Sarita Devi vs Union Of India And 3 Others

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - C No. - 44795 of 2025
Sarita Devi
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Union of India and 3 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Mohammad Parwez Khan, Raj
Kumar Singh, Vipul Yadav
Counsel for Respondent(s) : A.S.G.I., Dinesh Varun
Reserved
Court No. - 2 A.F.R
HON'BLE ATUL SREEDHARAN, J.
HON'BLE SIDDHARTH NANDAN, J.
Per Hon’ble Siddharth Nandan, J
1. Heard Shri Raj Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and
Shri Dinesh Varun, learned counsel for the respondents.
2. By the consent of the parties the writ petition is being disposed of at
the admission stage itself.
Facts
The admitted facts in the present case are that-
1. Shri Vinod Kumar Joshi (husband of the petitioner) was employed as
Senior Technician (Electrical) under the Senior Section Engineer
(Electrical)/Renukoot. On 08.04.2023, at approximately 7.30 AM, a
power outage was reported in the Renukoot main colony and on being
reported, the Senior Section Engineer (Electrical)/Renukoot directed the
deceased along with one Shri Vinod Kumar (Senior Technician), at 8.00
AM to rectify that fault. During patrolling, the team identified a burnt 11
KV HT fuse near the power house and after request of shutdown of the
11 KV HT line at 9.35 AM, the deceased proceeded to climb the utility
pole/ladder, equipped with necessary safety gear including gloves and
helmet, while his colleague, Mr. Vinod Singh secured ladder from below.

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2. As per the report of the Senior Section Engineer, East Central
Railway, Renukoot & Chopan and statement of Shri Vinod Singh (co-
worker), at approximately 9.45 AM while performing his official duties,
the deceased fell from the pole. He was immediately rushed to
HINDALCO hospital by railway staff, where he was declared dead and
an F.I.R. was also lodged; and a postmortem examination was
conducted.
As per postmortem report, the following ante-mortem injury was found:-
“1. Electrocution burn inj. of size 25 cm x 14 cm on Rt. Forearm
4 cm below Rt. Elbow.
2. Electrocution burn inj. of size 7cm x 1 cm, 10 cm below
cimbilians.
3. Swelling of size 7 cm x 5 cm on Rt. Side Skull (Pariatal bone),
10 cm above Rt. Underlying bone fracture, & about 50 ml blood
clot underneath the inj.
4. Exit wound – Electrocuted burn inj. of size 2 cm x 1 cm of
Nav on lt. sole of.”
3. It is admitted by the respondents that in a joint investigation, it was
found that the incident was a workplace accident, occurring in the course
of performance of duty. The perusal of the postmortem report also
indicates that there was an exit wound of size 2 cm x 1 cm and
electrocution burn injury of size 7 cm x 1 cm, 10 cm below cimbilians;
which has not been disputed by the respondents, as such the accident
was clearly attributed to the electrocution.
4. The petitioner was given a compensation of Rs. 10,16,700/- but
however she was not satisfied with the ex-parte computation and
accordingly has assailed the said computation of the compensation. The
present writ petition has been filed for enhancement of the same, since
no basis for the computation was either provided by the respondents or
by the Presiding Officer, in W.C. Case No. 15/2023(D) (Smt. Sarita Devi
Vs. Divisional Railway Manager), in its order dated 29.12.2023.
Issues-
(i) Whether for want of quantification of the compensation amount, the
determination of the same by the order dated 29.12.2023 can be justified
in view of the provision of Section 4(1)(a) read with Section 5 of the
Employees Compensation Act, 1923; and also whether, in the factual
context, petitioner is entitled to enhancement, by way of damages.
(ii) Whether the calculation of the Railway Authority regarding the
compensation being accepted without any opportunity to the
claimant/petitioner and treating the same to be final, amounts to post-
decisional hearing, in contravention to the principles of natural justice.

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(iii) Whether the notification issued in purported exercise of power
under Section 4(1B) regarding the fixation of “monthly wages” by the
Government shall supersede Section 5 of the Act, 1923.
Argument - (Issue No.1)
1. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that neither the
evidence which was placed on record was considered nor any
opportunity of hearing was provided, prior to accepting the ex-parte
compensation as determined by the respondent-Authorities to be Rs.
10,16,700/- and being directed to be released in favour of the petitioner;
though the “relevant factors” for determination of the compensation
were not taken into account by the authorities.
2. He has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Karnataka State
1
Road Transport Corporation Vs. B.T. Somasekharaiah to contend that
apart from the mitigating factors for award of compensation under
Section 4 of the Act, 1923, the Commissioner has power to award
compensation more than what is claimed by the workman, if the facts do
warrant such an award in the form of damages.
3. He has further contended that from the perusal of the postmortem
report, it is evident that negligence was that of the employees of the
Department, since the shutdown of the 11 KV HT Line was not made,
which resulted in the death of the deceased; and as such the State was
vicariously liable.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the
compensation was quantified as per the mandate of Section 4 of the Act,
1923 and has further submitted that apart from the aforesaid
compensation, all admissible retirement benefits payable to on-duty
deceased employee was paid, to the tune of Rs. 21,33,567/-; and further
maximum admissible ex-gratia as per Circular no. RBE No. 139/2016
dated 25.11.2016 i.e. Rs. 25,00,000/- was also paid; and as such the
acceptance of the compensation amount, as computed by them, was
completely justifiable. However, they had not disputed the postmortem
report and the cause of death with respect to the deceased employee on-
duty.
Discussion- (Issue No.1)
1. In view of the admitted facts that the deceased who was an employee
of the Department, had died while he was performing his duty and the
postmortem report clearly shows that the deceased suffer electrocution
burn injury; it demonstrate the negligence of the Department and the
same being the main cause of fall from the ladder, due to which the
husband of the petitioner died. Now, it is to be seen, if the State is
1 (1994 LLR 251 (KARA)

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vicariously liable and whether the adjudicating authority has failed to
take the same into account, while determining the compensation and as
such in the aforesaid background, the moot question which is to be
considered is, the basis of quantification of the compensation.
2. At this juncture, it will be relevant to quote Section 4(1)(a) and
Section 5, which are as below:
“ [ 4. Amount of compensation.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this
Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely:-
(a) where death results from the injury an amount equal to [fifty per
cent.] of the monthly wages of the deceased [employee] multiplied by
the relevant factor; or an amount of [one lakh and twenty thousand
rupees], whichever is more;
5. [Method of calculating wages. — [In this Act and for the purposes
thereof the expression “monthly wages” means me amount of wages
deemed to be payable for a month’s service (whether the wages are
payable by the month or by whatever other period or at piece rates),
and calculated] as follows, namely:—
( a) where the 1[employee] has, during a continuous period of not less
than twelve months immediately preceding the accident, been in the
service of the employer who is liable to pay compensation, the monthly
wages of the 1[employee] shall be one-twelfth of the total wages which
have fallen due for payment to him by the employer in the last twelve
months of that period;
[(b) where the whole of the continuous period of service immediately
preceding the accident during which the 1[employee] was in the
service of the employer who is liable to pay the compensation was less
than one month, the monthly wages of the 1[employee] shall be the
average monthly amount which, during the twelve months immediately
preceding the accident, was being earned by a 1[employee] employed
on the same work by the same employer, or, if there was no
[employee] so employed, by a 1[employee] employed on similar work
in the same locality;]
[(c)] [in other cases [including cases in which it is not possible for
want of necessary information to calculate the monthly wages under
clause (b)]], the monthly wages shall be thirty times the total wages
earned in respect of the last continuous period of service immediately
preceding the accident from the employer who is liable to pay
compensation, divided by the number of days comprising such period.
Explanation .—A period of service shall, for the purposes of [this
[section]] be deemed to be continuous which has not been interrupted
by a period of absence from work exceeding fourteen
days.”
3. The perusal of the aforesaid provision indicated that an amount equal
to 50% of the monthly wages of the deceased employee, is to be
multiplied by the relevant factors, where death results from an injury.

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4. Now, we proceed to examine the Scheme of the Act, to the extent it
relates to the quantification of amount of compensation. Section 4 (1)(a)
of the Act, 1923 clearly prescribes that in case of death, an amount equal
to 50% of the ‘monthly wages’ of the deceased employees has to be
multiplied by the relevant factor.
5. Explanation 1 to Section 4 of the Act, 1923 states that for the purposes
of clause (a), “relevant factor’’, in relation to an employee means the
factor specified in the second column of Schedule IV; against the entry
in the first column of the Schedule specifying the number of years which
are same as the completed years of the age of the employee on his last
birthday immediately preceding the date on which the compensation fell
due.
6. We find that the respondent-Railways had prepared an accident report
which has been annexed as Annexure 4 to the Affidavit filed with the
aforesaid Writ Petition and the pay of the deceased employee has been
clearly mentioned as Rs. 39,900/-. For ready reference the same is pasted
below:-

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WRIC No. - 44795 of 2025
7. It is also borne out from the record that in the accident report which
has been appended as Annexure 2, the age of the deceased has been
mentioned as 55 years at the time of the death. For ready reference the
Accident Report is pasted below:-

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8. In the aforesaid admitted facts, the factor as mentioned in Schedule IV
in case of an employee who is 55 years of age, is “135.56”. Based on the
aforesaid data the following calculation emerges:
Monthly wages Rs. 39,900/-
50% of Monthly Wage Rs. 19,950/-
Factor, as per Schedule IV for 55
year of age
135.56
Amount of compensation 19,950 x 135.56 = Rs. 27,04,422/-
9. On a pointed query to the counsel for the respondents as to what
method was adopted for computing the compensation, he could not
dispute that the mandatory provision of Section 4 read-with Section 5, is
the only method of calculation/computation of compensation; and
adoption of any other criteria for computation of compensation,
especially if it results in lesser compensation, than what is prescribed
under Section 4(1)(a) read with Section 5 of the Act, cannot be accepted
under the Scheme of the Act, which is a beneficial legislation. He also
could not dispute that the grant of compensation to a tune of Rs.
10,16,700/-, is an incorrect calculation while looking at the beneficial
nature of the legislation in question, the provision for any other method
of calculation resulting in a lesser computation, has to be superseded by
the calculation which is in consonance of Section 4(1)(a) read-with
Section 5 of the Act, 1923.
10. The Apex Court in the case of General Manager, Kerela State Road
2
Transport Corporation Vs. Susamma Thomas and Ors. while concluding
on the question of “just” compensation held that the multiplier method is
logically sound and legally well established method of ensuring a “just”
compensation, which will make for uniformity and certainty of the
award. A departure from this method can only be justified in rare and
extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases.
11. We may gainfully take a clue from the judgment in the case of Lata
3
Wadhwa and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Ors. ; when multiple claims
were raised by the heirs/survivors of an unfortunate accident, resulting in
death on account of burn injury to several persons, the Apex Court
appointed Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, former Chief Justice of India
having expertise in the matter, to determine the compensation, keeping
in mind principles enunciated by the Apex Court in various judgments
till date.
12. Justice Chandrachud, adopted the multiplier method and on that
basis determined quantum of compensation, as pertaining to various
2 (1994) 2 SCC 176
3 (2001) 8 SCC 197

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deaths/injuries which was suffered; and the said method for
determination of quantum of compensation, was thereafter approved by
the Apex Court.
13. The Apex Court, in the aforesaid judgment approved the method of
quantification of compensation on the basis of dependency of 60% of the
annual income and thereafter applied different multipliers, depending
upon their age. It also approved a conventional figure to compensate the
variables which were not quantifiable. It is also noteworthy that the other
benefits which were payable to the employees apart from the
compensation, was not taken into consideration, while determining the
compensation. The benefit already granted to the dependents of the
deceased were not taken into account as the quantification of the
compensation, was required to be made independent of the other
statutory rights and the entitlements.
14. However in the present case, since the field is covered by the special
enactment i.e. The Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, the calculation
has to be made keeping in mind the statutory provision of Section 4(1)
(a) read-with Section 5 of the Act, 1923. The said legislation being a
beneficial legislation, the object of the Act is to provide an undisputed
methodology for coming to the conclusion pertaining to the amount of
the compensation payable. However, this does not entitle the
adjudicating authority or act as a hindrance, to the power of the
Commissioner to award more compensation. There maybe an instance
where the claimant not knowing the provisions of the enactment or
aware to his rights, makes a claim for a lesser compensation; but the
Court finds that irrespective of the claim made by the claimant, the
adjudicating authority cannot grant a compensation which is lesser than
what the statue provides. Even in case of ambiguity as to the
applicability of the “factor”, it is obligatory on the Adjudicating
Authority to consider the “factor” or the “monthly wages” which leads to
a higher compensation and under no circumstances a compensation less
than what is provided under the Act can be awarded by the
Commissioner.
15. The aforesaid interpretation is in consonance with the purpose and
the objective of the legislation and can also be read to give ample powers
to the Commissioner to award further damages, considering the facts and
circumstances of each case and resultantly enhance the compensation.
16. The Apex Court while dealing with the issue with respect to public
law remedies and the award of compensation under Article 226 of
Constitution of India in the case of Chairman, Railway Board and others
4
v. Chandrima Das(Mrs) and others. laid down a ratio that the public law
4 (2000) 2 SCC 465

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remedies has also been extended to realm of Tort and the court can
award compensation to the petitioner, who suffer personal injuries,
amounting to tortuous act at the hand of officers of the Government. It
discarded the contention that for such a remedy, the petitioner has to
approach a Civil Court and a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, is not maintainable. The Apex Court held that where public
functionaries are involved and matters relate to violation of a
fundamental right or the enforcement of public duties, the remedy would
still be available under the public law, notwithstanding that a suit can be
filed for damages under private law.
17. The learned counsel for the respondents had also contended that as
far as the enhancement sought by the petitioner in the amount of
compensation to Rs. 60,00,000/- is concerned, the Department is only
liable to pay the compensation as provided under the Act, 1923 and for
any enhancement in the form of damages, the Government cannot be
held vicariously liable.
18. Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
functions of the State in a welfare State, is not limited to carry out the
obligations as provided under the statute but it also has to take the
responsibility being vicariously liable, so that the essential components
of the Government machinery i.e. their employees, if found to have
committed an act of tort, the Government, of which they are the
employees, can be subjected and held to be vicariously liable in
providing damages to the person wronged by the employees.
19. We find that the report submitted by the Department clearly states
that the deceased employee had asked for shutdown but clearly the same
was not done by other employees of the State Government, resulting in
electrocution of the deceased employee, which was the factor of the fall
from the ladder and resulting in his death.
20. Aforesaid admitted position clearly establishes all the ingredients of
the commission of “tort” against the deceased person, so as to entitle the
heirs/claimants to the relief or damages.
21. Now, we proceed to the other objection of the State Counsel, to the
effect that considering the nature of the liability, the relief is not
available to the petitioner, by invocation of the extraordinary jurisdiction
of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
22. The exercise of constitutional power by the High Court under Article
226 can be categorized as power of “judicial review”. In case an
employee is found to have committed a civil wrong, resulting in death of
another employee, the State in the opinion of this Court has to be held
vicariously liable and such action accordingly can be subjected to

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judicial scrutiny in exercise of its power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Especially, when the right to life, has been brutally violated
and as such those who can be treated as “authority”, within the meaning
of Article 12, can be made amenable to the jurisdiction of this court and
can be subjected to scrutiny on the touchstone of the constitutional
mandates. The causing of injuries, which amounted to tortuous act, was
compensated by this Court in many of its decisions beginning from
5 6
Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar . (See also Bhim Singh v. State of J&K ,
7
Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights v. State of Bihar , Peoples' Union
8
for Democratic Rights v. Police Commr., Delhi Police Headquarters ,
9
Saheli, A Women's Resources Centre v. Commr. of Police , Arvinder
10 11
Singh Bagga v. State of U.P. , P. Rathinam v. Union of India , Death of
12 13
Sawinder Singh Grower In re , Inder Singh v. State of Punjab and
14
D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. )
23. In the present case, there is involvement of public functionaries and
on admitted facts itself there is violation of fundamental rights, that
being so, since “life” has been recognized as a basic human right, which
has been interpreted by the courts in various decision relating to Article
21 of the Constitution of India, we find State is vicariously liable and
remedy for damages, resulting in enhancement of the compensation can
be claimed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Khadak
15
Singh Vs. State of U.P , the term “life” was held to indicate something
more than an animal existence; and its violation can give a cause of
action to be remedied by envocation of Article 226 of the Constitution.
24. The employees of the State at times, as in the present case, perform
hazardous duties which even raises threat to their life, however, such
duties are undertaken with a firm belief that the State shall be
responsible for their “life” as guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India and various human right declaration, to which India
is also a party; but however, in the present case, the State has failed, and
as such is vicariously liable, and is under a constitutional liability, to pay
damages.
16
25. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Vidyawati, it was held that Government
will be vicariously liable for the tortuous act of its employee. Reference
5 (1983) 4SCC 141
6 (1985) 4 SCC 677
7 (1987) 1 SCC 265
8 (1989) 4 SCC 730
9 (1990) 1 SCC 422
10 (1994) 6 SCC 565
11 1991 SCC (Cri) 228
12 1994 SCC (Cri) 1464
13 (1995) 3 SCC 702
14 (1997) 1 SCC 416
15 AIR 1963 SC 1295
16 AIR 1962 SC 933

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may also be made to the decisions of this Court in State of Gujarat Vs.
17
Memon Mahomed Haji Hasam and Basavva Kom Dyamangouda Patil
18
Vs. State of Mysore. These Principles were reiterated in N. Nagendra
19
Rao & Co. Vs. State of A.P. and again in State of Maharashtra Vs.
20
Kanchanmala Vijaysing Shirke.
Conclusion
1. We are constrained to note that the Department is guilty of ignoring
the standards of normal safety measures and resultantly the negligence
ultimately led to death of the sole bread winner of the family. In absence
of quantification by Adjudicatory Authority, the acceptance of a figure
given by the Department, without providing any basis of such a
quantification, cannot be accepted. It is no doubt that the amount of
compensation has to be determined as per the statutory provisions of
section 4(1)(a) read with Section 5 of the Act, 1923 which itself
contemplates i.e. the amount equal to 50% of the “monthly wages” of
the deceased employee, is to be multiplied by the relevant factors. Apart
from the same, in consideration of the various judgments referred herein
above, we find that no exhaustive list can be provided but for certainty,
the following points are to be kept in consideration, while determining
the compensation as contemplated under Section 4 of the Act 1923 and
to provide for damages, in exceptional cases:-
(i) It has to be taken into account, as to the life expectancy of the
deceased and the dependents and the amount that the deceased would
have earned during the remaining of his life, the amount that he would
have attributed to the dependents during that period.
(ii) Apart from the determination as provided under Section 4(1)(a) read
with Section 5 of the Act, 1923, it may also be seen that the said capital
if invested at the prevailing rate of interest, which is acceptable to a
stable economy, which would have been utilized in the form of saving;
and which is expected from an employee to invest for better future of his
children/family members; but for his death, it being not invested.
(iii) The chances that the deceased might have got better employment or
income i.e. an over all picture that matters, should be kept in mind while
making the computation or assessment for reaching to a “just”
compensation viz. a viz. the loss suffered.
(iv) The question of extent of harm/loss/pain/hardship, impact of
inflation, may also be taken into consideration. [Ref: V. Krishnakumar
21
Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.]
17 AIR 1967 SC 1885
18 (1997) 4 SCC 205
19 (1994) 6 SCC 205
20 (1995) 5 SCC 659
21 2015 9 SCC 388

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2. In view of the aforesaid, the Issue No.1 is decided in favour of the
petitioner and it is held that the quantification of the amount of
compensation, as provided under Section 4(1)(a) read with Section 5 of
the Act, 1923 being erroneous, is required to be re-determined by the
adjudicating authority and after doing so, he may also consider the grant
of damages for the tortuous act of the employees of the department,
keeping in mind other mitigating factors, as indicated hereinabove.
3. It is also provided that after the aforesaid determination, the petitioner/
claimants shall be entitled to interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of death
of the employee i.e. occurrence of the accident, on the amount, after
deducting Rs. 10,16,700/-, which has already been paid to the
petitioners/claimants, till the date of actual payment of entire amount.
Argument- (Issue No.2)
1. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that though, the
order dated 29.11.2023 records that certain evidences were filed on
affidavit but since there was no computation of the compensation of the
amount in terms of Section 4(1)(a) read with Section 5 of the Act 1923,
therefore, no opportunity was given to the petitioner to plead his case
pertaining to “relevant factors” that were essential for the claim for
damages viz-a-viz enhancement of of compensation and the
Adjudicatory Authority without such computation and opportunity
accepted the compensation amount of Rs. 10,16,700/- to be a “just”
compensation; which amounts to denial of principles of natural justice
and as such was a post decisional hearing; and failure to observe audi
alteram partem rule at pre-decisional stage, vitiates the determination of
compensation and accordingly they are entitled to a higher compensation
which has been prayed for in the present writ petition.
2. He has relied on the ratio propounded in H.L. Trehan Vs. Union of
22
India to contend that post-decisional opportunity of hearing does not
subserve rules of natural justice and the authority who embarks upon
post-decisional hearing will naturally proceed with the closest trend and
there is hardly any chance of getting a proper consideration of the
representation at such post-decisional hearing. He has further relied upon
23
the case of Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India and submitted that any
violation to the principles of audi alteram partem rule will lead to
paralysing the administrative process and the court must make every
effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent permissible in
the given case. He has relied on the following excerpt from the judgment
of Maneka Gandhi (supra).
22 (1981) 1 SCC 764
23 (1978) 1 SCC 248

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“The Court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule
to the maximum extent permissible in a given case. It must not
be forgotten that "natural justice is pragmatically flexible and is
amenable to capsulation under the compulsive pressure of
circumstances". The audi alteram partem rule is not cast in a
rigid mould and judicial decisions establish that it may suffer
situational modifications. The core of it must, however, remain,
namely, that the person affected must have a reasonable
opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine
hearing and not an empty public relations exercise.”
3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents have contended that
they have determined the compensation as per Section 4 of the Act, 1923
but on a pointed query as to the basis of the quantification of the
compensation, they could not state, as to what factors were considered
while determining the compensation.
Discussion- (Issue No.2)
1. It is to be determined in the facts of the present case, whether the
petitioner was at all put to notice or given an opportunity either by the
Department or the Adjudicatory Authority, to substantiate their claim by
providing cogent evidence, which according to them would have
substantiated their claim regarding various factors, which ought to have
been considered prior to quantification of the compensation and also
towards their claim for damages, for which State is vicariously liable, as
such for the enhancement of their compensation, itself.
2. It is also pertinent to note that even in case, the petitioner would have
failed to justify the factors for computing or quantifying the
compensation, was it justified on part of the Department or the
Adjudicatory Authority, to straightaway provide or accept a figure,
without looking into the basis of the quantification of the compensation.
The respondents, in their instructions, could not point out as to what
were the factors which formed the basis of the figure of Rs. 10,16,700/-;
and the learned Standing Counsel also could not point out as to whether
before the determination by the Adjudicatory Authority in its order dated
29.11.2023, did he made efforts either to put the petitioners to notice on
the question of quantification or by itself, it considered the basis on
which the Department has determined the said compensation.
Conclusion
1. From the aforesaid facts, it is admitted to the department that no
notice was given to the petitioner to demonstrate the mitigating factors
so as to determine the basis on which the quantification of the
compensation could have been made. They also could not justify the said
quantification or basis of any multiplier, or the principles of “restitutio in

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integrum”. They also could not demonstrate the compliance to the two
fundamental maxims of natural justice vis.
(i) audi alteram partem
(ii) nemo judex in re sua
2. The audi alteram partem rule has many facets, two of them being:
(a) Notice of the case to be made, and
(b) Opportunity to explain.
3. It is no longer res integra that even if the statute is silent with regard to
giving a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and which involves
a civil consequences of grave nature, it inherently involves the principles
of natural justice, which demands that the person to be effected, may be
given an opportunity, by putting him to notice prior to the determination;
and as such the Court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal
rule to the maximum extent. (Ref: State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani
24
Dei ). The principles of natural justice are now considered so
fundamental as ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ and, therefore,
implicit in every decision making function, call it judicial, quasi judicial
or administrative. Where the statute is silent about the observation of
principles of natural justice, such statutory silence it taken to imply
compliance with the principles of natural justice. (kindly referred to
25
Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of India.
4. In the Scheme of a Statute there may be a provision itself providing
for a post-decisional hearing, a post-decisional hearing may also be had
by the terms of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act; but it may not
necessarily help in the interpretation of the provision of the Statute
concerned. The exclusion of the principles of natural justice, is generally
when a question of public interest is involved and statute provides for
post decisional hearing itself.
5. However, in the present case we do not find any such exclusion to the
principles of natural justice or a question of public interest, since the
question of determination of the compensation under the Employees
Compensation Act, 1923 is very individual or a private right. We find
that the petitioner ought to have been given an opportunity to
substantiate by way of evidence or other mitigating factors, apart from
the multiplication of the average annual income, (to the extent of 50%)
with such “relevant factors” as provided in the statute; which has been
denied in the present case; and as such the decision of the adjudicatory
authority while accepting computation of compensation, without the
department justifying its basis or putting the claimant/petitioner to
24 1967 2 SCR 625
25 1981 1 SCC 664

15
WRIC No. - 44795 of 2025
notice, is clearly in violation of the principles of natural justice, which is
to be read as an implied requirement of the law.
6. Accordingly, under the facts and circumstances of the present case,
there has been a non compliance, with such implied requirement of audi
altram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage.
7. The family belongs to a middle class and in absence of the bread
winner, the pain and sufferings, lost wages and the future care that would
be necessary while accounting for inflationary trends; and accordingly,
the maxim ‘restitutio in integrum’ is applicable i.e. the aggrieved person
should get that sum of money, which would put him in the same
position, if he had not sustained the wrong.
8. We find that in such circumstances, the question of grant of damages,
by way of enhancement of compensation is also to be considered.
However, we restrain ourselves from computation for such damages, to
which the petitioner/claimant may be entitled and leave it open to the
Adjudicating Authority, to determine the same keeping in mind the
criteria/considerations as indicate hereinabove.
Argument- Issue No.3
1. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon a notification
dated 03.01.2020 which has been published in the Gazette of India in
supersession of the earlier notification dated 31.05.2010, in purported
exercise of Section 4(1B) of the Act, 1923 to contend that the monthly
wages have been capped at Rs. 15,000/-; and accordingly the said
amount is to be considered for the purposes of grant of compensation,
under Section 4 of the Act, 1923.
2. Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted, that
Section 5 of the Act, 1923 clearly provides that the expression “monthly
wages” means an amount of wages, which is payable for a month’s
service and the explanation appended to Section 5 of the Act, 1923,
further clarifies that the period of service shall, for the said purposes, be
deemed to be continuous, which has not been interpreted by a period of
absence from work exceeding 14 days.
3. He has further contended that the capping of the “monthly wages” will
render the statutory provision that Section 5 of the Act, 1923; to be
otiose.
Discussion- Issue No.3
1. We have carefully examined the interplay of the provisions i.e.
Section 4(1B) and Section 5 of the Act, 1923. The careful perusal of sub-
section (1B), undoubtedly gives a power to notify in the official Gazette,

16
WRIC No. - 44795 of 2025
such “monthly wages” in relation to an employee, which may be
required for the purpose of determination of the amounts of
compensation in the following conditions:-
(a) Where death results from the injury- or
(b) Where permanent total disablement results from the injury; or
(c) Where permanent partial disablement results from the injury; or
(d) Where temporary disablement, whether total or partial, results from
the injury.
2. Section 5 of the Act, 1923 provides the method of calculating wages
i.e. it gives meaning to the expression “monthly wages” i.e. the amount
of wages deemed to be payable for a month’s service; and Section 5(a)
may be relevant for the purposes of the present case, which states that
where the employee has, during a continuous period of not less than 12
months immediately preceding the accident, been in the service of the
employer which is liable to pay compensation, the monthly wages of the
th
employee shall be “1/12 of the total wages”, which have fallen due for
payment to him by the employer in the last 12 months of that period. In
the present case, the deceased employee was in continuous service, for
years together, immediately preceding the accident.
3. The said section also take notes of the circumstance, when the service
of the employee was less than one month; then in the said circumstance,
the monthly wages of the employee shall be average monthly amount
which, during 12 months immediately preceding the accident, was being
earned by the employee; and lastly it makes provision for a
circumstance, in “other cases” for example in cases in which it is not
possible for want of necessary information to calculate the monthly
wages under clause (b), the monthly wages shall be 30 times the total
wage earned in respect of the last continuous period of service
immediately preceding the accident, divided by the number of days
comprising such period.
4. In order to harmonize the provision of Section 4(1B) and Section 5 of
the Act, 1923, the object of the legislation or the scheme of the Act is to
be analyzed, to come to the conclusion as to whether Section 4(1B)
would proceed for all purposes Section 5 of the Act, 1923 or it may have
to give way, to the circumstances, which are covered by Section 5 of the
Act, 1923.
5. In the case of Pandit Ram Narain Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and
26
Ors. , the Apex Court observed that expression used in an Act must take
colour from the context in which they appear. In the case of East India
26 AIR 1957 Supreme Court 18

17
WRIC No. - 44795 of 2025
27
Hotels Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Anr. , the Apex Court
reiterated a settled principle that an Act is to be read as a whole and
different provisions have to be harmonize and effect have to be given to
all of them and is not proper to give judgment upon a single clause
unless a whole law is examined (Ref: Darshan Singh and Anr. Vs. State
28
of Punjab; and State of Maharashtra v. Marwanjee F. Desai &
29
Others. )
6. It is no longer res integra that an interpretation must taken on the text
and the context, as held in the case of Employees’ Provident Fund
30
Commissioner vs Official Liquidator of Esskay Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
7. In order to harmonize the statutory provision of Section 4(1B) and
Section 5 of the Act, 1923, it is the duty of the court to interpret the said
provision in a way which ultimately avoid conflict in two different
spheres and at the same time, achieve the objective of the legislation in
question, so as to suit, the intent of the legislature must be carefully
analysed, in crystallizing the interplay between the two provisions of
same statute.
8. This court, gainfully refers to the ratio in the case of M/s Aphali
31
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Others. , which was
32
considered with affirmation in ONGC Ltd. vs. Afcons Gunanusa JV,
and which has laid down context of the “principles of harmonizing
construction” i.e. provision could be so construed in the context of the
Act, that no word of the statute is rendered redundant, superfluous or
meaningless. The Apex Court, recently in the case of Assistant
Commissioner of Income Tax (International Taxation) and others vs.
33
Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd. etc. , has dealt with the issue in hand
and for ready reference Para-9 is quoted below:

"Principles of Statutory Interpretation:
9. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to discuss the relevant
principles of statutory interpretation from authoritative sources.
9.1 A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to
make it effective and operative. Thus, courts should lean against
construction which reduces a provision to a futility. It has been observed
by Lord Dunedin of the House of Lords that "A statute is designed to be
workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure
that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end
unattainable." vide Whitney vs. Inland Revenue Commissioner, (1926)
A.C. 37 ("Whitney"). Therefore, any construction which would defeat
27 (2001) 1 SCC 284
28 AIR 153 Supreme Court 83
29 2002 2 SCC 318
30 2011 10 SCC 727
31 1989 4 SCC 378
32 (2024) 4 SCC 481
33 2025 SCCOnline SC 1652

18
WRIC No. - 44795 of 2025
the plain intention of the Legislature must be rejected by the courts.
Hence, courts should avoid a construction which would reduce the
provision to futility and rather accept a construction based on the view
that Parliament or any Legislature would legislate only for the purpose
of bringing about an effective result. It is in that context that purposive
construction by court is gaining acceptance rather than holding that there
is absurdity in the statute. The doctrine of purposive interpretation may
be taken recourse to for the purpose of giving full effect to the statutory
provisions and the courts must state what meaning the statue should bear
rather than rendering the statute a nullity.
9.2 Another principle of statutory interpretation is that when the words
of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably
susceptible to only one meaning, courts are bound to give effect to that
meaning irrespective of consequences. The results of the construction are
then not a matter for the court, even though they may be strange or
surprising, unreasonable or unjust or oppressive. Gajendragadkar, J. in
Kanailal Sur vs. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan, AIR 1957 SC 907 opined thus:
"If the words used are capable for one construction only then it
would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical
construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is
more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act."

S.R. Das, J. in CIT, Agri vs. Keshab Chandra Mandal, AIR 1950 SC 265
observed thus:
"Hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the
language employed by the Legislature if such meaning is clear on
the face of the statute or the rules."
He further observed that:
"The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and
the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition
to the plain language of the sections of the Act". Vide Rananjaya
Singh vs. Baijnath Singh, AIR 1954 SC 749,"
9.3 Similarly, Subba Rao, J. observed that in interpretation of a statute,
the primary test is the language employed in the Act and when the words
are clear and plain, the court is bound to accept the expressed intention
of the Legislature, vide MV Joshi vs. MU Shimpi, AIR 1961 SC 1494.
9.4 This means that mere hardship cannot be a ground for not giving
effective and grammatical meaning to every word of the provisions of a
statute if the language used therein is unequivocal. Thus, an
unambiguous and plain statute must be given its full interpretation. It has
been observed that unambiguous means "unambiguous in context". The
expression "context" in this connection is used in a wide sense as
including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its
preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia and
the mischief which by those and other legitimate means can be discerned
that the statute was intended to remedy. In this context, it would be
useful to recall the words of Grover, J. in VO Tractoroexport vs.
Tarapore and Co., AIR 1971 SC 1, which are as follows:-
"We are aware of no rule of interpretation by which rank ambiguity
can be first introduced by giving certain expressions a particular

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meaning and then an attempt can be made to emerge out of
semantic confusion and obscurity by having resort to presumed
intention of the Legislature to give effect to international
obligations."
9.5 On the other hand, plain meaning rule applies at the stage when the
words have been construed in their context and the conclusion has been
reached that they are susceptible to only one meaning. In that event, the
meaning so derived is to be given effect to irrespective of consequences.
9.6 Further, while interpreting a statute it must be read as a whole and
one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other
provisions in the same Act so as to make out a consistent enactment of
the whole statutes. Such a construction has a merit of avoiding any
inconsistency or repugnancy either within a Section or between a
Section and other parts of the statutes. It is the duty of the courts to avoid
a clash between two Sections of the same Act and "whenever it is
possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that
they harmonise". While doing so the edges have to be ironed out so as to
read the provisions of an Act in consonance with the object of the Act.
Thus, the provisions of one Section of a statute cannot be used to defeat
another section of the same statute. The same rule applies to a sub-
section of a Section. In Venkataramana Devaru vs. State of Mysore AIR
1958 SC 255, Venkatarama Aiyar, J. said that "the rule of construction is
well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which
cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that,
if possible, effect should be given to both. This is what is known as the
rule of harmonious construction."
9.7 Therefore, effect should be given to both provisions. Thus, a
construction which reduces one of the provisions to a "useless lumber"
or 'dead letter' is to be avoided. One of the ways in dealing with such a
situation is to find out which of the two apparently conflicting provisions
is more general and which is more specific and to construe the same
accordingly. However, if a specific provision has to be read within the
mandate of a general provision then the same has to be accordingly
construed so as to give effect to the mandate of the general provision.
However, if a situation arises where two Sections of the Act cannot be
reconciled, as there is an absolute contradiction between them, it is often
said that the latter must prevail. Another way of looking at such a
situation is to ascertain which is the leading provision and which is the
subordinate provision and which must give way to the other, but only if a
harmonious construction of two apparently contradictory provisions is
possible which will not lead to any absurdity or give rise to practical
inconvenience or make well-established provision of existing law
nugatory, then the same should be resorted to. In other words, an
interpretation which would dilute the intention of the Parliament or give
rise to an absurdity or lead to any provision of law being rendered
nugatory has to be eschewed.
(Source: GP Singh - Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 15th Ed.
LexisNexis)."
9. We may also refer to the title of Section 4(1B) and Section 5 of the
Act, 1923. Section 4 has been titled as “amount of compensation”;
whereas Section 5 has been titled as “method of calculating wages”.
Primarily, Section 4(1B) gives an impetus to the Central Government to

20
WRIC No. - 44795 of 2025
determine “monthly wages” and Section 5 lays down the method of
calculating wages, in different circumstances. It is also no longer res
integra that even if a notification which has been issued in its purported
exercise of a statutory provision, the same shall not override a statutory
provision, itself; as it would amount to amending the statutory provision
itself. A circular, notifications, or instructions issued by Government
Departments under statutory powers are merely interpretative or
administrative guidance and cannot override, contravene, or supplant the
provisions of the statute itself. A statutory provisions is supreme, and any
subordinate legislation or executive instructions must align with it. It is
no longer res integra that executive fiat cannot override the statutory
provision.
10. In view of the aforesaid, principle of harmonizing construction and
the principle of law that a notification, which can only be categorized as
a subordinate legislation, cannot override a statutory provision of law;
this court has no hesitation in holding that the circular dated 03.01.2020
cannot override the statutory provision of Section 5 of the Act, 1923
which provides for a method of calculating wages, relevant for the
purposes of Section 4 of the Act, 1923. Aforesaid conclusion also finds
strength from the object of the Act and the fact that same is a beneficial
legislation.
11. For gain sake, the ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ of the
Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 is quoted below:
“The general principles of workmen's compensation command
almost universal acceptance, and India is now nearly alone among
civilised countries in being without legislation embodying those
principles. For a number of years the more generous employers have
been in the habit of giving compensation voluntarily, but this practice
is by no means general. The growing complexity of industry in this
country, with the increasing use of machinery and consequent danger
to workmen, along with the comparative poverty of the workmen
themselves, renders it advisable that they should be protected, as far as
possible from hardship arising from accidents.
An additional advantage of legislation of this type is that by
increasing the importance for the employer of adequate safety devices,
it reduces the number of accidents to workmen in a manner that
cannot be achieved by official inspection. Further, the encouragement
given to employers to provide adequate medical treatment for their
workmen should mitigate the effects of such accidents as do occur.
The benefits so conferred on the workman added to the increased
sense of security which he will enjoy, should render industrial life
more attractive and thus increase the available supply of labour. At the
same time, a corresponding increase in the efficiency of the average
workman may be expected. A system of insurance would prevent time
burden from pressing too heavily on any particular employer.
After a detailed examination of the question by the
Government of India, Local Governments were addressed in July

21
WRIC No. - 44795 of 2025
1921, and provisional views of the Government of India were
published for general information. The advisability of legislation has
been accepted by the great majority of Local Governments and of
employers' and workers' association and the Government of India
believe that public opinion generally is in favour of legislation.
In June 1922, a committee was convened to consider the
question. This committee was composed, for the most part of
members of the Imperial Legislature. After considering the numerous
replies and opinions received by the Government of India, the
committee was unanimously in favour of legislation and drew up
detailed recommendations regarding the lines which in its opinion
such legislation should follow. The Bill now presented follows these
recommendations closely. A number of supplementary provisions have
been added where necessary, but practically no variations of
importance have been made.
The Bill contains two distinct proposals. In Chapter II
modifications are made in the ordinary civil law affecting the liability
of employers for the damages in respect of injuries sustained by their
workmen; these clauses will operate only in actions before the
ordinary civil courts. The main part of the Bill makes provisions for
workmen's compensation and sets up special machinery to deal with
claims falling under this category.
Both parts of the Bill, however, apply to the same classes of
workmen. If the scope of the employers' liability clauses was made
wider than the scope of the workmen's compensation provisions, there
would be considerable danger of a great increase in litigation. The
classes included are those whose inclusion was recommended by the
committee, and are specified in Schedule II. Two criteria have been
followed in the determination of the classes to be included-
(1) that the Bill should be confined to industries which are more or
less organised;
(2) that only workmen whose occupation is hazardous should be
included.
The general principle is that the compensation should
ordinarily be given to workmen who sustained personal injuries by
accidents arising out of and in the course of their employment.
Compensation will also be given in certain limited circumstances for
disease. The actual rates of compensation payable are based on the
unanimous recommendation of the committee. They are in every case
subject to fixed maxima, in accordance with the committee's
recommendations. It should be remembered, however, that the more
highly paid workmen will be enabled in cases to which the employers'
liability clauses will apply, to obtain damages on a scale considerably
in excess of the maximum fixed for workmen's compensation.
A consistent endeavour has been made to give as little
opportunity for disputes as possible. Throughout the Bill in the
definitions adopted the scales selected, and the exceptions permitted
the great aim has been precision in order that in as few cases as
possible should the validity of a claim for compensation or the amount
of that claim be open to doubt. At the same time, on the unanimous
recommendation of the committee provision has been made for
special Tribunal to deal cheaply and expeditiously with any disputes

22
WRIC No. - 44795 of 2025
that may arise, and generally to assist the parties in a manner which is
not possible for the ordinary civil courts courts.”
12. The aforesaid object clearly envisages that by increasing the
importance of adequate safety devices for the employee, reduces the
number of accident to workman (employee) in a manner that it cannot be
achieved by official inspection. The benefit that an employee draws from
the enactment, is an increased sense of security, and which would render
industrial life more attractive, catering to the conduciveness and
increased availability with supply of labours. The liability of an
employer for the damages in respect of injury sustained by their
employee, was made paramount and the provision for compensation by
setting up special mechanism to deal with claims falling under this
category.
13. We also find that one of the considerations before the Committee was
that more highly paid workman, shall be entitled under the employers’
liability clause, to obtain “damages” on a scale considerably in excess of
the maximum fixed for the workman’s compensation.
We may gainfully refer to the judgment in the case of Union of India
34
Vs. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and Others , wherein while a lady was
trying to enter a train, fell down on railway track and was run over by
the train and consequently died, on legal representatives filing a claim
petition before the Railway Claims Tribunal, it held that it was not an
“untoward incident” within the meaning of the said expression in
Section 123(c) of the Railways Act, 1989; as the same was not an
accidental falling of the passenger from a train. However the Apex Court
held that the case came within the expression “accidental falling of a
passenger from a train carrying passengers” which was an “untoward
incident.”
In the aforesaid case, while interpreting the aforesaid provisions
and the words “untoward incident” as defined under Section 123(c) of
the Railways Act, 1989, the Apex Court held that, it is a well settled law
if the words used in a beneficial or welfare statute are capable of two
constructions, the one which is more in consonance with the object of
the Act and for the benefit of the person for whom the Act was made,
should be preferred. In other words, beneficial or welfare statutes should
be given a liberal and not literal or strict interpretation. Reliance was
35
placed on Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (AIR para
36
7), Jeewanlal Ltd. v. Appellate Authority (AIR para 11), Lalappa
37
Lingappa v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd. (AIR para 13), S.M.
34 (2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases 527
35 AIR 1961 SC 647
36 (1984) 4 SCC 356
37 AIR 1981 SC 852

23
WRIC No. - 44795 of 2025
38
Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager (SCC para 12). Paragraph no.13
of the Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and Others (supra) is quoted as below:
“13. In Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kate this Court observed:
(SCC pp. 347-48, paras 41-42)
"41. In this connection, we may usefully turn to the decision of this
Court in Workmen v. American Express International Banking Corpn.
wherein Chinnappa Reddy, J. in para 4 of the Report has made
following observations: (SCC p. 76)
'4. The principles of statutory construction are well Words
occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare
legislation and human rights' legislation are not to be put in
Procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian dimensions. In
construing these legislations the imposture of literal construction
must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must be
recognised and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with
the colour", the "content" and the "context" of such statutes (we
have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in
Prenn v. Simmonds). In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce
pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island of literal
interpretation but is to enquire beyond the language, unisolated
from the matrix of facts in which they are set; the law is not to be
interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations. In one of
the cases cited before us, that is, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central
Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court we had occasion to
say: (SCC p. 447, para 6)
"6. …. Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of
'bread and butter' statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity,
receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to
give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to e
make inroads by making etymological excursions."’
42. Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn., has
dealt with the Functional Construction Rule in Part XV of his book.
The nature of purposive construction is dealt with in Part XX at p. 659
thus:
‘A purposive construction of an enactment is one which
gives effect to the legislative purpose by -
(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that
meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in this Code
called a purposive-and-literal construction), or
38 (2003) 4 SCC 27

24
WRIC No. - 44795 of 2025
(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in
accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a
purposive-and-strained construction).’
At p. 661 of the same book, the author has considered the topic of
'Purposive Construction' in contrast with literal construction. The
learned author has observed as under:
'Contrast with literal construction.- Although the term
"purposive construction” is not new, its entry into fashion betokens a
swing by the appellate courts away from literal construction Lord
Diplock said in 1975: "If one looks back to the actual decisions of the
[House of Lords] on questions of statutory construction over the last
30 years one cannot fail to be struck by the evidence of a trend away
from the purely literal towards the purposive construction of statutory
provisions." The matter was summed up by Lord Diplock in this way-
...I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to
apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would
lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act.
But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged
remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into
the Act words which are not expressly included in it.' "
(emphasis supplied)”
14. Perhaps this brings us back to the question that once “method for
calculating” wages has been provided under Section 5, what could be the
intent of the legislature to make provision under Section 4(1B) of the
Act, 1923, by providing the Central Government to issue notification of
such “monthly wages” as it may consider necessary; for an employee
who is entitled for compensation under Section 4 of the Act, 1923.
15. There is no iota of doubt that Section 5 visualises three different
contingencies and provides a method for calculation of wages in the said
three contingencies; but nonetheless there may be a circumstance where
a claimant may not be able to demonstrate, the actual “monthly wages”
that the deceased employee was entitled to or there may be a
circumstance where an employee may be getting wages which may be so
meager that applying the methodology as provided under Section 5 of
the Act, 1923, the amount of compensation as contemplated under
Section 4 of the Act, 1923 is so meager that it may not be a “just
compensation”; and which was not be the intent of the Act, 1923; and in
form of a social security to the deceased dependents or the family. In the
said circumstances, a notification under Section 4(1B) has to be taken
into account, which provides for a minimum “monthly wages” to be Rs.
15000/-.

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Conclusion
In view of the foregoing discussions we have no hesitation in holding
that if the case of a deceased employee is covered by any of the
contingencies provided under Section 5 of the Act, 1923, the same shall
be applicable; which would mean the actual “monthly wages” an
employee was drawing immediately preceding the accident. However, in
case the “monthly wages” of an employee is less than what is provided
by the notification dated 03.01.2020 i.e. 15000/- the benchmark for
calculating the amount of compensation under Section 4 of the Act, 1923
shall be Rs. 15000/-. This is imperative and in consonance with the
objects and reasons of the Act, 1923 and in line with the principles for
providing a “just compensation” which the enactment envisages, for
providing a social security to the family in destitute, on account of death
of the earning member of the family. The amount fixed by the circular
dated 03.01.2020, can only get a benchmark that the calculation cannot
be with a lesser amount; but where the “monthly wages” admissible to
the deceased employee was higher, the same shall be considered, for
determining the “Amount of Compensation” under Section 4 of the Act,
1923.
Directions
In view of the aforesaid the writ petition stands allowed in terms of the
following directions.
(i) The present matter is referred to the Commissioner of the concerned
Region, who may have been appointed by the State Government by the
notification in the official Gazette, in view of the provisions of Section
20 of the Act, 1923; and he may put the claimant/petitioner to notice for
filing evidence/documents to demonstrate their restitutio in integrum,
which may be considered along with the mitigating factors; as indicated
hereinabove, for grant of damages; apart from the re-determination of
compensation as per Section 4 read-with Section 5 of the Act, 1923
(ii) Once the claimant is put to notice and given an opportunity to file
their evidence, he shall proceed to quantify the compensation and in
consideration of the determining factors. The compensation shall be
quantified afresh and paid to the claimant within a period of one month
from the date of such determination.
(iii) Once the compensation along with damages are determined, the
same shall be held to be payable along with the interest of 12% p.a.,
which is to be calculated from the date of death i.e. date of accident till
the actual disbursal of the said amount after deducting amount of Rs.
10,16,700/-, which has already been paid to the petitioner/claimant.

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(iv) In view of the law laid down in the case of Lata Wadhwa and Ors.
(supra) and in consideration of the admitted factual position and there
has been an infraction to the principles of natural justice, it is provided
that a conventional figure of Rs. 1,00,000/- is to be added and paid over
and above the quantifiable compensation, to be determined by the
Commissioner appointed under Section 20 of the Act, 1923.
(v) The entire aforementioned exercise is to be completed within a
period of four months from the date of production of copy of this order.
(vi) No order as to costs.
(Siddharth Nandan,J.) (Atul Sreedharan,J.)
February 27, 2026
Sumit.K
Digitally signed by :-
SUMIT KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad