Senior Intelligence Officer vs Mohammed Kamran
- Court
- Supreme Court
REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 1140
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL) NO. 7504 OF 2026]
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER …APPELLANT
VERSUS
MOHAMMED KAMRAN …RESPONDENT
O R D E R
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Senior Intelligence Officer, Directorate General of Service Tax
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Intelligence , challenges the judgment and order dated 26 December,
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2025 of a Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka , granting bail
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to Mohammed Kamran .
3. What is gleaned from the factual matrix is this. Appellant lodged a
private complaint before the Special Court for Economic Offences,
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Bengaluru against the respondent alleging commission of offences
Signature Not Verified
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appellant
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in Criminal Petition No. 16884 of 2025
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High Court
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respondent
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trial court
Digitally signed by
MANIK KUMAR
Date: 2026.10.16
17:24:34 IST
Reason:
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under Section 16(2)(b) read with Sections 132(1)(b), 132(1)(c) and
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132(1)(f) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 , punishable
under Section 135 thereof. The allegation in the complaint, inter alia ,
is that the respondent, being the proprietor of M/s MK Traders, issued
invoices without supply of goods, availed fraudulent input tax credit
and falsified documents and financial statements and furnished false
information to the appellant with an intent to evade payment of tax
under the CGST Act, thereby causing a loss of Rs. 43,08,22,936/-.
4. Apart from the challenge on merits to the grant of bail to the
respondent, it is the primary contention of the appellant that it was
not afforded any opportunity to present its case, much less sufficient
opportunity. According to the appellant, the High Court erroneously
recorded the name of the Special Public Prosecutor/Senior Standing
Counsel as having appeared representing the appellant when he was
not present in the country, let alone in the Court, on the relevant date;
that a request seeking adjournment, in view of absence of counsel,
was rejected by the Court; and that the application for bail was heard
and disposed of hurriedly during the winter vacation of the High Court.
5. It has also been alleged on behalf of the appellant that a search was
carried out at the declared residential premises of the respondent as
well as his actual residence, during which he offered stiff resistance
and ultimately fled from the spot. A separate FIR came to be registered
for this offence.
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CGST Act
2
th
6. On 16 September, 2025, the respondent was arrested. Successive
bail applications filed by him before the trial court as well as the
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Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge came to be rejected.
7. Respondent then filed the criminal petition before the High Court
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seeking bail. The petition was listed for the first time on 12 December,
2025; learned counsel for the respondent was directed to serve a copy
of the petition upon the Standing Counsel for the appellant; and the
appellant was directed to file its statement of objections within two
weeks.
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8. Though the winter vacation of the High Court commenced from 20
December, 2025, the criminal petition came to be listed promptly on
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26 December, 2025 pursuant to a memo moved by the learned
counsel for the respondent. A learned counsel for the appellant did
appear before the Single Judge. There are conflicting versions of what
transpired in Court, which we propose to note hereafter. The petition,
however, was allowed by the Single Judge by granting bail to the
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respondent. The order dated 26 December, 2025 granting bail is the
subject matter of challenge in this appeal.
9. We have heard Mr. N. Venkataraman, learned Additional Solicitor
General for the appellant and Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior
counsel for the respondent.
10. Mr. Venkataraman vehemently contends that the High Court ought not
to have heard the criminal petition in the first place, when a request
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Sessions Court
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for adjournment was made on behalf of the appellant citing the
absence of its arguing counsel. According to him, the learned counsel
who appeared before the Single Judge, though on the panel of the
appellant, had no instructions to contest the petition on merits, and
thus, had rightly sought an adjournment. Appellant having been
denied the opportunity of presenting its case to the fullest, he further
contends that principles of natural justice have been brazenly violated
in the process.
11. It is additionally brought to our notice by Mr. Venkataraman that on
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22 December, 2025, the respondent had instituted a writ petition
before the High Court challenging the legality of his arrest and seeking
quashing of the complaint filed before the trial court as well as the
order taking cognizance of the offences. An interim/ad-interim prayer
was also made in the writ petition seeking stay of further proceedings
and release on the ground that an application under Section 483 of the
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Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is not an efficacious
remedy. The disclosure made in the writ petition with regard to the
criminal petition, which was pending, reads thus:
35. the petitioner has filed Bail Petition for release under Section 483
of BNSS in Cr.P.No.46884/2025 but it is not efficacious and therefore
exercise of Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to
protect Fundamental Right is necessary, otherwise the petitioner will
suffer illegal detention which is in violation of Article 21 of the
Constitution.
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Writ Petition No. 38771 of 2025
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BNSS
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12. Mr. Venkataraman submits that not only was the prayer for ad-interim
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relief refused on 22 December, 2025, the writ petition was finally
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dismissed by an order dated 7 July, 2026; however, the respondent
never disclosed this fact of refusal of ad-interim relief to the Single
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Judge on 26 December, 2025.
13. Urging that a litigant like the respondent who left no stone unturned
to obtain bail by abusing the process of law should be dealt with firmly,
Mr. Venkataraman submits that the order granting bail is liable to be
set aside.
14. Per contra , Mr. Nagamuthu submits that the contention regarding
absence of the arguing counsel for the appellant was not taken before
the Single Judge. According to him, the learned Additional Solicitor has
not been appropriately instructed. In fact, the learned counsel
appearing before the Single Judge initially, faintly, sought an
adjournment; however, later on proceeded to address the Court on the
merits of the matter. That apart, the appellant miserably failed to file
its statement of objections within two weeks, as directed. Having failed
to avail such opportunity, it would be incorrect to claim that the
appellant was not adequately represented before the High Court or
that it was denied natural justice.
15. On merits, Mr. Nagamuthu submits that having regard to the nature of
allegations, the gravity of the offences allegedly committed, the long
incarceration of the respondent, the investigation having been
completed, the offences being Magistrate triable, and the maximum
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punishment that the offences attract is five years, this is not a case
where this Court ought to step in to curtail the liberty of an accused;
more particularly when in excess of nine months has elapsed since
then.
16. Mr. Nagamuthu, thus, prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
17. Ordinarily, we would have been inclined to dismiss the special leave
petition at the outset. However, notice was issued having regard to the
special facts and circumstances. A grievance had been raised that the
appellant was not heard by the High Court. Since the issue between
the parties has bearing on the twin questions of judicial propriety and
uberimma fides , we prefer to deal with the same.
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18. Vide our order dated 10 September, 2026 we permitted the appellant
to place on record the true and correct version of facts by filing an
additional affidavit, while also permitting a reply thereto to be filed by
the respondent.
19. Along with his reply affidavit, the respondent placed on record a pen
drive containing the recording of the hearing that took place on the
day the impugned order was passed. We have carefully perused the
affidavits as well as the video recording and the transcript thereof.
20. There appears to be merit in the submission of Mr. Nagamuthu that
the learned counsel representing the appellant, who was present on
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26 December, 2025 before the Single Judge, in fact, did advance
some submissions concerning the merits of the matter. However, it is
equally true that a request had been made by the learned counsel
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representing the appellant to adjourn hearing on the ground that the
Standing Counsel has been engaged to appear for the appellant. Since
adjournment was not granted, it seems that as an officer of the Court,
the learned counsel chose to assist the Single Judge by opposing the
prayer for bail. Thus, while on the one hand, it would not be entirely
correct to claim that the appellant was wholly unrepresented before
the Single Judge, on the other it stands to reason that the appellant
could not be represented by its Standing Counsel.
21. Having said so, what bothers us is the conduct of the respondent and
the manner in which he moved the High Court for an expedited hearing
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of his criminal petition on 26 December, 2025. In fact, not only has
he abused the process of law, he has suppressed material facts from
the High Court. There is clear lack of uberimma fides , which is the
foundation for invoking the equitable and discretionary jurisdiction for
grant of bail.
22. Respondent had filed the criminal petition before the High Court
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seeking bail on 9 December, 2025. On the day following, viz. 10
December, 2025, he filed a similar application seeking bail before the
Sessions Court. Such application came to be rejected at a point of time
when the criminal petition before the High Court was pending.
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Undeterred, on 22 December, 2025, the respondent challenged the
legality of his arrest by filing the writ petition. As noted, not only did
he seek quashing of the complaint filed before the trial court, he also
sought ad-interim stay of further proceedings and release from
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custody stating that the remedy of applying for bail under Section 483,
BNSS is not efficacious. Admittedly, a prayer for interim/ad-interim
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release was made on 22 December, 2025 in the writ petition before
the High Court, which came to be refused. Later in the day, a memo
seeking listing of the criminal petition came to be filed. This was
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allowed and the petition was directed to be listed on 26 December,
2025. Refusal of the prayer for ad-interim release was not disclosed to
the Single Judge who, having heard the parties and regard being had
to the nature of the case, proceeded to grant the respondent bail.
23. Mr. Venkataraman seems to be fully justified in highlighting that the
respondent has been crafty and disingenuous and in urged this Court
not to let the respondent off lightly, since he has abused the process
of law and suppressed material facts.
24. Two issues of substantial importance do arise in the present
circumstances.
25. First , pursuit of parallel remedies before various fora by the
respondent. He simultaneously pursued proceedings seeking
bail/release before the Sessions Court as well as in his writ petition
before the High Court while the criminal petition seeking bail before
the High Court was pending consideration. Rejection of the prayer for
bail (fourth in the series) by the Sessions Court as well as refusal by
the writ court to order release from custody were particularly not
brought to the notice of the High Court. The fact that the respondent
engaged in forum shopping is evident. Appellant, however, failed to
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place relevant materials on record by not filing its objections; may be,
the time was too short. Also, in view of the winter vacation that
followed and without having notice of the memo moved by the
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respondent for urgent listing of his criminal petition on 26 December,
2025, neither the appellant nor the learned counsel who appeared on
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26 December, 2025 on its behalf could bring all facts to the attention
of the Single Judge. Of utmost importance is that the respondent too
did not! He indulged in suppressio veri and suggestio falsi .
26. Respondent’s conduct in pursuing such parallel remedies, while
keeping all judicial authorities in the dark, must be severely
deprecated. It may be a right of the accused to challenge his arrest or
to approach a court seeking bail; however, such conduct of pursuing
remedies parallelly, particularly without adequate disclosure, clearly
amounts to abuse of the process of law.
27. Secondly , the criminal petition before the Single Judge was listed, upon
a memo having been moved by the learned counsel for the respondent,
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post 22 December, 2025, during the winter vacation of the High
Court. Ideally, in view of the earlier direction, the criminal petition
should have been listed upon reopening of the High Court after the
winter vacation particularly when such petition had not been made
returnable on a specific date falling during such vacation or the Single
Judge had not directed its listing before the Vacation Bench. To have
obtained listing of a petition, without adequate notice to the appellant,
was clearly an attempt to steal a march by even misleading the Court.
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28. Had it been a case of arrest for a heinous offence, we would have taken
a very strict view of the respondent’s conduct.
29. Be that as it may, regard being had to the entire turn of events, we
are of the view that though the bail granted by the High Court to the
respondent may not be set aside at this stage, certainly the matter
needs to be remitted to the Single Judge who had the occasion to deal
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with the criminal petition on 26 December, 2025 for its fresh
consideration.
30. Thus, we set aside that part of the impugned order whereby the
criminal petition stood disposed of with the result that the same shall
revive on the file of the High Court; and we direct that instead of the
bail granted by the Single Judge, the respondent shall continue to
remain on interim bail on earlier terms and conditions. Appellant is
granted liberty to place all materials on record by filing a counter
affidavit within two weeks, peremptorily. Respondent will have a
week’s time to file his rejoinder. The Single Judge shall, thereafter,
decide the criminal petition on its own merits, preferably by the end of
this year. Needless to observe, interim bail granted to the respondent
shall be operative till such time further orders are passed by the Single
Judge on the criminal petition.
31. The appeal stands disposed of on the above terms.
32. Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.
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33. Before parting, we wish to make certain observations on urgent listing
of matters, be it a petition or application or appeal, before a Bench of
a high court when the court is on vacation.
34. In cases of the present nature, where a Bench of a high court directs
listing of a petition “two weeks hence” and the day following expiry of
the period of “two weeks”, in terms of such direction, happens to fall
in the midst of a vacation, the period of two weeks should ordinarily
be computed by the registry of each such court excluding the period
during which the court is on vacation. However, if the petition is made
returnable on a specific date by the Bench which falls during the
vacation or the Bench directs listing before the Vacation Bench, such
petition should ideally be accordingly listed. This, of course, would be
subject to the relevant rules framed by the high courts.
35. These observations, aimed at serving the interest of justice better, are
essential to secure uniformity as well as to ensure that litigants are
not prejudiced due to an inadvertent act of the court.
…………………………………J.
DIPANKAR DATTA
..……………………………….J.
SHEEL NAGU
New Delhi;
October 16, 2026.
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