NARASIYAMMAL SEVATHAN vs G.K. RAVIKUMAR
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 27 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO. 7481 OF 2024 (CPC)
BETWEEN:
NARASIYAMMAL SEVATHAN,
W/O. LATE SEVATHAN,
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,
R/AT #669, 5TH A CROSS,
NEW THIPPASANDRA,
BANGALORE 560 075.
…APPELLANT
(BY MS. SANGEETHA C.K, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. G.K. RAVIKUMAR,
S/O GOVINDARAJU,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 10, 4TH CROSS,
RAMYA APARTMENTS,
JEEVAN BHIMA NAGARA,
BANGALORE-560078.
2. SRI GOVINDARAJU,
S/O SRINIVAS,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 10, 4TH CROSS,
RAMYA APARTMENTS,
JEEVAN BHIMA NAGARA,
BANGALORE-560078.
Digitally
signed by
VINUTHA M
Location:
HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
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3. SMT. PADMA,
D/O SRINIVAS,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 10, 4TH CROSS,
RAMYA APARTMENTS,
JEEVAN BHIMA NAGARA,
BANGALORE-560078.
4. SMT. JAYAMMA,
W/O MUNIYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 10, 4TH CROSS,
RAMYA APARTMENTS,
JEEVAN BHIMA NAGARA,
BANGALORE-560078.
5. G. PRASANNA KUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
S/O GOVINDAPPA,
R/AT NO. 199,
HOLY MOTHER SCHOOL COMPOUND,
JEEVAN BHEEMA NAGAR,
BANGALORE-560075.
6. SRI K DHANANJAYA,
S/O KRISHNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 11, KODOHALLI ROAD,
OPP. 4TH CROSS,
ULSOOR POST,
BANGALORE - 560008.
7. SRI D MAHENDRA,
S/O DASAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 11, KODOHALLI ROAD,
OPP. 4TH CROSS,
ULSOOR POST,
BANGALORE-560008.
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8. SMT. DASAMMA,
AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS,
W/O LATE NARAYANA,
R/AT NO. 11, KODOHALLI ROAD,
OPP. 4TH CROSS,
ULSOOR POST,
BANGALORE-560008.
9. SMT. PADMA,
W/O LATE JAYARAM,
AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 11, KODOHALLI ROAD,
OPP. 4TH CROSS,
ULSOOR POST,
BANGALORE - 560008.
10. SMT. JAYAMMA,
W/O LATE SRINIVAS,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 11, KODOHALLI ROAD,
OPP. 4TH CROSS,
ULSOOR POST,
BANGALORE - 560008.
11. SRI GOVINDARAJU,
S/O LATE SRINIVAS,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 11, KODOHALLI ROAD,
OPP. 4TH CROSS,
ULSOOR POST,
BANGALORE - 560008.
12. SRI CHANDRA,
S/O LATE NARAYANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 11, KODOHALLI ROAD,
OPP. 4TH CROSS,
ULSOOR POST,
BANGALORE-560008.
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13. SRINIVAS N,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
S/O LATE NANJUNDAPPA,
R/AT NO. 135,
ESHVAR SHREYAS NILAY,
ALUR PARLLEL ROAD, MAKALI,
BANGALORE-562162.
14. N KRISHNAMURTHY,
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
S/O LATE NANJUNDAPPA,
R/AT NO. 135, ESHVAR SHREYAS
NILAY, ALUR PARLLEL ROAD,
MAKALI, BANGALORE-562162.
15. SRI CHANDRA N,
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
S/O LATE NANJUNDAPPA,
R/AT NO. 1074-B20, 2ND FLOOR,
BDA FLATS, 2ND STAGE,
AUSTIN TOWN,
BANGALORE-560047.
16. KUM. VARSHITHA D,
AGED ABOUT 21 YEARS,
D/O DEENDAYAL,
R/AT NO. 387/A, HENNUR CROSS,
CHIKKANNA PALYA,
KALYANA NAGARA,
BANGALORE-560043.
17. VASANTHAMMA N,
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS,
W/O SRI CHANDRA BHOJARAJA,
R/AT NO.3/1, VENKATADRI NIVASA,
3RD CROSS, NEAR ADARSHA VIDYATAN,
MATHIKERE, BANGALORE-560054.
18. SMT. DHANALAKSHMI S,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
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W/O A.M. MANJUNATHA,
R/AT NO. 499/1,
MAHESHWARAMMA
TEMPLE STREET, YELAHANKA,
BANGALORE-560064.
19. KUM. VIJAYALAKSHMI K.V.S,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
D/O LATE K V SHAMAIAH,
R/AT NO. 499/1, MAHESHWARAMMA,
TEMPLE STREET, YELAHANKA,
BANGALORE 560064.
20. SMT. PADMAVATHI S,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
W/O VISHWANATH M,
R/AT NO. 104/5, HAROHALLI
YELAHANKA,
BANGALORE 560064.
21. SHANTHA KUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
S/O LATE THIMMAPPA,
R/AT NO.54, SADASHIVANAGAR,
1ST MAIN ROAD,
BANGALORE 560003.
22. SACHIN VORA,
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
S/O INDULAL VORA,
DESIGNATED PARTNER-
M/S VORA REALTY LLP,
HAVING HIS OFFICE AT NO. 237,
3RD FLOOR, RAJANI GANDHA,
GARDEN APARTMENTS,
NO. 21, VITTAL MALLYA ROAD,
BANGALORE 560001.
23. VORA REALTY LLP,
A LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP
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HAVING HIS OFFICE AT NO. 237,
3RD FLOOR, RAJANI GANDHA,
GARDEN APARTMENTS,
NO. 21, VITTAL MALLYA ROAD,
BANGALORE 560001,
REP. BY ITS DESIGNATED PARTNER,
SACHIN VORA.
24. SMT. ASHA S,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
W/O SRINIVAS N,
R/AT NO. 17, 5TH MAIN,
ANDANAPPA EXTENSION,
KAMAKSHIPALYA,
BANGALORE 560079.
25. SRI N SRIDHAR,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
S/O NARAYANA,
R/AT NO. 24/49, 5TH CROSS,
WILSON GARDEN,
BANGALORE-560027.
26. SRI NANDISHA,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
S/O NARAYANA,
R/AT NO. 24/49, 5TH CROSS,
WILSON GARDEN,
BANGALORE-560027.
27. SMT. VEDAVATHI,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
D/O NARAYANA,
R/AT NO. 24/49, 5TH CROSS,
WILSON GARDEN,
BANGALORE-560027.
28. SRI S JEEVAN,
S/O LATE SRINIVAS,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
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R/AT NO. 11,
KODIHALLI MAIN RAOD,
4TH CROSS, ULSOOR POST,
BANGALORE-560008.
29. SRI NIKHIL KUMAR R,
AGED ABOUT 24 YEARS,
S/O RAVI KUMAR,
R/AT NO. 10,
RAMYA APARTMENTS,
JEEVANVBHEEMA NAGAR,
BANGALORE-560075.
30. SHANTHA SRI HARSHA,
S/O LATE LAKSHMIPATHY,
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
R/O NO. 1458, 3RD CROSS,
2ND PHASE, CHANDRA LAYOUT,
VIJAYANAGAR,
BANGALORE - 560 040.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI R SWAROOP ANAND, ADVOCATE FOR C/R21 to R23;
NOTICE TO R-5 IS NOT NECESSARY, V/O DT: 18.9.2026)
THIS MFA IS FILED U/O 43 RULE 1(r) R/W SECTION 151
OF CPC, AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 14.10.2024 PASSED ON
I.A.NO.1 IN OS.NO.5250/2024 ON THE FILE OF THE III
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU
CCH-25, DISMISSING THE IA. FILED UNDER ORDER 39 RULE
1 AND 2 R/W SECTION 151 OF CPC.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR
ORAL JUDGMENT
This appeal is preferred by the appellant, who is the
plaintiff before the trial Court, seeking to set aside the
impugned order dated 14.10.2024 passed on interlocutory
application in O.S.No.5250/2024 by the III Additional City Civil
& Sessions Judge, Bengaluru.
2. The respondents are the defendants before the trial
Court. The respondent Nos.21 to 23 are the contesting
respondents-defendants and the other defendants have not
contested the application, which is impugned herein. Therefore,
the grievance is only as against respondent Nos.21 to 23 and
the relief though sought against all the defendants, it would be
only as against defendants Nos.21 to 23 as they are the
subsequent purchasers of the property in question.
3. Parties shall be referred to as plaintiff and
defendants, for the sake of brevity.
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4. A suit came to be filed by the plaintiff against the
defendants seeking the following reliefs:
"A. for a declaration declaring that the sale deed
dated 12.05.2022 executed by the defendants
1 to 12 in favour of defendant No.21 & 22 in
respect of the suit schedule A property as not
binding on the plaintiff.
B. For a permanent injunction restraining the
Defendants, their men, their agents, their
representatives or any person or persons
acting under or through them from alienating,
encumbering or creating any charge on the
Suit Schedule B property.
C. Costs of the suit; and
D. Grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble
Court deems fit under the facts and
circumstances of the case in the interest of
justice and equity."
4.1. Along with the suit, an application came to be filed
under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC by the plaintiff seeking for
an order of temporary injunction restraining the defendants
from alienating, encumbering or creating any charge over the
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suit schedule 'B' property, which is a portion of suit schedule 'A'
property.
4.2. The application was contested by defendant Nos.21
to 23 by filing detailed objections. However, the other
defendants did not contest the application.
4.3. Upon hearing learned counsel for the plaintiff and
learned counsel for defendant Nos.21 to 23, the trial Court
rejected the application-I.A. filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2
read with Section 151 CPC. Aggrieved by which, the appellant-
plaintiff is before this Court.
5. It is the vehement contention of learned counsel
Ms. Sangeetha.C.K., for the appellant-plaintiff that the
impugned order passed by the trial Court is perverse, illegal
and arbitrary and the same deserves to be set aside. She
contends that the trial Court has not appreciated the material
facts available on record so also date of the agreement of sale,
date of the sale deed and the date of the confirmation deed
said to have been executed by respondent No.5-defendant No.5
in favour of defendant Nos.21 to 23. It is also contended by
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learned counsel for the plaintiff that the trial Court has
committed a serious infirmity and error in arriving at a
conclusion that the confirmation deed dated 14.10.2022
executed by defendant No.5 in favour of defendant Nos.21 to
23 is prior to execution of the agreement of sale executed by
defendant No.5 in favour of the plaintiff which is dated
17.06.2022 and the same is exfacie incorrect. She further
contends that the confirmation deed is dated 14.10.2022,
whereas the agreement of sale executed by defendant No.5 in
favour of the plaintiff is dated 17.06.2022. Apparently, she
contends that the trial Court has misdirected itself in coming to
a wrong conclusion of the date of the agreement of sale with
the plaintiff by defendant No.5 of 17.06.2022 and the
confirmation deed which is later on 14.10.2022 and therefore,
the impugned order passed is illegal, perverse and arbitrary.
5.1. It is also contended by learned counsel that
defendant No.5 has not executed any sale deed in favour of
defendant Nos.21 to 23 and therefore, the question of
confirmation deed to be relevant or binding would not arise and
hence, the trial Court has committed an error in rejecting the
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application of the plaintiff for grant of temporary injunction
without following the essential principles. On these grounds,
she seeks to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned
order.
6. Per contra , learned counsel Sri. R.Swaroop Anand
appearing for the caveator/defendant Nos.21 to 23 vehemently
contends that there is no illegality or perversity in the
impugned order passed by the trial Court on the application
filed by the plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC. It is
contended by learned counsel that there is no dispute with
regard to the suit 'A' and 'B' schedule property being the
absolute ownership of defendant Nos.1 to 12 and subsequently,
several agreements of sale entered into by the owners in
favour of defendant Nos.21 to 23 and a sale deed has been
executed in favour of defendant Nos.21 to 23 on 12.05.2022 by
the erstwhile owners of the suit schedule property and
subsequently, a confirmation deed is executed on 14.10.2022,
whereby defendant No.5, who is the vendor of the plaintiff, has
affirmed the agreement of sale and confirmed the same
through the confirmation deed dated 14.10.2022 by affirming
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the sale agreement and the confirmation of the sale deed in
favour of defendant Nos.21 to 23. It is also contended that in
pursuance to the agreement of sale, the sale deed and the
confirmation deed, defendant Nos.21 to 23 are in peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property, and
therefore the trial Court, having come to the conclusion that
the plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case for grant of
any temporary injunction so also the balance of convenience
and irreparable injury and hardship would not be caused to the
plaintiff and rather it would cause more hardship and
inconvenience to the defendant, dismissed the application filed
by the plaintiff for grant of temporary injunction.
6.1. Learned counsel further contends that there is no
case made out by the plaintiff even in the main prayer as the
prayer sought by the plaintiff is for declaration of the sale deed
dated 12.05.2022 executed by defendant Nos.1 to 12 in favour
of defendant Nos.21 to 23 in respect of suit 'A' schedule
property and for injunction. He also contends that the plaintiff
has not sought for any cancellation of the confirmation deed or
for that matter, the agreement of sale executed by defendant
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No.5 in favour of defendant Nos.21 to 23. Therefore, he
contends that the suit itself is not maintainable and the trial
Court has rightly rejected the application which does not call for
interference.
6.2. It is also the contention of learned counsel that the
plaintiff has not filed any suit against defendant No.5 seeking
enforcement or specific performance of the agreement of
alleged sale dated 17.06.2022. Hence seeks to dismiss the
appeal.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant-
plaintiff and learned counsel for the caveator/respondent
Nos.21 to 23.
8. The points that arise for consideration before this
Court are:
1. Whether the appellant-plaintiff has made out
any valid ground for interference in the
impugned order passed by the trial Court?
2. What order?
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9. Apparently, there is no dispute to the fact that
originally the suit schedule property belonged to defendant
Nos.1 to 12, who are the absolute owners. The property was
agreed to be sold to defendant Nos.21 to 23 by virtue of
agreement of sale by the erstwhile owners i.e., defendant
Nos.1 to 12 and so also defendant No.5 has executed an
agreement of sale in favour of defendant Nos.21 to 23. It is
also seen that an agreement of sale is entered into by
defendant No.5 in favour of the appellant-plaintiff on
17.06.2022. This being the facts of the case, in pursuance to
this agreements of sale, a sale deed is executed on 12.05.2022
by the erstwhile owners i.e., defendant Nos.13, 15, 16 and 18
to 20 in favour of defendant Nos.21 to 23. Subsequently, after
the confirmation deed was executed on 14.10.2022 by
defendant Nos.1, 5 to 9 and 25 to 29 in favour of defendant
Nos.21 to 23, the other defendants have also confirmed the
sale in favour of defendant Nos.21 to 23 including the vendor of
the plaintiff who is defendant No.5. These are facts which are
not disputed.
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10. Now the plaintiff has filed the suit against the
defendants for the relief as mentioned herein above seeking for
declaration of the sale deed dated 12.05.2022 to be not binding
on the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff has not sought any relief
as against the confirmation deed and so also the agreement of
sale executed by the vendor of the plaintiff in favour of the
defendants.
11. In the suit, an application is filed by the plaintiff
seeking for an order of temporary injunction restraining the
defendants from alienating, encumbering, creating and
changing the nature of the suit schedule 'B' property, as the
plaintiff claims that she is the agreement holder from defendant
No.5 to an extent of 5,400 sq.ft. in the 'B' schedule property,
which is the portion of 'A' schedule property.
12. When an application is filed under Order 39 Rule 1
and 2 of CPC, the trial Court is required to see three essential
requirements namely prima facie case, balance of convenience
and irreparable hardship that would be caused to which of the
party.
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13. In the present case on hand, the plaintiff is making
a claim based on an agreement of sale dated 17.06.2022
executed by defendant No.5 in her favour. Whereas
subsequently, it appears there is a confirmation deed executed
by defendant No.5 in favour of defendant Nos.21 to 23,
preceding which there is an agreement of sale entered into by
defendant No.5 in favour of defendant Nos.21 to 23. Along with
'B' schedule property, 'A' schedule property was also sold by
other defendants, who are owners of entire extent of 'A'
schedule property, to defendants Nos.21 to 23. One by virtue
of a registered sale deed and another by virtue of a
confirmation deed confirming the agreement of sale and the
sale deed. Therefore, the trial Court is required to see as to
whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case to go in
for trial and if she has made out such a case, whether
balance of convenience and irreparable injury and hardship
would be caused more to the plaintiff rather than defendant
Nos.21 to 23 in grant of temporary injunction.
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14. Apparently, there is no dispute with regard to the
sale deed in favour of defendant Nos.21 to 23, the confirmation
deed and the agreement of sale by the other defendants as well
as defendant No.5, who is a vendor of the plaintiff.
15. It is apparently evident that the prima facie case is
not made out by the plaintiff for grant of temporary injunction
as defendant Nos.21 to 23 have secured title by way of a
registered sale deed and also by way of a confirmation deed
executed by the erstwhile owners and also the vendor of
plaintiff, who is defendant No.5. It is also not the case of the
plaintiff that the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of 'B'
schedule property. Therefore, the trial Court did not find favour
with the plaintiff for grant of interim order of temporary
injunction and found prima facie case having not been made
out, the balance of convenience and irreparable injury would
not be caused to the plaintiff, but it would rather cause to the
defendants in case of grant of interim order of temporary
injunction against defendant Nos.21 to 23. Under the
circumstances, the trial Court negatived granting of an interim
order in favour of the plaintiff.
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16. I do not find any illegality or perversity in the
impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge. It is
apparently clear that the plaintiff would have to make out a
prima facie case for grant of temporary injunction and even if
the plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case, the other
two essential ingredients would have to be fulfilled and satisfied
for grant of an order of temporary injunction, which is not
satisfactorily established by the plaintiff. Despite all these
aspects, this Court will have to see whether there is any
perversity committed by the trial Court for interference in the
impugned order.
17. As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
1
Wander Ltd. and anr. vs. Antox India P. Ltd., particularly
in paragraph Nos.9 and 14, which is confirmed by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v.
2
Harish Ambalal Choksi , this Court need not interfere even if
it were to come to a different opinion than what is expressed by
the trial Court and I do not find the trial Court having
1
1990 SCC (Supp) 727
2
(2024) 11 SCC 351
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committed any perversity for this Court to arrive at a different
opinion.
18. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Wander Ltd.
(surpa) in paragraph Nos.9 and 14 held as under:
"9.
Usually, the prayer for grant of an
interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the
existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff
and its alleged violation are both contested and
uncertain and remain uncertain till they are
established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this
stage, acts on certain well settled principles of
administration of this form of interlocutory remedy
which is both temporary and discretionary. The
object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated
“...is to protect the plaintiff against
injury by violation of his rights for which he
could not adequately be compensated in
damages recoverable in the action if the
uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the
trial. The need for such protection must be
weighed against the corresponding need of the
defendant to be protected against injury
resulting from his having been prevented from
exercising his own legal rights for which he
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could not be adequately compensated. The
court must weigh one need against another
and determine where the ‘balance of
convenience’ lies.”
The interlocutory remedy is intended to
preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which
may appear on a prima facie case. The court also, in
restraining a defendant from exercising what he
considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would
like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a
relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet
to commence his enterprise or whether he has
already been doing so in which latter case
considerations somewhat different from those that
apply to a case where the defendant is yet to
commence his enterprise, are attracted.
14.
The appeals before the Division Bench
were against the exercise of discretion by the Single
Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not
interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court
of first instance and substitute its own discretion
except where the discretion has been shown to have
been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or
perversely or where the court had ignored the settled
principles of law regulating grant or refusal of
interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise
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of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle.
Appellate court will not reassess the material and
seek to reach a conclusion different from the one
reached by the court below if the one reached by
that court was reasonably possible on the material.
The appellate court would normally not be justified in
interfering with the exercise of discretion under
appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered
the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a
contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been
exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a
judicial manner the fact that the appellate court
would have taken a different view may not justify
interference with the trial court's exercise of
discretion. After referring to these principles
Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd.
v. Pothan Joseph [(1960) 3 SCR 713 : AIR 1960 SC
1156] : (SCR 721)
“... These principles are well established,
but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in
Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton [1942 AC
130] ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of
appeal of an order made by a judge below in
the exercise of his discretion is well
established, and any difficulty that arises is due
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only to the application of well settled principles
in an individual case’.”
The appellate judgment does not seem to defer
to this principle."
19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramakant
Ambalal Choksi (surpa) in paragraph No.34 held as under:
"34. The burden is on the plaintiff, by evidence
aliunde by affidavit or otherwise, to prove that there
is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs
adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima
facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his
property or the right is a condition precedent for the
grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not
to be confused with prima facie title which has to be
established on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie
case is a substantial question raised, bona fide,
which needs investigation and a decision on merits.
Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself
is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further
has to satisfy that non- interference by the court
would result in “irreparable injury” to the party
seeking relief and that there is no other remedy
available to the party except one to grant injunction
and he needs protection from the consequences of
apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable
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injury, however, does not mean that there must be
no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but
means only that the injury must be a material one,
namely one that cannot be adequately compensated
by way of damages. The third condition also is
that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour
of granting injunction. The Court while granting or
refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound
judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial
mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the
parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it
with that which is likely to be caused to the other
side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing
competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of
injury and if the Court considers that pending the
suit, the subject matter should be maintained in
status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus, the
Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in
granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction
pending the suit. (See: Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad
Singh reported in (1992) 1 SCC 719.)"
20. Under the circumstances, I pass the following:
ORDER
i) This appeal is dismissed .
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ii) It is made clear that this Court has not
expressed any opinion on the merits of the
matter.
iii) All contentions of the parties are kept open.
Sd/-
(PRADEEP SINGH YERUR)
JUDGE
VM
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 30