior purchase of the land through registered
sale deeds dated 04.11.2008 and 07.11.2008, pursuant to which possession
had been delivered, as well as the pending civil litigation concerning the
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Will of Hardayal Singh and the subsequent sale transactions. It is argued
that the respondent instituted the suit after an unexplained delay of
approximately two years from the stipulated date of execution of the sale
deed. The alleged legal notices dated 14.05.2010 and 19.08.2011 were not
duly proved, as no postal receipts or acknowledgments were produced.
The respondent’s financial capacity to pay the earnest money and
remaining sale consideration was also disputed, and the alleged
admissions of Joga Singh regarding execution of the agreement were
specifically denied. It is further contended that the trial Court has wrongly
held that plea that respondent/plaintiff was not ready and willing to
execute his part of contract is not available to the appellant and the same is
not sustainable and learned First Appellate Court has not decided that issue
specifically raised in arguments.
8.2. It is accordingly contended that the Courts below failed to
properly appreciate the evidence relating to the alleged fraud, execution of
the agreement, absence of privity of contract, and the respondent’s
readiness and willingness to perform his contractual obligations. Reliance
is placed upon Hansraj vs. Parvati and Others, 2018(2) PLR 357, and
Harbans Singh vs. Ram Singh, 2006(1) PLR 569 . On these premises,
learned counsel seeks setting aside of the concurrent judgments and
decrees and dismissal of the suit for specific performance.
9. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff
opposes the appeal, contending that the appellant cannot simultaneously
deny execution of the agreement to sell and question the respondent’s
readiness and willingness to perform his contractual obligations. Reliance
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is placed upon Lal Chand vs. Tek Chand, 2012(4) Civil Court Cases
239 (P&H) , in support of the submission that, notwithstanding the denial
of the agreement, the respondent’s readiness and willingness stand
established on the basis of the evidence on record, whereas the appellant
failed to honour the contractual commitment. It is further argued that the
allegation of fraud, despite being specifically pleaded, remained
unsubstantiated, as no cogent evidence was led by the appellant. The
appellant herself, Swaran Kaur, also failed to enter the witness box, and
the explanation of her old age and medical condition remained
unsupported by any medical record. Learned Senior Counsel submits that
the testimony of PW-5 Simarjeet Singh, read with the relevant cross-
examination of DW-1 Joga Singh and DW-2 Raj Singh, duly supports the
findings recorded by the Courts below. Accordingly, dismissal of the
appeal is sought.
10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable
length and bestowed anxious consideration upon their submissions, this
Court has examined the pleadings, the evidence on record and the findings
recorded by the Courts below.
10.1. In the present case, the appellant specifically disputed the
respondent-plaintiff’s readiness and willingness to perform his contractual
obligations. The Trial Court, however, declined to entertain this objection
on the premise that, having denied execution of the agreement to sell, the
appellant was not competent to raise such a plea. Nevertheless, upon
appreciation of the evidence, it proceeded to hold that the respondent-
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plaintiff had established his continuous readiness and willingness to
perform his part of the contract.
10.2. The appellant specifically assailed the aforesaid finding before
the First Appellate Court. Although the contention was noticed in the
memorandum of appeal and the submissions advanced thereon, the First
Appellate Court failed to adjudicate upon this material issue or record any
independent finding thereon, despite its direct bearing upon the
respondent-plaintiff’s entitlement to the relief of specific performance. The
relevant observations of the Trial Court, dealing with the issue, are
reproduced hereinbelow:-
61. Now coming to whether the plaintiff has proved his readiness and
willingness to perform his part of agreement to sell? Although
during the arguments, learned counsel for the defendant has
maintained that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to get the
sale deed executed and registered. But since, in the present case,
defendant have denied execution of the agreement to sell, hence, in
view of the settled preposition of law held in catena of cases
including Lal Chand Vs Tek Chand 2012(4) Civil Court Cases 239
(P&H), Jora Singh versus Lakhwinder Kumar and Ors 2011 (2)
CCC 113 (P&H), that if the defendant denies execution of the
agreement to sell, it does not lies in his mouth to dispute the
readiness and willingness of plaintiff. It is only between the court
and the plaintiff to determine the question of readiness and
willingness.
62. Even otherwise, the arguments advanced by learned counsel for
defendant in this regard are absolutely devoid of merit because the
plaintiff has proved on record the issuance of legal notices dated
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14.05.2011 and 19.08.2011 in the testimony of PW11 (wrongly
written as PW9). Since, the said notices, were addressed to the
defendant, she was the best person to claim that she has not
received the said legal notices. but as already discussed, the
defendant has chosen not to step into the witness box, thus it does
not lie in the mouth of DW1 that the said legal notices were never
received by the defendant. Although, the defendant have denied
receipt of the said notice, but since the address as mentioned in the
notice is not denied. Therefore, as per Section 27 of General
Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 (f) of Indian Evidence Act,
1872 there is a presumption though rebuttable, in favour of service
of the legal notice on the accused. No evidence has been lead by
the defendant to rebut the same. Therefore, legal notice is held to
be validly served upon the accused. Further, plaintiff has duly
proved on record the issuance of third legal notice dated
05.11.2011 and the same has been admitted by the defendant, since
defendant has replied to the same. Further, plaintiff has failed to
prove on record that on the target date as fixed in the legal notice
that is on 18.11.2011, the plaintiff had remained present in the
office of Sub Registrar, Siwan for getting the sale deed executed
and registered and had got his affidavit attested on the same day
and the original affidavit has been produced in the court as Exhibit
P1. The said affidavit is proved in the testimony of PW1 and PW3.
10.3. Appellant specifically raised this ground in para No.12 of
memorandum of appeal, which is reproduced as under:-
12. That the Ld. Lower Court has failed to appreciate the fact that the
metro of readiness and willingness is always required to be proved
by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance and it was remain
a question of judicial scrutiny even though the defendant has
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denied the execution of the agreement to sell, in the present case
there is no evidence on the file lead by the plaintiff/respondent to
prove the factum of readiness and willingness.
10.4. The aforesaid contention was specifically addressed by
learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff before the First Appellate
Court, whose submissions in this regard are reproduced hereinbelow:-
It was further argued by learned counsel for plaintiff that the willingness
and readiness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract stands
fully proved. He approached the defendant to execute the sale deed but
defendant avoided the execution of sale deed on the pretext of same
litigation. Thereafter, he issued three legal notices to defendant to
execute the sale deed but of no avail. Ultimately, he filed the present suit
for specific performance within the period of limitation.
10.5. The pivotal question arising for consideration in the present
appeal is whether the respondent-plaintiff duly established his continuous
readiness and willingness to perform his part of the agreement to sell,
which constitutes an indispensable requirement for grant of the relief of
specific performance. The obligation is not merely procedural or formal;
the plaintiff must specifically plead and substantiate, through cogent and
convincing evidence, that he has performed or has continuously remained
ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract falling to
his part. Such readiness and willingness must subsist throughout the
relevant period and cannot be inferred merely from a formal assertion in
the plaint.
11. The appellant specifically assailed the aforesaid finding before
the First Appellate Court by raising a corresponding ground in the
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memorandum of appeal. However, a perusal of the judgment dated
26.09.2018 reveals that, although the First Appellate Court noticed the
submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, it failed to return any
specific or independent finding on this material aspect. The issue assumes
considerable significance, as the respondent-plaintiff’s entitlement to the
decree for specific performance is intrinsically dependent upon fulfilment
of the statutory requirement of readiness and willingness. The omission to
adjudicate upon an expressly raised ground having a direct bearing on the
ultimate relief sought cannot be treated as inconsequential.
11.1. The legal position in this regard stands authoritatively settled
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Awadh (Dead) by LRs and
Others vs. Achhaibar Dubey and Another, (2000) 2 SCC 428 . The
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the requirement embodied in Section
16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, is incumbent upon the Court to
examine before granting a decree for specific performance. It was further
clarified that the question of the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness is not
one which can be raised exclusively by the vendor or his legal
representatives; any defendant to the suit is competent to invite the Court’s
attention to the plaintiff’s failure to satisfy this statutory requirement.
Ultimately, the Court is under an obligation to independently assess
whether the plaintiff has established the requisite readiness and
willingness before granting the relief of specific performance.
11.2. The aforesaid principle was reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in U.N. Krishnamurthy (since deceased) through LRs vs. A.M.
Krishnamurthy, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 588 , wherein it was emphasised
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that the plaintiff must establish continuous readiness and willingness to
perform his contractual obligations, not merely through pleadings but by
reference to the conduct and evidence brought on record. The Court
underscored the significance of examining the plaintiff’s financial capacity
to arrange the balance sale consideration, wherever such capacity is in
issue, along with his conduct throughout the relevant period. It was further
explained that readiness and willingness, though interrelated, are distinct
requirements: readiness essentially concerns the plaintiff’s capacity to
perform, whereas willingness is reflected through his conduct and
intention to honour the contractual obligations.
11.3. In the light of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements, the
approach adopted by the Trial Court, insofar as it declined to entertain the
appellant’s objection merely because the appellant had denied execution of
the agreement to sell, cannot be sustained as a proposition of law. The
issue of readiness and willingness is a statutory requirement which the
Court is bound to examine independently, irrespective of the defence taken
by the defendant regarding the execution or genuineness of the agreement.
The denial of the agreement by the appellant does not, by itself, absolve
the respondent-plaintiff of the obligation to establish the essential
requirements for obtaining a decree of specific performance.
11.4. Equally, the First Appellate Court, being the final Court of
fact, was required to examine the specific ground of challenge raised by
the appellant and record a reasoned finding after due appraisal of the
pleadings and evidence on record. The failure to adjudicate upon this
material issue renders its judgment incomplete on an aspect central to the
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controversy. This Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction in the present
Regular Second Appeal, would therefore be reluctant to express any
concluded opinion on the merits of the rival submissions without the issue
having first been duly examined by the First Appellate Court.
11.5. In view of the foregoing discussion, and without expressing
any opinion on the merits of the rival contentions or the ultimate
entitlement of the respondent-plaintiff to the relief of specific
performance, this Court deems it appropriate to set aside the judgment and
decree dated 26.09.2018, passed by the First Appellate Court, and remand
the matter to it for fresh adjudication. The First Appellate Court shall
specifically examine and determine whether the respondent-plaintiff has
established continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the
agreement to sell, in the light of the pleadings, evidence available on
record and the principles of law discussed hereinabove. The appeal shall
thereafter be decided afresh, in accordance with law, preferably within a
period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
order. All questions on merits are left open to be considered by the First
Appellate Court.
12. In view of the final disposal of the principal matter, all
pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of
accordingly. No separate orders are warranted.
( VIRINDER AGGARWAL )
16.11.2026 JUDGE
Gaurav Sorot
Whether reasoned / speaking? Yes / No
Whether reportable? Yes / No
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