MD SHAMS BISWAS@TAPAN BISWAS vs UNITED BANK OF INDIA & ORS

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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE

Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Ananya Bandyopadhyay

W.P.A. 16800 of 2016
Md. Shams Biswas @ Tapan Biswas
-Vs-
United Bank of India (at present Punjab National Bank) & Ors.

For the Petitioner : Mr. M.R. Sarbadhikari

For the Respondents : Mr. R.N. Majumder
Mr. S.M. Obaidullah

Judgment on : 05.05.2026

Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.:-

1. The writ petitioner has approached this Court invoking the constitutional
prerogative under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking issuance
of a writ in the nature of mandamus for setting aside, quashing and/or
rescinding a series of memoranda, the principal among them being the
memorandum dated March 22, 2016 bearing Ref. No. HRM/PA(OE)/Misc-
63A/2001/2016, whereby the petitioner was subjected to premature
retirement from the service of the United Bank of India. Consequential
memoranda dated April 20, 2016, June 6, 2016, June 8, 2016 and March
29, 2016 have also been assailed, alongside a prayer for reinstatement with
restoration of all attendant service benefits and continuity in service.

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2. The facts unfurled the petitioner to have joined the services of the
respondent bank on April 1, 1981 and had, over a span exceeding three
decades, discharged his duties with diligence, sincerity, loyalty and utmost
devotion to institutional discipline. The petitioner rose to the position of
Senior Manager and asserted his service record remained satisfactory
throughout. However, his otherwise stable service tenure, it was contended,
was brought to an abrupt and unjustified cessation by the respondent
authorities under circumstances that betray arbitrariness and premeditated
intent.
3. A deeply disquieting dimension of the petitioner’s case pertained to
allegations of sustained racial and caste-based discrimination at the
workplace. The petitioner, originally belonging to the Dalit community,
asserted he was subjected to systemic humiliation and exclusion, which,
over a prolonged period, compelled him to renounce Hinduism and embrace
Islam on his own volition. It was further alleged that the petitioner became a
victim of targeted harassment, exacerbated by his perceived inclination to
expose internal irregularities and corruption within the bank, thereby
inviting retaliatory measures cloaked as administrative action.
4. The impugned order of premature retirement is stated to have been issued
under Regulation 19(1) of the United Bank of India (Officers’) Service
Regulations, 1979. The petitioner contends that such invocation of the
Regulation is fundamentally flawed. According to him, Regulation 19
contemplates only a process of “review” by a duly constituted Special
Committee, and does not envisage any “recommendation” capable of being

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acted upon by another authority. The procedure adopted by the respondent
bank, whereby a Special Committee allegedly recommended premature
retirement and such recommendation was thereafter accepted by a
competent authority, had been asserted to be an impermissible deviation
from the statutory scheme, rendering the entire action .
void ab initio

5. The chronology of events, as delineated in the pleadings, reflects an element
of undue haste and pre-determination. The impugned memorandum dated
March 22, 2016 not only imposed premature retirement with immediate
effect but was accompanied by issuance of a pay order bearing No. 099879
for an amount of Rs.1,83,904.94/- deducting the amount ppayable towards
TDS representing three months’ salary in lieu of notice.
6. The petitioner further asserted the very constitution, composition and
deliberations of the so-called Special Committee were shrouded in opacity.
Despite a specific request on April 18, 2016 seeking disclosure of the
recommendation and the materials forming the basis thereof, the respondent
authorities rejected such request by memorandum dated April 20, 2016 on
vague and untenable grounds. This denial, it is contended, has deprived the
petitioner of any meaningful opportunity to contest the decision, thereby
striking at the base of the principles of natural justice.
7. It was further averred during the pendency of the petitioner’s representation
before the Board of Directors, the respondent authorities proceeded to
initiate steps for settlement of provident fund and pensionary benefits. A
memorandum dated June 8, 2016 sought completion of formalities for
disbursement of provident fund, while an earlier memorandum dated March

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29, 2016 had already been issued in relation to pensionary benefits under
the United Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Rules, 1995. Such actions,
taken even before exhaustion of the petitioner’s remedial avenues, are
asserted to reflect a foregone conclusion and predetermined mindset.
8. The petitioner was compelled to submit a representation on April 22, 2016
before the Board of Directors (respondent no. 6). However, it is contended
that the Service Regulations, 1979 do not contemplate any appellate forum
before the Board against an order of premature retirement. Consequently,
the consideration and purported rejection of such representation, as
communicated through memorandum dated June 6, 2016, is alleged to be
wholly without jurisdiction. It was further contended that respondent no. 2
lacked authority to communicate any decision on behalf of the Board, and
any such decision, if at all taken, ought to have been conveyed under the
seal and signature of the Board itself.
9. The petitioner had also challenged the very foundation of the decision-
making process by contending that the Special Committee had no authority
to “recommend” premature retirement, as the Regulation contemplated only
a “review”. The adoption of a procedure whereby such recommendation was
placed before another authority for final decision is asserted to be a self-
devised mechanism, alien to the statutory framework and therefore legally
unsustainable.
10. In addition to the impugned retirement, the petitioner has brought forth
grievances relating to denial of legitimate service dues, including stagnation
increment due in June 2012 and medical aid allowance for the year 2015,

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despite repeated representations. Such denial is alleged to be arbitrary and
reflective of continued hostility.
11. A further facet of grievance pertains to the discontinuation of the petitioner’s
housing loan facility subsequent to his premature retirement. It is contended
that such action bears no rational nexus to cessation of service and has
caused severe financial hardship, particularly as the residential house
remained under construction and incomplete. The discontinuation of such
facility, without assigning any reason, is asserted to be an act of malice and
administrative arbitrariness.
12. The petitioner has, in essence, contended that the entire process of
premature retirement is vitiated by absence of any objective yardstick,
thereby enabling a “pick and choose” policy at the whim of the authorities.
Such unbridled discretion, it is urged, is antithetical to the principles of
fairness and reasonableness which underpin administrative action.
13. The cumulative effect of the impugned actions, as projected, is not merely a
violation of the statutory provisions embodied in the Service Regulations,
1979, but also an infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed under
Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner
asserts that the action of the respondent authorities is arbitrary,
discriminatory and devoid of procedural fairness, thereby failing the test of
constitutional scrutiny.
14. Thus, viewed in its entirety, the petitioner’s case is that the impugned
memorandum dated March 22, 2016, along with all consequential steps
taken pursuant thereto, stands vitiated by jurisdictional error, procedural

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impropriety, violation of natural justice and constitutional infirmity,
rendering the same entirely unsustainable in the eye of law.
15. The Learned Advocate for the petitioner challenged the impugned action as
one vitiated by jurisdictional transgression, procedural impropriety and
manifest arbitrariness, striking at the root of administrative fairness.

16. At the outset, it is contended that the writ petition has been instituted
assailing the forcible premature retirement of the petitioner, effected by
memorandum dated March 22, 2016, purportedly under Regulation 19(1) of
the applicable Service Regulations. The impugned action, it is urged, stands
irretrievably vitiated on two foundational grounds—firstly, for non-
compliance with the mandatory requirements of Regulation 20 of the
Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1977, and secondly, for gross infraction
of the principles of natural justice.
17. The petitioner’s service trajectory, it is submitted, reflects an unblemished
and diligent career commencing on April 1, 1981, as a Clerk, culminating in
successive promotions to Officer Grades I, II and III, the last of which was
attained on September 1, 2010. Such progression, founded upon integrity,
efficiency and professional rectitude, renders the abrupt invocation of
premature retirement wholly incongruous and devoid of rational substratum.
18. The Learned Counsel contended that from August 6, 2015 onwards, the
respondent bank embarked upon a premeditated course to dislodge the
petitioner from service under the ostensible pretext of mental unfitness.
However, the medical material relied upon was asserted to be self-
contradictory, inconclusive and bereft of any cogent finding establishing

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impairment of cognitive or functional capacity. Significantly, no disciplinary
proceeding was ever initiated, nor was any charge of misconduct articulated,
notwithstanding the availability of adequate time to do so, as the petitioner
had nearly four years of service remaining until his normal date of
superannuation on March 31, 2020.

19. The substratum of the impugned action was traced to the recommendation
of a so-called Special Committee, which, upon a purported review dated
March 17, 2016, recommended premature retirement by report dated March
18, 2016. It was emphatically urged that such recommendation is de hors
the statutory framework, inasmuch as Regulation 19 contemplated only a
process of review and not a determinative recommendation capable of
acceptance. The subsequent mechanical endorsement by the General
Manager, merely recording “approved as recommended,” was demonstrative
of total non-application of mind.
20. The challenge is further fortified by pointing out that the petitioner was
prematurely retired on March 22, 2016, in stark departure from the express
stipulation that retirement ought to take effect on the last day of the month.
The undue haste with which the decision was implemented, without
disclosing the authority determining the effective date, renders the process
opaque and procedurally suspect.
21. A conspicuous breach of natural justice is urged on account of the
respondents’ persistent refusal to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the
Special Committee’s recommendation, despite a specific request dated April
18, 2016. Such denial, followed by a cryptic rejection dated April 20, 2016,

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effectively foreclosed the petitioner’s right to make an informed and
meaningful representation.
22. Though the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Board of Directors, the
same was dismissed in a perfunctory and non-speaking manner. It is further
contended that the Service Regulations do not contemplate any such
appellate mechanism, and consequently, the purported affirmation by the
Board stands vitiated by lack of jurisdiction. The communication of such
decision, not under the seal of the Board but through an intermediary
authority, further accentuates the procedural infirmity.
23. The Learned Advocate has drawn attention to the startling arbitrariness
underlying the recommendation of the Special Committee, wherein out of
1786 officers reviewed, only the petitioner was singled out as ineligible to
continue in service. Such singular targeting, devoid of discernible criteria, is
urged to be emblematic of a “pick and choose” policy, repugnant to the
mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
24. The reliance placed upon an alleged medical assessment is further assailed
on the ground that neither the detailed findings of the Medical Board were
disclosed nor any opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to contest the
same. Even the request for video recording of the medical examination was
not considered. The medical report itself, it is contended, does not disclose
any abnormality in cognition or memory and is thus wholly inadequate to
sustain the drastic consequence of premature retirement.
25. An additional circumstance of considerable probative value is pressed into
service, namely, that the petitioner was sanctioned a housing loan on

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January 14, 2016, contemporaneously with the period during which he was
allegedly considered medically unfit. It is urged, with considerable force, that
no prudent financial institution would extend such facility to an employee
deemed unfit for service. This inherent contradiction, coupled with the
petitioner’s subsequent engagement as a witness in criminal proceedings
between 2017 and 2021, further undermines the credibility of the allegation
of unfitness.
26. The petitioner’s grievance is compounded by the abrupt discontinuation of
the housing loan facility, medical aid allowance and denial of consequential
benefits including increment in June 2012, thereby inflicting severe financial
hardship and leaving the residential construction incomplete. Such actions,
it is submitted, bear no rational nexus with cessation of service and are
indicative of mala fide intent.
27. The entire decision-making process, it is contended, is characterised by
opacity, haste and pre-determination, with successive authorities merely
endorsing prior conclusions without independent application of mind. The
failure to disclose material documents, absence of reasons, and denial of
procedural safeguards collectively render the impugned action legally
unsustainable.
28. Reliance is placed upon the celebrated decision in Central Inland Water
Transport Corporation Ltd. vs. Tarun Kanti Sengupta , to underscore that
arbitrary and unconscionable exercise of contractual or statutory power
cannot withstand judicial scrutiny.

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29. In culmination, the Learned Counsel submits that the impugned
memorandum dated March 22, 2016, together with all consequential
actions, is vitiated by patent illegality, violation of statutory provisions,
breach of natural justice and constitutional infirmity. The same, therefore,
warrants interference by this Court, with a direction for quashing of the
impugned action and grant of consequential reliefs in favour of the
petitioner, including costs.
30. The Learned Advocate appearing for the respondents emphatically resisted
the writ petition contending that the impugned action was neither arbitrary
nor de hors the governing statutory framework, but rather a considered
exercise of power strictly in consonance with the applicable Service
Regulations.
31. At the threshold, it was submitted that the petitioner, initially inducted into
the services of the erstwhile United Bank of India and subsequently elevated
to the position of Senior Manager, had, over a considerable period, exhibited
a pattern of conduct wholly inconsistent with the discipline and decorum
expected of an officer of a nationalised bank. The petitioner, it was urged,
was in the habitual practice of addressing a series of communications to
diverse authorities, including governmental bodies, commissions and
members of the public domain, couched in language described as
intemperate, derogatory and accusatory in tenor. Such communications, far
from being grounded in substantiated grievance, were characterised as
imaginative constructs borne out of misplaced apprehensions relating to his
workplace and colleagues.

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32. The Learned Advocate representing the respondents further submitted the
tenor, frequency and content of such communications reflected a gradual
but perceptible deviation from normal behavioural standards, thereby raising
legitimate concerns regarding the petitioner’s mental composure and fitness
to continue in a position of responsibility. In this backdrop, and having
regard to the institutional integrity of the bank, the competent authority
deemed it appropriate to subject the petitioner to a comprehensive medical
evaluation.
33. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner was referred to a duly constituted Medical
Board comprising expert psychiatrists attached to the Medical College and
Hospital, Kolkata, under the aegis of the Department of Health and Family
Welfare, Government of West Bengal. Upon examination, the Medical Board,
it was submitted, opined that the petitioner was suffering from a persistent
delusional disorder, rendering him unfit for continuation in service. The said
conclusion, embodied in the medical report dated January 28, 2016,
constituted a pivotal material forming the basis of subsequent administrative
action.
34. It was further urged that, in tandem with the medical assessment, the
petitioner’s service record was subjected to review by the competent
authorities. The Review Committee, upon consideration of the petitioner’s
overall performance, including adverse remarks regarding unsatisfactory
discharge of duties, concurred with the medical findings and formed the
opinion that the petitioner was no longer fit to be retained in service.
Consequently, in exercise of powers conferred under Regulation 19(1) of the

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United Bank of India (Officers’) Service Regulations, 1979, the Committee
recommended premature retirement in public interest.
35. It was further emphasised the statutory scheme expressly envisaged such a
course of action, permitting the bank, upon review by a duly constituted
committee, to retire an officer employee after attainment of the prescribed
age or length of service, where such retirement was considered necessary in
public interest. It was contended that the procedure contemplated under the
Regulations was scrupulously adhered to, including the constitution of a
Special Committee and the recording of its recommendation in writing.
36. Acting upon such recommendation, the competent authority, by order dated
March 22, 2016, directed the petitioner’s premature retirement,
accompanied by payment of three months’ salary in lieu of notice, as
mandated under the Regulations. The petitioner thereafter availed of the
statutory remedy of representation before the competent authority, which,
upon due consideration, was rejected and such rejection was duly
communicated to the petitioner.

37. It was further contended the petitioner’s challenge to the appellate process is
misconceived, inasmuch as the Board of Directors, being the apex
administrative authority of the bank, considered the representation and
affirmed the decision of the competent authority. The procedure thus
adopted, it was urged, satisfied the requirements of fairness and due
consideration embedded in the regulatory framework.
38. It was also contended that all admissible retiral benefits were duly disbursed
to the petitioner, and no further financial entitlement survived. The assertion

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that the petitioner had been wrongfully deprived of dues was, therefore,
emphatically denied.
39. In amplification, the respondents submit that the petitioner’s conduct,
viewed cumulatively with the medical findings and performance assessment,
warranted invocation of the power of premature retirement in public interest,
a measure preventive rather than punitive in character. The decision, it is
urged, cannot be equated with a disciplinary penalty, and therefore does not
necessitate adherence to the rigours of a full-fledged disciplinary proceeding.
40. Lastly, it is submitted that the merger of United Bank of India with Punjab
National Bank with effect from April 1, 2020, has no bearing on the legality
of the impugned action, which must be adjudged with reference to the
regulatory regime prevailing at the relevant point of time.
41. In culmination, the Learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the
impugned order of premature retirement is a lawful exercise of statutory
discretion, founded upon objective material and preceded by due process.
The writ petition, being devoid of merit and predicated upon unfounded
allegations, deserves to be dismissed.
42. The adjudicatory exercise in the present writ petition necessitates a
calibrated balance between the autonomy of administrative discretion and
the inviolable discipline of law. The controversy pivots not merely upon the
validity of an order of premature retirement, but upon whether the statutory
power under Regulation 19(1) of the United Bank of India (Officers’) Service
Regulations, 1979, as shaped by its underlying intent and subsequent

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notifications, has been exercised in a manner consistent with fairness,
transparency and constitutional fidelity.
43. The petitioner’s challenge proceeds on the assertion that the impugned
action is vitiated by arbitrariness, non-application of mind, violation of
natural justice and extraneous considerations, including alleged
discrimination. It is contended that the recommendation of the Special
Committee was mechanically accepted, that the material forming the basis of
the decision—particularly the medical report—was withheld, and that no
meaningful opportunity of representation was afforded. The petitioner
further emphasises his long tenure of service and the absence of any
disciplinary proceeding.
44. The respondents, in rebuttal, assert that the action was taken in public
interest, based on medical opinion indicating mental unfitness and a pattern
of conduct characterised by repeated and allegedly abusive complaints. It is
urged that such conduct disrupted institutional discipline and warranted
administrative intervention under Regulation 19(1).

45. At the outset, it is apposite to delineate the true import and legislative intent
of Regulation 19(1) of the United Bank of India (Officers’) Service
Regulations, 1979.
46. Regulation 19(1) of the United Bank of India (Officers’) Service Regulations,
1979 replicated as follows:-
19. Age of Retirement :

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(1) The age of retirement of an officer employee shall be as determined
by the Board in accordance with the guidelines issued by the
Government of India from time to time.
Provided that the bank may, at its discretion, on review by the Special
Committee/ Committees as provided hereinafter in Sub-Regulation (2)
retire, if it is considered necessary to do so in the public interest, an
officer employee on or at any time after the completion of 55 years of
age or on at any time after the completion of 30 years of total service
as an officer employee or otherwise whichever is earlier;
Provided further that before retiring an officer employee, at least three
months notice in writing or an amount equivalent to three months
substantive salary/pay and allowances, shall be given to such officer
employees;
Provided further that an officer aggrieved by the order of the Competent
Authority, as provided in Sub-Regulation (2) may within one month of
the passing of the order, give in writing, a representation to the Board
of Directors against the decision of Competent Authority, and on receipt
of such representation from the concerned officer, the Board of
Directors shall consider his representation and take a decision within a
period of three months. Where the Board of Directors decides that the
order passed by the Competent Authority is not justified, the concerned
officer shall be reinstated as though the Competent Authority has not
passed the order.
Provided also that nothing in this Regulation shall be deemed to
preclude an officer employee from retiring earlier pursuant to the option
exercised by him in accordance with the rules in the Bank.
Explanation. : An officer employee will retire on the last day of the
month in which he completes his age of retirement. Provided that, an
officer employee, whose date of birth is on the first day of the month,
shall retire from the service on the afternoon of the last day of the
preceding month on attaining the age of retirement.

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47. The said provision, read in conjunction with the scheme of the Regulations
and the notifications governing its operation, is designed as an instrument of
institutional discipline—enabling the employer to weed out inefficiency or
incapacity in public interest, while simultaneously insulating the process
from arbitrariness by mandating a structured review through a duly
constituted committee and an informed decision by the competent authority.
The notifications and explanatory clauses appended thereto accentuate such
power is not punitive in character. Such power is to be exercised sparingly,
upon objective assessment and bona fide satisfaction that the continuance of
the employee is not conducive to institutional interest. The discretionary
nature of the power does not render it unfettered; rather, it is circumscribed
by the principles of reasonableness, transparency and procedural fairness.
48. The requirement that an officer employee ordinarily retires on the last day of
the month in which he attains the age of superannuation, as clarified in the
explanatory framework, is not a mere procedural embellishment but reflects
a normative standard of uniformity and certainty. Any deviation therefrom
must, therefore, be justified by compelling reasons, discernible from the
record.
49. Firstly, the decision-making process betrays a conspicuous absence of
independent application of mind. The recommendation of the Special
Committee, which forms the substratum of the exercise under Regulation
19(1), has been adopted in a mechanical manner by the competent
authority. The endorsement “Approved as recommended”, devoid of any
analytical reasoning, does not satisfy the requirement of a conscious and

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reasoned satisfaction as envisaged under the Regulation and its governing
notifications. The intent of the regulatory framework is that the competent
authority must not act as a mere conduit, but as an active arbiter applying
its own judgment to the material placed before it.
50. Secondly, the reliance upon medical opinion, which appears to have been
treated as determinative, is vitiated by procedural impropriety. The medical
report, forming the bedrock of the decision, was not furnished to the
petitioner at the relevant stage. The notifications governing service
jurisprudence and the broader principles of administrative law require that
any material adverse to an employee must be disclosed to enable an effective
representation. The failure to do so has rendered the process fundamentally
unfair and violative of the principles of natural justice. The right to be heard
is rendered illusory if the affected party is not apprised of the material
forming the basis of the adverse action. Such non-disclosure vitiates the
process at its core. The petitioner, on repeated occasions, sought for a copy
of the Special Committee Recommendation and other communications
mentioned therein in the annexures to the writ petition and the same were
not supplied to him to his prejudice.
51. Thirdly, the impugned order and its affirmations suffer from a complete
absence of reasons. The regulatory intent, as reflected in the scheme of
Regulation 19(1) and its operational notifications, mandates that the
satisfaction of the authority must be demonstrable and not illusory. Reasons
are the only window through which such satisfaction can be judicially
assessed. Their absence renders the decision opaque and arbitrary.

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52. Fourthly, the deviation from the normative stipulation that retirement shall
take effect on the last day of the month has not been explained. The
petitioner was retired on 22.03.2016, prior to the completion of the month,
without any discernible urgency or justification. Such departure from the
explanatory framework of the Regulation, without recorded reasons,
undermines the very discipline sought to be maintained by the statutory
scheme.
53. Fifthly, while the respondents have sought to justify the action as one taken
in public interest, the concept of public interest, as embedded in Regulation
19(1), cannot be reduced to a subjective satisfaction untested by reason. It
must be founded upon credible material and must reflect a rational nexus
between the material and the conclusion. The record, in its present form,
does not satisfactorily establish such nexus.
54. Insofar as the allegations relating to caste and religion are concerned, this
Court reiterates that the constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 15 and
25 are not ornamental declarations but enforceable mandates. No
administrative action can be sustained if it is tainted by discrimination on
the ground of caste or if it impinges upon an individual’s freedom of
conscience and religion. While the materials on record do not conclusively
establish that the impugned decision was founded upon such impermissible
considerations, the very allegation reinforces the necessity for scrupulous
adherence to transparency and fairness in administrative processes.
55. Equally fundamental is the guarantee under Article 25, which secures to
every individual the freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise

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and propagate religion. The petitioner’s assertion regarding change of
religion, whether arising from personal conviction or otherwise, falls squarely
within the protective ambit of this constitutional guarantee. No adverse
administrative consequence can be predicated upon an individual’s choice of
faith. The State and its instrumentalities are constitutionally obligated to
maintain neutrality in matters of religion and to ensure that no
discrimination, direct or indirect, is occasioned on that ground.
56. While the material on record does not conclusively establish that the
impugned decision was directly founded upon considerations of caste or
religion, the presence of such allegations imposes a heightened duty upon
the administrative authority to act with scrupulous fairness, transparency
and objectivity. The failure to adhere to such standards, if any, further
undermines the credibility of the decision-making process.
57. The relevant portion of the Office Note No.PA(OE)/TP-21A/Review/164/2016
dated 18.03.2016 replicated as follows:-
“………
Regulation 19(2) of UBI(O) SR, 1979 inter alia states that no
order of retirement under Regulation 19(1) shall be made unless
the Special Committee recommendations in writing to the
competent authority the retirement of the officer employee.
Para 28 (C) of Administrative Instructions to UBI(O) SR, 1979 inter alia
states that General Manager (Personnel), presently the incumbent is
General Manager (HR & Training) , is the Competent Authority to
allow an officer in MMG SC III to retire as per Regulation 19(1) of UBI(O)
SR, 1979.

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In view of the above, the recommendation of Special Committee
effecting the retirement of Sri Tapan Biswas (SPF 20824), Senior
Manager, D&IR Division is placed before General Manager (HR &
Training) for his doing the needful.
It transpires that Sri Tapan Biswas (SPF 20824), Sr. Manager is in the
habit of using impetuous, abusive and derogatory language against the
Bank in his several communications with various
organizations/institutions and casting aspersion against the Bank. His
acts and beliefs are not expected from a person of normal prudence.
His attitude is evasive. He has gone to the extent of saying that his
colleagues are planning to kill/harm him while he was being examined
by the Medical Board. He is a constant source of agony, irritation and
annoyance in the work place.
We therefore propose that Sri Biswas, may be paid 3 months
substantive salary/pay and allowances in lieu of 3 months’ notice
required as per extant rule to retire an officer under Regulation 19(1) of
UBI(O) SR, 1979. The outstanding liability of Sri Biswas may be
adjusted from his retirement benefits.
……..”
58. The present writ petition, when examined in its full amplitude, raises an
ancillary yet a significant question – whether the perceived frustration of the
administrative authority arising out of the petitioner’s conduct in addressing
repeated and allegedly abusive or intemperate communications, can by itself
constitute a lawful ground for invoking the power of premature retirement
under Regulation 19(1) of the United Bank of India (Officers’) Service
Regulations, 1979.
59. Succinctly institutional discipline and decorum are indispensable to the
function of any public authority more so in a financial institution entrusted

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with public confidence. An ample discipline, one occupying a responsible
position, is expected to maintain a conduct befitting the office held. If the
petitioner had indeed engaged in a pattern of communications couched in
offensive, intemperate or unsubstantiated language, the same cannot be
countenanced as an appropriate conduct and would certainly justify
corrective administrative attention.
60. However, there is an obvious distinction between misconduct warranting
disciplinary action and unsuitability justifying premature retirement in
public interest. Regulation 19(1) as illuminated by its intent and
accompanying framework is not designed to serve as a substitute for
disciplinary proceedings. It is not an instrument disguised as an expeditious
recourse to expel the employee without adhering to the procedural
safeguards attendant to punitive action nor can it be invoked to penalize an
employee for conduct which, if objectionable, ought to be addressed within
the disciplinary regime.
61. Administrative frustration howsoever genuine cannot be elevated to a legal
precinct for exercise of statutory power unless it is translated into subjective
and objective material demonstrating that the continuance of service of the
employee is detrimental to the institutional as well as public interest. The
power under Regulation 19(1) as aforesaid must be exercised on the basis of
discernible criteria as enumerated therein mandatorily such as inefficient,
doubtful integrity or demonstrable incapacity and not on specific and/or
categorical irritation or institutional inconvenience.

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62. The Learned Advocate representing the respondents time and again
embarked upon the alleged misconduct of the petitioner, to the absolute
annoyance of his superiors and other staff in the bank unreasoned and
unwarranted communications abusively insinuating addressed to various
agencies to defame the individual and/or the institution for reasons and
interest within his exclusive cognitive domain which in a way propelled the
bank authorities to refer the petitioner to a Board of Doctors for medical
examination to determine his mental condition since the respondent bank
authorities failed to perceive and/or fathom such audacious, weird and
pugnacious act of the petitioner.
63. In the present case, the respondents have sought to justify the impugned
action, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner was in the habit of
lodging repeated complaints which were allegedly abusive and unfounded
thereby creating an atmosphere of disruption within the institution. While
such conduct, if established, may legitimately invite disciplinary scrutiny, it
cannot, in isolation, form the substratum of a decision to prematurely retire
an employee unless it is apparent on record that the same has a direct and
rationale nexus with his inability to discharge official duties or his
unsuitability to continue in service.
64. The materials on record do not disclose the respondent authorities to invoke
disciplinary mechanism against the petitioner in accordance with the service
rules of the bank to address such alleged misconduct. The absence of any
charge-sheet, enquiry or finding of misconduct assumes significance. The
recourse to Regulation 19(1) as aforesaid in such circumstances gives rise to

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a legitimate apprehension that the statutory power has been employed as a
convenient alternative to avoid the rigours of the disciplinary proceeding.
65. It is also to be borne in mind that an employee’s right to ventilate grievances,
even if expressed with dissatisfaction, cannot be altogether stifled, though
the manner of such expression must conform to norms of propriety. The line
between decent and misconduct is delicate and any administrative response
must be calibrated with caution lest it transgresses into suppression of
legitimate expression contrary to constitutional provision of freedom of
speech.
66. Thus, why this Court does not condone the use of abusive or intemperate
language in official communications, if any, does not equally consider to hold
that administrative displeasure or frustration, unaccompanying by objective
assessment within the framework of law, cannot be a valid ground to invoke
the power of premature retirement.
67. It is well settled that the writ Court does not act as an appellate authority
over administrative decisions. The scope of judicial review is confined to
examine the legality of the process. However, where the process is vitiated by
arbitrariness, non-application of mind, violation of natural justice or
deviation from statutory provisions, judicial intervention becomes not only
permissible but necessary to uphold the rule of law.
68. In the conspectus of the aforesaid, this Court is constrained to hold that the
impugned action does not withstand the scrutiny of law. The exercise of
power under Regulation 19(1) is vitiated by procedural impropriety, absence

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of reasoned satisfaction, non-disclosure of material, and reliance on
considerations extraneous to the statutory intent.
69. Accordingly, the order of premature retirement dated 22.03.2016, along with
all consequential and appellate orders, stands vitiated and is set aside.
70. The matter is remitted to the competent authority for fresh consideration in
accordance with law. The respondents shall furnish to the petitioner all
materials proposed to be relied upon, including medical reports and
committee recommendations, and shall afford him a reasonable opportunity
of representation. A reasoned and speaking order shall thereafter be passed.
71. It is made explicit that while reconsidering the matter, the authority shall
remain alive to the distinction between disciplinary misconduct and
administrative assessment under Regulation 19(1), and shall ensure that no
consideration violative of Articles 14, 15 or 25 of the Constitution influences
the decision.
72. This case stands as a reaffirmation of the principle that administrative
discretion, however wide, must operate within the disciplined confines of
legality, fairness and constitutional morality. The merger of the respondent
bank with Punjab National Bank does not abdicate its responsibilities in
dealing with the service records of the petitioner in its proper statutory
perspective.
73. In view of the above discussions, the instant writ petition being WPA 16800
of 2016 is disposed of.
74. There is no order as to costs.

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75. Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on
priority basis on compliance of all formalities.
(Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.)