Union Of India And Anr vs Vikram Hingorani And Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 24.04.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 22.05.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 22.05.2026
+ LPA 522/2022, CM APPL. 40048/2022, CM APPL.
48246/2022, CM APPL. 54265/2022, CM APPL. 26407/2023,
CM APPL. 71572/2025, CM APPL. 27359/2026
GAUTAM TAHILRAMANI AND ANR .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Subhash Tanwar, SPC with
Mr. Sandeep Mishra, Mr.
Harshit Deshwal, Mr. Mohit
Kumar Tomar, Mr. Mayank
Sehrawat, Advs. for R-1/UOI.
Mr. Naseem Ahmed, Adv. for
R-4.
Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Shreya Chopra, Adv.
for R-5 to R-10.
Mr. S.R. Mehta, Adv. R-11.
+ LPA 630/2022, CM APPL. 47325/2022, CM APPL.
47326/2022, CM APPL. 63753/2023, CM APPL. 21036/2024,
CM APPL. 71573/2025 and CM APPL. 27330/2026
SMT DARSHNA SACHDEVA .....Appellant
Through: Mr. S.R. Mehta, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Subhash Tanwar, SPC with
Mr. Sandeep Mishra, Mr.
Harshit Deshwal, Mr. Mohit
Kumar Tomar, Mr. Mayank
Sehrawat, Advs. for R-1/UOI.
Mr. Shashank Dixit, CGSC
with Mr. Kunal Ra, Adv.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
Signing Date:22.05.2026
15:50:50
LPA 522/2022 and connected matters Page 1 of 39
Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv. for R-3
and 4.
Mr. Naseem Ahmed, Adv. for
R-5.
Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Shreya Chopra, Adv.
for R-6 to R-11.
+ LPA 631/2022, CM APPL. 47341/2022 and CM APPL.
47342/2022
DARSHNA SACHDEVA .....Appellant
Through: Mr. S.R. Mehta, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS & ORS. .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Subhash Tanwar, SPC with
Mr. Sandeep Mishra, Mr.
Harshit Deshwal, Mr. Mohit
Kumar Tomar, Mr. Mayank
Sehrawat, Advs. for R-1/UOI.
Mr. Shashank Dixit, CGSC
with Mr. Kunal Ra, Adv.
Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv. for R-3
and 4.
Mr. Naseem Ahmed, Adv. for
R-5.
Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Yukta Chauhan, Adv.
for R-6 to R-11.
+ LPA 632/2022, CM APPL. 47346/2022 and CM APPL.
47347/2022
DARSHNA SACHDEVA .....Appellant
Through: Mr. S.R. Mehta, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Subhash Tanwar, SPC with
Mr. Sandeep Mishra, Mr.
Harshit Deshwal, Mr. Mohit
Kumar Tomar, Mr. Mayank
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
Signing Date:22.05.2026
15:50:50
LPA 522/2022 and connected matters Page 2 of 39
Sehrawat, Advs. for R-1/UOI.
Mr. Shashank Dixit, CGSC
with Mr. Kunal Ra, Adv.
Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv. for R-3
and 4.
Mr. Naseem Ahmed, Adv. for
R-5.
Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Yukta Chauhan, Adv.
for R-6 to R-11.
+ LPA 718/2022, CM APPL. 54380/2022, CM APPL.
54381/2022 and CM APPL.54382/2022
GAUTAM TAHILRAMANI & ANR. .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Subhash Tanwar, SPC with
Mr. Sandeep Mishra, Mr.
Harshit Deshwal, Mr. Mohit
Kumar Tomar, Mr. Mayank
Sehrawat, Advs. for R-1/UOI.
Mr. Naseem Ahmed, Adv. for
R-4.
Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Shreya Chopra, Adv.
for R-5 to R-10.
Mr. S.R. Mehta, Adv. for R-11.
+ LPA 719/2022, CM APPL. 54384/2022, CM APPL.
54385/2022, CM APPL.54386/2022, CM APPL. 63984/2023 &
CM APPL. 20844/2024
GAUTAM TAHILRAMANI & ANR. .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Subhash Tanwar, SPC with
Mr. Sandeep Mishra, Mr.
Harshit Deshwal, Mr. Mohit
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
Signing Date:22.05.2026
15:50:50
LPA 522/2022 and connected matters Page 3 of 39
Kumar Tomar, Mr. Mayank
Sehrawat, Advs. for R-1/UOI.
Mr. Naseem Ahmed, Adv. for
R-4.
Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Shreya Chopra, Adv.
for R-5 to R-10.
Mr. S.R. Mehta, Adv. for R-11.
+ LPA 596/2023, CM APPL. 42896/2023, CM APPL.
42897/2023, CM APPL.42898/2023, CM APPL.42899/2023,
CM APPL. 43626/2023, CM APPL. 57663/2023, CM APPL.
65301/2023, CM APPL. 27361/2026
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Sandeep Kumar Mahapatra,
CGSC with Ms. Mrinmayee
Sahu, Mr. Tribhuvan, Mr.
Abhimanyu, Ms. Anushka
Sarraf, Advs.
versus
VIKRAM HINGORANI AND ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Dr. Aman Hingorani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Shreya Chopra, Adv.
for R-1 to R-6.
Mr. Vikram Saini, Adv. for R-7
and 8.
Mr. Subhash Tanwar, SPC with
Mr. Sandeep Mishra, Mr.
Harshit Deshwal, Mr. Mohit
Kumar Tomar, Mr. Mayank
Sehrawat, Advs. for UOI.
Mr. S.R. Mehta and Mr.
Naseem Ahmed, Advs. for R-
10.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
Signature Not Verified
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J U D G M E N T
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J. :
1. The present batch of Letters Patent Appeals raises the following
issues for consideration:
i. Whether a decree for partition of a leasehold property,
passed without impleading the lessor, can result in splitting of
tenancy or otherwise bind the lessor so as to effect an alteration
of the terms and conditions of the lease?
ii. Whether a writ petition seeking a direction for mutation
(entry of leasehold rights in the official records) of leasehold
rights is maintainable without first challenging the order of
cancellation of the lease and re-entry passed by the lessor?
iii. Whether disputes inter se between co-lessees, particularly
with regard to liability for payment of misuse charges, are
amenable to adjudication in exercise of writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India?
2. The present batch of Letters Patent Appeals arises out of a
common set of facts and impugns a series of orders passed by the
learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 7452/2019, including the principal
Impugned Order dated 27.01.2021, as also the subsequent review and
corrigendum orders dated 16.12.2021 and 21.04.2022.
3. The controversy, though arising out of a dispute relating to
mutation and leasehold rights in respect of an immovable property, in
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substance raises significant questions concerning the nature and
incidents of leasehold estates, the permissibility and legal effect of
partition thereof, the scope and limitations of writ jurisdiction in
matters involving contractual and public law elements, as well as the
extent to which inter se disputes between co-lessees can be examined
in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
FACTUAL MATRIX
4. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the present
batch of Appeals, it would be necessary to briefly notice the relevant
facts leading to the present proceedings.
5. The dispute pertains to property bearing No. 13, Main Road,
West Patel Nagar, New Delhi, admeasuring approximately 800 square
yards [hereinafter referred to as the „subject property‟]. The said
property was originally allotted by the Union of India in favour of Shri
Ramchand B. Tahilramani, pursuant to which a lease deed dated
06.09.1956 came to be executed in his favour for a term of ninety-nine
years, subject to the terms and conditions contained therein.
6. It is not in dispute that the original lessee, Shri Ramchand B.
Tahilramani, subsequently transferred the leasehold rights in favour of
his wife, Smt. Sati Tahilramani, by way of a gift deed dated
27.07.1959. Thus, Smt. Sati Tahilramani came to be recorded as the
lessee in respect of the subject property under the terms of the original
lease.
7. Disputes thereafter arose with respect to rights in the subject
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property, culminating in Civil Suit No. 640A/1974, wherein Shri
Hardasmal Banasing Hingorani asserted claims against Smt. Sati
Tahilramani. The said suit came to be decreed, declaring both Shri
Hardasmal Banasing Hingorani and Smt. Sati Tahilramani as co-
lessees, each holding 50% undivided share in the subject property.
8. It is the case of the Hingorani family that, subsequent to the
aforesaid declaration, the Tahilramani side inducted a contractor in or
around the year 1988 for redevelopment of the subject property. The
contractor, in turn, is stated to have inducted various
occupants/tenants, including a banking institution, namely Laxmi
Vysya Bank (subsequently succeeded by Kotak Mahindra Bank).
9. Thereafter, disputes inter se between the co-lessees escalated,
leading to the institution of Civil Suit No. 364/2004 seeking partition
and rendition of accounts. The said suit culminated in a final decree of
partition dated 24.04.2008, which was passed on the basis of a
settlement between the parties.
10. A perusal of the said decree, read with the terms of the
settlement (Ex. C-1), indicates that the partition effected between the
parties does not result in a vertical subdivision of the plot into
independent sub-plots, nor it can be characterised as a purely
horizontal division or floor-wise division. The arrangement envisaged
under the decree is one whereby specific portions of the existing
superstructure, including basement, different floors, individual flats,
and terrace rights, have been allocated to the respective parties, while
the land beneath continues to remain undivided and no independent
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demarcation of the plot itself is effected. The decree also preserves
various common areas and creates mutual rights of access, user, and
enjoyment.
11. In that view, the partition is essentially in the nature of an inter
se arrangement regulating possession and enjoyment of different
portions of the superstructure, without effecting any physical or legal
subdivision of the plot itself. The decree did not contemplate, nor
could it have effected, a modification of the underlying lease
conditions binding the parties vis-à-vis the lessor.
12. It is also a matter of record that subsequent proceedings ensued
for enforcement of rights flowing from the partition decree, including
proceedings for possession. Ultimately, by order dated 15.01.2013, a
decree for possession came to be passed, which was carried in
challenge up to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and attained finality. The
occupants, including the successor of Laxmi Vysya Bank, were
directed to vacate the premises by December, 2018.
13. However, significantly, during the subsistence of the aforesaid
disputes and prior to culmination of the proceedings, the Union of
India, acting through the Land & Development Office (L&DO),
passed an order dated 06.02.2006 cancelling the lease of the subject
property on account of alleged misuse and exercising the right of re-
entry.
14. The effect of the said order of cancellation and re-entry is of
considerable legal consequence. Admittedly, neither party sought to
challenge or set aside the said order of cancellation of lease in
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appropriate proceedings including in the present round of litigation
filed by the Hingoranis Family. Consequently, the order of re-entry
continued to operate and attained finality.
15. Following the passing of the final decree of partition and
conclusion of possession proceedings, applications came to be
submitted by the parties before the L&DO seeking
mutation/substitution of their respective names in the records of the
lessor. The said applications were, however, rejected by the L&DO
vide communication dated 03.05.2019, inter alia , on the ground that
the lease of the subject property already stood cancelled and the
property had been re-entered by the Government.
16. Aggrieved by the rejection of their request for mutation, the
Hingorani parties instituted W.P.(C) 7452/2019 before this Court,
seeking, inter alia , the following:
“(a) issue appropriate Writ, Direction and Order setting
aside/quashing the Rejection Letter for Mutation No.
L&DO/PS3/62952/389 dated 03.05.2019 issued by Deputy Land &
Development Officer rejecting the mutation application of the
Petitioners in respect of their share in Property No. 13, Main Road,
West Patel Nagar, New Delhi;
(b) issue an appropriate Writ, Direction and Order setting
aside/quashing the Mutation-cum-Substitution letter No. L&DO/PS-
III/195 dated 02.02.2005 pertaining the lease hold rights in respect of
Property No. 13, Main Road, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi in the
names of the Respondent Nos. 3 and 4;
(c) issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the Respondent Nos. 1 to 2 to
mutate/substitute such lease hold rights in respect of Property No. 13,
Main Road, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi in favour of the Petitioners
in terms of the final decree of partition dated 24.04.2008 with Exhibit
C 1 passed by the Court of Shri NK Sharma, A.D.J., Tis Hazari
Courts, Delhi in Suit No. 364/2004;
(d) issue a Writ of Prohibition restraining the Respondent Nos. 3 and
4 and all persons claiming under them from acting on the Mutation-
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NARAYAN
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cum-Substitution letter No. L&DO/PS-III/195 dated 02.02.2005;
(e) issue a Direction to the Respondent No. 5 to pay the misuse or
other charges for breach of lease deed terms, if any, levied by the
Respondent No. 1 and 2;
(f) award costs of this Petition to the Petitioners; and”
17. The writ petition, as framed, was thus directed not only against
the rejection of the request for mutation vide communication dated
03.05.2019, but also sought to question the earlier
mutation/substitution effected in favour of certain co-lessees, while
simultaneously seeking a positive direction for mutation of the writ
petitioners‟ names in terms of the final decree of partition dated
24.04.2008.
18. The learned Single Judge, vide principal Impugned Order dated
27.01.2021, proceeded to dispose of the writ petition by granting, inter
alia , the following reliefs:
i. The writ petitioners were held entitled to seek
mutation/substitution of their names in respect of their share in
the subject property in terms of the partition decree;
ii. It was observed that the writ petitioners (Hingoranis
Family) could seek conversion of their share of the property from
leasehold to freehold without requiring any No Objection
Certificate from the other co-lessees;
iii. It was further observed that the writ petitioners
(Hingoranis) could deal with or alienate their respective shares in
the property;
iv. Significantly, it was also held that the writ petitioners,
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having been put in possession only on 08.12.2018, could not be
saddled with liability towards misuse charges for any prior
period.
19. The aforesaid findings, particularly those relating to (i)
permissibility of dealing with the property as if independently held,
and (ii) exclusion of liability towards misuse charges, form the core of
the present controversy.
20. Subsequent to the passing of the principal Impugned Order,
further proceedings were initiated by the parties, including review
petitions as well as proceedings in contempt. The record reveals that,
in the course of such proceedings, certain statements were made on
behalf of the L&DO indicating that steps would be taken for execution
of lease deeds.
21. The matter was thereafter considered by the learned Single
Judge in Review Petition No. 209/2021 and connected proceedings,
which came to be disposed of by order dated 14.12.2021, followed by
a corrigendum dated 16.12.2021 [hereinafter collectively referred to as
the „second set of Impugned Orders‟]. A perusal of the said orders
indicates that the learned Single Judge, while declining to interfere
with the operative directions contained in the principal Impugned
Order dated 27.01.2021, proceeded to clarify and, in certain respects,
reinforce the scope and effect thereof. The following clarifications
were issued:
i. The observations in the principal Impugned Order dated
27.01.2021 do not amount to an approval of the levy, quantum,
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or recoverability of misuse charges by the L&DO, which was left
at liberty to proceed in accordance with law;
ii. Any disputes between Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and the
L&DO would not operate as an impediment to
mutation/substitution of leasehold rights in favour of the writ
petitioners;
iii. There existed no impediment to execution of lease
documentation in favour of the writ petitioners (Hingoranis) in
terms of the earlier directions; and
iv. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were left at liberty to avail of
appropriate remedies in accordance with law in respect of their
disputes with the L&DO.
22. Thereafter, further proceedings ensued at the instance of the
L&DO and other parties seeking modification/clarification of the
earlier orders. The learned Single Judge, vide order dated 11.04.2022
in Review Petition Nos. 49/2022 and 66/2022, followed by a
corrigendum dated 21.04.2022 [hereinafter referred to as the „third set
of Impugned Orders‟], issued the following directions:
i. The Court took note of the memorandum dated
24.08.2021 (as corrected on 07.09.2021), whereby the L&DO
had already recorded mutation of the property in favour of the
parties as joint holders of undivided shares, on the terms of the
original lease deed dated 06.09.1956;
ii. The said memorandum specifically stipulated that sub-
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division of the property would not be permitted at any stage;
iii. Notwithstanding the above, the Court held that there was
no impediment to execution of the lease deed, provided that the
lease expressly reflects that the parties hold undivided shares in
the property;
iv. Accordingly, a direction was issued to the L&DO to
execute the lease deed in favour of the petitioners and other co-
lessees in terms of the said memorandum, within a stipulated
time;
v. It was further clarified that inter se disputes between the
co-lessees, including with Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, were outside
the scope of the writ proceedings.
23. All these three sets of orders, namely, (i) the principal
Impugned Order dated 27.01.2021, (ii) the review and corrigendum
Orders dated 16.12.2021, and (iii) the review and corrigendum Orders
culminating on 21.04.2022, are the subject matter of challenge in the
present batch of Letters Patent Appeals.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties have
advanced elaborate submissions both assailing and supporting the
Impugned Orders passed by the learned Single Judge. For the sake of
convenience, the array of parties as reflected in LPA 522/2022 is
being followed.
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24. Submissions on behalf of the Appellants (Tahilramani side)
24.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants assailed
the Impugned Orders on multiple grounds, both on maintainability as
well as on merits. At the outset, it was submitted that the learned
Single Judge erred in granting substantive reliefs in a writ petition
which, in essence, arose out of a purely contractual relationship of
lease governed by the terms of the lease deed read with the provisions
of the Government Grants Act, 1895. It was contended that rights
flowing from such lease could not have been altered or expanded in
exercise of writ jurisdiction.
24.2 It was submitted that the lease in respect of the subject property
stood validly cancelled by the competent authority vide order dated
06.02.2006 on account of alleged misuse, and the right of re-entry had
been duly exercised by the lessor. In the absence of any challenge to
the said order, it was contended that no subsisting leasehold rights
survived in favour of any party, and consequently, no direction for
mutation or substitution could have been issued in respect of a lease
that had already been determined.
24.3 Elaborating on the issue of maintainability, it was submitted
that the writ petition was fundamentally defective, inasmuch as it
sought consequential reliefs without first assailing the primary order
of cancellation. It was urged that the writ petitioners could not have
bypassed the order dated 06.02.2006 and proceeded on the premise
that mutation could be directed notwithstanding the extinguishment of
leasehold rights. In this regard, it was submitted that any relief
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flowing from the alleged partition decree could not be enforced in the
absence of revival or restoration of the lease.
24.4 It was further contended that a decree for partition between co-
lessees cannot result in splitting of tenancy or creation of independent
leasehold estates. It was submitted that the lessor was not a party to
the partition proceedings, and therefore, the decree could operate only
inter se the parties and could not bind the Union of India. It was
emphasized that the terms of the original lease govern the relationship
between the lessor and lessees, and any arrangement between co-
lessees cannot override or modify those terms.
24.5 It was also argued that the learned Single Judge erred in
observing that the writ petitioners could deal with, alienate, or
otherwise transact with their respective shares independently.
According to the Appellants, such findings effectively recognize
severable and independent rights in a leasehold property, which is
impermissible in the absence of express consent of the lessor. It was
submitted that the leasehold interest remained joint and indivisible
vis-à-vis the lessor, and could not be treated as partitioned for the
purposes of alienation or conversion.
24.6 On the aspect of misuse charges, it was submitted that the
liability arises out of breach of lease conditions and attaches to the
lessee as well as to the property. It was contended that the learned
Single Judge erred in excluding Respondents No. 5 to 10 from liability
towards misuse charges, particularly when such determination
involves disputed questions of fact and inter se rights between co-
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lessees. It was argued that such disputes are not amenable to
adjudication in writ jurisdiction and ought to have been relegated to
appropriate civil proceedings.
24.7 It was further submitted that the directions issued in the review
proceedings, particularly those relating to execution of lease deeds, go
beyond the scope of the original writ petition and amount to granting
substantive reliefs in review jurisdiction. It was contended that the
power of review is limited and cannot be exercised to enlarge the
scope of the original order or to grant fresh reliefs which were neither
sought nor considered at the initial stage.
24.8 It was also urged that reliance placed on the memorandum dated
24.08.2021 and the corrigendum dated 07.09.2021 is misplaced,
inasmuch as the said documents cannot override the original lease
conditions or the effect of cancellation. It was submitted that the
learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that administrative
communications cannot confer substantive rights contrary to the
governing legal framework.
24.9 It was further submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to
appreciate the fundamental distinction between mutation and
execution of a lease deed. Mutation, it was urged, is a ministerial act
intended to record or recognize pre-existing rights in the revenue or
administrative records, whereas execution of a lease deed creates or
reconstitutes contractual rights and obligations between the lessor and
the lessee. It was contended that the directions contained in the
principal Impugned Order dated 27.01.2021 stood fully complied with
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upon issuance of the memorandum dated 24.08.2021 (as corrected on
07.09.2021), whereby mutation/substitution was duly effected.
Consequently, the subsequent direction compelling execution of lease
deeds amounts to grant of a fresh and substantive relief, wholly dehors
the pleadings and beyond the scope of the writ proceedings.
24.10 It was also contended that at no stage in the writ petition had the
writ petitioners sought execution of any lease deed or creation of fresh
leasehold rights. The reliefs claimed were confined to
mutation/substitution in terms of the partition decree. In such
circumstances, the directions issued in the review and contempt
proceedings travel far beyond the pleadings and effectively rewrite the
scope of the original writ petition by introducing a relief which was
never sought.
24.11 It was further submitted that the directions for execution of
separate lease deeds are, in effect, contrary to the prohibition on
subdivision of plots under the applicable planning norms and lease
conditions. Reliance was placed on the relevant provisions of the
Master Plan for Delhi, 2021, as well as the applicable municipal
policies, which prohibit subdivision of plots in such categories of
properties. It was urged that execution of separate lease deeds in
favour of different parties would, in substance, amount to recognition
of subdivision, which is impermissible in law and contrary to the
express stipulation that the property must remain undivided.
24.12 Learned counsel further submitted that the statement recorded
on 09.09.2021 in the contempt proceedings, to the effect that a lease
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deed would be executed, was made without proper instructions and
under a mistaken understanding of the legal position. It was contended
that an inadvertent or erroneous concession by counsel cannot create
enforceable rights, particularly where such concession runs contrary to
the governing legal framework and the scope of the original judgment.
25. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 5-10 (Hingorani
side)
25.1 Per contra , learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
Respondents No. 5 to 10, supported the Impugned Orders and
submitted that the same do not warrant interference in appellate
jurisdiction.
25.2 It was submitted that the title of Respondents No. 5 to 10 to
50% share in the subject property stands conclusively established and
has attained finality up to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. It was pointed
out that the decree in Civil Suit No. 640A/1974 declared equal
ownership of the property, which position was subsequently affirmed
in appellate proceedings. The final decree of partition dated
24.04.2008 further crystallized the respective rights of the parties. It
was emphasized that the Respondents were put in actual physical
possession of their share only on 08.12.2018, pursuant to orders
passed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
25.3 It was further submitted that Respondents No. 5 to 10 derive
title through a distinct and independent line of succession tracing back
to Shri H.B. Hingorani, and are not claiming through the Appellants.
It was argued that the rights of the Respondents cannot be prejudiced
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by any alleged acts of misuse or breach attributable to the Appellants
or their predecessors.
25.4 On the issue of mutation, it was contended that mutation is a
ministerial act intended to reflect existing rights, and once the civil
court decree has attained finality, the L&DO was ought to give effect
to the same. It was submitted that the rejection of mutation by the
L&DO was arbitrary, particularly when the Respondents‟ title and
entitlement stood conclusively determined by a competent court.
25.5 With regard to the order of cancellation dated 06.02.2006, it
was contended that the said order was issued only against the
Appellants and cannot operate to the prejudice of Respondents No. 5
to 10, particularly when the L&DO itself has confined its claim for
dues to the Appellants. It was thus contended that the Respondents‟
rights were never extinguished. It was further submitted that the
failure of the L&DO to take physical possession of the property
pursuant to re-entry is contrary to its own policy framework and
established legal position. It was argued that mere issuance of a re-
entry order without taking actual possession ought not to be used to
defeat the rights of lawful co-owners, and that the re-entry, in the
absence of actual resumption of possession, cannot defeat accrued
rights.
25.6 On the issue of misuse charges, it was submitted that
Respondents No. 5 to 10 cannot be held liable for any alleged misuse
for the period prior to 08.12.2018, when they were not in possession
of the property. It was emphasized that the misuse, if any, was
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attributable exclusively to the Appellants and their inductees. It was
further pointed out that the L&DO itself, in its affidavit, confined its
claim for Government dues to the Appellants. It was thus contended
that no breach of lease conditions is attributable to the Respondents,
and that disputes relating to Government dues are essentially inter se
between the Appellants and the L&DO, falling outside the scope of
the present writ proceedings.
25.7 Learned Senior Counsel also supported the direction for
execution of lease deeds, submitting that the memorandum dated
24.08.2021 itself recognizes the parties as co-holders of undivided
shares. It was contended that execution of lease deeds reflecting
undivided shares does not amount to subdivision of the property, and
therefore, the objection raised on the basis of planning norms is
misconceived.
25.8 It was further submitted that the rights of the parties are
governed by the terms of the original lease read with the Government
Grants Act, 1895, and any execution of lease deeds would necessarily
be subject to such terms. It was argued that there is no legal
impediment in recognizing co-lessees holding undivided shares under
a common lease; and that the continued refusal to effect substitution of
leasehold rights or permit dealing with the property has resulted in an
unreasonable restriction on the Respondents‟ right to enjoy their
property, thereby infringing Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
25.9 Learned Senior Counsel also raised preliminary objections as to
the maintainability of the Appeals, contending that certain Appeals are
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barred by limitation and that no Appeal lies against an order
dismissing a review petition. It was further submitted that the
Appellants cannot be permitted to widen the scope of the original
proceedings by raising disputes which were never the subject matter
of the writ petition.
26. Submissions on behalf of Union of India / L& DO
26.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India and
the L&DO submitted that the rights of the parties are governed by the
terms of the lease and applicable policy framework. It was reiterated
that the lease stood cancelled vide order dated 06.02.2006 on account
of misuse, and that any further action would necessarily be subject to
clearance of outstanding dues and compliance with applicable
conditions
26.2 It was submitted that, pursuant to the directions of this Court,
the L&DO issued the memorandum dated 24.08.2021, as corrected on
07.09.2021, recording mutation in favour of the parties as holders of
undivided shares. It was submitted that the said action was taken in
compliance with the directions of the Court.
26.3 However, it was contended that certain practical and legal
difficulties arise in relation to execution of separate lease deeds,
particularly in view of restrictions on subdivision of the property
under applicable norms. It was submitted that execution of multiple
lease deeds may be construed as recognition of subdivision, which is
not permissible.
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26.4 It was further submitted that any observations or statements
recorded in prior proceedings, including contempt proceedings, cannot
be construed as binding admissions where the same were made
without proper instructions and were subsequently sought to be
recalled. It was emphasized that under the terms of the lease deed and
applicable municipal norms, subdivision of the property is
impermissible, and execution of separate lease deeds would amount to
recognizing such subdivision, which is legally untenable.
26.5 It was also contended that the impugned directions, particularly
those issued in review proceedings, effectively mandate a
restructuring of the leasehold arrangement contrary to the original
terms of the grant. At the same time, learned counsel fairly submitted
that the L&DO would abide by the directions issued by this Court and
take appropriate steps in accordance with law, subject to resolution of
outstanding issues including recovery of dues.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
27. This Court has carefully considered the submissions advanced
on behalf of the parties and perused the material on record.
Issue (i): Effect of Partition of Leasehold Property
28. The first and foremost issue that arises for consideration is
whether a decree for partition of a leasehold property, passed in
proceedings inter se between co-lessees, can result in a legal severance
of the tenancy so as to create independent and separately enforceable
leasehold estates vis-à-vis the lessor.
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29. At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the nature of a
leasehold interest created by the Government. A lease granted by the
Union of India is not merely a transfer of a limited interest in
immovable property, but is in the nature of a Government grant, the
terms whereof are governed primarily by the grant itself. In this
context, the provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1895 assume
significance, particularly in view of Sections 2 and 3 thereof, which
mandate that the terms of the grant shall take effect according to their
tenor, notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other
law.
30. The legal consequence of the aforesaid position is that the rights
and obligations of the lessee, as also the incidents of the leasehold
estate, must be gathered strictly from the terms of the lease deed. The
relationship between the lessor and lessee is thus regulated not merely
by general principles of property law, but primarily by the stipulations
embodied in the Government grant.
31. At this stage, it becomes necessary to advert to the relevant
clauses of the lease deed governing the subject property. Clause 1(vi)
expressly prohibits construction of more than one building on the plot,
except outhouses and servant quarters. Similarly, Clause 1(vii)
mandates that the premises shall not be used for any purpose other
than that of a residential house, except with the express permission of
the competent authority. The relevant Clauses read as under-
“(vi) not to erect more than one building upon the said land and except
such outhouses and servants’ quarters as may be approved by an officer
appointed by the lessor in this behalf;
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(vii) not to use the said land and buildings that may be erected thereon
during the said term for any other purpose other than the purpose of
constructing a house without the previous consent in writing of an officer
appointed by the Lessor in this behalf; provided that the lease shall
become void if the land is used for any purpose other than that for which
the lease is granted not being a purpose subsequently approved by the said
officer;”
These stipulations clearly indicate that the lease contemplates the
property as a single, indivisible residential unit, and not as a property
capable of fragmentation into independent units.
32. The above position stands reinforced by the planning regime
applicable to the property. Clause 4.4.3 of the Master Plan for Delhi,
2021, provides that subdivision of residential plots is not permissible.
The relevant stipulation reads as under:
“Master plan Delhi 2021 master plan for Delhi
Vide clause 4.4.3: Control for building/buildings within residential
premises
A. residential plot - plotted housing
Terms and conditions: vide condition number (iv):Subdivision of plots
is not permitted...”
33. A conjoint reading of the lease conditions and the Master Plan
leaves no manner of doubt that subdivision of the plot into separate
and independent units is impermissible.
34. At this stage, it also becomes necessary to examine the concept
of subdivision of a leasehold plot in the context of the present
controversy. A distinction must be maintained between an inter se
arrangement regulating possession and enjoyment of different portions
of the superstructure, and a legal subdivision of the leasehold estate
itself. The former may regulate enjoyment amongst co-lessees,
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whereas the latter would entail recognition of separate and
independently enforceable rights in distinct portions of the plot vis-à-
vis the lessor.
35. A perusal of the partition decree dated 24.04.2008 and the
settlement forming part thereof indicates that the arrangement between
the parties is confined to allocation of portions of the existing
superstructure and allied rights of enjoyment. The land underneath
continues to remain undivided and the parties continue to hold
undivided interests therein. The decree, therefore, does not effectuate
a legal subdivision of the leasehold estate.
36. It is true that the learned Single Judge has not expressly directed
subdivision of the subject property. However, the effect of the
directions permitting execution of separate lease documentation and
independent dealing with the respective portions would, in substance,
amount to recognition of severable and independently enforceable
leasehold interests. Such a consequence would run contrary to the
terms of the original lease as well as the planning norms governing the
property, both of which proceed on the basis that the plot constitutes a
single indivisible unit.
37. The partition decree dated 24.04.2008 must, therefore, be
understood as an arrangement governing inter se possession and
enjoyment between the parties. Any delineation of portions for use
and occupation thereunder cannot be construed as creating
independent leasehold estates enforceable against the lessor.
38. It is well settled that a lease, particularly one granted by the
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Government, is indivisible in nature, unless the terms of the grant
expressly permit fragmentation. The original lease in the present case
was created in favour of a single lessee. By virtue of judicial
determination, the parties came to be recognized as co-lessees;
however, such recognition does not alter the fundamental nature of the
tenancy.
39. The status of the parties, therefore, is that of co-lessees under a
single indivisible lease, and not that of independent lessees holding
separate tenancies. The principle that splitting of tenancy is
impermissible without the consent of the lessor is well established and
admits of no exception in the facts of the present case. The partition
decree, admittedly passed in proceedings to which the lessor was not a
party, cannot bind the lessor or compel it to recognize multiple
tenancies. It operates only inter se the parties and remains subject to
the overarching terms of the lease. The co-lessees, by any arrangement
inter se, cannot compel the lessor to recognise a fragmented tenancy
or impose altered obligations upon it
40. In the aforesaid backdrop, the directions issued by the learned
Single Judge permitting the writ petitioners to seek execution of lease
documentation in respect of their respective portions, and to
independently deal with or transact in relation thereto, cannot be
sustained. Though the Impugned Orders do not expressly direct
subdivision of the plot, the effect of the directions issued therein
would be to recognise separate and independently enforceable
leasehold interests in distinct portions of the property. Such
recognition would, in substance, operate as a fragmentation of the
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original leasehold estate, which is contrary to the terms of the lease
deed, the applicable planning norms, and the nature of the partition
decree itself. It is well settled that a decree for partition operates only
inter se the parties to the proceedings and cannot enlarge, alter, or bind
the rights of the lessor, who was not a party thereto. Consequently,
while the partition decree may regulate possession and enjoyment
between the co-lessees, it cannot compel the lessor to recognise
separate leasehold estates or independent tenancies in respect of
portions of the leased property.
41. This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that the
directions issued by the learned Single Judge proceed on a legal
assumption inconsistent with the indivisible nature of the leasehold
estate and could not have resulted in creation of independent rights
enforceable against the lessor.
42. Accordingly, it is held that the partition decree does not result in
splitting of tenancy, nor does it bind the lessor to recognize separate
leasehold estates. The lease, as originally granted, remains a single
and indivisible grant. Consequently, rights flowing under such a
common lease cannot be asserted in a fragmented or independent
manner by one or more co-lessees to the exclusion of others.
43. It necessarily follows that the legal consequences arising from
the lease, including its cancellation by order dated 06.02.2006, operate
uniformly upon all co-lessees. The writ petitioners, therefore, could
not have claimed insulation from the effect of the said order or sought
enforcement of leasehold rights in isolation from the status of the lease
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as a whole.
Issue (ii): Maintainability of Writ Petition in Light of Unchallenged
Cancellation dated 06.02.2006
44. The second issue which arises for consideration goes to the root
of the maintainability of the writ proceedings themselves. The
question is whether a writ petition seeking mutation/substitution of
leasehold rights could have been entertained and allowed, despite the
admitted position that the lease in respect of the subject property stood
cancelled by the competent authority, and the said cancellation had not
been challenged in any proceedings known to law.
45. The factual position in this regard is not in dispute. The L&DO,
acting on behalf of the Union of India as the lessor, passed an order
dated 06.02.2006 cancelling the lease of the subject property on
account of alleged misuse and simultaneously exercised the right of
re-entry. The said order has neither been set aside nor even questioned
by any of the parties in appropriate proceedings or in the writ petition
filed before this Court. It has, therefore, attained finality and continues
to subsist.
46. In the considered opinion of this Court, the legal consequences
flowing from such an order cannot be understated. A leasehold interest
is, by its very nature, a limited right derived from the lessor and
subject to the terms and conditions of the lease. Upon cancellation of
the lease and exercise of the right of re-entry, the substratum of such
leasehold rights stands fundamentally affected and renders the
continuance and enforceability of such leasehold rights seriously
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impaired and contingent upon the said order being set aside, stayed, or
otherwise regularised in accordance with law.
47. It is trite that mutation does not confer title; it merely recognises
or records an existing right. However, it is equally well settled that
mutation cannot be directed in a vacuum, divorced from the subsisting
legal status of the property. Where the very lease, which constitutes
the source of the rights sought to be mutated, stands cancelled, any
direction for mutation would necessarily presuppose the continued
existence or revival of such leasehold rights.
48. The writ petitioners, however, proceeded on an entirely
different premise. They sought mutation of their alleged shares in the
leasehold property on the basis of the partition decree dated
24.04.2008, without addressing, let alone challenging, the prior order
dated 06.02.2006 whereby the lease itself stood cancelled. In effect,
the writ petition invited the Court to grant consequential relief while
ignoring the foundational order which directly governed the existence
of the very rights claimed.
49. This, in the view of the Court, is impermissible. It is a settled
principle of law that a party cannot seek to circumvent or indirectly
nullify an order by seeking reliefs that are inconsistent with or
dependent upon the invalidation of such order, without expressly
challenging the same. The doctrine that one cannot do indirectly what
one is prohibited from doing directly squarely applies in such a
situation.
50. The learned Single Judge, while granting reliefs in favour of the
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writ petitioners, does not appear to have adequately considered the
effect of the subsisting cancellation order.
51. Much emphasis was sought to be placed by the Respondents on
the stand of the L&DO in its counter affidavit, to the effect that its
primary concern was recovery of government dues from the
Appellants, and that the rights of the Appellants stood “suspended”.
However, such pleadings cannot dilute or override the legal effect of
an order of cancellation and re-entry, which has the effect of rendering
the continuance of leasehold rights subject to the said order.
Thereafter, unless the order is set aside, stayed, or the lease is
otherwise restored or regularised in accordance with law, the lessees
cannot assert enforceable rights in respect of the property.
52. Even assuming that the L&DO had not taken physical
possession of the property, or had not proceeded to fully enforce the
consequences of re-entry, the legal position emanating from the
cancellation order does not automatically stand effaced. At best, such
inaction may give rise to independent remedies or consequences, but it
cannot justify the grant of reliefs that proceed in disregard of the
subsisting order.
53. The contention advanced on behalf of Respondent Nos. 5 to 10
that the order of cancellation dated 06.02.2006 operates only against
the Appellants and does not affect their rights as co-lessees also
requires consideration. This submission, however, cannot be accepted.
As already noted hereinabove, the lease in question was a single and
indivisible grant, and the parties derived their rights as co-lessees
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under a common leasehold estate. In such a situation, any action taken
by the lessor in respect of the lease, including cancellation and
exercise of the right of re-entry, necessarily operates upon the lease as
a whole and not in a fragmented manner qua individual co-lessees.
The leasehold interest, being unified vis-à-vis the lessor, cannot be
selectively determined or preserved in favour of some co-lessees while
being extinguished as against others.
54. It is equally untenable to contend that the absence of physical
resumption of possession by the lessor renders the order of
cancellation ineffective or inoperative. The legal effect of an order of
re-entry flows from its issuance in accordance with the terms of the
lease and applicable law, and does not stand automatically negated
merely on account of non-taking of physical possession. At best, such
circumstances may give rise to separate remedies or consequences, but
they do not efface the legal consequences of the cancellation order
itself.
55. Consequently, the plea that the Respondents‟ rights remained
unaffected by the order dated 06.02.2006, or that such order could not
be relied upon in the absence of physical dispossession, is rejected.
56. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution,
though wide, is nonetheless discretionary and equitable. It cannot be
invoked to grant reliefs that are contrary to the subsisting legal
framework or that effectively bypass mandatory legal requirements.
The Courts exercising such jurisdiction are required to ensure that its
directions do not result in creating a legal fiction inconsistent with
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binding orders or statutory consequences.
57. In the present case, the failure of the writ petitioners to
challenge the order dated 06.02.2006 is not a mere procedural
omission; it goes to the very root of the maintainability of the reliefs
sought. The writ petition, insofar as it sought mutation and allied
reliefs, was premised on a legal foundation that stood seriously
undermined by the unchallenged cancellation of the lease. The
contention based on Article 300A also does not advance the case of
the writ petitioners. The right to property, though constitutionally
protected, is not absolute and remains subject to valid legal
constraints, including contractual stipulations governing Government
grants and lawful orders passed thereunder. In the present case, any
restriction on enjoyment flows directly from the subsisting lease
conditions and the order of cancellation, and cannot be characterised
as an unconstitutional deprivation.
58. Even otherwise, it is evident that any direction for substitution
or recognition of leasehold rights in favour of the co-lessees could
arise only upon compliance with the conditions governing the lease,
including clearance of outstanding dues. In the absence of any express
stipulation to the contrary in the lease, such compliance could be
effected either jointly by all co-lessees or even individually by one or
more co-lessees for the purposes of restoration or recognition of the
common leasehold estate. However, in either eventuality, the
subsisting liability attached to the lease could not have been bypassed
or disregarded. The learned Single Judge, therefore, could not have
directed recognition of leasehold rights in favour of select co-lessees
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without ensuring satisfaction of the obligations arising under the lease.
59. Consequently, this Court is of the considered view that the writ
petition, to the extent it sought directions for mutation/substitution of
leasehold rights without assailing the order of cancellation and re-
entry dated 06.02.2006, suffered from a fundamental infirmity and
ought not to have been entertained in the manner it was.
60. The issue is, therefore, answered by holding that a writ petition
seeking mutation of leasehold rights is not maintainable in the absence
of a challenge to the subsisting order of cancellation of the lease and
re-entry passed by the lessor. Any relief granted in disregard of such
foundational order cannot be sustained in law.
Issue (iii): Scope of Writ Jurisdiction in Inter Se Disputes and
Liability Towards Misuse Charges
61. The third issue pertains to the permissible limits of the writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly in the
context of disputes arising inter se between co-lessees and the
determination of liability towards misuse charges levied by the lessor.
This issue assumes significance in light of the findings returned by the
learned Single Judge, whereby not only were certain rights recognised
in favour of the writ petitioners, but it was also held that they could
not be held liable for misuse charges for the period prior to their
obtaining possession.
62. At the outset, it must be noted that the writ jurisdiction is
primarily designed to enforce public law rights and to ensure that
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statutory and constitutional authorities act within the bounds of law.
While the jurisdiction is wide and flexible, it is equally well settled
that it is not intended to serve as a forum for adjudication of purely
private disputes, particularly those requiring detailed examination of
disputed questions of fact or enforcement of contractual obligations
inter se private parties.
63. In the present case, the controversy relating to liability to
deposit misuse charges amongst the co-lessees arises from alleged
breaches of the terms and conditions of the lease deed, which is a
contractual arrangement governed, in the case of government grants,
by the provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1895. The
determination of liability for such charges would ordinarily depend
upon a range of factors, including the nature of the breach, the identity
of the party responsible for such breach, the period during which such
misuse occurred, and the contractual stipulations governing the
consequences of such breach. Moreover, inter se disputes with respect
to liability to pay misuse charges amongst the joint lessees will not
affect lessor‟s rights to recover before revoking cancellation of the
lease.
64. The Respondent Nos. 5 to 10 have contended that they cannot
be saddled with liability towards misuse charges, as they were neither
in possession of the property during the period of alleged misuse nor
responsible for the acts leading to such misuse. On the other hand, the
Appellants contend that the liability, if any, cannot be apportioned in
the manner suggested and that the issue involves complex questions
relating to the rights and obligations of the parties under the lease.
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65. In the considered view of this Court, such a dispute, which
essentially concerns the allocation of liability arising out of alleged
contractual breaches and involves competing claims between co-
lessees, squarely falls within the realm of private law. The
adjudication of such disputes would necessarily require examination
of evidence, determination of factual responsibility, and interpretation
of contractual obligations; functions that are not ordinarily undertaken
in proceedings under Article 226.
66. The learned Single Judge, however, proceeded to record a
categorical finding to the effect that the writ petitioners (Hingoranis)
could not be held liable for misuse charges for the period prior to
08.12.2018, i.e., the date on which they were put in possession of the
property. While the reasoning appears to be founded on considerations
of equity, the question that arises is whether such a determination was
within the permissible scope of writ jurisdiction.
67. It is well settled that even where a public authority is involved,
the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, ordinarily refrains
from adjudicating disputes that are essentially contractual in nature,
unless the action of the authority is shown to be arbitrary,
unreasonable, or in violation of statutory provisions. The writ court
does not sit as a court of plenary jurisdiction to decide all disputes that
may have some nexus with a public authority.
68. In the present case, the liability towards misuse charges is
intrinsically linked to the terms of the lease and the conduct of the
parties. The L&DO, as the lessor, is entitled to determine the liability
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for such charges in accordance with the lease conditions and
applicable policies. Any dispute with regard to such determination,
including the question as to who is liable to pay such charges, would
ordinarily be amenable to challenge in appropriate proceedings where
evidence can be led and issues can be properly framed.
69. Furthermore, the dispute between the Appellants and
Respondent Nos. 5 to 10 regarding apportionment or exclusion of
liability is clearly an inter se dispute between co-lessees or persons
claiming under them. The writ court, in such circumstances, ought to
exercise restraint and leave the parties to avail of appropriate remedies
in civil proceedings, rather than rendering conclusive findings that
may prejudice the rights of parties without a full-fledged trial.
70. It is also relevant to note that the L&DO itself, as per the
record, issued a demand letter dated 07.09.2021 quantifying the dues
payable by the Appellants. The determination of liability by the lessor,
and any challenge thereto, would have to be examined in the context
of the relevant contractual and statutory framework. The writ court
could not have pre-emptively adjudicated upon such liability,
particularly in the absence of a direct challenge to the demand or a
comprehensive examination of the underlying facts.
71. The observations of the learned Single Judge, to the effect that
the writ petitioners cannot be made liable for misuse charges for the
prior period, effectively amount to a determination of civil liability
between parties. Such a determination, in the absence of a proper
evidentiary foundation and outside the framework of an appropriate
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proceeding, cannot be sustained.
72. The effect of the findings returned by the learned Single Judge
is that the liability towards misuse charges for the prior period stands
confined to the Tahilramani parties. Such a determination, which
directly adjudicates liability between co-lessees, travels beyond the
permissible scope of writ jurisdiction.
73. A writ petition, insofar as it seeks adjudication of civil liabilities
between private parties, is not maintainable, and such disputes must be
relegated to the jurisdiction of the competent civil court.
74. Equally, the further observations permitting the writ petitioners
to deal with, alienate, or otherwise transact with their respective shares
as if they held independent and severable interests, also trench upon
areas that are closely intertwined with the nature of the leasehold
rights and the contractual obligations governing the property. As
already noted while dealing with Issue (i), such matters cannot be
decided in isolation from the terms of the lease and the rights of the
lessor.
75. The cumulative effect of the directions issued by the learned
Single Judge is that the writ court has, in substance, assumed the role
of a civil court in adjudicating disputes relating to rights, liabilities,
and obligations inter se the parties, as well as vis-à-vis the lessor.
This, in the considered opinion of this Court, travels beyond the
permissible contours of jurisdiction under Article 226. The dispute
ought to have been left open for adjudication in appropriate
proceedings, particularly in view of the existence of disputed
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questions of fact. The inconsistent stands of the lessor, though not
commendable, cannot confer jurisdiction upon the writ court to
adjudicate private disputes or override the legal consequences of the
subsisting lease framework. Such conduct also cannot be construed as
a waiver of the legal consequences flowing from the terms of the lease
or the order of cancellation.
76. Accordingly, Issue (iii) is answered by holding that the
adjudication of inter se disputes between co-lessees, including
determination of liability towards misuse charges, falls outside the
limited scope of writ jurisdiction and must be left to be decided in
appropriate civil or other competent proceedings.
CONCLUSION
77. In view of the aforesaid discussion and findings on all the
issues, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Impugned
Orders passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained in their
entirety.
78. It is clarified that the rights and disputes inter se between the
co-lessees, including liability towards misuse charges, shall remain
open and may be agitated by the parties before the appropriate forum
in accordance with law.
79. It is clarified that nothing contained in the present judgment
shall preclude the GNCTD/L&DO from taking a decision, in
accordance with law and applicable policy, to revoke the cancellation
of the lease upon receipt of misuse charges along with applicable
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
Signing Date:22.05.2026
15:50:50
LPA 522/2022 and connected matters Page 38 of 39
interest, if otherwise permissible.
80. Insofar as the objection regarding limitation in the appeal
preferred by the GNCTD/L&DO is concerned, this Court is of the
view that, having regard to the fact that the Impugned Orders are
under challenge in the present batch of Appeals and are being
examined on merits, it would not be appropriate to non-suit the said
appellant solely on the ground of delay. The delay in filing the Appeal
is, accordingly, condoned in the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case.
81. The present batch of Letters Patent Appeals, along with all
pending applications, is accordingly disposed of in the above terms.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
MAY 22, 2026
s.godara/pal
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
Signing Date:22.05.2026
15:50:50
LPA 522/2022 and connected matters Page 39 of 39