Bhupesh Bhayana vs Kunal Seth
- Court
- Supreme Court
Non-reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2026 INSC 546
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. ………… & ………… OF 2026
(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. ............... & ............. of 2026)
(@ Diary No. 20732 of 2024)
Bhupesh Bhayana and another Appellants
versus
Kunal Seth and another Respondents
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KUMAR, J
Leave granted.
1.
Arbitration proceedings dating back to September, 2012, culminated
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in cross appeals by both parties under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
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Conciliation Act, 1996 . The common judgment dated 27.09.2023 passed
in the said appeals by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court is presently
under challenge by one of the parties.
3. By order dated 10.07.2024, this Court directed the appellants to
deposit ₹50,00,000/- before the High Court without prejudice to their rights
and contentions. Disbursal of that amount to the respondents was made
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Deepak Guglani
Date: 2026.05.26
15:27:28 IST
Reason:
subject to the final outcome of these cases. On 05.12.2025, this Court
stayed further proceedings in OMP(ENF)(COMM) No. 54 of 2024, the
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hereinafter, ‘the Arbitration Act’
execution petition filed by the respondents before the Delhi High Court in
relation to the arbitral award in question.
4. The genesis of this litigation is the agreement dated 09.04.2010
entered into by the father of appellant No.1, late Sudershan Kumar
Bhayana, and his mother, Kiran Bhayana, appellant No.2, with late Vinod
Seth, the father of respondent No.1 and husband of respondent No.2. This
agreement entailed reconstruction of the old building belonging to the
Bhayanas (for short, ‘the owners’) by Vinod Seth (for short, ‘the builder’),
whereupon he was entitled to retain the second floor without roof rights.
The builder was also required to pay ₹64,00,000/- to the owners, in
instalments, as earnest money and compensation.
5. Clause 7 of the agreement posited completion of the project within
12 months after providing the vacant land with a grace period of 2 more
months and, thereafter, the builder had to pay penalty @ ₹10,000/- per
day to the owners for the delayed period. Clause 13 provided for penalties
in the event of breach of the agreement. It stated that if the owners
committed breach of the agreement, they would be liable to pay double
the earnest money and if the builder committed breach of the agreement,
the earnest money and compensation amount would stand forfeited.
6. Out of the total sum of ₹64,00,000/- to be paid by him, the builder
paid only ₹45,00,000/-, as the remaining ₹19,00,000/- was payable by him
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within fifteen days of laying the 4 lanter (slab) of the building, which never
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came to pass. Admittedly, construction of the building was abandoned by
the builder in August, 2011, after the basement, stilt and ground floors and
chajja were built. The owners terminated the agreement on 11.11.2011.
7. Clause 6 of the agreement provided that, in case of any dispute
regarding the agreement by or between the parties, the matter shall be
referred to the arbitrators to be appointed by both the parties with mutual
consent. The builder invoked this arbitration clause by his notice dated
26.12.2011. He then approached the Delhi High Court by way of an
application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act in OMP No. 482 of 2012.
As both the parties were agreeable to their disputes being referred to an
arbitrator appointed by the Court, the High Court passed order dated
21.09.2012 appointing a sole arbitrator to adjudicate their disputes.
Further, as the owners expressed willingness to maintain status quo till
the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings as regards the second floor of
the building, as and when it was constructed, the High Court directed that
the second floor, as and when it was constructed, should not be alienated,
disposed of or dealt with, during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings,
and that the same would be without prejudice to the rights and contentions
of either party.
8. Upon completion of the arbitral proceedings, wherein both parties
raised claims against each other, the Arbitrator passed Award dated
21.10.2013. Therein, he held that there was a clear breach of the
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agreement by the builder and that the owners were entitled to payment of
penalty, under Clause 7 of the agreement, @ ₹10,000/- per day from
09.04.2011, the date of expiry of the stipulated 12-month period, till
08.04.2013, i.e., for 2 years, being the likely completion period as per the
owners, totalling to ₹72,00,000/-. Dealing with the counter claim of the
builder, who had asserted that he had incurred huge expenses for the
construction made, the Arbitrator noted that he had not filed proof of
incurring expenditure of ₹36,92,400/- but the owners had not contested
his claim in that regard. Further, the Arbitrator noted that the earnest
money and compensation amount of ₹45,00,000/- was still lying with the
owners but opined that, as damages were being awarded to them, they
could not seek forfeiture of that amount. The builder was held entitled to
₹81,92,400/- (₹36,92,400+₹45,00,000). He was, however, denied interest
thereon. The owners, therefore, had to pay ₹9,92,400/- to the builder.
Only the builder filed an application in OMP No. 1125 of 2014 before
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a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court, under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, assailing the Award dated 21.10.2013. This application
was disposed of by order dated 15.04.2019, whereby the award was
upheld with modifications. The learned Judge noted that the builder had
constructed the basement; stilt parking; ground floor and chajja by
September, 2011, and had claimed construction costs @ ₹900/- per
square foot for the basement and ₹600/- per square foot for the remaining
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area. It was noted that the Arbitrator had accepted the claim of the builder
in this regard and, as the owners had not challenged the award by way of
an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the learned Judge
held that she had no choice but to confirm the award to that extent.
The learned Judge noted that Clause 13 of the agreement provided
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for forfeiture of the earnest money and compensation for a breach by the
builder but the Arbitrator had only awarded compensation under Clause 7
of the agreement. She noted that the construction continued till August,
2011, and held that the commencement date for award of compensation
adopted by the Arbitrator, i.e., 09.04.2011, was without basis as it should
be 09.08.2011. Further, she held that the Arbitrator erred in applying a two
year-period to quantify the compensation as the agreement stipulated 12
months plus 2 months for completion of the project. The learned Judge,
accordingly, modified the period for which compensation was payable as
09.08.2011 to October, 2012, when the claim statement was filed.
Sudershan Kumar Bhayana and Vinod Seth having expired, their
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legal representatives assailed the aforestated order of the learned Judge
by way of separate appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
FAO (OS) No.132 of 2019 was filed by Bhupesh Bhayana and his mother,
Kiran Bhayana, while FAO (OS) No. 204 of 2019 was filed by Kunal Seth
and his mother, Sarita Seth. These appeals came to be disposed of by the
impugned judgment dated 27.09.2023. Therein, a Division Bench of the
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Delhi High Court noted that the learned Judge, in exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, had modified the award by
substituting her own decision. The Division Bench opined that this
approach was fundamentally flawed, being beyond the scope of Section
34 of the Arbitration Act. The Bench noted that the award stood altered
only to the extent of reducing the compensation in favour of the owners
from ₹72,00,000/- to ₹42,00,000/-. The Bench was of the opinion that the
learned Judge’s order was unsustainable even on merits. It was noted that
the appeal of the owners was only in relation to reduction of the
compensation payable to them as they had, otherwise, accepted the
award. However, as the owners had not adduced any evidence in proof of
the actual damage suffered by them, the Bench opined that it could not
concur with the view of the learned Judge that they were entitled to
damages. The Bench observed that the owners had not made any
categorical averment that the delay, by itself, had resulted in their suffering
any damage and they had only relied upon Clause 7 of the agreement to
claim the same. Noting that Clause 7 of the agreement could, at best, form
a measure of damages to be awarded, the Bench observed that such
damages could only be for the period of delay in the completion of
construction but as the owners had terminated the agreement on
11.11.2011, prior to the expiry of the stipulated period, the owners would
not be entitled to damages beyond that date. In consequence, the Bench
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set aside the award of damages to the owners in totality. Only the
acceptance, in part, of the builder’s counter claim by the Arbitrator was
upheld, as the owners had not even called it in question. The appeals
were disposed of accordingly. Hence, these appeals by the owners.
At this stage, we may note certain crucial factual aspects. The
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owners did not seek setting aside of the award and accepted it in its
entirety. In terms thereof, their right to enforce forfeiture of the builder’s
earnest money and compensation amount, under Clause 13 of the
agreement, stood extinguished as the Arbitrator denied them that relief
despite recording a clear finding that there was breach of the agreement
by the builder. The Arbitrator had opined that damages under Clause 7 of
the said agreement would suffice and did not permit the forfeiture under
Clause 13 thereof, on the ground that it would amount to penalising the
builder twice. It is on this reasoning that the Arbitrator had directed refund
of the sum of ₹45 lakh paid by the builder. As the owners did not choose
to challenge this direction of the Arbitrator and it was only the builder who
sought setting aside of the Award, being aggrieved by the damages
awarded to the owners, this issue stands settled and cannot be reopened.
13. Thereafter, the learned Judge who decided the builder’s application
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act reduced the compensation payable
by the builder to the owners, by way of her order dated 15.04.2019. She
concluded that as the agreement itself allowed 12 months to complete the
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construction and a further 2 months were granted as grace period,
compensation would be payable to the owners only from 09.08.2011,
when the construction activity was abandoned by the builder, till October,
2012, when the claim petition was filed. While so, dealing with the cross
appeals filed by both parties, the Division Bench of the High Court
completely reversed the view taken by the learned Judge and the
Arbitrator, holding that the claim of the owners was unfounded as they had
failed to adduce any evidence of the damage suffered by them and they
were, therefore, disentitled to seek any compensation.
14. The power of the Courts to set aside an arbitral award in exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and, thereafter, under
Section 37 thereof, is circumscribed by the grounds set out in Section 34.
Pertinently, a domestic arbitral award may be set aside under Section
34(2A) of the Arbitration Act if the Court finds that it is vitiated by patent
illegality appearing on the face of it. As was pointed out by a Costitution
2
Bench in ,
Gayatri Balasamy vs. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited
modification and setting aside of an arbitral award have different
consequences as the former alters the award while the latter annuls it. It
was observed that modification would not inevitably lead to examination
of the merits of the dispute and it would depend upon the extent of the
2
(2025) 7 SCC 1
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modification made, with the ultimate object of yielding more just outcomes.
It was held that denying Courts the authority to modify an award,
particularly when such denial would impose significant hardship, escalate
costs, and lead to unnecessary delays, would defeat the raison d'être of
arbitration. This concern, it was noted, is particularly pronounced in India,
where applications under Section 34 and appeals under Section 37 often
take years to resolve. It was held that modification represents a limited,
nuanced power in comparison to annulment of an award, as the latter
would entail the more severe consequence of the award being voided in
toto. As regards Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, it was held that the
appellate jurisdiction thereunder is coterminous with and as broad as the
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 thereof.
15. Having given our earnest consideration to the matter in the light of
the above edict, we are of the opinion that the Division Bench’s conclusion
as to the disentitlement of the owners to damages was not correct. The
agreement was executed on 09.04.2010, whereunder the builder was to
complete the project within the stipulated time frame. In this regard,
Clause 7 is of relevance and it reads as follows:
‘7. That the time period fixed from starting to end i.e. upto finishing upto
third floor, with all easement is 12 month or earlier after providing the
vacant land and a further grace period of two months can be given. After
wards second party will pay Rs. 10,000/- per day as penalty to the first first
party apart from what so ever the reason may be for the delayed period.
…...’
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16. In terms of the above clause, the crucial factor for commencement
of the initial 12-month period is the date on which the vacant land is
provided to the builder. However, this aspect was completely lost sight of
by both the Courts that dealt with the matter. In his written statement filed
before the Arbitrator, the builder asserted that the owners vacated the
building one month after the agreement dated 09.04.2010 and the builder
got the building demolished thereafter, which took about two months. The
builder reiterated these assertions in his counter claim also. There was no
rebuttal by the owners on these aspects. Even in his affidavit-in-evidence,
late Sudershan Kumar Bhayana did not deny the assertions made by the
builder as to the aforestated time frames. He merely stated that the 12
months with a grace period of 2 months would be with effect from
09.04.2010, the date of the agreement itself, which is contrary to what was
stated in Clause 7 therein.
As per the time frames put forth by the builder, which remained
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uncontroverted, the date for commencement of the 12-month period
would be 09.07.2010, when the vacant land was actually made available
to him after demolition of the existing building. As the 12-month period
commenced on that day and a further grace period of 2 months was
allowed to him, the stipulated 14 months expired on 09.09.2011, by which
date, the construction had stopped. The entitlement to penalty under
Clause 7 of the agreement would, therefore, be only from 09.09.2011.
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18. It is an admitted fact that the owners terminated the agreement on
11.11.2011, after the construction was stopped by the builder. Upon such
termination, the builder could not have continued with the construction.
Logically, after such termination, the owners also cannot seek
compensation under the contractual clause which provided for payment
of penalty for the ‘delayed period’. It is not in dispute that the owners failed
to adduce independent evidence of having suffered damage in the context
of the breach on the part of the builder, either in terms of increase in
construction costs or in terms of loss of revenue. That would have,
perhaps, laid foundation for a claim for damages outside of and beyond
Clause 7 of the agreement. In the absence thereof, their claim for penalty
under Clause 7 could be only till the date of termination of the agreement,
i.e., 11.11.2011. in effect, the owners’ entitlement to contractual penalty
under Clause 7 of the agreement would be from 09.09.2011 till 11.11.2011.
At the rate of ₹10,000/- per day, they would be entitled to a sum of
₹6,30,000/- for this period of 63 days.
Further, when the agreement categorically stipulated timelines for
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the commencement and completion of the construction and the
consequences that were to follow thereupon, it was not necessary for the
owners to adduce evidence separately in proof of the actual damage
suffered by them owing to the breach of the agreement on the part of the
builder. The very fact that the contractual clause itself envisioned payment
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of penalty on a day-to-day basis for the delayed period indicated that the
damage suffered by the owners was implicit therein. The Division Bench
was, therefore, in error in holding that the owners would be disentitled to
compensation on the ground that they failed to adduce evidence
separately, in proof of having suffered damage or loss. This conclusion
was opposed to the explicit covenant in the agreement and cannot be
accepted. Therefore, non-suiting of the owners’ claim on that ground by
the Division Bench was manifestly erroneous and cannot be sustained.
20. Lastly, we may note that the Arbitrator categorically held that the
builder would not be entitled to any interest, despite his prayer in the
counter claim for award of interest @ 12% per annum. Notably, the builder
did not raise a grievance as to the denial of interest in his application filed
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. In consequence, the learned Judge
who dealt with the said application made no reference to that issue in her
order dated 15.04.2019. Significantly, it was only in the appeal filed under
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, that the legal representatives of the
builder voiced a prayer for grant of interest upon the counter claim
amount, though no pleading was made in the body of the appeal in that
regard. The Division Bench, however, did not grant them any relief insofar
as the interest issue is concerned and no appeal has been preferred by
the legal representatives of the builder before this Court. It is, therefore,
not open to them to seek interest on the amount payable to them.
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21. On the above analysis, at the cost of repetition, we find that the
Award dated 21.10.2013 was patently illegal in more ways than one. The
Arbitrator ought not to have denied the owners their just deserts under
both the contractual clauses, viz., Clause 7 and Clause 13 of the
agreement dated 09.04.2010. When the contract itself contemplated that
they would be separately recompensed for the delay in construction, on
the one hand, and for the breach of the agreement, on the other, under
these two clauses, it was not for the Arbitrator to grant them relief only
under Clause 7 and deny them the right of forfeiture under the other
clause, viz., Clause 13. This being the correct construction of the
agreement clauses, the contrary and inconsistent interpretation by the
Arbitrator constitutes a patent illegality under Section 34(2A) of the
Arbitration Act. However, despite this patent illegality writ large on the face
of the award, the owners did not choose to file an application under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act in that regard. Therefore, the award
attained finality insofar as this issue is concerned.
Further, the Arbitrator committed an error in computing the period
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for which penalty under Clause 7 of the agreement was payable. The
wrong dates adopted by the Arbitrator in this regard were taken note of by
the learned Judge exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, but she added to the said blunder by adopting equally
erroneous dates for computing the penalty period. The Division Bench that
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exercised appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act
further compounded the matter by altogether denying the entitlement of
the owners to penalty under Clause 7 on the ground that they had failed
to adduce evidence of actual damage suffered by them.
Insofar as the builder’s counter claim is concerned, we may note
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that his entitlement to refund of the earnest money and compensation
amount of ₹45,00,000/- stood confirmed, as the owners did not choose to
challenge the same. The builder was also held entitled to the construction
costs of ₹36,92,400/-, as his claim in that regard was never controverted
by the owners. However, as regards the denial of interest upon the said
sums, it was only before the Division Bench that a feeble prayer was made
for award of interest, without any foundational pleading. Denial of that
relief by the Division Bench is now final as no further appeal has been
preferred before this Court by the respondents.
Though the award, being patently illegal, deserves to be set aside
24.
under Section 34(2A) of the Arbitration Act, we are of the opinion that
doing so would not be in the interest of justice, given the fact that the
parties have been litigating since the year 2012. Setting aside the award
at this stage would mean that they would again have to start afresh. As
was pointed out in Gayatri Balasamy ( supra ), when setting aside an
award would impose significant hardship and lead to unnecessary delay,
it would be open to the Court to modify the award within the guardrails
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stipulated in the said judgment. Further, it was also held therein that this
Court’s power under Article 142 of the Constitution can be used to effect
substantial justice between the parties instead of relegating them to a
fresh round of litigation. We, therefore, exercise our power under Article
142 of the Constitution so as to give a quietus to the dispute between the
parties in the light of what has been stated hereinabove.
In consequence, the appellants are held entitled to penalty of
25.
₹6,30,000/- and the respondents are held entitled to refund of
₹81,92,400/-. Deducting ₹6,30,000/- payable to the appellants therefrom,
the amount payable to the respondents would be ₹75,62,400/-. As a sum
of ₹50,00,000/- has already been disbursed to them, pursuant to the order
passed by this Court in the present appeals, the balance payable by the
appellants to the respondents is ₹25,62,400/-. No interest can be claimed
by either party on the amounts payable to them.
The appeals are disposed of in the aforestated terms.
Parties shall bear their own costs.
Pending applications stand disposed of.
……………………...J
[SANJAY KUMAR]
.……………………...J
[K. VINOD CHANDRAN]
New Delhi;
May 26, 2026.
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