Soma Bhadra vs Prudence School Sector 16-B Dwarka And Ors

$~22
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 15.10.2026
# CNR No. DLHC011028392025
+ LPA 770/2025 & CM APPL. 79881/2025
SOMA BHADRA
W/O Mr. Sukanta Bhadra,
R/o 80L, Vasant Vihar,
New Delhi-110089 .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Khagesh B. Jha, Ms. Shikha
Sharma Bagga, Ms. Mahak Tyagi,
Advs.
versus
1. Prudence School, Dwarka
Through Manager/Principal
Sector -16B Dwarka
Phase-II, HAF Pocket –A
New Delhi-110075. .....Respondent No. 1
2. Florence Nightingale Educational Society
Through the Chairperson
Sector - 16 - B, Phase - II, HAF Pocket - A,
Dwarka, New Delhi – 110075. .....Respondent No. 2
3. Govt. of N.C.T. Of Delhi
Through Director Education,
Directorate Of Education,
Civil Lines, Old Secretariat,
Delhi-110054. .....Respondent No. 3
Through: Ms. Sarita Malhotra, Ms. Suman
Malhotra, Advs. for R-1 and 2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NISHA SAHAY SAXENA
J U D G M E N T
1. This Letters Patent Appeal assails the order dated 19.11.2025 passed by
the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 17585/2025, whereby the writ petition
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filed by the Appellant was dismissed and she was relegated to the remedy of
appeal under Section 8(3) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (“the
Act”), without any expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
2. The facts relevant for the purposes of this appeal are that the
Petitioner/Appellant was appointed as a Music Teacher in 2010 in the school
which is now run as Respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 is the society
running the school, and Respondent No. 3 is the Directorate of Education.
The Appellant resigned with effect from 30.09.2014 and was appointed again
on 02.01.2015. On 03.07.2025, the school called upon her to show that she
held the essential qualification for the post of Music Teacher on the date of
her appointment. A reminder followed on 11.07.2025, and she replied on
16.07.2025, under protest. By order dated 25.08.2025, the School Managing
Committee invoked Explanation (c) to Rule 117 of the Delhi School
Education Rules, 1973 (“the Rules”), and directed that her services “be
dispensed with immediate effect” and that she be replaced with a qualified
teacher. The Appellant challenged this order in the present writ petition.
3. A preliminary objection was raised that that the Petitioner/Appellant
has a remedy of statutory appeal. The learned Single Judge held that writ
jurisdiction is exercised, in spite of a statutory remedy of appeal, only in
exceptional cases. It further held that no case is made out to bring the matter
within those exceptions, as the order dated 25.08.2025 was passed after
issuance of a show cause notice, and the plea that no show cause notice was
issued itself raised a disputed question of fact. The learned Single Judge held
that Section 8(3) of the Act provides an appeal against dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank, and that the present case is covered by the word “removal”.
The writ petition was, therefore, dismissed, relegating the Appellant to the
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remedy of appeal, and it was clarified that no opinion had been expressed on
the merits.
4. Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the school itself treats
the order dated 25.08.2025 as a “replacement” under Explanation (c) to Rule
117, and not as a penalty. Since an appeal under Section 8(3) of the Act lies
only against dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, the Tribunal has no
jurisdiction. It is further submitted that no show cause notice was issued, and
the procedure under Section 8(2) of the Act and Rules 118 and 120 was not
followed. The case, therefore, falls within the exceptions for exercise of writ
jurisdiction. It is also urged that the appeal before the Tribunal is not an
efficacious remedy. On merits, it is argued that the Appellant now holds the
required qualification and is protected by Section 23(2) of the Right of
Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.
5. Learned counsel for the Respondents submits that the order dated
25.08.2025 brings the service of the Appellant to an end, and an appeal
against it lies to the Tribunal under Section 8(3) of the Act. The learned Single
Judge has, therefore, rightly declined to entertain the writ petition.
6. This is an intra-court appeal. We can only examine the correctness of
the impugned order. In The Management of Narendra & Company Private
Limited v. The Workmen of Narendra & Company , (2016) 3 SCC 340, the
Supreme Court held as under:
“5. … Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a finding of
fact, unless the appellate Bench reaches a conclusion that the
finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall not disturb the
same . Merely because another view or a better view is possible,
there should be no interference with or disturbance of the order
passed by the Single Judge, unless both sides agree for a fairer
approach on relief.”
(emphasis added)
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Recently, the Supreme Court in R. Saravanan v. Periyar University Rep by
its Registrar & Ors , 2026 INSC 1136, decided on 16.10.2026, held in
paragraph 29 that “Simply put, the Letters Patent Bench cannot interfere with
the decision rendered by the writ Court which is otherwise just and
reasonable”.
7. It is relevant to note Sections 8(3) of the Act, which reads as under:
(3) Any employee of a recognised private school who is
dismissed , removed or reduced in rank may, within three
months from the date of communication to him of the order of
such dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, appeal against
such order to the Tribunal constituted under Section 11 .”
8. The Explanation to Rule 117 of the Rules, on which the school relies,
reads as under:
“Explanation:- The following shall not amount to a penalty
within the meaning of this rule, namely:—
(a) stoppage at the efficiency bar on the ground of unfitness to
cross the bar;
(b) retirement of the employee in accordance with the
provisions relating to superannuation or retirement;
(c ) replacement of a teacher, who was not qualified at the date
of his appointment, by a qualified one ;
(d) discharge of an employee appointed on a short-term
officiating vacancy caused by the grant of leave, suspension or
the like.”
9. The argument of the Appellant is that a replacement under Explanation
(c) is not a penalty, and thus it is not a “dismissal, removal or reduction in
rank” under Section 8(3). This very argument, based on the same Explanation
(c), was raised before the Supreme Court in Shashi Gaur v. NCT of Delhi
and Ors. , (2001) 10 SCC 445, and was rejected. The Supreme Court held:
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“8 . In this view of the matter, we are persuaded to take the
view that under subsection (3) of Section 8 of the Act, an
appeal is provided against an order not only of dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank, which obviously is a major
penalty in a disciplinary proceeding, but also against a
termination, otherwise except, where the service itself comes
to an end by efflux of time for which the employee was
initially appointed . Therefore, we do not find any infirmity with
the order of the High Court not entertaining the writ
application in exercise of its discretion though we do not agree
with the conclusion that availability of an alternative remedy
ousts the jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 of the
Constitution.”
(emphasis added)
The abovesaid is also followed in Sunil Sikri v. Guru Harkrishan Public
School , (2022) 16 SCC 85.
10. Thus, an appeal under Section 8(3) of the Act lies not only against
dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, but also against a termination,
otherwise except, where the service comes to an end by efflux of time. The
order dated 25.08.2025 directs that the services of the Appellant “be
dispensed with immediate effect”. Her service has not come to an end by
efflux of time. The order is, therefore, appealable under Section 8(3),
whatever name the school gives it. The objection to the maintainability of the
appeal before the Tribunal, that the school may raise, stands answered by
Shashi Gaur (supra). The view of the learned Single Judge that the Appellant
has a remedy of appeal is correct, and we find no illegality in it.
11. So far as submission of the Appellant that no show cause notice was
issued and that the principles of natural justice were violated which makes out
a case for exercise of writ jurisdiction, is concerned, it is settled law that
exercise of writ jurisdiction is discretionary. In Whirlpool Corporation v.
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Registrar of Trademarks ,(1998) 8 SCC 1, relied upon by the learned Single,
the Supreme Court held:
“15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court,
having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to
entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High
Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of
which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is
available, the High Court would not normally exercise its
jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently
held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three
contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed
for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or
where there has been a violation of the principle of natural
justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a
plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle
of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of
the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still
hold the field.”
12. The order dated 25.08.2025 records as under:
“AND WHEREAS, Show Cause Notice was issued to Ms. Soma
Bhadra, Music Teacher vide letter dated 03.07.2025 calling
upon her to confirm whether she possessed the mandatory
qualifications prescribed by the Directorate of Education,
Government of NCT of Delhi/ Delhi Subordinate Services
Selection Board (DSSSB) as prescribed in the Recruitment
Rules for the post of Music Teacher at the time of her
appointment/re-appointment in Presidium School, Sector-16B,
Dwarka, New Delhi and if so, to submit documentary proof in
support of her claim within seven (07) days from the date of
receipt of the Notice for further appropriate action in the
matter.”
13. The learned Single Judge noted in paragraph 7 of the impugned order
that “The impugned order was passed after issuance of SCN”, and in
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paragraph 8 that the plea of no notice “itself raises a disputed question of
fact”. We find no illegality in this part of the impugned order either.
14. As regards the efficacy of the remedy, the Supreme Court in paragraph
7 of Shashi Gaur (supra) has held that the appeal to the Tribunal “is
undoubtedly a more efficacious remedy to an employee whose services stand
terminated after serving the institution for a number of years”. The
Appellant’s case is no different.
15. The pleas regarding the present qualification of the Appellant and the
protection under Section 23(2) of the Right of Children to Free and
Compulsory Education Act, 2009 go to the merits. The learned Single Judge
did not go into them, and we too express no opinion on them. These pleas are
left open to be raised before the Tribunal.
16. We, therefore, find no illegality or perversity in the impugned order
dated 19.11.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 17585/2025.
The same is affirmed, and the present appeal is dismissed.
17. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
VIVEK CHAUDHARY
(JUDGE)
NISHA SAHAY SAXENA
(JUDGE)
OCTOBER 15, 2026
NC
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