RAVI KUMAR NAGDEO vs UNION OF INDIA

Court: Chhattisgarh High Court
Case type: WRIT PETITION TAX MATTER RELATED TO OTHER MATTER
Decided on: 08-04-2026

<div> 1<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16134</b><br /> <br /> <br /> 2026:CGHC:16134<br /> <b>NAFR </b><br /> <b>HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR</b><br /> <b>WPT No. 221 of 2022</b><br />  Ravi Kumar Nagdeo S/o Late Shri Radhamal Nagdeo Aged About 56 Years <br /> R/o Opposite Jagdish Lagde Sadar Bazar, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, Pin- <br /> 495001<br /> <b>... Petitioner</b><br /> <b>versus</b><br /> 1. Union Of India Through Secretary Ministry Of Finance, Department Of <br /> Revenue, North Block, New Delhi- 110001, India.<br /> 2. Income Tax Officer Ward- 1(1), Bilaspur, Office Of The Income Tax Officer <br /> Ward -1 (1), Bilaspur, Aayakar Bhawan, Vyapar Vihar, Bilaspur, <br /> Chhattisgarh- 495001, India<br /> 3. Principal Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Raipur- 1 Office Of The Principal <br /> Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Raipur- 1, Central Revenue Building Civil <br /> Lines, Raipur, Chhattisgarh- 492001, India.<br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>4.</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><div><br /> National Faceless Assessment Centre, Delhi, India<br /></div><table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>... Respondent(s)</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>For Petitioner</th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>: Mr. Siddharth Dubey, Advocate</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>For U.O.I./Respondent No. 1</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>: Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Dy. S.G. along with Mr.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Abhishek Banjare, C.G.C.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>For Respondents No. 2 to 4</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>: Mr. Ajay Kumrani, Advocate holding the brief</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>of Mr. Amit Chaudhari, Advocate</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>08.04</th><th>.2026</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>1.</th><th></th><th>By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):-</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>“10A.1</th><th>Quashing /setting aside Annexure "P/1".</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Annexure "P/3"(Colly), Annexure "P/5" (Colly),</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Annexure "P/6"</td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table><div><br /><br /> 2<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16134</b><br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>10A.2</th><th></th><th>Any other relief(s) that this Hon'ble Court</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>may deem fit in facts and circumstances of the</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>case.</td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table><div><br /> <b><i>10. B INTERIM RELIEF(S) PRAYED: -</i></b><br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>10B.1</th><th>Calling for the entire records of the present</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>matter.</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>10B.2</th><th>Staying effect and operation of Annexure</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>"P/1", Annexure "P/3" (Colly), Annexure "P/5"</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>(Colly), Annexure "P/6" till the disposal of the</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>present petition.</td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>10B.3</th><th>Any other interim relief(s) that this Hon'ble</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Court may deem fit in facts and circumstances of</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>the case.”</td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>2.</th><th></th><th>Mr. Dubey would submit that a notice under Section 148 of Income Tax Act,</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><div><br /> 1961 was issued to the petitioner after cut-off date i.e. 01.04.2021, therefore, <br /> the respondent authorities were under obligation to conduct a proceeding <br /> according to the provisions of Section 148A of the Income Tax Act, 1961(for <br /> short “Act, 1961”). He has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the <br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>High Court of Delhi in the matter of</th><th>Suman Jeet Agrawal vs. Income-tax</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>Officer</th><th>reported in</th><th>[2022] 143 taxmann.com 11 (Delhi).</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>3.</th><th></th><th>On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondents No. 2 to 4</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><div><br /> would submit that notice under Section 148 of Act, 1961 was dispatched on <br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>31</th><th>st</th><th>of March, 2021, and therefore, there was no need to conduct a</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><div><br /> proceeding according to the provisions of Section 148A of the Act, 1961. <br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>4.</th><th></th><th>I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><div><br /> placed on record. <br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>5.</th><th></th><th>Perusal of screen shot of</th><th>Income Tax Business Application (</th><th>ITB</th><th>A) portal</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><div><br /> would reveal that notice was issued on 01.04.2021 at 12:19:37 hour, and <br /><br /> 3<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16134</b><br /> thus, it was issued after cut-off date, and therefore, the respondent authorities <br /> are required to conduct a proceeding according to the provisions of Section <br /> 148A of the Act, 1961. <br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>6.</th><th></th><th>The High Court of Delhi in the matter of</th><th>Suman Jeet Agrawal</th><th>(supra)</th><th>while</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><div><br /> dealing with the similar issue in para 25.1 to 25.13, 26.20 and 26.23 held has <br /> under :-<br /> <b>“25.1</b> It has emerged as an admitted position on facts, that the e-<br /> mails attaching the impugned Notices dated 31st March, 2021, <br /> were despatched by the ITBA servers on 01st April, 2021, or <br /> thereafter.<br /> <b>25.2</b> Faced with the aforesaid factual position, it has been <br /> contended by the Department that since generation of impugned <br /> Notices on the ITBA portal on 31st March, 2021, is undisputed, <br /> the singular act of generation of Notice by JAO satisfies the <br /> requirement of issued for the purpose of section 149 of the Act of <br /> 1961 and despatch of the Notice on 31st March, 2021 is not a <br /> mandatory requirement.<br /> <b>25.3 </b> The Department contends that since each of the impugned <br /> Notices bear a DIN, its generation as on 31st March, 2021, is <br /> beyond doubt. It is further contended that since, on the ITBA <br /> portal, after generation of Notice the JAO is left with no power to <br /> amend, alter, cancel or ante-date the Notice, the said act of <br /> generation conclusively establishes that the Notice has been <br /> issued.<br /> <b>25.4 </b> The petitioners as noted above have opposed this contention <br /> of the Department as being contrary to settled law interpreting the <br /> expression 'issued', 'shall be issued and the dictionary meaning of <br /> the phrase 'issue'. It is contended that under the Act of 1961, a <br /> Notice is held to be 'issued on the date of its due despatch and not <br /> on the date the notice is drawn up.<br /> <b>25.5</b> It would be useful to refer to the judgments relied upon by <br /> the petitioners, which clearly bring out that for an authority to <br /> contend that a Notice has been issued, the same must be duly <br /> despatched by the issuing authority. The first instructive judgment <br /> on this point is Delhi Development Authority (supra) at <br /> paragraphs 5, 13 and 15, which reads as under:<br /> ‘…<br /> 5. The substituted clause (ii) in para 2, in O.M. dated <br /><br /> 4<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16134</b><br /> September 14, 1992, is as under:<br /> "(ii) Government servants in respect of whom a charge-<br /> sheet has been issued and the disciplinary proceedings are <br /> pending; and"<br /> ...<br /> 13.... The context in which the word 'Issued' has been <br /> used, merely means that the decision to initiate <br /> disciplinary proceedings is taken and translated into action <br /> by despatch of the charge-sheet leaving no doubt that the <br /> decision had been taken. The contrary view would defeat <br /> the object by enabling the government servant, if so <br /> inclined, to evade service and thereby frustrate the <br /> decision and get promotion in spite of that decision. <br /> Obviously, the contrary view cannot be taken.<br /> ...<br /> 15. The meaning of the word 'issued', on which <br /> considerable stress was laid by learned counsel for the <br /> respondent, has to be gathered from the context in which it <br /> is used. Meanings of the word 'issue' given in the Shorter <br /> Oxford English Dictionary include: 'to give exit to; to send <br /> forth, or allow to pass out; to let out; ... to give or send out <br /> authoritatively or officially; to send forth or deal out <br /> formally or publicly; to emit, put into circulation'. The <br /> issue of a charge-sheet, therefore, means its despatch to the <br /> government servant, and this act is complete the moment <br /> steps are taken for the purpose, by framing the charge-<br /> sheet and despatching it to the government servant, the <br /> further fact of its actual service on the government servant <br /> not being a necessary part of its requirement.<br /> (Emphasis Supplied)<br /> In the aforesaid judgment the Supreme Court emphatically laid <br /> down that despatch is an essential condition to complete the act of <br /> issuance. The Court clarified that service on the recipient was not <br /> a condition precedent for satisfying the act of issuance.<br /> <b>25.6</b> It would also be useful to refer to the judgment of the <br /> Supreme Court in the case of R.K. Upadhyaya (supra). In the said <br /> case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the controversy of <br /> the validity of a notice with reference to sections 148 and 149 of <br /> the Act of 1961. In the said case, the notice under section 148 of <br /> the Act of 1961, was despatched by registered post on 31st March, <br /> 1970, but the same was received by the assessee on 03rd April, <br /> 1970; and therefore, the Gujarat High Court after observing that <br /> the expression "issued and 'served' in sections 148 and 149 have <br /> the same meaning, held that the notice was time barred. In appeal, <br /> the Supreme Court after taking note that the Notice was <br /> despatched by registered post on 31st March, 1970, set aside the <br /> judgment of the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the <br /> service of notice is not a condition precedent for satisfying the <br /> condition of "issued". The date of despatch of the notice was taken <br /><br /> 5<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16134</b><br /> into consideration by the Supreme Court as the relevant date for <br /> determining that the notice has been validly issued for the purpose <br /> of section 149 of the Act of 1961. The date of notice is discernible <br /> 1<br /> from the judgment of High Court .<br /> <b>25.7.</b> The contention of the Department that since the impugned <br /> Notices were generated and digitally signed on 31st March, 2021, <br /> the same should be considered as the date of issue, <br /> notwithstanding the fact that the same had not been despatched, <br /> was categorically rejected by the Madras High Court in Smt. <br /> Parveen Amin Bhathara (supra) following the judgment of Gujarat <br /> High Court in Kanubhai M. Patel (HUF) (supra). The Gujarat <br /> High Court, dealing with a notice issued in paper form, at <br /> paragraphs 13 and 16 observed as under:<br /> “.…<br /> 13.... Whereas, on behalf of the revenue, it has been <br /> contended that the notices were actually signed on 31-3-<br /> 2010, hence, the said date would be the date of issue and <br /> as such, the impugned notices have been issued within the <br /> time limit prescribed under section 149 of the Act.<br /> 16. Thus, the expression to issue in the context of issuance <br /> of notices, writs and process, has been attributed the <br /> meaning, to send out; to place in the hands of the proper <br /> officer for service. The expression "shall be issued" as <br /> used in section 149 would therefore have to be read in the <br /> aforesaid context. In the present case, the impugned <br /> notices have been signed on 31-3-2010, whereas the same <br /> were sent to the speed post centre for booking only on 7-4-<br /> 2010. Considering the definition of the word issue, it is <br /> apparent that merely signing the notices on 31-3-2010, <br /> cannot be equated with issuance of notice as contemplated <br /> under section 149 of the Act. The date of issue would be <br /> the date on which the same were handed over for service <br /> to the proper officer, which in the facts of the present case <br /> would be the date on which the said notices were actually <br /> handed over to the post office for the purpose of booking <br /> for the purpose of effecting service on the petitioners. Till <br /> the point of time the envelopes are properly stamped with <br /> adequate value of postal stamps, it cannot be stated that <br /> the process of issue is complete. In the facts of the present <br /> case, the impugned notices having been sent for booking <br /> to the Speed Post Centre only on 7-4-2010, the date of <br /> issue of the said notices would be 7-4-2010 and not 31-3-<br /> 2010, as contended on behalf of the revenue. In the <br /> circumstances, impugned the notices under section 148 in <br /> relation to assessment year 2003-04, having been issued <br /> on 7-4-2010 which is clearly beyond the period of six <br /> years from the end of the relevant assessment year, are <br /> clearly barred by limitation and as such, cannot be <br /> sustained.<br /> .…” (Emphasis <br /> Supplied)<br /><br /> 6<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16134</b><br /> The Gujarat High Court categorically held that it is on the date of <br /> despatch of the section 148 notice that the same will be held to be <br /> issued for the purpose of section 149 of the Act of 1961.<br /> <b>25.8.</b> The Madras High Court in Smt. Parveen Amin Bhathara <br /> (supra), after approving the dicta of Kanubhai Patel (supra) and <br /> considering section 282 of the Act of 1961 and rule 127 of IT <br /> Rules, held as under:<br /> “.…<br /> 8. In the present case, the respondent reopened the <br /> assessment of the appellant for the assessment year 2011-<br /> 12, through notice dated 31-3-2018 under section 148 of <br /> the Act. Admittedly, the limitation period of six years for <br /> reopening the assessment, came to an end on 31-3-2018. <br /> The main plank of contention of the learned counsel for <br /> the appellant is that the notice under section 148 of the Act <br /> dated 31-3-2018 has been received by the appellant <br /> through e-mail only on 18-4-2018 i.e, after the expiry of <br /> six years from the end of the assessment year under <br /> consideration and hence, the same is clearly barred by <br /> limitation, whereas the Department contended that mere <br /> signing of notice by the respondent on 31-3-2018 amounts <br /> to issuance of notice under section 149 of the Act and <br /> therefore, the same is within the limitation period.<br /> 12. In Kanubhai M. Patel v. Hiren Bhatt and others ((2011) <br /> 334 ITR 25 (Guj)), it was held by the Gujarat High Court <br /> that "date of issuance of notice under section 148 Income-<br /> tax Act has to be reckoned not from the date when it was <br /> issued, but on the date when it was actually delivered on <br /> the assessee.<br /> ....<br /> Thus, it is apparent from the aforesaid decisions that the <br /> issuance of notice under section 149 is complete only <br /> when the same is issued in the id decisions that bed under <br /> section 282 r/w rule 127 of the Income-tax Rules <br /> prescribing the mode of service of notice under the Act. <br /> The signing of notice would not amount to issuance of <br /> notice as contemplated under section 149 of the Act. In <br /> other words, the requirement of issuance of notice under <br /> section 149 is not mere signing of the notice under section <br /> 148, but is sent to the proper person within the end of the <br /> relevant assessment year.<br /> .…” (Emphasis <br /> Supplied)<br /> In the said judgment the Division Bench of the Madras High Court <br /> categorically rejected the submission of the Department that <br /> signing of Notice, without despatch, would amount to issuance of <br /> Notice as contemplated under section 149 of the Act of 1961.<br /><br /> 7<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16134</b><br /> <b>25.9</b> The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Yuvraj (supra) similarly <br /> dealt with a case of a Section 148 Notice dated 31st March, 2021, <br /> which was sent by e-mail to the assessee on 16th April, 2021. The <br /> High Court held that the Notice was issued on 16th April, 2021 <br /> and quashed the same reserving liberty to the Department to issue <br /> a fresh Notice under section 148A of the Act of 1961, in <br /> accordance with law. The grounds for challenging the impugned <br /> Notice in the said case were same as have been raised herein for <br /> challenging the impugned Notices falling under category 'A' and <br /> 'B'.<br /> <b>25.10.</b> The judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Daujee <br /> Abhusan Bhandar (supro), was earliest to hold that drawing up a <br /> Notice on 31st March, 2021, and digitally signing the same, in the <br /> absence of despatch, does not amount to issuance of Notice within <br /> the meaning of section 149 of the Act of 1961. The High Court <br /> after elaborately discussing the provisions of sections 282 and <br /> 282A of the Act of 1961, and the provisions of section 13 of the <br /> Act of 2000, held that, since the impugned Notice therein though <br /> dated 31st March, 2021, was issued through e-mail on 06th April, <br /> 2021, the same was time barred and therefore liable to be quashed. <br /> The Court at paragraph 29 and 30 held as under:<br /> “.…<br /> 29. Thus, considering the provisions of sections 282 and <br /> 282A of the Act, 1961 and the provisions of section 13 of <br /> the Act, 2000 and meaning of the word "issue" we find <br /> that firstly notice shall be signed by the assessing authority <br /> and then it has to be issued either in paper form or be <br /> communicated in electronic form by delivering or <br /> transmitting the copy thereof to the person therein named <br /> by modes provided in section 282 which includes <br /> transmitting in the form of electronic record. Section 13(1) <br /> of the Act, 2000 provides that unless otherwise agreed, the <br /> despatch of an electronic record occurs when it enters into <br /> computer resources outside the control of the originator. <br /> Thus, the point of time when a digitally signed notice in <br /> the form of electronic record is entered in computer <br /> resources outside the control of the originator i.e. the <br /> assessing authority that shall the date and time of issuance <br /> of notice under section 148 read with section 149 of the <br /> Act, 1961.<br /> 30. In view of the discussion made above, we hold that <br /> mere digitally signing the notice is not the Issuance of <br /> notice. Since the impugned notice under section 148 of the <br /> Act, 1961 was issued to the petitioner on 6-4-2021 through <br /> e-mail, therefore, we hold that the impugned notice under <br /> section 148 of the Act, 1961 is time barred. Consequently, <br /> the impugned notice is quashed.<br /> .…” (Emphasis <br /> Supplied)<br /><br /> 8<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16134</b><br /> <b>25.11</b> In the subsequent judgments of the Allahabad High Court in <br /> the case of Santosh Krishna HUF (supro) and Mohan Lal <br /> Santwani (supra) the High Court summoned the details of date and <br /> time of triggering of e-mail by the ITBA e-mail software system to <br /> determine the date of issuance of the e-mail attaching the Notice. <br /> The High Court held the said date of triggering of e-mail to be the <br /> date of issue of Section 148 Notice for the purpose of section 149 <br /> of the Act of 1961.<br /> <b>25.12 </b> The review of the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme <br /> Court and the several High Courts shows that all Courts have <br /> consistently held that the expression 'issue' in its common parlance <br /> and its legal interpretation means that the issuer of the notice must <br /> after drawing up the notice and signing the notice, make an overt <br /> act to ensure due despatch of the notice to the addressee. It is only <br /> upon due despatch, that the notice can be said to have been issued.<br /> <b>25.13</b> Further, a perusal of the Compliance Affidavit reveals that <br /> while the function of generation of Notice on ITBA portal and <br /> digital signing of the Notice is executed by the JAO, the function <br /> of drafting of the e-mail to which the Notice is attached and <br /> triggering the e-mail to the assessee is performed by the IIBA e-<br /> mail software system.<br /> Thus, mere generation of Notice on the ITBA Screen cannot in <br /> fact or in law constitute issue of notice, whether the notice is <br /> issued in paper form or electronic form. In case of paper form, the <br /> notice must be despatched by post on or before 31st March 2021 <br /> and for communication in electronic form the e-mail should have <br /> been despatched on or before 31st March 2021.<br /> In the present writ petitions, the despatch by post and e-mail was <br /> carried out on or after 01st April 2021 and therefore, we hold that, <br /> the impugned Notices were not issued on 31st March 2021.<br /> <b>26.20</b> We are in respectful agreement with the law laid down by <br /> the various High Courts in Daujee Abhushan (supra), Santosh <br /> Krishna HUF (supra), Mohan Lal Santwani (supra), Advance <br /> Infradevelopers (P) Lad. (supra) and Yuvraj (supra), that for <br /> determining when Notices were issued, the date and time of when <br /> the ITBA e-mail software system is triggered and the Notices <br /> leave the last ITBA server would be considered.<br /> <b>26.23 </b> We also take judicial notice of the fact that the Department <br /> from May, 2022, for Notices issued on or after 1st April 2021, has <br /> considered the date and time of despatch of the notices as recorded <br /> by the ITВА portal as the date of issuance and disregarded the date <br /> of generation of notice Le. 31-3-2021. For notices despatched on <br /> or after 1st April 2021, the Department, following the Supreme <br /> Court's order in Ashish Agarwal (supra) considered the notices as <br /> issued under section 148A of the Act of 1961. This shows that the <br /> Department itself acknowledges and admits that the date of <br /> generation is distinct from date of issuance and the Department <br /><br /> 9<br /> <b>2026:CGHC:16134</b><br /> considers the despatch by ITBA Portal as the date of issue for the <br /> purpose of Section 149 of the Act of 1961.<br /> Finding for Notices falling under category ‘C’<br /> Since the time taken by the ITBA email software system in <br /> triggering the e-mails is attributable to the Department, the AO is <br /> directed to determine the date and time on which the emails were <br /> triggered by the ITBA system server as per the ITBA records and <br /> consider the same as the date of issuance.<br /> Illustratively, in W.P.(C) 8994 of 2021 for the Notice dated 31st <br /> March 2021 and digitally signed on 31st March 2021 the JAO is <br /> directed to determine the date and time of despatch as recorded by <br /> ITBA portal and consider the same as the date of issuance.<br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>7.</th><th></th><th>Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and law enunciated in</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>the matter of</th><th>Suman Jeet Agrawal</th><th>(supra), I am inclined to allow this</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><div><br /> petition. The impugned notice dated 31.03.2021(Annexure P/1) including re-<br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>assessment order dated 30.03.2022 (Annexure P/6) are hereby</th><th>quashed</th><th>. The</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><div><br /> respondent authorities would be at liberty to initiate a fresh proceeding in <br /> accordance with the provisions of Section 148A of Income Tax Act, 1961. <br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>8.</th><th></th><th>The issue of limitation would not come in the way of conducting proceeding.</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>Sd/-</th><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>J</td><td></td><td>UDGE</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table><div><br /> $iddhant</div>