AASHIQ HUSSAIN NAIKOO vs UNION TERRITORY OF J AND K AND ORS. (HOME)
- Court
- Jammu and Kashmir High Court
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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
HCP No. 257/2025
Reserved on: 04.06.2026
Pronounced on: 06.06.2026
Uploaded on: _____________
Operative part or full judgment - Full
Aashiq Hussain Naikoo
S/O Mohd. Munawar Naikoo,
R/O Diver Anderbugh,
District Kupwara.
…Petitioner(s)
Through: Adv. Wajid Md. Haseeb.
Vs.
1. Union Territory of J&K through
Principal Secretary to Govt.,
Home Department,
Civil Sectt. Srinagar.
2. District Magistrate,
Kupwara.
3. Sr. Superintendent of Police,
Kupwara.
…Respondent(s)
Through: GA Faheem Nisar Shah.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M. A.CHOWDHARY, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. Through the medium of present petition, the petitioner seeks
quashment of the Detention Order No. 15-DMK/PSA of 2025
dated 30.04.2025 passed by respondent No.2-District Magistrate
Kupwara, whereby the petitioner/detenue has been detained
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under the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety
Act, 1978 (PSA), in order to prevent him from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the security of the UT of J&K.
2. Grounds of challenge raised in the petition in brief are, that the
allegations made in the grounds of detention have no nexus with
the petitioner and have been fabricated by the police in order to
justify its illegal action of detaining the petitioner; that the
petitioner has been falsely implicated in case FIR No.09/2024
under Sections 7/2 Arms Act, 13, 18, 19, 20, 23, 39, 38 UA(P)
Act registered at Police Station Lalpora; that the allegations are
vague, non-existent and no prudent man can make a
representation against such allegation, and passing of detention
on such grounds is unjustified and unreasonable; that the last
single alleged activity attributed to the detenue has taken place in
March 2024 and thereafter no fresh activity has been attributed to
the petitioner, as such, the allegations on which the detention
order is based are stale and lack proximity; that the petitioner
was already admitted to bail in the above mentioned case; that
the detention order is unreasonable and unconstitutional for the
reason that the detaining authority has itself mentioned in the
grounds of detention that the petitioner deserve to be detained
under preventive custody for maximum period and by suggesting
the period of detention, the preventive detention has been
rendered ultra vires to Article 22 of the Constitution of India; that
the impugned detention order deserves to be quashed.
3. Respondents have filed their reply/counter affidavit wherein it is
stated that there is a long history of petitioner’s link in
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transporting and providing food and shelter to the militants
initially in Sopore and then in Kupwara; that the petitioner is
involved in stone pelting and terrorist acts particularly providing
support to the terrorists; that the field reports suggest that the
petitioner did not bother to mend his ways and was involved in
promoting subversive activities; that the petitioner is a category
“A” OGW of proscribed organizations of LeT/TRF; that the
detaining authority, after examining the dossier and connected
material, arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the activities of
the petitioner were prejudicial to the security of the Union
Territory and that his preventive detention was necessary to
prevent him from acting in a manner detrimental to the security of
the State.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while making submissions,
argued that the detention order is illegal as the petitioner/detenue
had already been granted bail in case FIR No. 09/2024
registered under provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act; that the grounds of detention are vague; and that the whole
material relied upon was not supplied to the petitioner; that the
representation submitted by the petitioner was not considered,
expeditiously.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
contends that the petitioner is “A” categorized Over Ground
Worker (OGW) affiliated with the terrorist outfits LeT/TRF; that
despite registration of FIR No. 09/2024 under the UAPA and
despite having been enlarged on bail on 29.01.2025, the
petitioner continued with activities prejudicial to security interests;
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that the petitioner had earlier been bound down under Sections
127/170 BNSS but failed to mend his ways; that the entire
material comprising about 80 leaves relied upon by the detaining
authority was furnished to the petitioner and explained to him in
the language understood by him; that the representation dated
12.07.2025 was duly considered and rejected by the Government
on 01.09.2025 and its decision was communicated to the
petitioner through the Superintendent of concerned Jail.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the detention
record and considered the same.
7. The scope of judicial review in matters of preventive detention is
limited. The Court does not sit in appeal over the subjective
satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority. Interference is
warranted only where there is non-application of mind, absence
of relevant material, violation of constitutional or statutory
safeguards, or where the detention is otherwise shown to be
legally unsustainable. Reference in this regard may be made to
Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal , (1975) 3 SCC 198;
State of Gujarat v. Adam Kasam Bhaya , (1981) 4 SCC 216 ;
and Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu , (2012) 4 SCC 699 .
8. Perusal of the detention record demonstrates that the detaining
authority has taken note of the antecedents of the petitioner, his
activities over a prolonged period, and his alleged association
with terrorist networks. The grounds of detention disclose that the
petitioner has remained involved in activities of a prejudicial
nature since the year 2012 and has developed a radical ideology.
The record further indicates that the petitioner was categorized
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as an “A” category OGW of LeT/TRF and was providing support
to anti-national elements.
9. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the
detention order could not have been passed because the
petitioner had been granted bail in FIR No. 09/2024, is without
merit. The law is well settled that preventive detention and
prosecution in a criminal case operate in distinct fields. The fact
that a person has been granted bail in a criminal case does not
preclude the competent authority from passing a preventive
detention order if the material before it reasonably indicates a
likelihood of the detenue engaging in activities prejudicial to
security or public order. The grounds of detention specifically
refer to the petitioner having been enlarged on bail and the
apprehension of his reverting to activities detrimental to security.
The detaining authority has, thus, taken into consideration the
relevant fact of grant of bail and has recorded reasons justifying
preventive detention notwithstanding such release. Reliance in
this regard may be placed upon Kamarunnissa v. Union of
India , (1991) 1 SCC 128 , wherein the Supreme Court held that
detention of a person already on bail is permissible if there exists
a real possibility of his engaging in prejudicial activities upon
release. Similar principles were reiterated in Union of India v.
Paul Manickam , (2003) 8 SCC 342 and Huidrom Konungjao
Singh v. State of Manipur , (2012) 7 SCC 181.
10. In the present case, the grounds of detention specifically refer to
the petitioner's release on bail on 29.01.2025 in FIR No. 09/2024
under the provisions of UAPA and the apprehension that he
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would continue his prejudicial activities, thereby satisfying the
legal requirements laid down in the aforesaid judgments.
11. The record further reveals that prior preventive measures,
including proceedings under Sections 127/170 BNSS, had been
initiated against the petitioner. However, according to the
material placed before the detaining authority, such measures
failed to deter him from continuing with activities perceived as
prejudicial to the security interests of the Union Territory. The
detaining authority was, therefore, justified in forming the opinion
that ordinary law had not proved sufficient to prevent the
petitioner from pursuing such activities. In Haradhan Saha v.
State of West Bengal , (1975) 3 SCC 198, the Supreme Court
recognized that preventive detention is not a parallel punishment
but a precautionary measure to prevent future conduct. The
material before the detaining authority in the present case
disclosed that proceedings under Sections 127/170 BNSS had
failed to reform the petitioner, thereby justifying recourse to
preventive detention.
12. The plea regarding non-supply of material is also not borne out
from the record. The execution report and connected documents
demonstrate that the petitioner was furnished the grounds of
detention together with the material relied upon by the detaining
authority, comprising approximately (80) pages. The petitioner
acknowledged receipt of the documents. The material supplied
was sufficient to enable him to make an effective representation
against the detention order. Consequently, no infraction of Article
22(5) of the Constitution or the provisions of the PSA is made
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out. The principle has been authoritatively laid down in Icchu
Devi Choraria v. Union of India , (1980) 4 SCC 531 ; Sophia
Ghulam Mohd. Bham v. State of Maharashtra , (1999) 6 SCC
593; and Thahira Haris v. Government of Karnataka , (2009)
11 SCC 438 .
13. Since the detention record establishes supply of the complete
relied-upon material comprising about 80 pages, the
constitutional requirement stands fully complied with.
14. As regards the representation, the record shows that the
petitioner submitted a representation on 12.07.2025, same was
examined by the Government and came to be rejected on
01.09.2025. The decision was thereafter communicated to the
petitioner through the Superintendent of concerned Jail. The
record does not disclose any deliberate or unexplained lapse of
such nature as would vitiate the detention. The constitutional
requirement is consideration of the representation and
communication of the decision, both of which stand satisfied in
the present case.
15. It is also argued that the detention order is vitiated because the
maximum period of detention has been mentioned therein. This
contention too is untenable. It is well settled that a detention
order is not rendered invalid merely because the permissible
period of detention under the statute has been indicated, so long
as the order discloses independent application of mind by the
detaining authority. The Court is concerned with the existence of
valid subjective satisfaction and compliance with procedural
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safeguards, not with the mere form of expression employed in
the detention order.
16. Upon an overall deliberation of the material on record, this Court
finds that the detaining authority had before it, relevant and
germane material, including the petitioner's alleged involvement
in FIR No. 09/2024 under the provisions of UAPA, which was
neither stale nor there was lack of live link; his release on bail; his
categorization as an ‘A’ category OGW associated with LeT/TRF;
his continuing activities despite preventive measures under the
BNSS; and his long-standing involvement in subversive activities
since 2012, for consideration. The subjective satisfaction
recorded by the detaining authority cannot be said to be arbitrary,
irrational, or based on extraneous considerations. No procedural
violation, denial of constitutional safeguards, or other legal
infirmity having been established, this Court finds no ground to
interfere with the impugned detention order.
17. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed, and the Detention
Order No. 15-DMK/PSA of 2025 dated 30.04.2025, is upheld.
18. Detention record be returned to learned counsel for respondents.
( M. A. CHOWDHARY )
JUDGE
Srinagar
06.06.2026
Muzammil. Q
Whether the order is reportable: Yes / No