N.I.A.CO.LTD. vs PRAVAT KU.MAJHI andANR

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
MACA No.343 of 2014
CNR No. ODHC010074352014

(In the matter of application under Section 173(1) of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988).

The New India Assurance Co.
Ltd., Bhubaneswar
Appellant
…
-versus-

Pravat Kumar Majhi and
another
… Respondents


For Appellant : Mr. G.P. Dutta, Advocate

For Respondents : None

CORAM: JUSTICE G. SATAPATHY


DATE OF HEARING & JUDGMENT:06.11.2026 (ORAL)

G. Satapathy, J.

MACA No.343 of 2014 & Misc. Case No.2306 of 2014

1. This judgment shall not only dispose of the
Appeal on merit, but also the Misc. Case No.2306 of
2014 filed U/S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for
condonation of delay of 28 days in preferring the
Appeal to challenge the impugned judgment dated
25.11.2013 passed by the learned Fifth Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal, Khurda (in short, the “Tribunal”) in
MAC Misc. Case No.88 of 2003 directing the New India
MACA No.343 of 2014 Page 1 of 9

Assurance Co. Ltd.-cum-appellant herein (In short, “the
insurer”) to pay a sum of Rs.64,000/- to the claimant-
R1 together with simple interest @ 6% per annum
w.e.f. the date of filing of the claim application on
11.11.2003 as compensation.
2. The facts in this case, being largely undisputed
are not reiterated to avoid prolixity; but it appears on a
consideration of the Appeal Memo together with the
oral submission as advanced for the appellant that the
insurer only challenges its liability to indemnify the
owner for the vehicle not being insured with the
appellant at the relevant date and time of the accident.
3. Heard, Mr. G.P. Dutta, learned counsel for the
appellant, but none appears for R1 despite being duly
noticed. None appears for R2-cum-owner of the
offending vehicle, but since the owner of the vehicle did
not contest the case and remain declared ex-parte by
the learned Tribunal, the re-issuance of notice against
R2 stands dispensed with in view of the provision under
Order XLI Rule 14(4) of the CPC.
MACA No.343 of 2014 Page 2 of 9

4. Admittedly, there is a delay of 28 days in filing
the appeal, but it is claimed by the insurer that the
delay is neither intentional nor deliberate, rather it is
prevented by “sufficient cause” for not approaching the
Court within the stipulated time. It is no more res
integra that when delay is of shorter duration, the
Court should approach the case liberally, but the same
is not applicable when the delay is of longer duration
and the same is the product of negligence and utter
apathy of the person responsible for delay. The ground
under which the insurer seeks for condonation of delay
in this case appears to be convincing and does not
suggest to be a case of absolute apathy. Besides, the
grounds taken for condonation of delay in this Appeal is
late processing of the file in the office of the insurer.
The delay in this case is definitely of shorter duration
and, therefore, the expression “sufficient cause” must
receive liberal construction. Further, what constitutes
“sufficient cause” cannot be laid down precisely by any
hard and fast rule, but the ground for which delay has
occurred in this case must be considered pragmatically.
MACA No.343 of 2014 Page 3 of 9

The law of limitation is of course based upon public
policy that there should be an end to the litigation and
even if the delay is condoned in this case, this appeal
would be disposed of by this judgment only. Besides,
when substantial justice and technical consideration are
pitted against each other, the cause of substantial
justice deserves to be preferred. In the backdrop of
aforesaid settled principles of law, when the case of the
Appellant-Insurer is considered liberally for a delay of
small duration, it cannot be said that the Appellant-
Insurer was negligent or slack, rather the insurer can
be considered to have been prevented by “sufficient
cause” in not preferring this Appeal in time. Hence,
adopting a liberal, pragmatic and justice-oriented
approach, the delay of 28 days in filing this Appeal by
the insurer is, hereby, condoned. Accordingly, Misc.
Case No.2306 of 2014 is disposed of.

5. Admittedly, the Appellant-Insurer challenges
the award only on the ground that the vehicle in
question was not insured with the Appellant-Insurer
MACA No.343 of 2014 Page 4 of 9

company at the relevant date and time of the accident
and in support of such challenge, Mr. Dutta, learned
counsel for the Appellant-Insurer by highlighting the
observation of the learned Tribunal in paragraph-6 of
page no.5 of the impugned judgment “the offending
vehicle had valid Insurance policy No.550200131/03/
01088 which was valid up to 29.04.2004 covering the
date of accident” submits that the accident in fact took
place on 25.04.2003 and, thereby, the insurance policy
remaining valid w.e.f. 30.04.2003, but even if the
accident taking place five days before the policy coming
into existence, the learned Tribunal ignored such facts
and has erroneously passed the impugned judgment
saddling the liability of paying compensation to the
Appellant-Insurer. Adverting to the aforesaid challenge
of the appellant-insurer, it appears that the Appellant-
Insurer has not specifically pleaded in its Written
Statement (WS) that the vehicle was not insured with
its company, rather it has evasively denied the
existence of insurance policy of the offending vehicle
with the company by stating in paragraph-13 of the WS
MACA No.343 of 2014 Page 5 of 9

(the copy of WS was made available to the Court on
behalf of the Appellant), which reads as under:-
13. That the this O.P. No-2 does not
“
admit at this stage that the offending
vehicle alleged to have caused the
accident was insured with this O.P. at the
time of accident as stated by the
applicant in the claim application for
which the applicant as well as the owner
of the alleged offending vehicle are
directed to file the said policy for
corroboration of the allegation, failing
which this O.P. No-2 is not liable to pay
any compensation . In this case failing which
it shall be presumed that there is statutory
violation of the conditions of policy if any as
contemplated U/S 149 (2) of M.V. Act and this
O.P. No-2 will not as such stand in law to
identify the award of compensation if at all in
future.”

6. It is emphasized here that the law of pleading
makes it imperative for a party to clearly plead and
establish such facts in evidence, but in this case, the
Appellant-Insurer has never taken the plea that the
vehicle in question was not duly insured with the
company, rather the pleading itself suggests that it has
only evasively denied by not admitting the claim of the
claimant with regard to existence of insurance policy of
the insured with the insurer. It cannot be forgotten that
MACA No.343 of 2014 Page 6 of 9

the insurance company has not led any evidence, either
oral or documentary. What cannot be lost sight of is
that the insurance company must have the policy of the
insured qua the offending vehicle, but it has preferred
not to produce such insurance policy before the learned
Tribunal for its inspection. The principle of documentary
evidence makes it imperative for a party to produce the
document(s) for its inspection of the Court to give a
finding which the party wishes in his favour, which is
evident from the principle of burden of proof as
provided U/S.101 of Indian Evidence Act (U/S.104 of
BSA).
7.
The statutory provision “burden of proof”
never shifts and it is for the party who wishes a
particular finding in his favour has to produce the
evidence in support of his claim, but in this case, the
Appellant-Insurer has not produced any evidence.
Further, the burden of proof rests on which party can
be decided by the following test that the party which
would fail, if no evidence is produced and, therefore, in
this case, the Appellant-Insurer would definitely fail if
MACA No.343 of 2014 Page 7 of 9

the document that is insurance policy is not produced
to suggest that the vehicle in question was not insured
with the appellant-insurance company.
8. In such view of the matter and on
consideration of the materials and documents placed on
record and keeping in view the position of law and
taking into account the failure of the Appellant-
Insurance to produce any evidence to suggest that the
vehicle in question was not duly insured with its
company, this Court does not consider it proper to
accept the challenge of the Appellant-Insurance in this
Appeal to disturb the finding arrived at by the learned
Tribunal. Consequently, no ground is made out to set-
aside the impugned judgment. It is also not in dispute
that this is a case in which the claimant has been
awarded with compensation of Rs.64,000/- in an
application U/S.166 of the Act for the injury sustained
by him in a motor vehicular accident, but the award
was passed way back on 25.11.2013 for an accident
occurring on 25.04.2003 and it would not be proper to
MACA No.343 of 2014 Page 8 of 9

disturb the quantum of compensation as granted by the
learned Tribunal in favour of the claimant-R1.
9. In the result, the Appeal being unmerited
stands dismissed, but there is no order as to costs.
Consequently, the impugned judgment of the learned
Tribunal is, hereby, confirmed and the Appellant-
Insurance company is, hereby, directed to pay the
compensation together with the interest as directed by
the learned Tribunal to the claimant-R1 within eight
weeks hence. The statutory deposit together with the
accrued interest thereon be refunded upon receipt of
proof of deposit of compensation amount before the
learned Tribunal.


(G. Satapathy)
Judge



Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
th
Dated the 6 day of November, 2026/Subhasmita
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SUBHASMITA DAS
Designation: Sr. Stenographer
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 09-Nov-2026 17:46:29
MACA No.343 of 2014 Page 9 of 9