SUKHDARSHAN SINGH vs UNION OF INDIA

[2026:RJ-JD:22602]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1724/2024
Pradeep Singh S/o Ranjeet Singh, Aged About 36 Years, By
Caste Jat Sikh, R/o Chak 46 F, Tehsil Srikaranpur, District
Sriganganagar(Raj.).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Union Of India, Through Secretary, Ministry Of
Transportation And Road Highway, New Delhi.
2. Project Director, National Highway Tribunal Working Unit
Hanumangarh Junction.
3. District Collector (Authorized Arbitral Tribunal),
Sriganganagar.
4. Competent Authority (Land Acquisition) And Sub
Divisional Officer (Revenue) Srikaranpur, District
Sriganganagar.
----Respondents
Connected With
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 458/2024
Sukhdarshan Singh S/o Resham Singh, Aged About 70 Years, By
Caste Jat Sikh, R/o Chak 46 F, Tehsil Srikaranpur, District
Sriganganagar (Raj.).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Union Of India, Through Secretary, Ministry Of
Transportation And Road Highway, New Delhi.
2. Project Director, National Highway Tribunal Working Unit
Hanumangarh Junction.
3. District Collector, (Authorized Arbitral Tribunal)
Sriganganagar.
4. Competent Authority (Land Acquisiton) And Sub
Divisional Officer (Revenue), Srikaranpur, District
Sriganganagar.
----Respondents
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 459/2024
Ranjeet Singh S/o Pala Singh, Aged About 65 Years, By Caste Jat
Sikh, R/o Chak 46 F, Tehsil Srikaranpur, District Sriganganagar
(Raj.).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Union Of India, Through Secretary, Ministry Of
Transportation And Road Highway, New Delhi.
2. Project Director, National Highway Tribunal Working Unit
Hanumangarh Junction.
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3. District Collector, (Authorized Arbitral Tribunal)
Sriganganagar.
4. Competent Authority (Land Acquisiton) And Sub
Divisional Officer (Revenue), Srikaranpur, District
Sriganganagar.
----Respondents
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1720/2024
Jitendra Singh S/o Malkiyat Singh, Aged About 47 Years, By
Caste Jat Sikh, R/o Chak 46 F, Tehsil Srikaanpur, District
Sriganganagar (Raj.).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Union Of India, Through Secretary, Ministry Of
Transportation And Road Highway, New Delhi.
2. Project Director, National Highway Tribunal Working Unit
Hanumangarh Junction.
3. District Collector (Authorised Arbitral Tribunal),
Sriganganagar.
4. Competent Authority (Land Acquisition), And Sub
Divisional Officer (Revenue) Srikaranpur, District
Sriganganagar.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Gopi Ram Goyal
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sanjay Raj Paliwal, GC
Mr. Devki Nandan Vyas
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEET PUROHIT
Order
Reportable
08/05/2026
1. Present bunch of writ petitions has been filed challenging
order dated 16.11.2023 passed by Respondent No. 3 - learned
Arbitrator-cum-District Collector, Sriganganagar, refusing to
entertain applications submitted by petitioners under Section
3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (“the Act of 1956”) and
also declining to adjudicate upon the objections raised by
petitioners regarding quantum of compensation determined by the
Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (“CALA”), particularly in
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relation to denial of compensation for trees standing upon
acquired land.
2. Learned Arbitrator had returned the applications on the
ground that, since no amount of compensation under the head of
standing trees had been quantified, determined, or awarded by
the CALA, applications preferred under Section 3G(5) of the Act of
1956 are not maintainable.
3. Since all petitioners are aggrieved by orders of identical
nature passed on the same date, and common questions of law
are involved, this Court deems it appropriate to decide present
bunch of petitions by way of a common order.
4. For the sake of convenience, facts pertaining to S.B. Civil
Writ Petition No. 1724/2024 are being taken into consideration.
4.1 Learned counsel for petitioner stated that for the purpose of
construction of the Bharatmala Project Package 3 (Part-I),
khatedari land of petitioner situated in Chak 46 F Moda, Tehsil Sri
Karanpur, District Sri Ganganagar, was acquired. It is contended
that during the pendency of acquisition proceedings, Respondent
No. 4 – CALA obtained a report from Tehsildar, in which report it
was clearly recorded that an orchid existed upon petitioner’s land
and kinnu and khajoor (date palm) trees were standing thereon.
4.2 It is further stated that despite said report, the CALA, while
passing award dated 24.06.2022, refused to grant any
compensation in respect of said trees. Such compensation was
denied on the ground that the trees appeared to have been
planted / grown solely with a view to claim enhanced
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compensation and, therefore, petitioner was held disentitled to
compensation in respect thereof.
4.3 Being aggrieved by quantum of compensation determined,
and more particularly by denial of compensation under the head of
standing trees, petitioner preferred an application under Section
3G(5) of the Act of 1956 before learned Arbitrator-cum-District
Collector, Sri Ganganagar. However, learned Arbitrator refused to
entertain said application vide its order dated 16.11.2023 holding
the same as not maintainable and returned the same to petitioner
for availing appropriate remedy before competent forum. Learned
Arbitrator held that since no amount had been quantified by CALA
under the head of compensation for standing trees, thus, the
same did not amount to “ determination of amount ” within the
meaning of Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 and, therefore, no
dispute regarding inadequacy or insufficiency of compensation in
respect thereof could arise.
4.4 Challenging said order, present writ petitions have been filed.
5. Learned counsel for petitioners submitted that impugned
order dated 16.11.2023 passed by learned Arbitrator is wholly
erroneous, arbitrary, and contrary to scheme and spirit of the Act
of 1956. It is contended that while determining compensation
payable to petitioners, CALA specifically denied compensation for
standing trees by assigning its own reasons, and such denial itself
amounts to determination of compensation under that particular
head. Therefore, application under Section 3G(5) of the Act of
1956 before learned Arbitrator was, in fact, maintainable.
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5.1 It is further contended that learned Arbitrator adopted a
narrow and hyper-technical interpretation of Section 3G(5) of the
Act of 1956. It is contended that whenever compensation under a
particular head is refused or denied by CALA, such denial also
amount to determination of compensation and legality and
correctness of such denial can also be adjudicated by Arbitrator
under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 and by no other forum.
6. Per contra , learned counsel for respondents, while supporting
impugned order dated 16.11.2023, submitted that rejection of
applications by learned Arbitrator is wholly justified. It is argued
that, after coming to know about proposed acquisition
proceedings, petitioners had planted and grown kinnu and date
palm trees with the sole view to claim an inflated amount of
compensation. Therefore, CALA rightly declined to grant
compensation under said head.
6.1 It is further argued that as no amount of compensation had
been determined by CALA towards standing trees, thus,
applications under Section 3G(5) were not maintainable, as said
provision contemplates adjudication only in relation to the amount
determined by the CALA. On aforesaid basis, learned counsel for
respondents prayed for dismissal of writ petitions.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
8. The sole question involved in present litigation pertains to
interpretation of Section 3G(5) of National Highways Act, 1956,
namely, whether an application under Section 3G(5) is
maintainable where compensation under a particular head has
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been denied by Competent Authority for Land Acquisition while
determining compensation.
9. It is pertinent to observe at the outset that the National
Highways Act, 1956 is a complete code in itself and provides a
comprehensive mechanism not only for acquisition of land through
designated authorities, but also for determination of compensation
and adjudication of disputes relating thereto.
9.1 In order to appreciate the controversy involved herein and
adjudicate the issue raised, this Court deems it appropriate to
take into account relevant provisions of National Highways Act,
which are reproduced below :
Section 3(b) of the Act defines“ land as under:-
“3. Definitions.— In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires,—
(b) “land” includes benefits to arise out of land and things
attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything
attached to the earth.”
Section 3G(5) of the Act reads as under:-
“3G. Determination of amount payable as compensation.—
*
*
(5) If the amount determined by the competent authority
under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable
to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application
by either of the parties, be determined by the arbitrator to
be appointed by the Central Government.”
A reading of Section 3(b) makes it clear that definition of
“land” provided therein is inclusive in nature and covers within its
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purview, inter alia, things attached to the earth. It is settled
proposition of law that standing trees constitute things attached to
the earth, thus, final determination of compensation of land,
therefore, necessarily includes determination of compensation of
things attached to such land including trees.
9.2 This view finds support from judgment passed by Hon’ble
Calcutta High Court in the case of Sagar Dey vs. State of West
Bengal & Ors., reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Cal 9747 ,
wherein, while interpreting Sections 3(b) and 3G(5) of the Act of
1956, it has been held that disputes pertaining to compensation in
respect of structures standing on the acquired land as well as
other rights arising out of land are equally amenable to arbitration
under Section 3G(5). Relevant paras are extracted below: -
“8. Therefore, when the amount determined - either for
land or for the said rights arising out of land, as mentioned
in sub-sections (1) and (2) respectively - is not acceptable
to either of the parties, and either party has been allowed
to apply to the Central Government for appointment of an
arbitrator to determine the amount, it naturally refers to
compensation for land including structures standing
thereon, as also the compensation for the said stated rights
arising out of land.
9. I can put it even more simply - any reference to
arbitration may be either because a party does not accept
the compensation determined by the competent authority
for the land and the structure because land includes the
structure standing thereon, or because he does not accept
the compensation determined by the competent authority
for the acquisition of the said rights arising out of the land.
*10.
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11. The statutory scheme indicates that the only recourse
given to a person whose land, including structures thereon
and/or rights in land are acquired or affected by acquisition
for such public purpose as aforesaid, and who is not
satisfied with the compensation determined by the
competent authority, is arbitration. This was the intention of
the legislature. Therefore, any interpretation which
advances this legislative intention, which also minimizes the
time and expense of a protracted formal litigation, is to be
preferred over any interpretation which would leave the
person concerned without a remedy in a law providing for
expropriation. If the interpretation advanced by the Learned
Advocates of the State, that since “structure” or building is
not separately and specifically mentioned in sub-sections
(1), (2) or (5) of Section 3G, therefore, no arbitration is
possible in case of the acquisition of the structure, standing
on the land which is acquired, is accepted, then it will make
mince-meat out of the legislative intention, and hence, such
interpretation is expressly repelled.
12. Therefore, I hold that acquisition of land under the said
Act of 1956 includes acquisition of the permanent structures
on the said land, including buildings, and the compensation
amount determined under Section 3G(1) of the Act of 1956
must also include in terms of what the competent authority
determines under sub-section (7), the fair market value of
the permanent structures thereon, and a person aggrieved
by the amount of compensation even in case of the amount
or sum determined for the structure, can seek reference of
that dispute before the arbitrator to be appointed under
subsection (5) of Section 3G and if he seeks such reference,
the arbitrator is duty bound to decide the dispute and
enhance or refuse to enhance the compensation even on
that count, but is not entitled to refuse to accept such
reference or refuse to consider such dispute.”
9.3 This Court is of considered opinion that once the CALA
examined the claim relating to such trees and declined
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compensation by assigning reasons, the same constituted a
determination under that particular head of compensation.
Consequently, if such determination, even in the form of denial
was not acceptable to petitioners, recourse to arbitration under
Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 could not have been denied to
them.
10. This Court further finds that the expression employed in
Section 3G(5), namely, “if the amount determined by the
competent authority is not acceptable to either of the parties,” is
of wide import and cannot be construed in a narrow or pedantic
manner so as to exclude disputes where compensation under a
particular head has been wholly denied.
10.1 This Court is of the considered opinion that claims relating to
items attached to the acquired land, such as trees and structures,
form part of the overall compensation payable. Consequently, any
dispute concerning such claims—whether arising from
undervaluation or complete denial—may validly be raised before
the Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) of the Act.
The expression “amount determined” cannot be confined to
the narrower meaning of “amount quantified.” Determination is a
process whereby a claim is examined in light of the material
available on record and adjudicated upon after due application of
mind and recording of reasons. Acceptance of a claim in whole or
in part, or its rejection in toto or under a specific head, is merely
the consequence of such determination.
10.2 The scope of adjudication by an Arbitrator under Section
3G(5) of the Act is sufficiently broad to determine the correct and
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justified compensation payable under each head, and is not
restricted merely to reviewing items already assigned a numerical
value.
In other words, the Arbitrator is empowered to adjudicate all
objections and disputes relating to each head of compensation,
including claims that have been wrongly excluded or inadequately
valued, and cannot reject such objections merely because the
CALA did not assign a quantified amount to a particular head.
A decision refusing compensation, when supported by
reasons, reflects due application of mind by the competent
authority and therefore constitutes a “determination,” albeit in the
form of denial. In view of the foregoing discussion, such
determination is amenable to arbitral scrutiny under Section 3G(5)
of the Act of 1956.
11. If the interpretation adopted by the learned Arbitrator were
accepted, a landholder whose claim under a particular head of
compensation has been rejected outright by the CALA would be
left without an effective remedy, leading to an anomalous situation
concerning the adjudication of such claims.
For instance, where compensation awarded under certain heads is
challenged as undervalued, while claims under other heads are
entirely rejected, acceptance of the Arbitrator’s interpretation
done in present case, would result in strange situation where
disputes regarding undervaluation being adjudicated by the
Arbitrator, whereas disputes arising from complete denial under
another head would have to be pursued before a different forum.
Such an interpretation would defeat the legislative intent
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underlying Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 and therefore cannot
be sustained.
11.1 This Court is further of the considered opinion that claims
which are undervalued and claims assigned a nil value cannot be
treated differently. Section 3G(5) provides a statutory mechanism
for adjudication of all disputes relating to the award of
compensation under the National Highways Act. An omission or
refusal by the CALA to value a compensable component itself
constitutes a dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator.
Since the Act provides a self-contained mechanism for resolution
of disputes concerning the quantum of compensation, there
remains no scope for relegating landowners to any other forum for
adjudication of disputes of such nature.
12. As an upshot of above discussion, it is held that learned
Arbitrator-cum-District Collector committed manifest illegality and
jurisdictional error in rejecting applications preferred by
petitioners under Section 3G(5) of National Highways Act, 1956 as
not maintainable.
13. Consequently, present writ petitions are allowed . Impugned
orders dated 16.11.2023 passed by learned Arbitrator-cum-
District Collector, Sri Ganganagar are hereby quashed and set
aside. It is held that objections regarding denial of claim under
any head are also arbitrable and maintainable under Section 3G(5)
of the NH Act. Matters are remanded back to learned Arbitrator-
cum-District Collector, who shall restore applications to their
original numbers and decide the same on merits, in accordance
with law.
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14. Since present writ petitions have been pending before this
Court for last three years, learned Arbitrator is directed to decide
applications of petitioners expeditiously, preferably within a period
of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
order.
15. Stay applications and all other applications, if any, are also
disposed of.
(SANJEET PUROHIT),J
250-253-shashikant-neha/-
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