Payal vs Pooja Gupta

Court
Delhi High Court

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
% Reserved on: 09 September, 2026
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Pronounced on: 20 November, 2026
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Uploaded on: 20 November, 2026

# CNR No. DLHC010425362026

+ RSA 166/2026, CM APPL. 60972/2026, CM APPL. 60973/2026,
CM APPL. 60974/2026, CM APPL. 60975/2026, CM APPL.
60976/2026, CM APPL. 60977/2026

PAYAL
D/o Sh. Sunder Lal,
R/o Room No.406, P.G. Girl, U-204,
Fourth Floor, Shakarpur, Delhi, 110092
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Pulkit Prakash, Mr. Arjun
Mohan, Ms. Nabira Farman, Ms.
Arushi Sharma, Ms. Ankita Sinha,
Advs.
versus

POOJA GUPTA
W/o Sh. Gaurav Singhal,
R/o G-33-B, Near Arjun Park,
Shakarpur, Delhi -110092 ....Respondent

Through:

CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

J U D G M E N T
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
1. The Present Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 ( hereinafter referred to as „CPC‟ ) has been preferred
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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by the Defendant/Appellant, Payal, against the Judgment and Decree dated
15.04.2026 , whereby the Regular First Appeal was dismissed, thereby
affirming the Order dated 14.05.2025 whereby, the Suit for possession was
decreed under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, in favour of the
Plaintiff/Respondent, Pooja Gupta.
2. The Plaintiff/Respondent had instituted Civil Suit No. 162/2023 for
Possession, recovery of arrears of rent, Damages and Mandatory Injunction
in respect of Room No. 406 situated at property bearing No. U-204,
Shakarpur, Delhi ( herein referred to as “suit property”).
3. The facts in brief , as narrated in the Plaint, are that the Plaintiff,
Pooja Gupta, was running a Paying Guest Accommodation ( hereinafter
referred to as the „PG ’) at the suit property for girls who were either
students or working women. Each room comprised of two beds, with one
bed allotted to each resident.
4. The Plaintiff averred that the Defendant had previously resided in the
PG for five months, from July to mid-November, 2020. At that time, the
Defendant was unmarried; she then got married to Davinder Singh on
25.11.2020, and during the subsequent divorce proceedings instituted by her
husband, communications issued by the Court were served at the address of
the PG.
5. In November 2021, i.e., after about one year, the Defendant again
returned to the PG and was allotted one bed in room no. 403. It was stated
that, as per the rules and conditions of the PG, every resident was required to
furnish their identity proof, address proof, along with photographs for police
verification. The Plaintiff and her staff had maintained a Register regarding
the security deposit made by the Defendant. Upon being asked to furnish the
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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documents, the Defendant stated that she had earlier resided in the PG and
would provide the documents within a week, but failed to do so.
6. The Plaintiff further alleged that the Defendant did not permit another
girl to occupy the second bed in Room No. 403 and frequently quarrelled
with other residents. The Defendant, by misusing the law and in connivance
with the police, entered Room No. 406 and threatened the Plaintiff that she
would implicate her and her husband in false cases, as she claimed to have a
good approach at Police Station Shakarpur.

7. In September 2022, the Defendant quarrelled with the other residents
as well as the Plaintiff’s representatives. She also broke the CCTV camera
of the PG with a wooden stick (danda), causing a loss of Rs. 40,000/- to the
plaintiff. Some other residents also sustained injuries. The Defendant
intentionally blocked the hole of the washroom and latrine, for which the
Plaintiff had to incur monetary loss towards clearing the blockage on a
regular basis.
8. The Plaintiff had called the police, but neither the PCR nor the local
police took any action against the Defendant. In September, 2022, the
Defendant gave a written assurance at Police Station Shakarpur that she
would vacate the PG within two months and pay the arrears of rent.
However, the Defendant neither vacated the room nor paid the rent.
9. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant had paid rent for only three
months, i.e., October to December 2022, through electronic mode, but took

back the rent for December 2022 in cash, by threatening the Plaintiff’s
representative. It was further alleged that the Defendant demanded ₹50,000/-
for vacating the room and stopped paying rent from January 2023.
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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10. The Plaintiff further stated that complaints had been lodged against
the Defendant with the police on 06.12.2022 to the SHO, PS Shakarpur; and
on 12.12.2022 to the ACP, Preet Vihar. On 17.12.2022, the Plaintiff, as well
as other residents of the PG, gave written complaints to the SHO, PS
Shakarpur. However, no action was taken on the said complaints.
11. The Plaintiff also alleged that the Defendant had filed false cases and
complaints against the Plaintiff, her husband and her representative, which
were pending before the Courts. The Plaintiff stated that FIR No. 539/2022,
Police Station Shakarpur, was lodged against the Defendant for usurping the
room.
12. A Civil Suit for Recovery and Permanent Injunction titled “Payal v.
Gaurav Singhal & Ors.,” was instituted by the Defendant against the
Plaintiff, her husband Gaurav Singhal and others, before the learned ASCJ,
East, Karkardooma Courts.
13. The Plaintiff stated that left with no alternative, she issued a Legal
Notice dated 29.12.2022 to the Defendant, terminating her tenancy and
requesting her to vacate the bed and hand over vacant possession of the suit
premises . However, despite repeated requests and the said Notice, the
Defendant failed to vacate the room or pay rent from January, 2023.
14. The Plaintiff further stated that, on 07.02.2023, she lodged another
written complaint against the Defendant with the SHO, Police Station
Shakarpur, DCP (East) and the ACP concerned, but no action was taken.
15. Aggrieved, the Plaintiff filed the Suit seeking a decree of possession,
recovery of arrears of rent @ ₹5,500/- per month from December, 2022 till
delivery of Possession, Damages of ₹40,000/- till vacation of the premises
and a decree of Mandatory Injunction.
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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16. The Defendant, Payal, in her Written Statement, took the
preliminary objection that the Plaintiff was neither the owner of the suit
property nor had she placed on record any original documents to establish
her ownership. It was further contended that there was no privity of contract
between the parties and that the Defendant had never paid rent to the
Plaintiff. The Defendant alleged that the Suit was based on false and
fabricated facts, was without any cause of action , and was liable to be
rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. She also alleged that the Plaintiff
had approached the Court with unclean hands, as she had already filed Suit
No. 1019/ 2022 against the Plaintiff, which is pending for trial.
17. The Defendant asserted that she was the lawful owner of the suit
property and that the Plaintiff had no ownership, land lordship or other legal
right, title or interest therein. The Defendant further asserted that the
Electricity Connection situated on the top floor of the suit property was in
the joint names of Mrs. Savitri Devi and Amar Chand, for which she
referred to the correspondence details, including the mobile number and an
email address reflected in the electricity bill issued by BSES Yamuna Power
Limited. It was further stated that the GST registration at the said address
was in the name of Vinod Thakur.
18. The Defendant further referred to online listings showing the name of
Umesh Kumar at the address of the suit property and a listing on Just-dial
showing the name Shree Radha Krishna Girl PG, at the address of the suit
property.
19. The Defendant claimed that she had entered into an oral rental
arrangement with Mr. Umesh Kumar in April, 2018, at a monthly rent @
₹2,800/- and had paid a security deposit of ₹20,000/- to him and his wife,
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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Mrs. Shashi. She claimed that the rent was regularly paid to Mr. Umesh
Kumar till January 2023. She asserted that Mr. Umesh Kumar borrowed a
sum of Rs. 50,000/- in cash from the Defendant, citing an urgent need for
funds. However, despite repeated attempts, she was unable to contact him
thereafter, as he did not respond to her calls and blocked her number.
20. The Defendant had lodged FIR No. 539 dated 17.12.2022 under
Sections 448 and 34 of the IPC, and FIR No. 542 dated 18.12.2022, under
Sections 147,149, 186 and 353 IPC for various alleged offenses, against the
Plaintiff and her associates.
21. The Defendant further asserted that she had paid a sum of ₹2,00,000/-
to the Plaintiff, on the understanding that she would execute a Sale Deed in
respect of Rooms No. 403 and 406, along with two bathrooms, in her favour.
The Plaintiff had signed an Agreement dated 23.02.2023 on plain paper; a
copy of which was handed over to the Defendant, while the original was
retained by the Plaintiff. The said Agreement was a legally binding
Agreement for sale and was supported by documents provided by the
Plaintiff herself. However, the Plaintiff had neither produced the ownership
documents nor transferred the property in her favour.
22. The Defendant further asserted that in Suit No. 1019/2022, an interim
Order had been passed restraining the Plaintiff and her associates from
dispossessing her of the suit property, except by due process of law. They were
also restrained from entering the suit property, except upon a written request
from the Defendant for maintenance work.
23. The Defendant alleged that the said Order had been deliberately violated
by the Plaintiff and her associates, who entered the suit property on 10.05.2023,
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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25.09.2023 and 16.11.2023, disconnected the electricity supply and locked her
room from outside while she was inside.
24. The Defendant further alleged that the Plaintiff and her associates had
threatened her with consequences if she failed to comply with their demand
for higher rent or vacate the suit property. She asserted that the Plaintiff had
no right, title or interest to interfere with her peaceful possession and
occupation of the Suit Property.
25. On merits, the Defendant denied the Plaintiff’s averments regarding the
nature and functioning of the PG. She asserted that the accommodation was
being run for non-working women and students, and that married women,
children and their parents were also residing in the accommodation. The
Defendant denied receiving any Legal Notice from the Plaintiff on
29.12.2022. She further stated that all the police Complaints allegedly made
by the Plaintiff were based on a false and concocted story. All the other
allegations of the Plaintiff were denied.
26. It was, therefore, submitted that the suit of the Plaintiff was liable to
be dismissed.
27. The learned Trial Court, in the Order dated 14.05.2025, on the
consideration of rival assertions of the Plaintiff and the Defendant, observed
that the statement of the Defendant had been recorded on oath under Section
165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 on 12.08.2024, wherein she had stated
that she had paid Rs. 2,00,000/- to the Plaintiff towards the purchase of
Room Nos. 403 and 406 of the suit property, though she could not recollect
the year of payment. She had further stated that she had paid Rs.20,000/- or
Rs.30,000/- to Mr. Gaurav, husband of the Plaintiff, towards rent. However,
she stated that she did not know the Plaintiff or her husband, Gaurav, and
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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was unaware of the owners of Room Nos. 403 and 406, prior to entering into
an Agreement to purchase the property.
28. The Trial Court also referred to the pleadings of the
Defendant/Appellant in CS No.1019/2022, wherein she had described the
Plaintiff and her husband as owners/landlords of the suit property and
herself as a tenant, paying rent of Rs. 2,800/- per month. Reliance was also
placed upon the Order dated 08.07.2024 in the said proceedings, which
recorded the aforesaid statement of the Defendant/Appellant.
29. The learned Trial Court further observed that the suit property was
being used as a Paying Guest Accommodation and that such an arrangement
was essentially in the nature of a licence, rather than a lease. It also noted that
the Plaintiff had clarified in her Written Submissions that the room had been
allotted to the Defendant/Appellant as a licensee. Accordingly, it held that the
Defendant/Appellant was not entitled to protection under the Delhi Rent
Control Act.
30. The learned Trial Court also considered the plain-paper Agreement
dated 23.02.2023 relied upon by the Defendant/Appellant, allegedly
acknowledging receipt of Rs. 2,00,000/- by the Plaintiff/Respondent towards
the sale of Room Nos. 403 and 406. It was observed that the said document did
not confer any right, title or interest in the suit property upon the
Defendant/Appellant, as the transfer of immovable property could only be
effected through a registered instrument.
31. Further, it was observed that the amounts allegedly paid by the
Defendant/Appellant to Umesh Kumar, the caretaker of the
Plaintiff/Respondent, and his failure to repay the same, would give rise to a
separate cause of action.
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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32. It was thus, concluded that the Defendant/Appellant was estopped
from disputing the title of the Plaintiff/Respondent. Hence, the Suit was
accordingly decreed for Possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, vide
judgment dated 14.05.2025.
33. Aggrieved, the Defendant/Appellant preferred RCA No. 57 of 2025
to challenge the judgment on possession dated 14.05.2025 .
34. The Learned District Judge, while dismissing the Application for
condonation of delay, observed that the Defendant/Appellant had failed to
explain the delay of 51 days in filing the Appeal, despite having received the
certified copy of the impugned judgment on 30.07.2025.
35. Further, on independent appreciation of the record, it was observed
that the Defendant/Appellant had failed to produce any reliable documentary
evidence in support of the alleged payment of Rs. 2,00,000/- or any Written
Agreement for purchase of the rooms. It was held that even if such payment
had been made, it would not confer any right, title or interest in the Suit
Property. The Court also rejected the contention that the premises were
being used for commercial purposes, observing that the room had been
allotted for residential accommodation, as a Paying Guest. Consequently, it
was held that the Suit of the Plaintiff for possession has been rightly
granted under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The Appeal was accordingly,
dismissed.
36. The Regular Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100
CPC, by the Defendant/Appellant.
37. The grounds of challenge are that the procedure adopted by the
Courts below has deprived the Appellant of her right to a fair trial. Reliance
is placed on Sheodan Singh v. Smt. Daryao Kunwar , (AIR 1966 SC 1332),
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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wherein it has been reiterated that a decision on merits amounts to hearing
the matter and finally deciding it on merits. It is contended that the Learned
First Appellate Court, having held the Regular Appeal to be barred by
Limitation, proceeded to consider the merits and confirmed the impugned
judgment passed by the trial court. The present Regular Second Appeal is
accordingly stated to be maintainable in regard to the findings on merits.
38. Further, it is contended that Order XII Rule 6 CPC, providing for a
judgment on admissions, is an enabling, discretionary, and permissive
procedure and is not mandatory, obligatory or peremptory. A judicial
discretion is vested in the Court, which cannot be claimed as a matter of
right. Reliance is placed on Himani Alloys Limited v. Tata Steel
Limited, (2011) 15 SCC 273.
39. Further, reliance is placed on Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8
SCC 396, wherein it was held that the Court can, at an interlocutory stage,
pass a judgment on the basis of admissions, but only after the admissions
are shown to be unequivocal, clear and positive.
40. Further, it is contended that the Appellant had raised objections,
which go to the root of the case, and it was not appropriate to exercise
discretion under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. Reliance is also placed on S.M. Asif
v. Virender Kumar Bajaj , (2015) 9 SCC 287, wherein it was observed that
mere admission of a landlord-tenant relationship cannot be considered an
unequivocal admission, warranting a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
41. It was submitted that in the present case, the Appellant did not deny
making some payments, but had denied that Ms. Pooja Gupta was the lawful
owner. Moreover, the payment of Rs.2,00,000/- had been made as the
purchase consideration. Therefore, Order 12 Rule 6 CPC was inapplicable.
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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Reliance is also placed on Hari Steel and General Industries v. Daljit Singh ,
(2019) 20 SCC 425 and Pushpa and Ors.v. Dayawati and Ors., 2026 INSC
603, reiterating that the decree under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is not automatic.
42. Further, it is contended that the Application under Order VII Rule 11
CPC filed by the Respondent was dismissed, by observing that there were
“ effectively triable issues”. There was thus a judicial finding in the present
Suit that the defence disclosed triable issues. There was no amended
pleading, new material or fresh admission after the said Order. Yet, on
14.05.2025, the Court passed a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, which
is legally impermissible.
43. Further, it is contended that the learned Trial Court relied upon the
statement under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, recorded on
12.08.2024. However, there were three aspects to the statement : firstly , that
₹2,00,000/- was paid to the Respondent for the purchase of Room Nos. 403
and 406; secondly , ₹20,000/- or ₹30,000/- was paid to Mr. Gaurav, husband
of the Respondent; and thirdly , that she did not know who owned the rooms,
before purchasing them.
44. These statements cannot simultaneously be termed unequivocal
admissions, as they required interpretation, inferential reasoning and
examination of surrounding circumstances, as observed in the case of
Pushpa (supra) . It is contended that the learned Trial Court read parts of the
statement in isolation, and ignored other parts thereof and the categorical
denial of the Respondent’s title.
45. The learned Trial Court had observed that the Appellant's defence was
“such as to make it impossible for her to succeed and, therefore, is a ground
to accept the defence as admission .” However, the Judgment under Order 12
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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Rule 6 CPC can be passed only on clear, categorical and unequivocal
admissions and not merely because the defence is held to be weak or
unlikely to substitute. Therefore, the statutory requirement of unequivocal
admission of the party, has been substituted with the own assessment of the
merits of defence, which is wholly impermissible in law.
46. Further, it is contended that the learned First Appellate Court
mechanically affirmed the findings of the Trial Court, without considering
the legal contradictions arising from the Order dated 03.03.2025, vide which
the Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was rejected, and the Suit was
decreed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
47. Further, it is contended that in the impugned Appellate judgment, the
payment of ₹2,00,000/- was held to establish that the Appellant recognised
the Respondent as a competent person to transfer the suit property. It is
contended that failure of the Appellate Court to consider the settled
principles of law constitutes a substantial error in law, warranting
interference by this Court.
48. It is further contended that the learned Trial Court had relied upon an
interlocutory Order dated 08.07.2024 passed by the learned ACJ/CCJ/ARC
in CS No. 1090/2022 in a separate Suit instituted by the Appellant, in the
Court of the learned ACJ wherein it was observed that the Appellant had
described the Respondent/Plaintiff and her husband as owner/landlords in
the Plaint of that Suit. Treating those observations as admissions under
Section 17 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the Suit has been
decreed under 12 Rule 6 CPC. Such findings are contrary to the observation
made by the Supreme Court in the case of Pushpa & Ors . (supra) and also in
Nagindas Ram Das v. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram and others (1974)
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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1 SCC 242; Umesh Aggarwal and Ors. v. Mahesh Aggarwal and Ors. ,
(2013) SCC Online Sikk 60 and Bharat Singh v. Mst. Bhagirathi , (1965)
INSC 165.
49. The Appellant has contended that the description of the
Plaintiff/Respondent as owner-landlord in CS No. 1090/2022, was not based
on personal knowledge of any registered title, but was made under a mistake
of fact arising from the representations made to her. No registered Sale
Deed, Property Tax Record or public document evidencing the Plaintiff's
ownership was ever shown to the Appellant.
50. It is further asserted that Section 122 of B.S.A. ( erstwhile Section 116
of the Indian Evidence Act ) uses the term " the landlord of such tenant",
which means the person who was actually inducted as the tenant, who was
in possession. It assumes that the relationship is already established, and it
does not provide for determination of who is the landlord, in the first place.
Therefore, it does not prevent the tenant from disputing the identity or title
of someone who merely claims to be the landlord but is not the person
through whom the tenant has entered into the possession.
51. The Appellant's tenancy commenced in April, 2018 under Mr. Umesh
Kumar, the admitted operating Caretaker of the paying guest
accommodation. The Plaintiff herself, in her Replication, acknowledged Mr.
Umesh Kumar as a caretaker. Also, the Delhi Police tenant registration dated
02.09.2022 identifies him as the operating Caretaker and primary point of
contact for the PG. The agreed monthly rent of Rs.2800/- and the security
deposit of Rs.20,000/-, was paid to Mr. Umesh Kumar and his wife, Mrs.
Shashi. At no point did the Appellant enter into any oral or written tenancy
Agreement with the Respondent, nor was there any relationship of landlord-
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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tenant or any privity of contract with the Plaintiff, who is not the person
through whom the Defendant/Appellant was inducted into possession.
52. In Subhash Chandra v. Mohammad Sarif , AIR 1990 SC 636, the
Supreme Court held that the doctrine of estoppel ordinarily applies where
the tenant has been let into possession by the Plaintiff. A tenant, who is
already in possession, can challenge the Plaintiff's claim of derivative title
by showing that the real owner is somebody else.
53. Similarly, reliance is placed on Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem
Prakash, (2002) 3 SCC 375.
54. In the present case, the Appellant merely required the Plaintiff to
prove her title as claimed in the Written Statement, Application under Order
11 Rule 14, as well as, in the Written Submissions under Order 12 Rule 6
CPC. It is clear from the law that tenant may dispute the title of a person
claiming through the original landlord, unless such person is acknowledged
by the tenant either expressly or by paying rent.
55. The Appellant had applied for the certified copy of the impugned
Trial Court Judgment on 28.05.2025, reflecting that she had a bona fide
intention to pursue the statutory remedy of Appeal. The delay was neither
deliberate nor actuated by any mala fide intention, but arose in the course of
obtaining the certified copy and preparing the Appeal.
56. The discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, has not been
exercised in consonance with the principles enumerated in Collector Land
Acquisition Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji , (1987) 2 SCC 107 and N. Balakrishnan
v. M. Krishnamurthy , (1998) 7 SCC 123. The Bona fide explanations have
been furnished by the Appellant, to explain that the delay was not
intentional. Instead, a technical approach was adopted by the learned
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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Appellate Court in treating the period of delay itself as determinative and
thereby, erroneously failed to exercise the judicial discretion under Section 5
of the Limitation Act.
57. The finding that the period between receipt of certified copy and the
institution of the Appeal remained unexplained demonstrates that the learned
Appellate Court examined the chronology of events, rather than the
explanation given by the Appellant. The refusal to condone the delay
without examining the explanation given therein amounts to improper
exercise of jurisdiction. Hence, it is submitted that the impugned judgment
of the learned Trial Court, which is affirmed by the Appellate Court, be set
aside.
58. The learned counsel for the Appellant has addressed arguments on the
Appeal, on the grounds similar to those which have been raised in the
Second Appeal.

Submissions heard and Record perused.
59. The Suit for Possession has been decreed against the
Defendant/Appellant under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, on the basis of her
admissions, and the decree has been affirmed by the learned First Appellate
Court. Two preliminary objections have been raised by the
Defendant/Appellant, which may be considered first, before examining the
case on merits.
60. The first preliminary objection taken by the Appellant is that while
dismissing the Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the learned Trial
Court had observed that there were triable issues disclosed in the Written
Statement. Once having held that there were triable issues, the Suit for
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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Possession could not have been decreed on the basis of the admissions,
without giving an opportunity to the Defendant/Appellant to lead her
evidence.
61. The contention is completely fallacious for the simple reason that
while deciding the Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, only the
averments made in the Plaint are to be considered, to ascertain if it discloses
any cause of action. The Written Statement or the defence of the Defendant
is not considered at that stage. The learned Trial Court may have observed
that there were triable issues, but that was only in the context of whether the
Plaint disclosed a cause of action. The rejection of the Application under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC is, therefore, not an adjudication that the defence
raises triable issues which require evidence. The mere observation that there
were triable issues is no ground to assert that the learned Trial Court had
held that evidence was required to be recorded for determination of the facts.
62. Pertinently, the scope of the Applications under Order VII Rule 11
and Order XII Rule 6 CPC is absolutely distinct . At the stage of Order XII
Rule 6 CPC, the rival contentions of the parties are to be considered to
ascertain if the facts are admitted and, therefore, do not require any
evidence. Merely because it was observed while disposing of the
Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC that there were triable issues, it
does not imply that the Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC could not
be considered, after the filing of the Written Statement by the Appellant.

63. The second preliminary objection of the Appellant is that the learned
Appellate Court had declined to condone the delay of 51 days in filing the
Appeal, by observing that the delay was not sufficiently explained. The
Signature Not Verified
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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Appellant has asserted that the sole ground for dismissing the Application
was the length of the delay, without adverting to the sufficiency of the
reasons.
64. The Appellant had disclosed in her Application seeking condonation
of Delay in filing the Appeal, that she had applied for the certified copy of
the Judgment dated 14.05.2025, on 28.05.2025, and had collected the same
on 30.07.2025.
65. The learned District Judge has observed that the certified copy had
been prepared by the Copying Agency on 09.06.2025, though it was
collected by the Appellant only on 30.07.2025. The Appellant had given
absolutely no explanation for collection of the certified copy after almost
two months of its preparation . Furthermore, even as per the showing of the
Appellant that she received the copy on 30.07.2025, she filed the Appeal
only on 19.08.2025, for which again there was no explanation.
66. The objective of the Limitation Act is to prevent stale claims from
being agitated after a lapse of time. It also addresses the delay and laches on
the part of a party. However, in the present case, it cannot be overlooked that
a substantive right of Appeal was under consideration, and it is settled law
that substantive rights must not be defeated on technical grounds. Though
the learned District Judge has observed that there was no explanation
forthcoming for non-collection of the certified copy from 09.06.2025 till
30.07.2025, it cannot be overlooked that there was summer vacation in the
month of June, 2025. Moreover, the Appeal has been filed within 17 days of
getting the certified copy. Some time is evidently required to prepare an
Appeal, and 17 days taken for preparing and filing it cannot be said to be an
inordinate delay, which could not have been condoned.
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67. In view of the foregoing discussion, the learned Appellate Court
should have condoned the delay of 51 days in filing the Appeal. The Order
dismissing the Application for condonation of delay is, hereby, set aside.
68. It may be noted that even though the condonation Application had
been dismissed, the learned Appellate Court had still proceeded to consider
the Appeal on merits. Those findings on merits are, therefore, considered in
the present Second Appeal.


69. The case may now be considered on merits to ascertain the validity of
the impugned Judgment of possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. It is a
settled principle that a decree on admissions may be passed where the
admissions are clear, categorical, unequivocal and unambiguous. In light of
this principle, the facts of the case may be considered, to ascertain if the
Judgment of Possession has been rightly passed, based on admissions of the
parties.
70. The present Suit is one for recovery of Possession , filed by the
Plaintiff/Respondent asserting herself to be the owner of the suit property
and the Defendant/Appellant to be a tenant therein. It is not a case of
determination of title, but of examining whether the Plaintiff/Respondent
has better proprietary rights in the suit property. It is, therefore, pertinent to
consider whether the Defendant/Appellant had come into the suit property
through the Plaintiff/Respondent.
71. At the outset, it may be noted that the Written Statement of the
Defendant/Appellant was directed to be taken on record subject to payment
of Rs.1500/- vide Order dated 03.03.2025. Though the costs were not paid,
the Respondent submitted that the Written Statement may nevertheless be
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considered while deciding the submissions under Order XII Rule 6. The
Learned Trial Court accordingly considered the Written Statement while
examining the rival stands of the parties.
72. Now considering the case on merits, the case of the
Plaintiff/Respondent was that she was the lawful owner of the suit property,
where she was running a Paying Guest Accommodation for girls. The
defendant/ Appellant had initially taken a Room in the PG accommodation,
but she left in November, 2020 as she got married.

73. However, in November 2021, i.e. after about one year, the Defendant
again returned to the PG and was allotted one bed in room no. 403.
However, she had paid the rent till December, 2022, though she forcibly, by
extending threats, took back the rent for the month of December, 2022, and
stopped making payment of the monthly charges from January, 2023.
74. It was further alleged that the Defendant/Appellant had quarrelled
with other residents and had given an assurance before the Police Station,
Shakarpur, in September 2022, to vacate the premises within two months,
but had failed to do so. The Defendant had filed a Civil Suit for Permanent
Injunction, which is pending trial, and had also got a FIR No. 539/2022
registered against the Plaintiff.
75. The Defendant/Appellant, in her Written Statement, disputed the
ownership of the Plaintiff/Respondent, relying upon the electricity
connection standing in the names of Ms. Savitri Devi and Mr. Amar Chand
and the GST registration in the name of Mr. Vinod Kumar.
76. She also relied upon the interim Order passed in Civil Suit No.
1019/2022 , whereby the Plaintiff/Respondent was restrained from
dispossessing her except in accordance with due process of law.
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77. The Defendant/Appellant further asserted that she had entered into an
oral Rent Arrangement in respect of the premises, with one Mr. Umesh
Kumar in April 2018 , at a monthly rent of Rs.2,800/- . She admitted having
paid Rs.20,000/- as security to Mr. Umesh Kumar and his wife, Smt. Shashi,
and claimed to have regularly paid rent to them till January, 2023. She also
alleged that Mr. Umesh Kumar had borrowed Rs.50,000/- from her, which
he had failed to repay.
78. She further asserted that she had paid a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- to the
Plaintiff/Respondent, Ms. Pooja Gupta, towards the purchase of Room Nos.
403 and 406, along with two bathrooms, pursuant to an agreement dated
23.02.2023 executed on plain paper.
79. Thus, the defence of the Defendant/Appellant was that she had
initially entered the premises through Mr. Umesh Kumar under an oral
rental arrangement, but had subsequently agreed to purchase Room Nos. 403
and 406 from the Plaintiff/Respondent, for a consideration of Rs.2,00,000/-,
allegedly recorded in the above-mentioned document/plain paper.
80. The Statement of the Defendant/Appellant was recorded on oath by
the learned Trial Court, on 12.08.2024. In the said statement, she stated that
she had paid a sum of Rs.20,000/- or Rs.30,000/- to the husband of the
Plaintiff/ Respondent, towards rent. She also stated that she had paid Rs.
2,00,000/- to the Plaintiff/Respondent towards the purchase of Room
Numbers 403 and 406, in the property in question.
81. Though the Defendant/Appellant had asserted that the
Plaintiff/Respondent was not the owner of the suit property on the ground
that the electricity and water connections stood in the names of third parties,
she herself claimed to have paid a sum of Rs.20,000/- or Rs.30,000/- to the
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husband of the Plaintiff/Respondent, towards rent. This clearly reflects that
she had acknowledged the Plaintiff/Respondent's right in the suit property,
by making payment of rent to her husband. Further, her own assertion that
she had entered into an agreement to purchase the rooms from the
Plaintiff/Respondent, also reflects her admission of the
Plaintiff/Respondent's proprietary rights in the suit property.
82. The Defendant/Appellant herself relied upon Civil Suit
No.1019/2022, filed by her against the Plaintiff/Respondent for Permanent
and Mandatory Injunction. In the plaint of the said Suit, she had stated as
under:-
“…..
2. That the Plaintiff is residing here and is paying the rent
amount of Rs. 2800/- as per the agreement between the
Plaintiff and the caretaker of the P.G. i.e. the defendant
no.5/Shashi and the defendant no.4/Umesh.
3. That on 29.12.2021, at the time of taking room as a PG,
the Plaintiff has given a security amount of Rs.20,000/- (Rs.
Twenty Thousand). The Plaintiff is giving the rent of P.G.
on time still both the care takers recently started to demand
more money without any justified reasons.”
4. That when the Plaintiff told about the said unjustified
increment in the rent to owners i.e. the defendant
no.1/Gaurav Singhal and the defendant no.2/Pooja Gupta,
they took no action against the defendant no.4 & 5 and
instead asked the Plaintiff to give more money as rent or
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vacate the P.G as soon as possible otherwise she would
have to face dire consequences.
5. That the Plaintiff agreed to vacate the PG and demanded
her security money of Rs.20,000/- from the defendant
no.1/Gaurav Singhal and the defendant no.2/Pooja Gupta
but they flatly refused to return the same and asked the
Plaintiff to vacate the PG as soon as possible.
6. The Plaintiff had also informed the concerned police
officials about the threatening being given to the Plaintiff by
the defendants on 29.08.2022.
7. That on 01.09.2022 the care taker i.e. the defendant
no.5/Shashi came to the room of the Plaintiff and asked her
to vacate the P.G otherwise the luggage of the Plaintiff
would be thrown out of the P.G. being threatened the
Plaintiff called the police officials on 112 no. but they
pacified the situation on call only.
8. That again on 02/09/22 both the care takers i.e. the
defendant no.5/Shashi and the defendant no.4/Umesh came
to the room of the Plaintiff and started shouting and
quarrelling with the plaintiff. The defendant no.5/Shashi
slapped and pulled the hair of the plaintiff and forcefully
dragged the plaintiff on the floor to make her to vacate the
P.G. Somehow the plaintiff saved herself and called the
Police Officials on 112 no. but the police officials pacified
the matter.
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9. That on 03/09/22, the owners i.e. the defendant
no.1/Gaurav Singhal and the defendant no.2/Pooja Gupta
came to the P.G at night and asked the plaintiff to vacate
the P.G otherwise she has to face dire consequences ..”

83. The pertinent question is, whether the admissions made by the
Appellant outside the pleadings of this case, can be considered in this case.
84. This aspect was specifically considered recently, in the case of Rajiv
Ghosh v. Satya Narayan Jaiswal , 2025 INSC 467, wherein the Supreme
Court explained that the words “or otherwise” in Order XII Rule 6 CPC
and observed that the words are wide enough to encompass admissions
made outside the pleadings. However, such admissions must be clear and
unequivocal and the pleadings have to be read as a whole.
85. In Pushpa & Ors. v. Dayawati , 2026 INSC 603, the Supreme Court
reiterated that every statement made by a party does not automatically
constitute an admission sufficient to pass a decree under Order XII Rule 6
CPC and that the admission must clearly establish the entitlement to the
relief claimed.
86. The admissions made by the Defendant/Appellant in her earlier Civil
Suit No.1019/2022, against the Plaintiff, can therefore, be considered in the
present proceedings.
87. The pleadings in the earlier Suit as reproduced above, reflect that the
Defendant/Appellant had repeatedly acknowledged the Plaintiff/
Respondent and her husband as the owners of the PG accommodation and
that she had occupied the premises through the caretakers, Sh. Umesh and
his wife, Shashi. These statements constitute admissions regarding the
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ownership claimed by the Plaintiff/Respondent. Also, it explains that the
property was taken from Sh. Umesh, who was the caretaker of the Plaintiff;
thereby implying that he was acting for and on behalf of the Plaintiff and
had no independent title in the suit property.
88. Further, even if the Defendant/Appellant's allegation that Mr. Umesh
Kumar, the caretaker, had borrowed Rs.50,000/- from her and failed to repay
was to be accepted, the same would give rise to an independent cause of
action against him, wholly unconnected with her occupation of the suit
property. The Defendant/Appellant would be at liberty to pursue an
appropriate remedy for recovery of the said amount from Mr. Umesh
Kumar, but the alleged transaction cannot constitute a ground to continue
occupying the suit property, as has been rightly observed by the learned
Trial Court.
89. The Defendant/Appellant, having categorically admitted having come
into possession of the suit property through Ms. Pooja, is estopped from
questioning the title of Ms. Pooja, in terms of Section 122 of the Bharatiya
Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (erstwhile Section 116 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872).
90. Significantly, the Defendant/Appellant's own defence is that she had
paid Rs.2,00,000/- to the Plaintiff/Respondent towards the purchase of
Room Nos. 403 and 406, along with the bathrooms, for which she relied
upon a document dated 23.02.2023 executed on plain paper. Her own plea of
having entered into an agreement to purchase the said rooms from the
Plaintiff/Respondent, is a clear and unequivocal admission and
acknowledgment of the defendant about the ownership of the Plaintiff, in
the suit property.
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91. The learned Trial Court, therefore, rightly observed that the
Appellant, having come into the premises through the Plaintiff, cannot
question the locus of the plaintiff to seek possession of the suit property. It
is a simpliciter Suit for Possession and, as per the admissions of the
Appellant herself, Ms. Pooja has a better proprietary right and the
Defendant/Appellant cannot question her right to seek possession of the
suit property.

92. The next significant aspect for consideration is the nature of the
Defendant/Appellant's occupation , i.e. whether she was occupying the
room as a tenant or as a licensee.
93. The Plaintiff/Respondent had described the Defendant/Appellant in
the Plaint as having been inducted into a room in the PG accommodation, at
a monthly payment of Rs.2,800/-. However, the nature of the arrangement
has to be determined from its substance and not merely from the
terminology used by the parties. It is not disputed that the premises is a PG
accommodation with several rooms, and each Room is occupied on a
double-sharing basis. One bed in Room No.403 was allocated to her, but
she, by her behaviour, did not permit the second person to share the room.
94. The distinction between a lease and a licence was considered by the
Supreme Court in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor , AIR 1959
SC 1262. The dispute concerned two cloakrooms in the Imperial Hotel that
had been occupied by a hairdresser, under an Agreement framed in language
appropriate to a licence. K. Subba Rao, J. observed that, although the
document used phraseology appropriate to a licence, it was the substance
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of the Agreement, and not its form, that mattered; otherwise, clever
drafting could camouflage the real intention of the parties.
95. The propositions of law were thus, summarised as under:
“ (1) To ascertain whether a document creates a licence or
lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to
the form;
(2) the real test is the intention of the parties - whether they
intended to create a lease or a license and
(3) if the document creates an interest in the property, it is a
lease; but if it only permits another to make use of the
property, of which the legal possession continues with the
owner, it is a license; and
(4) if under the document a party gets exclusive possession
of the property, prima facie, he is considered to be a tenant;
but circumstances may be established which negative the
intention to create a lease. ”

96. It was observed in Associated Hotels (supra) that there was a marked
distinction between a lease and a licence. Section 105 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 defines a lease of immovable property as a transfer of
the right to enjoy the property for a specified time, in consideration of a
price paid or promised. Under Section 108 of the Act, the lessee is entitled
to be put in possession of the property. A lease, therefore, transfers an
interest in the property, and during the term of the lease, the lessee acquires
the right to enjoy the property to the exclusion of the lessor. On the other
hand, Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 defines a licence as
under:
“Where one person grants to another, or to a definite
number of other persons, a right to do or continue to do in
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or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something
which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and
such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in
the property, the right is called a licence.”

97. K. Subba Rao, J. explained that if a document gave a person only the
right to use property in a particular way or on specified terms, while
possession and control remained with the owner, the arrangement would
amount to a licence. Legal possession would remain with the owner, and
the licensee would be permitted to use the premises for a particular purpose.
The licence would not create an estate or interest in the property. It was
further noted that exclusive possession had once been treated as conclusive
proof of a lease, but the later approach treated it only as prima facie
evidence of tenancy, subject to circumstances showing that the parties did
not intend to create one.
98. The tests to determine whether an arrangement is a lease or a licence
were further explained by the Supreme Court in Delta International Ltd. v.
Shyam Sundar Ganeriwalla , (1999) 4 SCC 545, as under:
“(1) To find out whether the document creates a lease or a
license the real test is to find out “the intention of the
parties”; keeping in mind that in cases where exclusive
possession is given, the line between a lease and a license is
very thin.
(2) The intention of the parties is to be gathered from the
document itself. Mainly, the intention is to be gathered from
the meaning and the words used in the document except
where it is alleged and proved that the document is a
camouflage. If the terms of the document evidencing the
agreement between the parties are not clear, the
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surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties
have also to be borne in mind for ascertaining the
relationship between the parties.
(3) In the absence of a written document and when
somebody is in exclusive possession with no special
evidence how he got in the intention is to be gathered from
the other evidence which may be available on record, and in
such cases exclusive possession of the property would be the
most relevant circumstances to arrive at the conclusion that
the intention of the parties was to create a lease…”

99. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, it is not disputed
that the property in question is being used as a PG containing various rooms.
There is no denial that each room has two beds, which are shared by two
residents who pay a fixed amount as licence fee for the occupation of a bed
in the room.
100. Further, in the Written Statement filed by the Plaintiff/Respondent in
the Civil Suit No. 1019/2022 instituted by the Defendant/Appellant, the
Defendant/Appellant was described as a licensee. This circumstance also
supports the finding of the learned Trial Court that the relationship between
the parties was that of licensor and licensee and that the bar under the Delhi
Rent Control Act was not attracted.
101. Therefore, a paying guest arrangement is closer to the concept of a
license than a lease, since the occupant is permitted to use a particular room
or space, while the overall management and control of the premises remains
with the owner, as rightly observed by the learned Trial Court. The learned
Trial Court, therefore, rightly held that the Defendant/Appellant was
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occupying the room as a licensee and that the bar under the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 was not attracted .
102. Further, in the case of Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh , (1985) 2 SCC
332, the Supreme Court held that a licensee, upon termination of the licence,
is under an obligation to surrender possession and pursue any independent
remedy available to him separately.
103. Therefore, the the Appellant, who as per her own admissions as
discussed above, is a Licencee, who is under an obligation to vacate the suit
property, once the Licence is terminated.

104. The Defendant/Appellant had also taken the defence that she had
agreed to purchase Room Nos. 403 and 406, along with the bathrooms, for
which she had paid Rs.2,00,000/- to the Plaintiff/Respondent . However,
even if the copy of the plain paper dated 23.02.2023, relied upon by the
defendant, is treated as an Agreement to Sell, it does not, by itself, confer
any right upon the Defendant/Appellant to continue in possession of the suit
property, and the same by itself, does not confer any right upon her to
continue in possession of the suit property.
105. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that a
sale of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and
upwards can be made only by a registered instrument. It further provides
that a contract for the sale of immovable property “does not, of itself, create
any interest in or charge on such property.”
106. Thus, ownership of immovable property passes only on the execution
of a registered Sale Deed. Till then, the prospective purchaser may, at best,
seek specific performance of the Agreement to Sell. If a person is a tenant or
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a licensee, mere execution of an Agreement to Sell does not, by itself, create
any ownership or proprietary interest in the property in her favour.
107. The Supreme Court in Nazim Shaikh Hasan v. Nasir Mushtaq Shaikh
& Ors., 2026 INSC 853, referring to Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd. (2)
v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656 and Narandas Karsondas v. S.A.
Kamtam, (1977) 3 SCC 247, reiterated that an “ Agreement to Sell does not
by itself confer any title or interest in the property, since only a registered
conveyance transfers ownership, and “an agreement of sale, whether with
possession or without possession, is not a conveyance.”
108. The Supreme Court in Nazim Shaikh Hasan (supra) distilled the law
into the following propositions:
“(i) the mere execution of an agreement to sell between a
landlord and tenant does not ipso facto bring about a
determination of the subsisting tenancy;
(ii) it is only when the terms of the agreement or the
unequivocal conduct of the parties, inconsistent with the
continuance of the existing tenancy, disclose either an
express or implied surrender within the meaning of Section
111(e) or (f) of the TP Act, that the lease can be said to have
been determined;
(iii) the continuous possession of a tenant even after the
execution of an agreement to sell does not amount to part
performance under Section 53A of the TP Act unless such
possession is shown to be directly relatable to and flowing
from the agreement to sell; and
(iv) any agreement to sell, not being a registered deed of
conveyance, does not by itself confer any title or interest in
the property.”

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109. It was further observed, relying upon D.S. Parvathamma v. A.
Srinivasan , (2003) 4 SCC 705, that a person who was in possession as a
tenant before the Agreement to Sell, and continues in possession thereafter,
cannot be heard to say that by reason of the Agreement to Sell, her
possession was no longer that of a tenant.
110. In the present case, the Defendant/Appellant came into possession of
the room as a licensee in the PG accommodation, much prior to the alleged
plain-paper document dated 23.02.2023. Neither does the said document
record that the licence came to an end, nor that the possession was handed
over to her in terms thereof. Her possession, therefore, is not relatable to the
alleged Agreement to Sell and continues to be that of a licensee. The
reliance of the Defendant/Appellant on S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj
(supra) is also misplaced, since in that case a Suit for Specific Performance
was pending, whereas no such Suit has been filed by the
Defendant/Appellant.
111. Thus, the Defendant/Appellant may pursue her independent
remedy, if any, in respect of the alleged Agreement to Sell, but the same,
by itself, cannot constitute a ground to resist the Suit for Possession.

112. Another aspect for consideration is whether the possession of the
Defendant/Appellant is protected under Section 53A of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 , on the basis of this copy of the plain paper dated
23.02.2023, relied upon by the Defendant, even if it is treated as an
Agreement to Sell.
113. In Ameer Minhaj v. Dierdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar & Ors. , (2018)
7 SCC 639, the Supreme Court held that an Agreement to transfer
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immovable property executed after Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act,
1908 which came into force w.e.f. 24.09.2001, is required to be registered to
for the purposes of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
114. The document relied upon by the Defendant/Appellant, dated
23.02.2023, is an unregistered Agreement executed on plain paper. It,
therefore, cannot protect the possession of the Defendant/Appellant under
Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, even if its execution was
to be assumed. The Defendant/Appellant cannot, therefore, claim a protected
right to continue in possession of the suit property on the basis of the said
Agreement, for which she is at liberty to pursue any independent remedy
that may be available to her, in respect thereof.
115. In Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh , (1985) 2 SCC 332, the Supreme Court
held that a licensee, upon termination of the licence, is under an obligation
to surrender possession and pursue any independent remedy available to
him separately.

116. The Appellant had next contended that she was not served with
the Legal Notice. The Plaintiff however, had stated that she terminated the
license vide a Legal Notice dated 29.12.2022, asking the Defendant/
Appellant to vacate the premises and thereafter, had filed a Suit for seeking
Possession.
117. Even if the contention of the Defendant is accepted, then too, filing of
the Suit itself amounts to the notice of the intention of the Plaintiff to
terminate the occupation rights and seek possession, as has been held in the
case of M/s. Nopany Investments (P) Ltd. v. Santokh Singh (HUF) , (2008) 2
SCC 728.
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118. For a Decree of possession, the necessary factors that are required to
be established are, firstly, the ownership/proprietary right of the Plaintiff;
secondly, the occupation of the defendant as a licensee/tenant; thirdly, the
valid termination of the right of occupation of the defendant; and fourthly,
that the Suit is not barred under Delhi Rent Control Act.
119. All these factors are established from the Pleadings and there are
specific admissions as discussed above. The learned Trial Court, as well as
the First Appellate Court, have rightly considered the admissions made by
the Defendant/Appellant in the various proceedings and have held her to be
a licensee in respect of the suit property . The decree for possession under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC has, therefore, rightly been passed in favour of
the Plaintiff/Respondent.

Conclusion:
120. No substantial question of law arises in the present Second
Appeal. The concurrent findings of the learned Trial Court and the learned
First Appellate Court are based on the admissions of the Defendant/
Appellant herself, and are in accordance with the settled principles of law.
121. There is no merit in the present Second Regular Appeal, which is
hereby, dismissed.
122. The pending Applications are disposed of, accordingly.


(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE
NOVEMBER 20, 2026/dss/RS
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