ALOK CHAKRABORTY AND ORS vs UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

Form No. J(2)

In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side






Present: The Hon‟ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon‟ble Justice Sandip Kumar De








MAT 1294 of 2025

Alok Chakraborty and others
Vs.
Union of India and others





For the appellants : Mr. Partha Sarathi Bhattacharya, Snr. Adv.,
Mr. Shahan Shah,
Ms. Iqra Rahaman

For the respondent
nos.1 to 6, 10, 11 & 13 : Mr. Debajyoti Deb,
Mr. Debashish Basak
:

Heard on : 03.09.2026


Judgment on : 03.09.2026











Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-



1. The present appeal assails an order passed by the writ court whereby
the appellants‟ writ petition, challenging an eviction notice issued by
the railway authorities, was dismissed.
2. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants argues that on
two earlier occasions, the appellants had moved writ petitions against
similar notices. In the first instance, the notice was stayed and the

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railway authorities were directed to consider the representation of the
appellants. Subsequently, the appellants, who represent the hawkers
in a railway property at Chandanpur, were given a hearing, upon
which an order was passed against them, which was again assailed
before the writ court. The second writ petition culminated in an order
whereby the railway authorities were directed to give another
opportunity of hearing to the appellants and to pass a reasoned order.
3. Pursuant thereto, the respondent authorities passed a speaking order
on October 17, 2023, wherein it was categorically observed that the
appellants could not submit authentic documents for doing their
business on premises of the railway land at Chandanpur Railway
Station areas. It was further observed that the Railway authority had
not given permission to the appellants for registration of the
cooperative society named Chandanpur Bazar Railway Premises
Shopper Cooperative Society Limited (the present appellant no.2).
4. Without permission of the Railway, it was observed, the Government
of West Bengal had no right to issue the registration certificate for
business on railway premises at Chandanpur Railway station areas
for those petitioners.
5. Thereafter, on August 01, 2025, an eviction cum show cause notice
was issued by the railway authorities, which was assailed before the
learned Single Judge.
6. Learned senior counsel for the appellants argues that, although
couched as a show cause notice, the impugned notice dated August
01, 2025 did not give any opportunity of hearing to the appellants but

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directed the members of the appellants society to peacefully remove
all their structures, allegedly unauthorized, from railway land
outright, failing which an eviction programme was scheduled on
August 18, 2025.
7. Learned senior counsel argues that by dint of the said notice, all
norms of natural justice have been squarely violated.
8. Learned senior counsel next argues that the procedure as enumerated
in Sections 4 and 5 of the West Bengal Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (for short, “the 1971 Act”) are
mandatorily to be adhered to before evicting the members of the
appellants. However, no steps were taken under the said statute by
the Railway authorities, thereby vitiating the impugned notice.

9. Learned senior counsel argues that although Section 147 of the
Railways Act, 1989 (for short, “the 1989 Act”) may authorize the
Railway authorities to remove trespassers, the appellants cannot be
labelled as rank trespassers.
10. In support of such contention, learned senior counsel places reliance
on a communication dated February 21, 2006 by the Divisional
Engineer (ARBN)/Howrah to the Chief Promoter of the Chandanpur
Bazar Railway Premises Shoppers‟ Cooperative Society Ltd. (appellant
no.2 herein) to the effect that the Railway authorities requested the
appellants to submit proper documents regarding the formation of the
registered cooperative society to the Railway authorities. It was
admitted in the said document that the same was issued in
connection with an application made by the appellants proposing to

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do business on spareable railway land on cooperative basis in the
vicinity of Chandanpur Railway Station.
11. Thus, by asking for proper documents regarding the formation of a
registered cooperative society, in principle, the Railway authorities
had acceded to the request of formation of a cooperative society and
doing business on the railway premises, subject only to such
registration. It is submitted that such registration was subsequently
obtained and, as such, the members of the appellants are lawful
occupiers of the railway property concerned.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the railway authorities places reliance
on a judgment dated July 22, 2024 passed by a learned Single Judge
of this Court in WPA 18248 of 2024 where, under similar
circumstances, it was held that under Section 147 of the Railways
Act, 1989, the Railway authorities are permitted to remove
trespassers/encroachers from railway property even without taking
resort to the 1971 Act.
13. Learned counsel further argues that the said judgment was
challenged before a Division Bench which, vide judgment dated
August 21, 2024, upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge and
dismissed the appeal. The matter went up to the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court which, by its order dated March 28, 2025, also affirmed the
orders passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division
Bench, holding that the Bench did not see any illegality in the eviction
order issued by the Railway authorities for removing the

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encroachment from their land, including the shops run by the
petitioner-society or its members therein.
14. Learned counsel appearing for the Railway authorities also cites the
judgment of another learned Single Judge of this Court, reported at
2006 (2) Cal LJ 193 (G. Phalaguna vs. General Manager) , where it was
categorically observed that in the face of the clear and unambiguous
provisions of Section 147(2) of the 1989 Act, there is no scope at all to
hold that without initiating necessary proceeding against all the
occupants of the area under provisions of the 1971 Act, the Railway
authorities would not be entitled or empowered to evict or remove all
or any of such unauthorized occupants. It was further observed that
by employing Article 21 of the Constitution of India, as had been
sought to be done by the petitioners therein, neither the scope of the
provisions of Section 147(2) of 1989 Act can be enlarged or curtailed,
nor can a fundamental right of the unauthorized occupants be
canvassed and enforced.
15. Learned counsel next relies on the judgment of Subrata Ghosh vs.
Union of India and others, rendered by a learned Single Judge of this
Court as well, reported at 2019 (2) CHN 62 , where the self-same
principle was reiterated.
16. It is further contended by the Railway authorities that the
communication dated February 21, 2006 was merely an insistence by
the railway authorities for documents regarding registration of the
appellant no.2-cooperative society to be produced by the appellants

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for the purpose of processing the application of the appellants for
doing business.
17. It is further submitted that from a communication dated January 09,
2007 issued by the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies,
Hooghly to the Divisional Railway Manager, Howrah Division, Eastern
Railway, it would be evident that the Assistant Registrar of
Cooperative Societies requested the Railway authorities to issue a „no
objection‟ certificate for running/using necessary land to the
appellant no. 2 society after registration, thereby admitting that the
same was required prior to such registration from the end of the
Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Hooghly.
18. It is submitted that no such permission or „no objection‟ was ever
issued by the Railway authorities, thereby invalidating the registration
of the cooperative society granted to the appellants.
19. It is further submitted that the principles of natural justice have to be
seen in proper perspective. In the present case, ample opportunity of
hearing was given to the appellants on an earlier occasion, which
culminated in the speaking order dated October 17, 2023, whereby all
claims of rights of the appellants to the railway property were turned
down. It is further argued that although a writ petition was preferred
against the said speaking order, no interim order of stay was passed
in connection therewith.
20. Thus, it is argued that the impugned notice was rightly sustained by
the learned Single Judge.

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21. On a perusal of the ratio laid down in Subrata Ghosh (supra) as well
as G. Phalaguna (supra) , it is found that this Court has repeatedly
interpreted Section 147 of the 1989 Act and construed the same to
override the provisions of the 1971 Act in respect of railway
properties.
22. The order of the learned Single Judge in WPA 18248 of 2024 was also
affirmed by a Division Bench and ultimately by the Hon‟ble Apex
Court, the latter having found that there was no illegality in the
eviction order issued by the Railway authorities for removing the
encroachment from their land, including shops run by the petitioner-
society therein or its members.
23. Section 147 of the 1989 Act is set out hereinbelow:
“147. Trespass and refusal to desist from trespass .—
(1) If any person enters upon or into any part of a railway without lawful
authority, or having lawfully entered upon or into such part misuses such
property or refuses to leave, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one
thousand rupees, or with both:
Provided that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the
contrary to be mentioned in the judgment of the court, such punishment shall
not be less than a fine of five hundred rupees.

(2) Any person referred to in sub-section (1) may be removed from the railway
by any railway servant or by any other person whom such railway servant
may call to his aid.”


24. Sub-section (2) thereof, in no uncertain terms, provides that any
person referred to in sub-section (1) may be removed from the railway

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by any railway servant or by any other person who such railway
servant may call to his aid.
25. Section 2(31) of the 1989 Act defines “railway” to mean a railway, or
any portion of a railway, for the public carriage of passengers or goods
and includes all lands within the fences or other boundary marks
indicating the limits of the land appurtenant to a railway etc.
26. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the subject land
belongs to the railway authorities, thus coming within the purview of
the expression “railway” as used in Section 147(2) of the 1989 Act.
27. Thus, Section 147 squarely applies to the instant case.
28. As noted above, sub-section (2) of Section 147 relates the power of
removal of the railway authorities to persons referred to in sub-
section (1). Sub-section (1), in turn, includes any person who, having
lawfully entered upon or into any part of a railway property, refuses to
leave.
29. Whereas sub-section (1), in respect of such persons, provides for
monetary penalty and imprisonment, sub-section (2), on the other
hand, gives the additional power to the Railway authorities to remove
such persons from the railway land. Section 147(2) does not contain
any statutory prerequisite even to issue a notice before doing so.
30. However, even if we construe sub-section (2) of Section 147 to include
a right of hearing, the said chapter has already been exhausted in
respect of the appellants in the present case. In the earlier round of
litigation, the initial eviction notice was set aside, which culminated in
a subsequent order deciding the representation of the appellants.

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However, since the said decision was unreasoned, the appellants had
moved the writ court again, which directed a reasoned/speaking order
to be passed upon hearing the representation of the writ
petitioners/appellants, pursuant to which a speaking order was
passed.
31. By such speaking order dated October 17, 2023, all claims of right to
the subject property made by the appellants were categorically turned
down by the Railway authorities.
32. Even if a challenge has been preferred thereto, till date, there is
neither any stay order nor any order setting aside the same.
33. Even independently, we do not find that any document indicating any
iota of right, title and interest of the appellants or their members to
possess the railway property has been produced by the appellants,
either before the writ court or before this Court.
34. The communication of the Railway authorities dated February 21,
2006 was only a request, that too, on the application of the appellants
to do business on railway property, for submission of “proper
documents” regarding formation of a registered cooperative society
“for taking necessary action” at the end of the railways.
35. Hence, there was no assurance contained in the letter that even if
such a registration was done or documents in that regard produced, a
right would be conferred automatically on the appellants to possess
the railway property. Such insistence of the Railway authorities on
production of documents regarding formation of registered cooperative
society would only be the first step for the appellants to cross the

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threshold of consideration of their request for doing business on the
railway property. Per se , such request was not any sort of assurance
to the appellants that their application for carrying on business on
railway property would be granted.
36. Even otherwise, as rightly submitted by learned counsel for the
Railway authorities, the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies,
Hooghly categorically admitted by his letter dated January 09, 2007
that a „no objection‟ certificate was mandatorily required from the
Railways for registering a cooperative society on railway property.
There is nothing on record to indicate that any such „no objection‟
certificate was ever issued by the Railway authorities; yet the
cooperative society was granted registration. Such exercise itself was
vitiated, being in contravention of law and existing norms.
37. That apart, mere formation of a cooperative society does not
automatically confer a right on such society to possess railway
property in any manner whatsoever, without any tacit or express
consent on the part of the Railway authorities, which is completely
missing in the present case.
38. The principle of audi alteram partem , which is an integral part of
natural justice, when applicable to administrative action, is also to be
subjected to the test of prejudice. In the present case, by the
speaking order dated October 17, 2023, the Railway authorities had
already come to a reasoned conclusion, upon giving ample
opportunity of hearing to the appellants, to the effect that the

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appellants have no right of possession of the railway property-in-
question.
39. Thus, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellants that infinite
number of opportunities of hearing have to be given to them, in which
regard a conclusive decision has already been taken by the Railway
authorities upon giving such opportunity to the appellants.
40. Thus, even if a right of hearing could otherwise have been carved out
in Section 147(2) of the 1989 Act, such exercise has already been
exhausted in the present case.
41. In such view of the matter, the law is well-settled that not even any
notice is required for evicting trespassers/unlawful occupants from
railway premises and such action can be taken by the Railway
authorities through any railway servant or by any other person who
such railway servant may call to his aid, without taking resort to the
provisions of the 1971 Act.
42. Accordingly, we find that the learned Single Judge was justified in
dismissing the writ petition of the appellants, whereby the eviction
notice dated August 01, 2025, directing all encroachers to vacate
peacefully by removing their unauthorized structures with belongings
from railway land within a particular period, was assailed.
43. Although the expression “eviction cum show cause notice” was used
to caption the said notice, the phrase “show cause notice” in the said
caption was a surplusage, the notice merely being one to make aware
the encroachers that they would be removed from the said property

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within the purview of Section 147(2) of the 1989 Act. Thus, we do not
find any illegality in the impugned order.
44. Accordingly, MAT 1294 of 2025 is dismissed on contest, thereby
affirming the impugned judgment and order dated August 08, 2025
passed in WPA 18067 of 2025.
45. However, keeping in view the plight of the appellants and their
members, who have been vending their fares from the concerned
railway property since long, we grant further time of 90 days from this
date to the appellant no.2 and its members to vacate the concerned
railway premises.
46. In the event the appellants and their members do not so vacate, it will
be open to the Railway authorities to take appropriate steps for their
removal.
47. There will be no order as to costs.
48. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment and order, if applied
for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the
requisite formalities.










(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.




(Sandip Kumar De, J.)


AD-48
TN