Keshav Bhalla vs Prescribe Authority /Rent Authority (Additional District Magistrate) And Another

Court
Allahabad High Court

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 8450 of 2026
Keshav Bhalla
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Prescribe Authority /Rent Authority (Additional District Magistrate) and
another
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Chandrachud Pandey, Rajesh
Kumar, Vineeta Pandey
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Ashok Nath Tripathi, C.S.C.,
Mukesh Kumar, Shivangi Singh
With:
Matters Under Article 227 No. 7645 of 2026
(Sandeep vs. Vinod Kumar Chhabra)
AFR
Court No. - 35
HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
Heard Sri Chandrachud Pandey, learned counsel for the
petitioner, and Sri Ashok Nath Tripathi, along with Ms Shivangi Singh,
learned counsel appearing for respondent no.3, in Petition under
Article 227 No.8450 of 2026; Sri Nipun Singh, learned Senior
Counsel,  assisted by Sri Aishwarya Pratap Singh and Sri Sumit Suri,
learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri Keshav Hari Dixit, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent, in Petition under Article 227
No.7645 of 2026. Sri Kartikey Saran, learned Additional Advocate
General, assisted by Sri Harish Chandra Kesari, learned Additional
Chief Standing Counsel, has also been heard to assist the Court on the

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questions of statutory interpretation arising for consideration in these
petitions.   
2. Petition under Article 227 No.7645 of 2026 has been filed
assailing the judgment and order dated 13.05.2026 passed by the
District Judge/Rent Tribunal, Muzaffarnagar in Rent Control Appeal
No. 15 of 2025, whereby the order dated 13.02.2025 passed by the
Rent Authority, Muzaffarnagar, rejecting the eviction application, has
been set aside and the petitioner has been directed to vacate the
premises in question. Petition under Article 227 No.8450 of 2026 is
directed against the order dated 22.02.2025 passed by the Rent
Authority/Additional District Magistrate, Farrukhabad in Case No.
1255 of 2022 and the judgment dated 10.04.2026 passed by the Rent
Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No.7, Farrukhabad in Rent
Appeal No.35 of 2025, whereby the order directing eviction of the
petitioner has been affirmed.
3. Both petitions arise out of proceedings under the Uttar Pradesh
1
Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 and raise a common
question concerning the scope of the grounds of eviction contemplated
under Section 21(2) thereof. They have, accordingly, been heard
together and are being decided by this common judgment. Since,
however, the factual matrix and the grounds of challenge in the two
petitions are not identical, the facts giving rise to each petition shall be
noticed separately, insofar as may be necessary for determination of
the respective controversy.
4. The facts giving rise to the Petition under Article 227 No. 7645
of 2026 are that the petitioner, Sandeep Kumar, is a tenant in respect of
Shop No. 97-B, Wakil Road, New Mandi, Muzaffarnagar, at the
alleged monthly rent of 12,000/-. The respondent-landlord, Vinod
₹
Kumar Chhabra, instituted proceedings under Section 21(2) of the Act
of 2021 seeking eviction of the petitioner from the aforesaid premises.
The eviction application was founded, inter alia, on the allegations of
default in payment of rent with effect from 31.10.2023, material
1 Act of 2021

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alteration in the premises, termination of the tenancy by notice dated
19.03.2024 issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882, and requirement of the premises for the business/office of the
landlord’s son. The petitioner contested the proceedings and, inter alia,
disputed the alleged rate of rent and also the allegation of default. His
case was that rent had been paid up to 31.10.2023 and that thereafter
the landlord had refused to accept rent. It was further asserted that the
money orders sent towards payment of rent had been refused and that,
thereafter, an application under Section 14(1) of the Act of 2021 had
been moved for deposit of rent. The Rent Authority, Muzaffarnagar, by
order dated 13.02.2025, rejected the eviction application. Aggrieved
thereby, the landlord preferred Rent Control Appeal No.15 of 2025
before the District Judge/Rent Tribunal, Muzaffarnagar. The appeal
was partly allowed by judgment and order dated 13.05.2026, whereby
the order of the Rent Authority was set aside and the petitioner was
directed to vacate the disputed premises. The petitioner has
consequently invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
5. The facts giving rise to the Petition under Article 227 No.8450
of 2026 are that the petitioner, Keshav Bhalla, is in occupation of a
shop situated at Mohalla Badhpur, Tehsil Sadar, District Farrukhabad.
According to the parties, the premises had originally been let out by
late Mahavir Singh Gangwar, father of respondent no. 3, to the
petitioner’s father, late Anil Kumar Bhalla, about 45–48 years ago.
Following the death of the original tenant on 07.07.2022, the petitioner
continued in possession and carried on the business of tempo repairing
therein under the name and style of M/s Anil Auto Repairs.
Respondent no. 3, Akhilesh Chandra Gangwar, instituted proceedings
under Section 21(2) of the Act of 2021, registered as Case No. 1255 of
2022 before the Rent Authority/Additional District Magistrate,
Farrukhabad, principally alleging default in payment of rent and
requirement of the premises for his son, who was stated to be
unemployed and desirous of establishing a business therein. The

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petitioner contested the proceedings while admitting the tenancy, but
disputed the alleged default and asserted that rent had been paid up to
September 2022 and that thereafter the landlord had refused to accept
rent. He also disputed the alleged rate of rent and asserted that the
disputed shop constituted his principal source of livelihood. The Rent
Authority, by order dated 22.02.2025, allowed the eviction application
and directed the petitioner to vacate the premises. The petitioner
preferred Rent Appeal No. 35 of 2025 before the Rent
Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No. 7, Farrukhabad. The
appeal was dismissed by judgment dated 10.04.2026, affirming the
order of eviction. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the petitioner has
approached this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
principally assailing the findings recorded by the authorities below
with regard to default, the requirement pleaded for the landlord’s son,
availability of alternative accommodation and the other circumstances
relied upon in opposition to the eviction.
Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner in ‘Matters under Article 227
No. 8450 of 2026’
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the petition under Article
227 No. 8450 of 2026 submits that the impugned orders travel beyond
the scope of the Act of 2021. It is contended that, the proceedings
having been instituted under Section 21(2) of the Act, an order of
eviction could be passed only on a ground expressly contemplated by
the said provision. According to learned counsel, the learned Tribunal
has erroneously treated the alleged requirement of the landlord’s son
for business/office purposes as the requirement of the landlord within
the meaning of Section 21(2)(m), although the said provision
contemplates the requirement of the landlord himself. It is, therefore,
submitted that the Tribunal has impermissibly enlarged the statutory
ground of eviction beyond the language of the enactment.
7. It is further submitted that, following the death of the original
tenant on 07.07.2022, the petitioner continued in possession of the
disputed premises and has been carrying on the business of tempo

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repair. Learned counsel submits that the said business constitutes the
sole source of livelihood of the petitioner and his family and that, since
the death of his father, the petitioner has had no other source of income
apart from the business carried on from the premises in question. It is
contended that his eviction from the premises would, therefore, cause
serious prejudice to his livelihood.
8. Learned counsel further submits that the respondent-landlord has
failed to establish any genuine or pressing requirement for the disputed
premises. It is pointed out that respondent no. 3 owns several other
shops in the vicinity of Vadhpur, Fatehgarh/Farrukhabad, some of
which are stated to be lying vacant, and also has other business
interests. According to learned counsel, these circumstances were
material to the determination of the genuineness of the alleged
requirement, but have not been properly considered by the authority. It
is argued that a mere assertion or desire on the part of the landlord,
without examination of the surrounding circumstances and the
availability of alternative accommodation, cannot by itself constitute
sufficient proof of a bona fide requirement.
9. Learned counsel next submits that the impugned order has been
passed without proper appreciation of the pleadings, evidence and
other material available on record. According to him, the authority
failed to properly consider the respective circumstances of the parties
and proceeded on an erroneous assumption with regard to the alleged
default in payment of rent. It is contended that the burden of
establishing the statutory ground of eviction rested upon the landlord
and could not have been shifted to the petitioner unless the landlord
had first established the foundational facts necessary to sustain the
claim. The finding regarding default is, therefore, assailed as being
unsupported by the evidence on record.
10. It is also submitted that the question of comparative hardship has
not been properly examined. Learned counsel submits that the
petitioner has been earning his livelihood exclusively from the
business carried on in the disputed premises and that his displacement

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would result in substantial hardship to him and his family, whereas the
respondent-landlord owns several other properties and has other
business interests. These circumstances, according to learned counsel,
were relevant for determining the comparative hardship of the parties
but have not received due consideration in the impugned order.
11. Lastly, learned counsel submits that the proceedings suffer from
a further jurisdictional impropriety inasmuch as a dispute concerning
the premises is already pending before a competent civil court. It is
contended that the authority failed to take into consideration the
pendency of the said proceedings and the possibility of conflicting
adjudications. On these grounds, it is urged that the impugned order,
being arbitrary, perverse and contrary to the material available on
record, is liable to be set aside.
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No.3 appearing in ‘Matters
under Article 227 No.8450 of 2026’ 
12. Learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 3, opposing the
petition, submits that the principal question arising for consideration is
the scope and meaning of the expression “occupation by landlord”
occurring in Section 21(2)(m) of the Act of 2021. It is contended that
the expression cannot be construed to mean that the landlord must
necessarily be in personal and physical occupation of the premises and
that, in an appropriate case, occupation through the landlord’s son may
constitute occupation by the landlord, particularly where the
requirement originates from the landlord and possession and juridical
control over the premises continue to remain with him.
13. Learned counsel places primary reliance upon the judgment of
2
the Supreme Court in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore , wherein the
expression “for his own use” was held to require a wide, liberal and
practical construction and was not confined to actual physical user by
the landlord personally. It is submitted that the Supreme Court
recognised that the requirement of a family member, including a son,
may, depending upon the relationship, dependence, surrounding
2 (2002) 5 SCC 397

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circumstances and genuineness of the claim, constitute the landlord’s
own requirement.
14. Learned counsel further relies upon Kailash Chand v. Dharam
3
Dass , wherein the Supreme Court, while considering the expression
“his own occupation”, held that the same does not necessarily mean
occupation by the landlord alone or in his individual capacity and
recognised that the requirement of family members may constitute the
landlord’s own requirement. According to learned counsel, the said
principle is of particular relevance while interpreting the expression
“occupation by landlord” occurring in Section 21(2)(m).
4
15. Reliance is also placed upon Ajit Singh v. Jit Ram , wherein the
Supreme Court referred to and reaffirmed the principle laid down in
Joginder Pal and treated it as an authoritative interpretation of the
expression “for his own use”, including in the context of use of non-
residential premises by the landlord’s son.
16. Learned counsel has placed particular reliance upon Mehmooda
5
Gulshan v. Javaid Hussain Mungloo , wherein the Supreme Court
specifically considered whether the requirement of the landlord for
“own occupation” could include occupation by a member of the
family, namely, the son. It is submitted that the controversy considered
therein bears substantial similarity to the question arising in the present
case and that the Supreme Court answered the issue in favour of the
landlord, recognising the requirement of the landlord’s unemployed
son to establish himself in business.
17. Learned counsel further relies upon Murlidhar Aggarwal (Dead)
through L.R. Atul Kumar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan (Dead)
6
through L.Rs. , wherein the Supreme Court reiterated that the
requirement for occupation by the landlord is to be construed liberally
and that the requirement of family members may also be covered. It is
submitted that, although the said judgment arose under the Uttar
Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
3 (2005) 5 SCC 375
4 (2008) 9 SCC 699
5 (2017) 5 SCC 683
6 2025 INSC 564

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Act, 1972, it reaffirms the line of Supreme Court jurisprudence,
including the principles laid down in Joginder Pal, regarding the legal
understanding of the landlord’s occupation and requirement.
18. Learned counsel also places reliance upon Dwarka Prasad v.
7
Niranjan ,wherein the requirement of the premises for settling the
landlord’s son and younger brothers in business was considered while
adopting a practical construction of the landlord’s own requirement. It
is submitted that the said decision assumes further significance as it
has subsequently been relied upon by the Supreme Court in Murlidhar
Aggarwal.
19. On the strength of the aforesaid authorities, learned counsel
submits that the case of respondent no. 3 is not founded upon any
independent statutory right of the son to seek eviction. According to
learned counsel, the requirement continues to be that of the landlord,
with the son being the person through whom the premises are proposed
to be beneficially utilised. Thus, the mere fact that the son may
physically carry on the proposed business from the premises would
not, by itself, take the case outside the expression “occupation by
landlord”, particularly where possession and juridical control over the
premises continue to remain with the landlord.
20. Learned counsel submits that the omission of the expression
“member of his family”, which existed in the earlier enactment, cannot
be construed as an express statutory prohibition against occupation of
the premises through a family member. It is contended that respondent
no. 3 is not seeking insertion of the words “son” or “member of his
family” into Section 21(2)(m), but seeks only an interpretation of the
expression actually employed by the Legislature, namely, “occupation
by landlord”. According to learned counsel, giving appropriate
amplitude to the expression “occupation” does not amount to
supplying a casus omissus.
21. Learned counsel further submits that the expression
“occupation” cannot be reduced to a test of the landlord’s personal
7 (2003) 4 SCC 549

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physical presence in the premises. The relevant consideration,
according to learned counsel, is whether possession, control and
beneficial use of the premises are attributable to the landlord. It is,
therefore, urged that where the landlord seeks to utilise his premises
for establishing or settling his son in business, and such use remains
under the landlord’s possession and control, the same may legitimately
constitute occupation by the landlord within the meaning of Section
21(2)(m).
22. Learned counsel has also relied upon the decision in Shyam Pal
8
v. B.S. Enterprises to contend that Section 21(2)(m) must be construed
on its own language. It is submitted that the provision premises are
required for “its occupation by landlord” does not stipulate that such
occupation must be personal, exclusive or physical occupation by the
landlord himself, or exclude occupation by his son or other family
member. Reliance is placed on the principle that words not enacted by
the Legislature cannot be judicially introduced so as to restrict the
statutory right.
23. Learned counsel accordingly submits that the findings recorded
by the authorities below, insofar as they recognise the requirement
pleaded by respondent no. 3, do not suffer from any jurisdictional
error, perversity or other infirmity warranting interference in exercise
of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India. The petition, it is urged, is therefore liable to be dismissed.
Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner appearing in ‘Matters under
Article 227 No. 7645 of 2026’ 
24. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Matter under
Article 227 No. 7645 of 2026 submits that the impugned judgment of
the learned Rent Tribunal is unsustainable, having travelled beyond the
statutory scheme of the Act of 2021. It is contended that the
proceedings were instituted under Section 21(2) of the Act of 2021
and, therefore, the respondent-landlord could succeed only upon
establishing a ground expressly contemplated by the said provision.
8 2026 SCC OnLine All 1729

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According to learned counsel, the learned Tribunal proceeded on the
premise that the disputed premises were required for the
business/office of the landlord’s son and treated such requirement as
constituting the requirement of the landlord within the meaning of
Section 21(2)(m). It is submitted that clause (m) specifically
contemplates requirement of the premises for the occupation of the
landlord and does not independently recognise the requirement of the
landlord’s son as a ground of eviction. The Tribunal, therefore, could
not have enlarged the statutory ground so as to sustain the eviction
merely on the basis of the alleged requirement of the landlord’s son.
25. Learned counsel next submits that the learned Tribunal further
erred in treating the notice dated 19.03.2024, purportedly issued under
Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as furnishing an
independent basis for eviction. It is contended that, once the
respondent-landlord invoked the special remedy under Section 21(2) of
the Act of 2021, eviction could follow only upon establishment of one
of the statutory grounds contemplated therein. Termination of a month-
to-month tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882, cannot, by itself, constitute an independent ground of eviction
under Section 21(2) of the Act of 2021. The mere absence of a written
tenancy agreement, or the alleged month-to-month nature of the
tenancy, therefore, could not, according to learned counsel, enable the
respondent to bypass the statutory requirements governing eviction
under the Act of 2021.
26. It is further submitted that, even on the question of requirement,
the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal is not supported by the
material available on record. Learned counsel submits that the
requirement pleaded was essentially that of the landlord’s son for
commencing a business/office, whereas the statutory ground invoked
was Section 21(2)(m). The Rent Authority, upon consideration of the
pleadings and evidence, had not found the alleged requirement to have
been established. According to learned counsel, the learned Tribunal
reversed that finding without demonstrating any perversity, misreading

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of evidence or other jurisdictional error in the order of the Rent
Authority. It is further pointed out that the alleged requirement was not
disclosed in the notice dated 19.03.2024 in the manner in which it was
subsequently sought to be relied upon before the authorities. The
finding recorded by the Tribunal is, therefore, assailed as being
founded upon an enlargement both of the pleaded case and of the
statutory ground invoked for eviction.
27. Learned counsel submits that the learned Tribunal also erred in
interfering with the findings recorded by the Rent Authority on the
other grounds of eviction. It is contended that the Rent Authority had
found that the allegations of material alteration and default in payment
of rent had not been established and that these grounds were not
pressed by the respondent-landlord before the Tribunal. In any event,
learned counsel submits that the petitioner had consistently maintained
that rent had been paid up to 31.10.2023; that thereafter the landlord
refused to accept the rent; and that money orders were sent towards
payment of rent but were refused, followed by proceedings under
Section 14(1) of the Act of 2021 for deposit of rent. It is, therefore,
submitted that no finding of wilful default could validly have been
sustained against the petitioner.
28. Learned counsel accordingly submits that the judgment and
order dated 13.05.2026 passed by the learned Rent Tribunal is contrary
to the statutory scheme and the material available on record and is
liable to be set aside.
29. Learned counsel has also sought to distinguish the authorities
relied upon on behalf of the respondents and the State. It is submitted
that those decisions were rendered in the context of differently worded
provisions contained in the respective rent-control enactments and,
therefore, cannot be relied upon to enlarge or expand the express
language employed in Section 21(2)(m) of the Act of 2021. Learned
counsel further submits that the decisions relied upon by the
respondents are also required to be understood with reference to the
statutory provisions which fell for consideration therein.

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30. According to learned counsel, the question whether the
requirement of a son or any other family member can, in a given case,
be treated as the requirement of the landlord has to be determined
primarily with reference to the language, scheme and legislative
framework of the Act of 2021 itself. It is submitted that principles
evolved in the context of materially different statutory provisions
cannot be imported so as to enlarge the scope of the express language
employed by the Legislature in Section 21(2)(m) of the Act of 2021.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondents appearing in ‘Matters under
Article 227 No. 7645 of 2026’ 
31. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the
challenge raised by the petitioner proceeds upon an unduly narrow
construction of the expression “requirement of the landlord” occurring
in Section 21(2)(m) of the Act of 2021. It is contended that the fact that
the premises are required for the business or office of the landlord’s
son does not, by itself, take the case outside the ambit of the landlord’s
requirement.
32. Learned counsel places reliance upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Joginder Pal, wherein, in the context of a somewhat
similar provision under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act, 1956, the expression “for his own use” was held to
require a wide, liberal and practical construction and was not confined
to actual physical occupation by the landlord himself. It is submitted
that the Supreme Court recognised that, in appropriate circumstances,
the requirement of a member of the landlord’s family may constitute
the landlord’s own requirement, depending upon the relationship,
dependence, surrounding circumstances and genuineness of the claim.
33. Learned counsel submits that Joginder Pal does not lay down a
rule that eviction may be ordered merely because the person proposed
to use the premises happens to be a family member of the landlord.
Rather, according to learned counsel, the decision lays down the
principles by which it is to be determined whether, in substance, the
requirement pleaded is the requirement of the landlord. It is submitted

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that those principles stand satisfied in the present case, as the premises
are sought for the legitimate occupation and establishment of the
landlord’s son and the competent authority has found the requirement
to be genuine. The learned Tribunal, therefore, committed no error in
treating the requirement of the son as falling within the statutory
requirement of the landlord.
34. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner cannot insist
upon a narrow or purely literal construction of the expression
employed in Section 21(2)(m). The provision, according to learned
counsel, has to be construed in a practical manner having regard to the
realities of life and the relationship between a landlord and members of
his family. The question, it is submitted, is not merely who would
physically occupy the premises but whether the requirement pleaded
is, in substance, attributable to and forms part of the landlord’s own
requirement.
35. It is further submitted that the findings recorded by the learned
Rent Tribunal are based upon an appreciation of the material available
on record and do not suffer from perversity, patent illegality or
jurisdictional error warranting interference under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. According to learned counsel, the petitioner is, in
substance, seeking a re-appreciation of the evidence and substitution of
the view taken by the Tribunal with another possible view. Such an
exercise, it is submitted, falls outside the limited scope of supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227.
36. Learned counsel also submits that the alleged availability of
other shops or the respondent-landlord’s other business interests does
not, by itself, defeat the claim of requirement. The relevant question,
according to learned counsel, is whether the particular premises sought
to be vacated are genuinely required for the purpose pleaded. Mere
ownership of other properties cannot be treated as conclusive against
the landlord unless it is established that such alternative
accommodation is suitable and reasonably available for the intended
purpose.

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37. With regard to comparative hardship and the alleged default in
payment of rent, learned counsel submits that the petitioner cannot
avoid eviction merely by asserting that the disputed premises constitute
his sole source of livelihood. These matters, according to learned
counsel, are required to be determined on the basis of the evidence
adduced before the competent authority. It is submitted that the
conclusions reached by the Rent Tribunal with regard to the conduct of
the parties and payment of rent do not warrant interference merely
because another view of the material may also be possible.
38. Learned counsel accordingly submits that the petition is devoid
of merit and that no jurisdictional or other infirmity has been
demonstrated in the judgment of the learned Rent Tribunal warranting
interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The petition is,
therefore, liable to be dismissed.
Submissions on behalf of the State
39. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State
submits that the controversy in the present petitions principally
concerns the interpretation of Section 21(2)(m) of the Act of 2021, and
in particular, whether the requirement contemplated under the said
provision must necessarily be confined to the landlord’s own physical
occupation or may also extend to the occupation of a member of his
family, such as his son. It is submitted that the provision has to be
construed in the context of the scheme and legislative policy of the Act
of 2021 and cannot be interpreted by importing restrictions or
conditions contained in the earlier rent-control regime.
40. It is submitted that the Act of 2021 consciously marks a
departure from the scheme of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Section 21(2)(m)
does not employ the expression ‘bona fide’, and the requirement of
comparative hardship, which formed an important part of the earlier
statutory regime, has also not been incorporated in the new enactment.
Reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in Shyam Pal, to

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contend that the statutory scheme under the Act of 2021 cannot be
subjected to tests evolved under the repealed enactment. According to
learned Additional Advocate General, the provision must, therefore, be
given effect in accordance with its own language, structure and
legislative scheme.
41. Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that, while
interpreting a State legislation originally enacted in Hindi, the Hindi
version assumes significance where any divergence arises between the
original text and its official English translation. Reliance is placed
upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Surat Mishra v.
9
State of U.P. and others. According to the submission, a reading of the
original Hindi text of Section 21(2)(m) indicates that the provision is
capable of being divided into two distinct parts: the first dealing with
the requirement of the landlord in respect of the premises in their
existing form, and the second dealing with cases where demolition and
new construction are contemplated, in which event the requirement of
occupation by the landlord is specifically attracted.
42. It is submitted that the same legislative intention is also
discernible from the punctuation and structure of the English version
of Section 21(2)(m). Learned Additional Advocate General points out
that the English translations contained in the Ordinances dated
09.01.2021 and 09.04.2021 did not contain a comma after the words
“either in its existing form”, whereas the provision as finally enacted
by the Legislature contains a comma at that place, followed by the
disjunctive “or”. According to the submission, the Legislature, thus,
consciously separated the two contingencies contemplated by the
clause. The requirement of occupation by the landlord, it is contended,
attaches to the latter contingency concerning demolition and new
construction and cannot be read into the first limb, which deals with
the requirement of the premises in their existing form.
43. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the word “or”
occurring in the provision must be given its ordinary disjunctive
9 2013 (6) ADJ 503 (FB) (LB)

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meaning and cannot be rendered otiose. In support of this submission,
reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in Bajrangi v. State
10
of U.P. and 2 Other . It is contended that the expression relating to
occupation by the landlord cannot be transposed from the second limb
of the provision to the first limb, as such a construction would
disregard the grammatical and structural distinction deliberately
maintained by the Legislature.
44. Reliance is also placed upon the judgments of the Supreme
11
Court in Dr. M.K. Salpekar v. Sunil Kumar Shamsunder Chaudhari ,
12
and Sama Alana Abdulla v. State of Gujarat , to submit that
punctuation, including the placement of a comma, may legitimately
assist in ascertaining the structure and meaning of a statutory provision
where the grammatical construction so warrants. It is urged that the
punctuation introduced in the enacted version of Section 21(2)(m),
read with the disjunctive “or”, supports the interpretation that the
requirement of occupation by the landlord is confined to the second
contingency involving demolition and fresh construction.
45. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the
distinction between “requirement of the landlord” and “occupation by
the landlord” is material. In the first limb of Section 21(2)(m), what is
required to be established is the requirement of the landlord in respect
of the premises, whereas the specific condition of occupation by the
landlord has separately been attached to the second limb. Such a
construction, according to the submission, also serves a rational
legislative purpose, since the requirement of the landlord in respect of
the premises in their existing form may arise in circumstances where
the premises are intended to be put to use by a member of the
landlord’s family.
46. On the question whether the requirement of the landlord may
include the requirement of his son, learned Additional Advocate
General submits that expressions such as “own use” or “requirement of
10 2023:AHC:102801
11 (1988) 4 SCC 21
12 (1996) 1 SCC 427

17
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the landlord” occurring in rent-control statutes have consistently
received a liberal and practical interpretation. Reliance is placed upon
Nanalal Goverdhanial and Co. and others v. Samratbai Lilachand
13
Shah , wherein it was observed that the requirement of a landlord may
include a requirement by the landlord for someone else, but not the
requirement by someone else. It is accordingly urged that a
requirement arising from the landlord’s family, particularly where the
premises are sought for establishing the business of his son, may
legitimately constitute the landlord’s requirement.
47. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the aforesaid
interpretation also finds support in the recent decisions of this Court in
Varsha Agrawal vs. Rent Tribunal/ A.D.S.J./ Special Judge Spcial
14
Court No 4 (P.C Act ) And 2 Others and Shafikurrman vs. Special
15
Judge , P.C. Act IV , Lucknow And 4 Others , wherein the requirement
of a landlord to establish the business of his son was recognised as
falling within the scope of the requirement contemplated under Section
21(2)(m) of the Act of 2021. It is, therefore, contended that the
construction advanced by the petitioner, namely, that the statutory
provision is confined to the landlord’s personal occupation alone,
would result in an unduly restrictive interpretation of the enactment
and would not accord with either its language or its legislative purpose.
48. It is accordingly submitted that the Rent Authority and the Rent
Tribunal have committed no jurisdictional error in taking into
consideration the requirement of the landlord’s son while examining
the case under Section 21(2)(m). According to learned Additional
Advocate General, the interpretation adopted by the authorities is
consistent with the structure of the provision, the legislative departure
embodied in the Act of 2021, and the judicial principles governing the
construction of expressions relating to the landlord’s own use or
requirement. The challenge raised by the petitioner, it is submitted,
therefore discloses no ground warranting interference in exercise of the
13 1980 Mh. L.J. 867
14 2025:AHC-LKO:11981
15 2025:AHC-LKO:18381

18
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supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. 
Issue for Consideration  
49. Whether, on a proper interpretation of Section 21(2)(m) of the
Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021, the
expression “requirement of the landlord” occurring in the provision is
confined to a requirement for the landlord’s own occupation and use of
the premises, or whether it may, having regard to the language,
structure and legislative scheme of the provision, include a
requirement arising from the proposed occupation, establishment or
business of a member of the landlord’s family, and, in that context,
what is the significance of the distinct expression “occupation by
landlord” occurring in the latter part of the said provision.
Discussion
I. Interpretation of Section 21(2)(m): Punctuation and
Grammatical Structure
50. In order to appreciate the rival submissions concerning the scope
and meaning of Section 21(2)(m) of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of
Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021, it would be appropriate, at the
outset, to notice the legislative history of the enactment. The statutory
regime under consideration was preceded by the Uttar Pradesh
Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Ordinance, 2021, promulgated
on 09.01.2021. The long title of the Ordinance records the legislative
purpose in the following terms:
“ -
परिसरोंकीकिरायेदारीकोविनियमितकरनेऔरभू स्वामियोंतथाकिरायेदारोंकेहितोंका

संरक्षणकरनेहेतुकिरायाप्राधिकरणतथाकिरायाअधिकरणोकीस्थापनाकरनेऔरउससे

सम्बंधितयाआनुषंगिकविवादोंयामामलोंकासमाधानकरनेहेतुत्वरितन्यायनिर्णयन
”
क्रियाविधि काउपबन्धकरनेकेलिए
The corresponding official English translation published in the
Gazette reads:
“to establish Rent Authority and Rent Tribunals to regulate renting of
premises and to protect the interests of landlords and tenants and to provide

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speedy adjudication mechanism for resolution of disputes and matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto.”
The legislation was thus conceived as a new statutory
framework for regulating tenancies, protecting the interests of
landlords and tenants, and providing a specialised and expeditious
mechanism for adjudication of tenancy disputes.
51. The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the
legislation is also of significance. It records that the Uttar Pradesh
Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972
had given rise to difficulties in the settlement of disputes between
landlords and tenants, that a large number of tenancy disputes were
pending before the Courts and that owners of buildings were not
receiving proper rent for their properties. It further records that, having
regard to the directions of the Supreme Court, the Draft Model
Tenancy Act prepared by the Government of India and the
recommendations of the Uttar Pradesh State Law Commission, it was
decided to repeal the 1972 Act and replace it with a new law. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons thereafter records that the first
Ordinance was promulgated on 09.01.2021, that it lapsed on
31.03.2021 and that, in order to continue the new tenancy regime, the
Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy (Second)
Ordinance, 2021 was promulgated on 09.04.2021. The Bill was
thereafter introduced to replace the Second Ordinance.
52. The legislative history thus discloses continuity in the statutory
scheme from the first Ordinance to the Second Ordinance and
thereafter to the Act of 2021. The Second Ordinance was intended to
continue the new tenancy regime pending enactment of the replacing
legislation. This continuity assumes relevance while examining
whether any textual distinction between the Ordinance and the finally
enacted provision discloses a conscious legislative change.
53. It would, therefore, be appropriate to notice the relevant
provision in the form in which it appeared in the first Ordinance, as

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contained in the official English translation published in the Gazette.
Section 21(2)(m), as extracted from the Ordinance, reads:
“that the premises is required by land lord either in its existing form or after
demolition and new construction thereof for the purpose of its occupation
by landlord”
54. It is noticeable that, in this version, there is no comma after the
words “either in its existing form”. The structure of the provision
consequently presents the words “for the purpose of its occupation by
landlord” without the punctuation which subsequently appears in the
enacted English version. The position in the Act of 2021 is somewhat
different. The English text of Section 21(2)(m), as finally enacted,
reads:
“that the premises are required by landlord either in its existing form, or
after demolition and new construction thereof for the purpose of its
occupation by landlord.”
55. The difference is apparently slight, but its grammatical
significance requires consideration. The enacted provision places a
comma immediately after the words “either in its existing form”,
followed by the disjunctive conjunction “or”. The Hindi text of the
provision, as published with the Act, also deserves notice. The relevant
portion reads:
“( ) ,
ड यहकि उक्तपरिसर भूस्वामीद्वारायातोअपनेविद्यमानरूपमेंयाभूस्वामीद्वाराअपने
”
अधिभोगकेप्रयोजनार्थउसकेविध्वंसऔरनयेनिर्माणकेपश्चात्अपेक्षितहै।
56. A comparison of the two versions shows that the basic two-fold
arrangement namely, premises required in their existing form, or
premises required after demolition and new construction was present
from the Ordinance stage itself. What requires examination is whether
the words relating to occupation by the landlord qualify both
alternatives or whether, on a proper grammatical and structural reading
of the enacted provision, they are attached only to the second
alternative.

21
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57. The insertion of the comma, therefore, assumes some
significance. The question, however, is not whether punctuation, by
itself, can create a statutory meaning which the words otherwise cannot
bear. Punctuation is only a subordinate aid to construction. The real
question is whether the punctuation introduced in the enacted English
text, read with the use of the disjunctive “or”, assists in determining
whether the words appearing thereafter qualify only the second
alternative or both alternatives.
58. The submission of the learned Additional Advocate General is
that the clause may grammatically be understood as containing two
distinct contingencies. The first is where the premises are required by
the landlord “in its existing form”; the second is where the premises
are required “after demolition and new construction thereof for the
purpose of its occupation by landlord”. On this construction, the
requirement of occupation by the landlord is specifically associated
with the second contingency and is not necessarily imported into the
first. The punctuation appearing in the enacted English text, according
to the State, reinforces this separation.
59. The submission derives contextual support from the fact that the
expression “or” is inherently disjunctive. Where two alternatives are
placed on either side of a disjunctive conjunction, ordinarily each
alternative is intended to retain an independent meaning unless the
context requires otherwise. The construction suggested by the State
seeks to preserve such distinction by treating the requirement of the
premises in their existing form and the requirement following
demolition and reconstruction as separate statutory situations, rather
than making the words relating to occupation necessarily common to
both limbs.
60. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Dr. M.K. Salpekar and
Sama Alana Abdulla recognise that punctuation may be taken into
consideration in construing a statutory provision. The principle is
relevant here only as an aid to construction. Punctuation must,

22
A227 No. - 8450 of 2026
therefore, be considered in the context of the words employed, their
syntax, the Hindi text and the legislative scheme of the provision.
61. Equally relevant is the principle governing an enactment of a
State Legislature originally enacted in Hindi. In Ram Surat Mishra,
this Court considered the significance of the original Hindi text where
a divergence arises between the enacted text and its official English
translation. The Hindi text must, therefore, receive due consideration
while resolving any ambiguity that may arise from the English version,
particularly where the controversy itself concerns the grammatical
relationship between different parts of the translated provision.
62. On a comparison of the legislative materials placed before the
Court, it is apparent that they do not disclose any alteration in the basic
subject-matter of clause (m) between the Ordinance and the Act. In
both versions, the premises are contemplated as being required either
in their existing form or after demolition and new construction. The
material textual difference relied upon by the State lies principally in
the punctuation employed in the final English version.
63. The comma cannot, by itself, be treated as conclusively
determining legislative intent. Nevertheless, its introduction by the
Legislature immediately after the words “either in its existing form”,
followed by the disjunctive “or”, is a circumstance which may
legitimately be considered together with the syntax and structure of the
provision. The Court must, therefore, examine whether the words
appearing thereafter are syntactically connected only with the second
alternative or are intended to qualify the entire preceding expression.
64. There is, however, an important qualification. The two
expressions on either side of the disjunctive are not, in themselves, two
independent substantive grounds of eviction. They describe two
alternative forms in which the premises may be required. The statutory
foundation remains the requirement of the premises by the landlord.
The words “in its existing form” and “after demolition and new

23
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construction thereof” indicate the condition in which the premises are
sought to be recovered.
65. The question, therefore, is not simply whether the words “for the
purpose of its occupation by landlord” can be read with the second
alternative. They plainly can. The more difficult question is whether
those words are intended to qualify the entire preceding expression,
namely, premises required “either in its existing form, or after
demolition and new construction thereof”, or whether, by reason of
their position in the sentence, they are confined to the second
alternative.
66. If the latter construction is adopted, the provision would
contemplate two distinct situations: first, where the premises are
required by the landlord in their existing form; and secondly, where the
premises are required after demolition and new construction for the
purpose of occupation by the landlord. Such a construction gives
independent operation to both alternatives and does not require the
words relating to occupation by the landlord to be read backwards so
as to qualify the first limb.
67. If, on the other hand, the words “for the purpose of its
occupation by landlord” are treated as governing both alternatives, the
provision would mean that the premises, whether required in their
existing form or after demolition and new construction, must in either
case be required for the landlord’s occupation. On this construction,
the comma merely separates the two alternative forms in which the
premises may be required and does not alter the substantive reach of
the words occurring at the end of the clause.
68. The latter construction has a textual consideration in its favour.
The principal subject of the provision is the requirement of the
premises by the landlord, and the words “for the purpose of its
occupation by landlord” may naturally be understood as stating the
purpose for which the premises are required. The mere placement of

24
A227 No. - 8450 of 2026
the qualifying words at the end of the sentence may not, by itself, be
sufficient to detach them from the first alternative.
69. The former construction, however, derives support from the
ordinary grammatical principle that a qualifying expression placed
after a series of alternatives may, depending upon its syntactical
arrangement, attach to the immediately preceding alternative. The use
of the comma before “or” in the enacted English version reinforces the
visual and grammatical separation between the two contingencies. This
consideration cannot be ignored, although it cannot be treated as
decisive.
70. The principle is sometimes described as the ‘Rule of the Last
Antecedent’. It proceeds on the ordinary grammatical assumption that
a qualifying or relative phrase ordinarily refers to the words or phrase
immediately preceding it, unless the context or structure of the
provision indicates that the qualification was intended to extend to
words occurring earlier in the sentence. The principle is thus a guide to
determining the syntactical reach of a qualifying expression and is not
an inflexible rule of statutory construction.
71. The principle under consideration is also recognized in standard
works on statutory interpretation. Sutherland’s Statutes and Statutory
Construction states the rule that “referential and qualifying words and
phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last
antecedent.” A similar syntactic preference is expressed by Antonin
Scalia and Bryan A. Garner in Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts through the nearest-reasonable-referent canon ,
according to which, where the syntax does not involve a parallel series
of nouns or verbs, a prepositive or postpositive modifier ordinarily
applies only to the nearest reasonable referent. Justice G.P. Singh, in
Principles of Statutory Interpretation , likewise recognises the
principle through the maxim ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi
impediatur sententia , namely, that a qualifying or relative word or
phrase ordinarily refers to its proximate or immediately preceding

25
A227 No. - 8450 of 2026
antecedent, unless such construction is displaced by the context or
subject-matter of the enactment.
72. The significance of punctuation in statutory construction has
also received consideration in comparative jurisprudence. In O’Connor
16
v. Oakhurst Dairy , the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit considered the effect of the absence of a serial comma in a
statutory enumeration and examined the punctuation together with the
grammatical structure, drafting conventions and context of the
provision. The decision illustrates that punctuation may become
relevant where its presence or absence bears upon the syntactical
relationship between the words or expressions used in a statutory
provision. The relevance of punctuation, however, arises from its
relationship with the grammatical structure of the provision and not
from punctuation considered in isolation.
73. The same principle finds recognition in judicial decisions. In
17
Barnhart v. Thomas , the Supreme Court of the United States observed
that, ordinarily, a limiting clause or phrase should be read as modifying
only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows. The Supreme
Court of India has also applied the principle in determining the
syntactical reach of statutory expressions. In Surendra Narain Singh v.
18
State of Bihar , the Court considered the grammatical relationship
between the qualifying expression and the words preceding it.
19
Likewise, in Mohd. Shabir v. State of Maharashtra , while construing
Section 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the Court examined
the arrangement of the words “manufactures for sale, sells, stocks or
exhibits for sale, or distributes” and considered the punctuation and
grammatical structure in determining the expression to which the
words “for sale” related.
74. The ‘Rule of the Last Antecedent’, however, cannot be applied
mechanically. Where the context, subject-matter or structure of the
16 851 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2017)
17 540 U.S. 20 (2003)
18 (1998) 5 SCC 246
19 (1979) 1 SCC 568

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enactment indicates that a qualifying expression was intended to
govern more than the immediately preceding words, the grammatical
presumption must yield to that wider construction. Conversely, where
the provision contains a parallel series of alternatives and the
qualifying expression is placed so as naturally to attach to only one of
them, its grammatical position may provide a significant indication of
the legislative arrangement.
75. Section 21(2)(m) assumes significance in this context because
the expression “for the purpose of its occupation by landlord” occurs at
the end of a clause containing two alternatives, namely, that the
premises are required “either in its existing form, or after demolition
and new construction thereof”. On a strict application of the Rule of
the Last Antecedent, the qualifying expression occurring at the end of
the clause would ordinarily be understood as referring to the
immediately preceding contingency, namely, the requirement of the
premises after demolition and new construction. This grammatical
inference is consistent with the structure of the enacted English
provision.
76. The inference, however, cannot be regarded as conclusive. The
punctuation, the use of the disjunctive “or”, the corresponding Hindi
text, the legislative history and the overall structure and purpose of the
provision must all be considered before determining the intended reach
of the qualifying expression. The rule is an aid to construction and
cannot displace the language and scheme of the enactment.
77. The same caution is reflected in Bell ExpressVu Limited
20
Partnership v. Rex where the Supreme Court of Canada reiterated that
statutory words must be read in their grammatical and ordinary sense
and in harmony with the entire context, scheme and object of the
enactment. A particular feature of punctuation or syntax cannot,
therefore, be examined in isolation from the provision as a whole.
20 2002 SCC OnLine Can SC 42

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A227 No. - 8450 of 2026
78. Reference may also be made, with appropriate caution, to the
21
historical English decision in Rex v. Casement . The decision
concerned the interpretation and territorial application of the Treason
Act of 1351 and involved consideration of the grammatical
arrangement of statutory language. The decision is popularly
associated with the expression that Casement was “hanged by a
comma”. The expression should not, however, be understood as
suggesting that punctuation by itself determines legislative meaning.
Its relevance lies in illustrating that punctuation and grammatical
arrangement may, in an appropriate case, form part of the textual
material available to a Court in construing statutory language.
79. The position in Indian law is consistent with this approach,
subject to the important qualification that punctuation remains a
subordinate aid to construction. In Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda
22 23
Bose , the Supreme Court, after referring to Stephenson v. Taylor
24
and Crawford on Statutory Construction , observed:
“Punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a statute,
and very little attention is paid to it by English courts... When a statute is
carefully punctuated and there is doubt as to its meaning, a weight should
undoubtedly be given to the punctuation... Punctuation may have its uses in
some cases, but it cannot certainly be regarded as a controlling element and
cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of a text.”
80. The decisions in Dr. M.K. Salpekar and Sama Alana Abdulla
similarly recognise that punctuation and grammatical arrangement may
be taken into consideration in construing statutory language. The
principle emerging from these authorities is not that punctuation
controls interpretation, but that it may assist the Court in ascertaining
the grammatical relationship between the words employed where the
construction of the provision so requires.
81. The present case falls within that limited area in which
punctuation has some relevance. The question is not whether the
21 [1917] 1 K.B. 98
22 AIR 1952 SC 369
23 (1861) 1 B & S 101
24 Crawford on Statutory Construction, p. 383

28
A227 No. - 8450 of 2026
comma introduced in the enacted English version can, by itself, create
a meaning which the words of the provision otherwise do not bear. It
plainly cannot. The question is whether the comma occurring
immediately after the words “either in its existing form”, followed by
the disjunctive conjunction “or”, lends support to the grammatical
understanding that the two contingencies contemplated by Section
21(2)(m) are distinct. That question must necessarily be considered
together with the syntax of the complete clause, the corresponding
Hindi text, the legislative history and the structure and purpose of the
enactment.
82. One further aspect of the statutory scheme is relevant. Section
21(2)(m) permits recovery where the premises are required either “in
its existing form” or “after demolition and new construction thereof”.
The legislature has thus contemplated not merely immediate use of the
premises in their existing condition but also recovery of possession for
a future use following demolition and reconstruction. The focus of the
provision is consequently upon the requirement of the premises and the
purpose for which possession is sought. The words relating to
occupation must accordingly be construed in that statutory context.
83. The legislative history further shows that the Act of 2021 was
enacted as a new statutory framework in place of the earlier rent-
control regime. The omission, in Section 21(2)(m), of the expression
“bona fide”, as well as the absence of the earlier statutory formulation
concerning comparative hardship, is material. As noticed by this Court
in Shyam Pal, the provisions of the Act of 2021 have to be examined
according to their own statutory scheme, and the conditions forming
part of the repealed statutory regime cannot be mechanically imported
into the new enactment.
84. The legislative history, therefore, supports the proposition that
the interpretation of Section 21(2)(m) must primarily be derived from
the language and structure of the new enactment. At the same time, it
does not follow that the punctuation in the English version

29
A227 No. - 8450 of 2026
conclusively determines the meaning of the provision. Nor can the
Court, merely because the statute represents a new legislative scheme,
disregard the ordinary grammatical significance of the expressions
employed.
85. The question emerging from this part of the discussion is
accordingly a limited one. The punctuation, syntax and legislative
history provide some support to the submission that the words “for the
purpose of its occupation by landlord” may be grammatically attached
to the second contingency concerning demolition and new
construction. Whether that is the correct substantive construction of the
provision, however, cannot be answered by punctuation or grammar
alone. It requires examination of the judicial understanding of
expressions such as “own use”, “own occupation” and “requirement of
the landlord”, particularly where the premises are intended to be used
by a member of the landlord’s family.
II. Judicial Interpretation of “Own Use” and “Occupation”
86. Having examined the legislative history, the language and
grammatical structure of Section 21(2)(m), and the principles
governing punctuation as an aid to construction, it is now necessary to
consider the authorities relied upon by learned counsel for the parties.
The principal authorities relied upon by the respondents are Joginder
Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass, Ajit Singh
v. Jit Ram, Dwarkaprasad v. Niranjan, Mehmooda Gulshan v. Javaid
Hussain Mungloo and Murlidhar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan.
The petitioner, on the other hand, submits that Section 21(2)(m) must
be construed with reference to the language actually employed by the
Legislature in the Act of 2021. The authorities, therefore, have to be
examined not merely by reference to factual similarity, but with due
regard to the statutory expressions which fell for consideration in those
cases.
87. The starting point is Joginder Pal. While considering the
expression “for his own use”, the Supreme Court expressly rejected a

30
A227 No. - 8450 of 2026
narrow construction which would require the landlord himself to
physically occupy the premises. After considering earlier authorities
arising under different rent-control enactments, the Court held that the
expression was required to receive a wide, liberal and practical
meaning. The Court further held that the requirement of a member of
the landlord's family, or of a person dependent upon the landlord or
upon whom the landlord is dependent, could, in appropriate
circumstances, constitute the requirement of the landlord. The relevant
portion is extracted below:
“33. Our conclusions are crystallised as under:
(i) The words “for his own use” as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 must receive a wide, liberal
and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow construction.
(ii) The expression — landlord requires for “his own use”, is not confined
in its meaning to actual physical user by the landlord personally. The
requirement not only of the landlord himself but also of the normal
“emanations” of the landlord is included therein. All the cases and
circumstances in which actual physical occupation or user by someone else,
would amount to occupation or user by the landlord himself, cannot be
exhaustively enumerated. It will depend on a variety of factors such as
interrelationship and interdependence — economic or otherwise, between
the landlord and such person in the background of social, socio-religious
and local customs and obligations of the society or region to which they
belong.
(iii) The tests to be applied are: (i) whether the requirement pleaded and
proved may properly be regarded as the landlord's own requirement; and,
(ii) whether on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case, actual
occupation and user by a person other than the landlord would be deemed
by the landlord as “his own” occupation or user. The answer would, in its
turn, depend on (i) the nature and degree of relationship and/or dependence
between the landlord pleading the requirement as “his own” and the person
who would actually use the premises; (ii) the circumstances in which the
claim arises and is put forward; and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the claim.
The court on being satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of claim,
as distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold the
landlord's claim.

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(iv) While casting its judicial verdict, the court shall adopt a practical and
meaningful approach guided by the realities of life.
(v) In the present case, the requirement of the landlord of the suit premises
for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of
landlord “for his own use” within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii).”
88. The reasoning in Joginder Pal is of particular relevance because
the Supreme Court did not rest its conclusion merely upon the
existence of a family relationship. It formulated a structured approach.
Where actual use of the premises is intended by a person other than the
landlord, the Court is required to examine whether the requirement
pleaded and proved can properly be regarded as the landlord's own
requirement and whether, having regard to the relationship,
dependence and surrounding circumstances, the proposed use by such
person can reasonably be regarded as the landlord's own use. On the
facts before it, the Supreme Court found that the premises were
required for the office of the landlord's son, who was a chartered
accountant, and held that such requirement fell within the expression
“for his own use”.
89. The principle emerging from Joginder Pal is thus broader than a
rule that the requirement of a son automatically constitutes the
requirement of the landlord. The decision proceeds upon a combination
of circumstances, including the nature of the relationship, the purpose
for which the premises are required, the genuineness and
reasonableness of the requirement, and the nexus between the landlord
and the person for whose use the premises are sought. The Court was
concerned with giving the statutory expression a practical meaning
while ensuring that the statutory ground was not converted into a mere
device for obtaining possession.
90. The approach adopted in Joginder Pal was subsequently applied
by the Supreme Court in Kailash Chand. While interpreting the
expression “his own occupation”, the Court held that the expression
could not be assigned a narrow meaning and did not necessarily signify
occupation by the landlord alone and as an individual. Relying upon

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Joginder Pal and Dwarkaprasad, the Court recognised that, in
appropriate circumstances, the requirement of members of the
landlord's family or persons dependent upon him may amount to the
landlord's own requirement.
91. The significance of Kailash Chand lies in its recognition that the
concept of “own occupation” in rent legislation is not necessarily
exhausted by the physical presence of the landlord. The Court adopted
a practical construction having regard to the social and familial
circumstances in which a landlord's requirement may arise. The
decision, however, does not dispense with the necessity of examining
the language and scheme of the particular enactment in which the
expression occurs.
92. In Dwarkaprasad, which was noticed both in Kailash Chand and
Murlidhar Aggarwal, the requirement of premises for settling the
landlord's son and younger brothers in business was considered in the
context of the statutory expression relating to the landlord's own
occupation or use. The decision reflects the same practical approach:
the expression cannot be interpreted in isolation from the familial and
social setting in which the requirement is asserted.
93. The principle was carried forward in Ajit Singh. The Supreme
Court, referring expressly to Joginder Pal, held that the requirement of
non-residential premises by the landlord's son for his use could fall
within the expression “for his own use” occurring in the statute under
consideration. The decision consequently considered the statutory
requirements applicable to the landlord's own use in the context of a
shop required for the business of his son.
94. It is important, however, to notice what Ajit Singh does and does
not decide. It affirms that, where the governing statute employs the
expression “for his own use”, that expression may extend to the use of
non-residential premises by the landlord's son. It does not lay down
that every statutory reference to “occupation by landlord” must
necessarily receive an identical meaning irrespective of the language,

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context and structure of the enactment. The authority is, therefore,
relevant for the interpretative principle which it applies, but the precise
language of Section 21(2)(m) remains to be examined independently.
95. The same principle finds reaffirmation in Mehmooda Gulshan,
where the Supreme Court considered the requirement of the landlord's
son to establish himself in business. The decision illustrates that the
requirement of a son may, in an appropriate statutory setting and upon
the facts established before the Court, be regarded as the requirement
of the landlord. The judgment thus lends support to the broader
proposition that a landlord's requirement cannot, in every case, be
confined to his own immediate physical use of the premises.
96. More recently, in Murlidhar Aggarwal, the Supreme Court
reiterated that the requirement for occupation of the landlord is to be
liberally construed and that the requirement of family members may
also be covered. Referring to Joginder Pal and Dwarkaprasad, the
Court reaffirmed the underlying principle that an expression
concerning the landlord's own occupation is not necessarily to be given
an unduly restricted or artificial meaning.
97. The cumulative effect of these authorities is that the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court does recognise, in appropriate
circumstances, a distinction between personal physical occupation by
the landlord and occupation or use which, though actually undertaken
by a family member, may in substance constitute the landlord's own
requirement. Such conclusion, however, does not follow from the
relationship alone. The authorities indicate the relevance of the nature
of the requirement, the relationship between the parties, the
circumstances of dependence or obligation, the genuineness of the
requirement and, where relevant, the continuing possession or control
of the premises by the landlord.
98. The aforesaid authorities, therefore, provide substantial
assistance to the submission of the respondents that an expression
relating to the landlord's occupation cannot necessarily be reduced to a

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requirement of the landlord's personal physical presence. At the same
time, these authorities were rendered while interpreting expressions
such as “for his own use”, “his own occupation”, or provisions forming
part of different rent-control statutes. The question before this Court is
not whether those expressions have been liberally construed by the
Supreme Court; that proposition admits of little doubt. The question is
whether the same principle, without modification, governs the words
chosen by the Legislature in Section 21(2)(m) of the Act of 2021.
99. This distinction assumes significance because the Act of 2021
does not merely reproduce the earlier statutory framework. It replaced
the regime under U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and introduced a distinct
statutory scheme. The omission of expressions which formed part of
the earlier regime, as well as the particular formulation adopted in
Section 21(2)(m), cannot therefore be disregarded while determining
the amplitude of the provision. The Court must give effect to the
language actually employed by the Legislature and cannot import into
it either an expression or a limitation merely because a similar
expression under an earlier rent statute received a particular judicial
construction.
100. At the same time, the respondents' submission cannot be rejected
merely on the ground that the proposed actual user is the landlord's
son. Joginder Pal itself demonstrates why such a distinction, if made
solely on the basis of physical user, may be artificial. The Court must,
therefore, determine whether, having regard to the language and
structure of Section 21(2)(m), the requirement of the son in the facts of
the present cases bears the requisite nexus with the landlord so as to
constitute the landlord's requirement within the meaning of the
provision.
101. The decision in Shyam Pal, relied upon by the respondents,
operates in a somewhat different field. The decision emphasises that
the provisions of the Act of 2021 have to be examined according to
their own statutory scheme and that conditions belonging to the

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repealed statutory regime cannot be mechanically imported into the
new enactment. That principle equally requires the Court to examine
Section 21(2)(m) on its own language. The said decision does not, on
the issue presently arising, determine the specific question whether the
expression “occupation by landlord” includes the proposed occupation
or business use of the landlord's son.
102. The authorities relied upon by the respondents thus cannot be
said to be inconsistent with the interpretation sought to be advanced by
them. They establish the judicial principle that expressions such as
“own use” and “own occupation” are capable of receiving a liberal and
practical construction and that, where the requisite nexus exists, the
requirement of a son or other close family member may constitute the
requirement of the landlord. Whether that principle applies to Section
21(2)(m), however, depends upon the construction of the particular
words and structure adopted therein.
103. The petitioner's submission that the words “for the purpose of its
occupation by landlord” must be given their ordinary meaning cannot,
therefore, be rejected merely because the Supreme Court has adopted a
liberal construction of similar expressions under other statutes.
Equally, the respondents' submission cannot be rejected merely
because the son is the proposed actual user. The Court must avoid both
extremes: an interpretation so narrow as to equate “occupation”
invariably with physical presence, and an interpretation so expansive
as to treat every requirement of a family member as the landlord's
requirement without examining the statutory language and the requisite
nexus.
104. The authorities thus assist the Court in identifying the limits
within which the expression may operate. They indicate that personal
physical occupation is not an indispensable condition in every rent-
control statute and that the requirement of a family member can, in an
appropriate case, constitute the landlord's own requirement. But the
ultimate determination under Section 21(2)(m) must still proceed from

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the language of that provision, read with its grammatical structure, the
two contingencies contemplated therein, the Hindi text, the legislative
history and the object and scheme of the Act of 2021.
105. The Court must, therefore, now undertake the final interpretative
exercise in relation to Section 21(2)(m). Two questions arise for that
purpose. First, whether the words “for the purpose of its occupation by
landlord”, having regard to their placement in the clause, the
punctuation, the disjunctive alternatives and the corresponding Hindi
text, govern both alternatives or are confined to the latter. Secondly, if
those words govern the first alternative as well, whether the expression
“occupation by landlord” is necessarily confined to the landlord's own
physical occupation or may, consistently with the statutory scheme,
extend to a requirement which is sought to be fulfilled through the
occupation or business use of a member of the landlord's family.
106. These questions have to be answered without importing into the
Act of 2021 either the precise statutory language of the repealed 1972
Act or every interpretative limitation developed under that enactment.
At the same time, the Court must give due weight to the well
recognized principle that statutory expressions concerning a landlord's
own use or occupation may, depending upon the language and context
of the enactment, receive a practical construction which does not
invariably require personal physical occupation. The task, therefore, is
to reconcile the language actually employed in Section 21(2)(m) with
the principle emerging from the authorities, and thereafter to examine
whether the requirement pleaded in the present cases falls within the
statutory ground.
Application of Law to the Facts
107. Applying the aforesaid principles, the comma appearing in the
finally enacted English version cannot, by itself, be regarded as
creating a substantive condition which is otherwise absent from the
statute. At the same time, it cannot be treated as wholly meaningless.
Its placement immediately after the words “either in its existing form”,

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followed by the disjunctive “or”, provides grammatical support for
treating the two contingencies separately. The significance of the
punctuation, therefore, lies not in creating legislative intention, but in
assisting the Court in ascertaining the grammatical relationship
between the words employed by the Legislature.
108. The use of the expression “or” is of particular relevance. The
first contingency is that the premises are required by the landlord “in
its existing form”; the second is that the premises are required “after
demolition and new construction thereof for the purpose of its
occupation by landlord”. The words expressly referring to occupation
by the landlord occur in the latter part of the provision. Read according
to its ordinary grammatical arrangement, those words are more
naturally referable to the second contingency. To make them
necessarily govern the first limb as well would require the Court to
extend those words beyond the manner in which they have been
structurally placed by the Legislature.
109. This interpretation does not mean that the insertion of the
comma in the enacted English version, by itself, brought about a
substantive change in the law. The two-fold contingency was present
even in the First Ordinance. The significance of the enacted
punctuation is, therefore, limited to its role as a textual aid in
understanding the relationship between the two alternatives. When
read together with the disjunctive “or” and the placement of the words
relating to occupation by the landlord, it supports the conclusion that
the provision contemplates two separately structured situations.
110. The legislative scheme of the Act of 2021 also warrants
consideration. The enactment replaced the earlier rent-control regime
under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent
and Eviction) Act, 1972 and introduced a distinct statutory framework
regulating landlord-tenant relations. The interpretation of Section 21(2)
(m) must, therefore, principally be derived from the language, structure
and scheme of the new enactment. The Court would not be justified in

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importing into the provision restrictions which are not expressed
therein merely because analogous expressions occurring in the earlier
rent-control legislation were subjected to a particular judicial
interpretation.
111. This aspect assumes significance because Section 21(2)(m) does
not employ the expression “bona fide requirement”, nor does it
reproduce the earlier statutory formulation concerning comparative
hardship or any similar additional requirement. As noticed by this
Court in Shyam Pal, the statutory inquiry under the Act of 2021 has to
be undertaken with reference to the language actually employed by the
Legislature. An express statutory requirement cannot be supplied by
judicial interpretation merely on the basis of concepts which formed
part of the earlier statutory regime.
112. The legislative history and textual structure considered above
provide contextual support for the conclusion that the two
contingencies contemplated by Section 21(2)(m) are separately
structured. The comma appearing in the enacted English version is a
supporting circumstance and cannot, by itself, furnish the foundation
for such construction. The conclusion instead follows from the
combined effect of the two alternatives, the disjunctive “or”, the
placement of the words “for the purpose of its occupation by landlord”,
and the language and statutory scheme of the provision read as a
whole.
113. Having reached this conclusion, a distinct question remains.
Even if the words “for the purpose of its occupation by landlord” are
treated as grammatically referable to the second contingency
concerning demolition and new construction, it remains to be
considered whether the expression “required by landlord” occurring in
the first contingency necessarily means that the premises must be
required for the landlord's own personal physical occupation. This
question is conceptually distinct from the punctuation issue and must
be answered by reference to the language and scheme of the first limb,

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read in the light of the judicial principles governing expressions such
as “own use” and “own occupation”.
114. The authorities discussed hereinabove provide guidance on this
question, but they do not conclude it merely because some of them
concerned the requirement of a landlord’s son. In Joginder Pal , the
Supreme Court construed the expression “for his own use” broadly and
held that it was not confined to the actual physical use of the premises
by the landlord personally. At the same time, the Court did not treat the
relationship between the landlord and the proposed user as conclusive.
It formulated a structured test, namely, whether the requirement
pleaded and proved could properly be regarded as the landlord’s own
requirement, having regard to the nature and degree of relationship or
dependence, the circumstances in which the claim arose, and the
genuineness and intrinsic tenability of the claim.
115. The subsequent decisions in Kailash Chand, Dwarkaprasad, Ajit
Singh, Mehmooda Gulshan and Murlidhar Aggarwal, considered
hereinabove, reinforce the broader proposition that expressions such as
“own use” or “own occupation”, when employed in rent legislation,
are not invariably confined to the landlord's personal physical
occupation and may, in an appropriate statutory setting, comprehend a
requirement to be fulfilled through a close family member. These
authorities, however, were rendered in the context of the particular
statutory expressions falling for consideration therein. They do not
authorise the Court to disregard the distinct language employed in
Section 21(2)(m) of the Act of 2021.
116. The question must, therefore, be answered from the language of
the present enactment. The expression employed in the first limb is
“required by landlord”. It is not qualified by words such as “for his
personal occupation” or “for his own occupation”, nor by any other
expression expressly confining the requirement to the landlord's
physical presence or personal use of the premises. This assumes
significance when viewed alongside the second limb, where the

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Legislature has expressly employed the words “for the purpose of its
occupation by landlord”. The difference in the language employed in
the two limbs cannot be disregarded.
117. It would, therefore, not be appropriate to read the words
“required by landlord” as necessarily synonymous with “required for
the landlord's own personal physical occupation”. Such a construction
would introduce into the first limb a qualification which the
Legislature has not expressed there, while the Legislature has, in the
second contingency, expressly used words referring to occupation by
the landlord. The Court must ordinarily give meaning to the distinction
in the language adopted in the two parts of the provision rather than
efface that distinction by importing into the first limb the expression
occurring in the latter part.
118. At the same time, the conclusion that personal physical
occupation is not an indispensable condition cannot be taken to mean
that every requirement of a family member automatically becomes the
requirement of the landlord. The safeguard furnished by the
authorities, particularly the test articulated in Joginder Pal, remains
relevant. The Court must ascertain whether the requirement pleaded
and proved can properly be regarded as the requirement of the
landlord. The relationship between the landlord and the proposed user,
the nature and purpose of the proposed use, the circumstances in which
the requirement has arisen, the degree of dependence or
interrelationship, and the genuineness and intrinsic tenability of the
claim are relevant considerations in determining that question.
119. There is thus a material distinction between the identity of the
proposed user and the legal character of the requirement. The fact that
the premises are intended to be used by the landlord's son does not, by
itself, take the requirement outside the expression “required by
landlord”. Conversely, the mere fact that the proposed user is the
landlord's son does not, by itself, establish that the requirement is
legally the requirement of the landlord. What is necessary is a

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sufficient and legitimate nexus between the requirement asserted and
the landlord's own interest and circumstances, assessed in the factual
setting of the case.
120. This construction also gives effect to the distinction between the
two limbs of Section 21(2)(m). The first limb concerns premises
required by the landlord “in its existing form”, whereas the second
concerns premises required “after demolition and new construction
thereof for the purpose of its occupation by landlord”. The Legislature
has thus expressly qualified the second contingency by reference to
occupation by the landlord. There is consequently no warrant to read
the same qualifying words into the first contingency as though they
were expressly incorporated therein.
121. The principle emerging from Shyam Pal is also relevant at this
stage. The Court is required to apply the statutory test enacted in the
Act of 2021 and cannot enlarge that test by importing the expressions
or conditions of the repealed statutory regime. The absence of the
expression “bona fide requirement”, comparative hardship or any
similar condition in Section 21(2)(m) cannot be supplied judicially.
Equally, however, the Court is not called upon to disregard the
ordinary meaning of “required by landlord” or the requirement that the
claim actually asserted must bear a genuine and legitimate nexus with
the landlord.
122. The Court, therefore, does not accept either of the two extreme
constructions advanced before it. The first, that the words “required by
landlord” necessarily mean that the landlord himself must physically
occupy the premises, would add a qualification not found in the first
limb of the provision. The second, that the requirement of a son or any
other family member automatically constitutes the requirement of the
landlord, would deprive the expression “by landlord” of its limiting
content. The proper construction lies between these two extremes and
gives effect both to the statutory language and to the controlled
principle of nexus recognised in the authorities.

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123. Accordingly, where premises in their existing form are sought
for establishing or carrying on the business or occupation of the
landlord's son, such requirement cannot be rejected at the threshold
merely because the son, rather than the landlord personally, is the
proposed user. The relevant question is whether, on the facts and
material placed before the competent authority, the requirement can
properly be regarded as the landlord's own requirement within the
meaning of Section 21(2)(m). In answering that question, the authority
must examine the relationship between the parties, the circumstances
giving rise to the requirement, the nature and purpose of the proposed
use, the genuineness of the claim, and the nexus between the proposed
use and the legitimate interest and circumstances of the landlord.
124. The punctuation occurring in the enacted English version has,
therefore, a limited but discernible role. It supports the grammatical
conclusion that the words “for the purpose of its occupation by
landlord” are attached to the second contingency. It does not, however,
determine the meaning of “required by landlord” in the first
contingency. That expression has to be construed independently, in
accordance with its ordinary meaning, the statutory context and the
scheme of the Act of 2021, while the principles emerging from the
authorities are used to determine whether the requirement asserted can,
in the circumstances of the case, properly be regarded as the landlord's
own requirement.
125. The legal position may, therefore, be summarised thus: the first
and second contingencies contemplated by Section 21(2)(m) are
grammatically distinct; the words “for the purpose of its occupation by
landlord” are more naturally referable to the second contingency; and
the expression “required by landlord” in the first limb does not
necessarily mean personal physical occupation by the landlord. The
authorities, particularly Joginder Pal, establish that actual physical use
by the landlord is not invariably indispensable where the governing
statutory expression permits a broader construction; they also make
clear that a family relationship alone is not conclusive and that the

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requirement must bear the requisite nexus with the landlord.
Consequently, a genuine requirement intended to establish or carry on
the residential or business activities of an immediate family member,
including a son, may fall within the first limb where, on the facts, it
can properly be regarded as the landlord's requirement. The ultimate
determination must, however, be made on the material placed before
the competent authority.
Findings and Conclusion
126. The discussion hereinabove leads to the conclusion that Section
21(2)(m) of the Act of 2021 contemplates two separately structured
contingencies. The words “for the purpose of its occupation by
landlord”, occurring after the expression “either in its existing form, or
after demolition and new construction thereof”, are more naturally
referable to the latter contingency. The expression “required by
landlord” occurring in the first limb cannot, therefore, be read as
necessarily requiring the landlord himself to be in physical occupation
of the premises. At the same time, the requirement of a family member
does not become the requirement of the landlord merely by reason of
the relationship. There must be a genuine and legitimate nexus
between the requirement asserted and the circumstances and interest of
the landlord, assessed in the manner indicated hereinabove.
127. Applying the aforesaid construction to the present cases, the
question that remains is whether the requirements pleaded by the
respondent-landlords were duly considered by the competent
authorities and whether the findings recorded by them suffer from
perversity, illegality, jurisdictional error, manifest error of law or any
other infirmity warranting interference in exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
128. In Petition under Article 227 No. 7645 of 2026, the respondent-
landlord specifically pleaded that the disputed premises were required
for the business/office of his son. The Rent Authority, upon
consideration of the material placed before it, initially rejected the

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eviction application. In appeal, the Rent Tribunal considered the
pleadings and material on record and recorded a finding accepting the
requirement pleaded by the landlord. Nothing has been shown to
demonstrate that the Tribunal proceeded upon an irrelevant
consideration, ignored any material circumstance having a direct
bearing upon the asserted requirement, or arrived at a conclusion
which could not reasonably have been reached on the material before
it.
129. In Petition under Article 227 No. 8450 of 2026, the respondent-
landlord likewise pleaded that the disputed premises were required for
his son, who was unemployed and intended to establish his business
therein. The Rent Authority considered the material available on record
and accepted the requirement, directing eviction. The Rent Tribunal
thereafter examined the matter in appeal and affirmed the finding
recorded by the Rent Authority. The petitioner has not been able to
demonstrate that the concurrent findings are founded on no evidence,
that any material circumstance having a direct bearing upon the
requirement was ignored, or that the conclusion reached is one which
no reasonable authority, upon the material before it, could have
reached.
130. In both matters, the requirement pleaded by the respondent-
landlords was not a ground introduced for the first time before this
Court. It formed part of the pleadings before the Rent Authority, was
considered on the material placed before the competent authorities and
was thereafter examined in the respective appellate proceedings. The
challenge raised before this Court, insofar as it concerns the
genuineness, sufficiency or factual basis of the requirement, essentially
invites a re-examination of the factual determination already made by
the authorities below. Such re-appreciation of evidence does not
ordinarily fall within the scope of supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227. Interference may, however, be warranted where the
findings are shown to be perverse, arbitrary, based on no evidence,

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founded upon a material misdirection in law, or otherwise vitiated by
jurisdictional error.
131. The objections relating to alternative accommodation and other
circumstances relied upon by the petitioners also do not warrant a
different conclusion. Having regard to the statutory scheme of the Act
of 2021 and the interpretation of Section 21(2)(m) discussed above,
such considerations cannot be elevated into independent statutory
conditions which the landlord must necessarily satisfy in every case
when the Legislature has not incorporated them as such. The essential
inquiry remains whether the requirement contemplated by Section
21(2)(m), as properly construed, has been established on the material
placed before the competent authority. In both cases, that inquiry was
undertaken by the authorities below and findings were recorded in
favour of the respondent-landlords.
132. This Court is conscious that the supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 is not an appellate jurisdiction. The Court does not
ordinarily substitute its own assessment of the evidence merely
because another view may be possible. Interference is warranted where
the subordinate authority has acted beyond jurisdiction, failed to
exercise jurisdiction vested in it, committed a manifest error of law, or
recorded findings which are perverse, arbitrary or unsupported by the
material on record. The present cases do not disclose any such
infirmity.
133. In Petition under Article 227 No. 7645 of 2026, therefore, the
finding that the disputed premises were required for the business/office
of the landlord's son cannot be rejected merely on the ground that the
proposed user was the son. The requirement was specifically pleaded
and was considered first by the Rent Authority and thereafter by the
Rent Tribunal, which recorded its finding in favour of the landlord. No
perversity, manifest error of law or jurisdictional infirmity has been
established in the decision of the Tribunal warranting interference by
this Court.

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134. Likewise, in Petition under Article 227 No. 8450 of 2026, the
requirement pleaded for the unemployed son of the landlord, for the
purpose of establishing his business, was considered by both the Rent
Authority and the Rent Tribunal. The concurrent findings in favour of
the landlord have not been shown to be based on no evidence, to
disregard any material circumstance, or to suffer from any error of
jurisdiction, manifest error of law or perversity.
135. The findings recorded by the competent authorities in both
matters, therefore, cannot be displaced merely because the proposed
occupation or business is that of the landlord's son. The statutory
requirement under Section 21(2)(m) does not render such a claim
inadmissible at the threshold. What is required is that the asserted
requirement bear a genuine and legitimate nexus with the landlord's
circumstances and interests, and that the finding in that regard be
supported by the material placed before the competent authority. On
the facts of the present cases, no infirmity warranting interference
under Article 227 has been established.
136. The challenge in both petitions, founded on the contention that
the premises were sought for the occupation or business of the
landlord's son and that such requirement is, for that reason alone,
outside the scope of Section 21(2)(m) of the Act of 2021, therefore
fails. Petition under Article 227 No. 7645 of 2026 and Petition under
Article 227 No. 8450 of 2026 are, accordingly, dismissed.
137. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners in both the
petitions seek an alternative relief for grant of six months' time to
vacate the premises in question.
138. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-landlords in both
the petitions, on instructions, submit that they have no objection to the
petitioners being granted six months' time to vacate the premises in
question.
139. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, and in
view of the prayer made on behalf of the petitioners, six months' time,

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as agreed to by learned counsel for the parties, is granted to the
petitioners to vacate and hand over peaceful possession of the premises
in question to the respective respondent-landlords, subject to the
following conditions:
(i) The tenant-petitioners shall file an undertaking before the
concerned Rent Authority stating therein that they shall vacate the
premises in question and hand over peaceful possession thereof to the
respective respondent-landlords on or before 23rd March, 2027. The
tenant-petitioners shall also deposit the entire arrears of rent, after
adjustment of the amount, if any, already deposited, within a period of
two weeks from today.
(ii) The aforesaid undertaking shall be filed before the concerned
Rent Authority within a period of two weeks from today.
(iii) During the period for which the benefit of extended occupation
is granted, the tenant-petitioners shall continue to deposit a sum of
Rs.4,000/- per month, as agreed to by learned counsel for the parties,
towards use and occupation charges, on or before the 7th day of each
succeeding month, commencing from October, 2026, until the
premises are vacated and peaceful possession thereof is handed over to
the respective respondent-landlords.
140. It is made clear that in the event of failure on the part of the
tenant-petitioners to comply with any of the aforesaid conditions, the
protection granted by this Court shall stand vacated automatically,
without any further order of this Court, and it shall be open to the
respective respondent-landlords to seek enforcement of the orders of
eviction impugned in these petitions, in accordance with law.
141. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.)
September 23, 2026
RKK/-
Digitally signed by :-
RAJ KUMAR KANNAUJIA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad