Madhya Pradesh Madhya Kshetra Vidyut Vitaran Company Ltd. Thr. vs Dulari

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI
FIRST APPEAL No.11 of 2018
MADHYA PRADESH MADHYA KSHETRA VIDYUT VITARAN
COMPANY LIMITED
Versus
DULARI AND ANOTHER
Appearance:
Shri Narottam Sharma – learned counsel for the appellant.
Shri J.P. Mishra - learned counsel for the respondents.
Reserved on : 02/09/2026
Delivered on : 07/09/2026
JUDGMENT
1 . With the consent of learned counsel for parties, the matter is
heard finally.
2 . The appellant- Madhya Pradesh Madhya KshetraVidyut Vidyut
Vitran Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Company”) has filed
this first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure
challenging the judgment and decree dated 22/09/2017 passed by the
District Judge, Sheopur in Civil Suit No.400003-A/2015, whereby the
suit for grant of damages/compensation to respondent no.1 & 2 has
been decreed.
3 . For purposes of convenience, respondents are referred to as
'plaintiffs' and the appellantis referred to as 'defendant' as per their

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respective status in civil suit.
4 . The facts necessary for decision of this case are that one
Mangilal died of electrocution on 25/11/2009 at about 8 a.m. in
agriculture field near his house due to felling of live wire from 11 KV
electric pole. The plaintiffs are his parents. They filed the present civil
suit claiming compensation to the tune of Rs.32,00,000/- from the
defendant inter-alia on the ground of negligence on its part in
maintaining the electric line properly. The live electric wire fell down
on Mangilal which resulted in his death. The plaintiffs alleged that
defendant failed to keep supervision and maintenance of electric line
and is, thus, responsible for payment of compensation.
5 . The defendant/appellant filed its written statement denying the
plaintiffs' claim. It was its case that no incident, as alleged by plaintiffs,
took place. The incident happened inside the house of deceased while
he was repairing some electricity line. The defendant thus denied its
liability to pay any compensation. It also denied plaintiffs’ entitlement
to receive the amount towards compensation
6 . The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and
documentary evidence filed by the parties, partly decreed the suit
thereby directing payment of Rs.4,80,000/- towards compensation by
defendant together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the
date of filing of the suit till actual payment.
7 . The present appeal has been filed challenging the judgment and
decree passed by the learned trial Court.
8 . Shri Narrottam Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant
Company challenged the judgment and decree primarily on the ground

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that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the incident occurred in
agriculture field. As per his submission, the incident actually occurred
inside the house of Mangilal while he was repairing some electricity
line. He argued that the Company is not liable to pay compensation if
the incident happened inside the house. It is his further submission that
the deceased himself was responsible and negligent which is the cause
of accident. He, thus, submitted that trial Court erred in holding
defendant/appellant Company as responsible for payment of
compensation.
9 . Shri J.P. Mishra- learned counsel appearing for the
plaintiffs/respondentssupported the impugned judgment and decree. It
is his submission that the plaintiffs duly established their case by
leading oral and documentary evidence which remained un-rebutted by
defendant Company. As per his submission, no evidence contrary to
plaintiffs’ evidence is led, except oral denial of incident. He thus prayed
for dismissal of appeal.
10 . Considered the arguments and perused the record.
11 . Before adverting to the facts of this case, it is profitable to refer
to the Apex Court judgment rendered in the case of M.P. Electricity
Board v. ShailKumari reported in (2002)2 SCC 162 wherein the Court
held in paragraphs 8 to 13 as under:-
“8. Even assuming that all such measures have been
adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving
hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable
under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered
by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or
carelessness on the part of the managers of such
undertakings. The basis of such liability is the
foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such

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activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in
law, as “strict liability”. It differs from the liability
which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this
way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the
foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable
precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be
done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable
when the action is based on any negligence attributed.
But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict
liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective
of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by
taking precautions.
9. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English
common law when it was propounded in the celebrated
case of Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-
73) All ER Rep 1]. Blackburn, J., the author of the said
rule had observed thus in the said decision: (All ER p.
7E-F)
“The true rule of law is that the person who, for
his own purposes, brings on his land, and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do
mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril,
and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape.”
10. There are seven exceptions formulated by means of
case-law to the doctrine of strict liability. It is
unnecessary to enumerate those exceptions barring one
which is this: “Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was
caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule
does not apply.” (Vide p. 535, Winfield on Tort, 15th
Edn.)
11. The rule of strict liability has been approved and
followed in many subsequent decisions in England. A
recent decision in recognition of the said doctrine is
rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co.
Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc. [(1994) 1 All ER
53 (HL)] The said principle gained approval in India,

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and decisions of the High Courts are a legion to that
effect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in
CharanLalSahu v. Union of India [(1990) 1 SCC 613]
and a Division Bench in Gujarat SRTC v.
RamanbhaiPrabhatbhai [(1987) 3 SCC 234 : 1987 SCC
(Cri) 482] had followed with approval the principle in
Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All
ER Rep 1] . By referring to the above two decisions a
two-Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated the same
principle in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance
Co. Ltd. [(2001) 2 SCC 9 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 268].
12. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [(1987) 1 SCC
395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37] this Court has gone even
beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that: (SCC
p. 421, para 31)
Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or
inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on
anyone on account of the accident in the operation of
such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely
liable to compensate those who are affected by the
accident; such liability is not subject to any of the
exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the
rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73)
All ER Rep 1].
13. In the present case, the Board made an endeavour to
rely on the exception to the rule of strict liability
(Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All
ER Rep 1] ) being “an act of stranger”. The said
exception is not available to the Board as the act
attributed to the third respondent should reasonably
have been anticipated or at any rate its consequences
should have been prevented by the appellant-Board. In
Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. London Guarantee and
Accident Co. Ltd. [1936 AC 108 : 105 LJPC 18 : 154 LT
89] the Privy Council repelled the contention of the
defendant based on the aforecited exception. In that case
a hotel belonging to the plaintiffs was destroyed in a fire
caused by the escape and ignition of natural gas. The gas

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had percolated into the hotel basement from a fractured
welded joint in an intermediate pressure main situated
below the street level and belonging to the defendants
which was a public utility company. The fracture was
caused during the construction involving underground
work by a third party. The Privy Council held that the
risk involved in the operation undertaken by the
defendant was so great that a high-degree care was
expected of him since the defendant ought to have
appreciated the possibility of such a leakage.”
12 . From the aforesaid pronouncement of law by the Apex
Courtregarding strict liability, it is evident that the electricity board is
having strict liability irrespective of any negligence on its part.
13 . It is the specific case of plaintiffs that incident occurred due to
felling of live wire from 11 KV electric pole. This is established by
plaintiff by oral statement of plaintiff- Siyaram (PW-1) which is
supported by oral statement of one Badrilal (PW-2). The oral testimony
of plaintiffs is corroborated by documentary evidence which includes
the FIR (Ex. P/2) which was lodged on the same day at about 10 a.m.
without any delay by the brother of deceased Mangilal. The Police
prepared panchanama on the same day which is marked as Ex. P/3. The
incident has been narrated as it is as pleaded in plaint. Apart from the
above, the post mortem report is marked as Ex. P/10 which is duly
proved by Dr. Rajendra Kumar Jain which also establishes that the
death of Mangilal occurred due to electrocution.
14 . On the other hand, the defendant Company examined Shri R.S.
Bhadoriya, Junior Engineer in support of its case. This witness stated
that on oral information received by him, he visited the place of
incident alongwith line staff. However, no line staff is examined. This

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witness stated that he conducted an enquiry and prepared the report.
However, no such report is placed on record before the trial Court. The
witness then stated that the electric line is regularly maintained. The
record in this regard is also not produced. The trial Court has thus
rightly drawn adverse inference against the defendant Company.
15 . This Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 96 CPC
would not interfere with the findings recorded by trial Court if the view
taken is a probable view. The learned trial Court is the best forum to
appreciate the evidence led by parties and unless the view taken by trial
Court is shown to be perverse or so improbable that no prudent man
can take such a view, no interference is warranted in the appeal. From
the discussion made above, this Court is of the opinion that the findings
of trial Court are based on proper appreciation of evidence.
16 . In view of the aforesaid, the judgment and decree passed by the
trial Court is found to be just and proper advancing interest of justice
and is not liable to be interfered with in this appeal in absence of any
perversity shown.
17 . Consequently, this appeal fails and is, hereby, dismissed .
(ASHISH SHROTI)
JUDGE
rahul
RAHUL SINGH
PARIHAR
Digitally signed by RAHUL SINGH PARIHAR
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH AT GWALIOR,
2.5.4.20=eac942476567cd1b39b3da46068403462fdf82ab676d0cde4dee
473fe77953f5, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH AT
GWALIOR,CID - 7063520, postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh, serialNumber=0275c4f803f94c47998be5c534e21bded910fd4ab9d159b5
5575e814d05b2eed, cn=RAHUL SINGH PARIHAR
Date: 2026.09.08 10:50:25 +05'30'