Earthz Urban Spaces Pvt Ltd vs Ravinder Munshi & Ors.

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgement reserved on: 09.10.2026
Judgement delivered on: 27.10.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010262532022

+ FAO(OS) 79/2022, CM APPL. 35227/2026 (Ex.), CM APPL.
35228/2026 (Extension of time for filing Court fees) & CM
APPL. 35229/2026 (Stay)

EARTHZ URBAN SPACES PVT LTD .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Avishkar Singhvi, Ms.
Tanushka Agrawal, Ms.
Ridhima Manchanda and Mr.
Akash Raja Sahib, Advocates.
versus

RAVINDER MUNSHI & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Sanam Tripathi and
Ms. Anjali Kaushik, Advocates.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

J U D G E M E N T

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
REVIEW PET. 247/2026 (by Petitioner to review the judgment
dated 09.10.2025) & CM APPL. 35226/2026 (delay of 130 days in
filing review)

1. The present Review Petition has been filed under Section 114 of
1
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 , by the Applicant/

1
CPC
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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FAO(OS) 79/2022 Page 1 of 19

2
Appellant/Review Petitioner challenging the Judgment dated
3
09.10.2025 passed by this Court in the captioned Appeal, being FAO
(OS) 79/2022.
2. The present Review Petition is also accompanied by an
Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking the
condonation of delay of 130 days in filing the captioned Review
Petition.
SUBMISSIONS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE REVIEW
PETITIONER:

3. Mr. Singhvi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Review
Petitioner, limits his challenge in the present Review Petition to the
contents of Paragraph Nos. 31, 36 and 39 of the Impugned Judgment
as also to the imposition of costs of Rs. 5,00,000/- to be paid to the
Respondents. We deem it appropriate to reproduce the said paragraphs
of the Impugned Judgement, which read as under:
“ 31 . We are also constrained to observe that the reliance placed
on various electronic communications is wholly misplaced. The
WhatsApp messages and Zoom transcripts relied upon by the
Appellant do not evince any concluded or binding contract;
instead, they only reflect ongoing negotiations. The materials
produced are not only inconclusive but appear to have been
selectively extracted in order to mislead the Court.

*
36 . In the present case, even on a prima facie evaluation, the
indispensable element of valid consideration is wholly absent. The
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that any payment was in fact
made, much less accepted by the Respondents. In such
circumstances, the foundation of the suit appears to be tenuous.

*
39 . The law recognizes that the Courts are vested with the
power, in appropriate cases, to exempt properties from the rigours
of Section 52 of the TP Act. The rationale behind such an
exemption is to insulate genuine property owners from being

2
Review Petitioner
3
Impugned Judgment
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BHATIA
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FAO(OS) 79/2022 Page 2 of 19

trapped in vexatious, frivolous, or mala fide litigations, and to deter
land-grabbers, speculators, and false claimants from misusing
judicial processes to create artificial obstacles in the real estate
market. In our considered opinion, the present case falls squarely
within the four corners of these observations.

49. We are also of the view that the present Appeal itself is devoid
of merit, is clearly an abuse of the process of law, and deserves to
be dismissed with exemplary costs. Accordingly, the present
Appeal is dismissed with costs of Rs. 5,00,000/- payable to the
Respondents.”

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Review Petitioner
submits that the observations made in Paragraph 39 are imputing that
the Review Petitioner herein is a “land-grabber” and the same is a
rather uncharitable observation and would require review.

5. Furthermore, he also raises objections with respect to the
contents of Paragraph 36. He submits that the said observation is
unsustainable. He submits that the Review Petitioner‟s case has prima
facie merits over that of the Respondents and, therefore, the
observations made in the said paragraph warrant reconsideration.
6. During the course of arguments, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the Review Petitioner candidly and fairly submits that he
does not wish to press the challenge with respect to Paragraph 31.
7. He further submits that the imposition of costs is likely to be
considered an imputation and has a negative connotation; therefore,
the same may be waived.
8. No further arguments were advanced and the adjudication of the
present Review Petition will be confined to the grounds recorded
hereinabove.
ANALYSIS:
9. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Review Petitioner and have carefully examined the grounds urged in
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BHATIA
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support of the present Review Petition, as well as the judgment dated
09.10.2025 passed in FAO (OS) 79/2022.
10. At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the scope of the
jurisdiction exercised by this Court while considering a Review
Petition. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with
Order XLVII Rule 1 thereof, permits review only on limited and well-
recognised grounds, including the discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, despite the exercise of due diligence, was
not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced at
the time when the order was passed; a mistake or error apparent on the
face of the record; or any other sufficient reason recognised in law.
The power of review is not an appellate power in disguise and cannot
be exercised merely because a party is dissatisfied with the
conclusions reached by the Court or seeks a reconsideration of the
material already examined. This Court is also guided by the judgement
of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul
4
Qasim , the relevant extract of which reads as under:
“24. Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, 1908 is
verbatim similar to Section 623 CPC, 1877, except for the
Explanation to Order 47 Rule 1 which was added by way of an
amendment in the year 1976. Section 114 CPC, 1908 speaks of the
circumstances, instances and situations under which a review can
be filed. The words “ as it thinks fit ” cannot be interpreted to mean
anything beyond what is conferred under Order 47 Rule 1. In other
words, Section 114 has to be read along with Order 47 Rule 1.
While they are to be read together, Section 114 is more procedural,
whereas Order 47 Rule 1 is substantially substantive.
25. The words “ due diligence ”, though one of fact, places onus
heavily on the one who seeks a review. It has to be seen from the
point of view of a reasonable and prudent man. Though an element
of flexibility is given to any evidence or matter on its discovery, it
has to be one which was not available to the court earlier. It could
not have been produced despite due diligence, meaning thereby

4
(2024) 6 SCC 46
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BHATIA
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that it should have been available and, therefore, in existence at
least at the time of passing the decree.
26. Mistake or error apparent on the face of record would debar
the court from acting as an appellate court in disguise, by indulging
in a re-hearing. A decision, however erroneous, can never be a
factor for review, but can only be corrected in appeal. Such a
mistake or error should be self-evident on the face of record. The
error should be grave enough to be identified on a mere cursory
look, and an omission so glaring that it requires interference in the
form of a review. Being a creature of the statute, there is absolutely
no room for a fresh hearing. The court has got no role to involve
itself in the process of adjudication for a second time. Instead, it
has to merely examine the existence of an apparent mistake or
error. Even when two views are possible, the court shall not
indulge itself by going into the merits.
27. The material produced, at this stage, should be of such
pristine quality which, if taken into consideration, would have the
logical effect of reversing the judgment. Order 47 Rule 1CPC,
1908 indicates that power of review can be exercised by courts, in
three different situations, but these occasions ought to be read in an
analogous manner. In other words, they should be read in a manner
to mean that a restrictive power has been conferred upon the court.
As stated, the words “ for any other sufficient reason ” ought to be
read in conjunction with the earlier two categories reiterating the
scope. Being a judicial discretion, it has to be exercised with
circumspection and on rare occasions. It is a power to be exercised
by way of an exception, subject to the rigours of the provision.
28. A subsequent event per se cannot form the basis of a
review. Clause ( c ) of Order 47 Rule 1CPC, 1908, clearly specifies
that the important matter or evidence produced must have been
available at the time when the decree was passed. This is a matter
of rule. On a very rare occasion, an exception can be carved out.
Such an exception can only be exercised when the said matter or
evidence is of unimpeachable quality. It is not only a new matter or
evidence that should be taken into consideration, but it should also
be an important one.
29. While exercising the said power, the court has to first check
the evidentiary value of such discovery, including the
circumstances under which it emanated, particularly when it
inherently lacks jurisdiction or the evidence cannot be made
admissible in law and therefore, is not relevant. In such a
circumstance, there is no question of proceeding further in deciding
the review application.
Precedents
30. Now, we shall place on record decisions rendered by this
Court on the above principle of law discussed by us.
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BHATIA
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Power of review is not to be confused with powers of the appellate
court in appeal jurisdiction
31. Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak
Sharma [ Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma ,
(1979) 4 SCC 389] : (SCC p. 390, para 3)
“ 3 . The Judicial Commissioner gave two reasons for
reviewing his predecessor's order. The first was that his
predecessor had overlooked two important documents
Exts. A/1 and A/3 which showed that the respondents
were in possession of the sites even in the year 1948-49
and that the grants must have been made even by then.
The second was that there was a patent illegality in
permitting the appellant to question, in a single writ
petition, settlement made in favour of different
respondents. We are afraid that neither of the reasons
mentioned by the learned Judicial Commissioner
constitutes a ground for review. It is true as observed by
this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab [ Shivdeo
Singh v. State of Punjab , 1961 SCC OnLine SC 29 : AIR
1963 SC 1909] there is nothing in Article 226 of the
Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the
power of review which inheres in every court of plenary
jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct
grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are
definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The
power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new
and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise
of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the
person seeking the review or could not be produced by
him at the time when the order was made; it may be
exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the
face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on
any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the
ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That
would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of
review is not to be confused with appellate powers which
may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of
errors committed by the subordinate court .”
(emphasis supplied)
Error apparent on the face of record
32. Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. State (UT of
Delhi) [ Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. State (UT of Delhi) ,
(1980) 2 SCC 167] : (SCC pp. 171-72, paras 8-9)
“ 8 . It is well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a
review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for
the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the
case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced
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BHATIA
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by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is
justified only when circumstances of a substantial and
compelling character make it necessary to do so : Sajjan
Singh v. State of Rajasthan [ Sajjan Singh v. State of
Rajasthan , 1964 SCC OnLine SC 25, para 20 : AIR 1965
SC 845 : (1965) 1 SCR 933, 948] . For instance, if the
attention of the Court is not drawn to a material statutory
provision during the original hearing, the Court will
review its judgment : G.L. Gupta v. D.N. Mehta [ G.L.
Gupta v. D.N. Mehta , (1971) 3 SCC 189 : 1971 SCC (Cri)
279 : (1971) 3 SCR 748, 750] . The Court may also reopen
its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is
necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice
: O.N. Mohindroo v. Distt. Judge, Delhi [ O.N.
Mohindroo v. Distt. Judge, Delhi , (1971) 3 SCC 5 : (1971)
2 SCR 11, 27] . Power to review its judgments has been
conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the
Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of
any law made by Parliament or the rules made under
Article 145. In a civil proceeding, an application for
review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order
47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a
criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on
the face of the record (Order XL Rule 1, Supreme Court
Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it
is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be
equated with the original hearing of the case, and the
finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be
reconsidered except “where a glaring omission or patent
mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial
fallibility” : Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib [ Sow
Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib , (1975) 1 SCC 674] .
9 . Now, besides the fact that most of the legal material
so assiduously collected and placed before us by the
learned Additional Solicitor General, who has now been
entrusted to appear for the respondent, was never brought
to our attention when the appeals were heard, we may also
examine whether the judgment suffers from an error
apparent on the face of the record. Such an error exists if
of two or more views canvassed on the point it is possible
to hold that the controversy can be said to admit of only
one of them. If the view adopted by the Court in the
original judgment is a possible view having regard to
what the record states, it is difficult to hold that there is an
error apparent on the face of the record .”
(emphasis supplied)
33. Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [ Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi ,
(1997) 8 SCC 715] : (SCC p. 719, paras 9-10)
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BHATIA
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“ 9 . Under Order 47 Rule 1CPC a judgment may be
open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error
apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not
self-evident and has to be detected by a process of
reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on
the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its
power of review under Order 47 Rule 1CPC. In exercise
of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1CPC it is not
permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and
corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has
a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal
in disguise” .
10 . Considered in the light of this settled position we
find that Sharma, J. clearly overstepped the jurisdiction
vested in the Court under Order 47 Rule 1CPC. The
observations of Sharma, J. that “accordingly, the order in
question is reviewed and it is held that the decree in
question was of composite nature wherein both mandatory
and prohibitory injunctions were provided” and as such
the case was covered by Article 182 and not Article 181
cannot be said to fall within the scope of Order 47 Rule
1CPC. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous
decision and an error apparent on the face of the record .
While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the
latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review
jurisdiction . While passing the impugned order, Sharma, J.
found the order in civil revision dated 25-4-1989 as
an erroneous decision, though without saying so in so
many words. Indeed, while passing the impugned order
Sharma, J. did record that there was a mistake or an error
apparent on the face of the record which was not of such a
nature, “which had to be detected by a long-drawn process
of reasons” and proceeded to set at naught the order of
Gupta, J. However, mechanical use of statutorily
sanctified phrases cannot detract from the real import of
the order passed in exercise of the review jurisdiction.
Recourse to review petition in the facts and circumstances
of the case was not permissible. The aggrieved judgment-
debtors could have approached the higher forum through
appropriate proceedings to assail the order of Gupta, J. and
get it set aside but it was not open to them to seek a
“review” of the order of Gupta, J. on the grounds detailed
in the review petition. In this view of the matter, we are of
the opinion that the impugned order of Sharma, J. cannot
be sustained and we accordingly accept this appeal and set
aside the impugned order dated 6-3-1997.”
(emphasis in original and supplied)
Signature Not Verified
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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Meaning of the words “for any other sufficient reason” in Order
47 Rule 1CPC, 1908
34. Chhajju Ram v. Neki [ Chhajju Ram v. Neki , 1922 SCC
OnLine PC 11] : (SCC OnLine PC)
“ It will be observed that the question with which their
Lordships have to deal is one concerned not with appeal
to a Court of Appeal, but with review by the Court which
had already disposed of the case. In England it is only
under strictly limited circumstances that an application
for such a review can be entertained. In India, however,
provision has for long past been made by legislation for
review in addition to appeal. But as the right is the
creation of Indian statute law, it is necessary to see what
such statutory law really allows. The law applicable to the
present case is laid down by Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908. This Rule is enacted in the
following terms :
„ 1. Application for review of judgment .—
(1) Any person considering himself
aggrieved—
( a ) by a decree or order from which an
appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal
has been preferred,
( b ) by a decree or order from which no
appeal is hereby allowed, or
( c ) by a decision on a reference from a
Court of Small Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and
important matter or evidence which, after the
exercise of due diligence, was not within his
knowledge or could not be produced by him at
the time when the decree was passed or order
made, or on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record, or for any
other sufficient reason , desires to obtain a
review of the decree passed or order made
against him, may apply for a review of
judgment to the Court which passed the decree
or made the order.‟
*
If their Lordships felt themselves at liberty to construe
the language of Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 without reference to its history and to the decisions
upon it, their task would not appear to be a difficult one.
For it is obvious that the Code contemplates procedure by
way of review by the Court which has already given
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BHATIA
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judgment as being different from that by way of appeal to
a Court of Appeal. The three cases in which alone mere
review is permitted are those of new material overlooked
by excusable misfortune, mistake or error apparent on the
face of the record, or “any other sufficient reason”. The
first two alternatives do not apply in the present case, and
the expression “sufficient”, if this were all, would
naturally be read as meaning sufficiency of a kind
analogous to the two already specified, that is to say, to
excusable failure to bring to the notice of the Court new
and important matters, or error on the face of the record .
But before adopting this restricted construction of the
expression “sufficient”, it is necessary to have in mind, in
the first place, that the provision as to review was not
introduced into the Code for the first time in 1908, but
appears there as a modification of previous provision
made in earlier legislation : and, in the second place, that
the extent of the power of a court in India to review its
own decree under successive forms of legislative
provision has been the subject of a good deal of judicial
interpretation, not, however, in all cases harmonious. That,
the power given by the Indian Code is different from the
very restricted power which exists in England appears
plain from the decision in Charles Bright & Co.
Ltd. v. Sellar [ Charles Bright & Co. Ltd. v. Sellar , (1904)
1 KB 6 (CA)] , where the Court of Appeal discussed the
history of the procedure in England and explained its
limits.
*
Their Lordships have examined numerous authorities,
and they have found much conflict of judicial opinion on
the point referred to. There is plainly no such
preponderance of view in either direction as to render it
clear that there is any settled course of decision which
they are under obligation to follow. Some of the decisions
in the earlier cases may have been influenced by the wider
form of expression then in force, and these decisions may
have had weight with the learned Judges who, in cases
turning on the subsequent Code, had regarded the
intention of the legislature as remaining unaltered. But
their Lordships are unable to assume that the language
used in the Codes of 1877 and 1908 is intended to leave
open the questions which were raised on the language
used in the earlier legislation. They think that Rule 1 of
Order 47 must be read as in itself definitive of the limits
within which review is today permitted, and that reference
to practice under former and different statutes is
misleading. So construing it they interpret the words “any
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BHATIA
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other sufficient reason” as meaning a reason sufficient on
grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately
previously . Such an interpretation excludes from the
power of review conferred the course taken by the second
and third Division Bench, composed of Wilberforce, J.,
and Scott Smith, J., and by Wilberforce, J., and
LeRossignol, J., respectively. The result is that the
judgments given by these two Division Benches ought to
be set aside, and that of the Bench of the Chief Court
composed of Scott Smith, J., and Leslie Jones, J., restored,
so that the suit will stand dismissed. The respondent-
plaintiffs must pay the costs here and in the courts below.”
(emphasis supplied)
Discovery of new matter or evidence
35. State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta [ State of W.B. v. Kamal
Sengupta , (2008) 8 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 735] : (SCC p.
633, paras 21-22)
“ 21 . At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a
review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter
or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and
must be of such a character that if the same had been
produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other
words, mere discovery of new or important matter or
evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito
justitiae . Not only this, the party seeking review has also
to show that such additional matter or evidence was not
within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due
diligence, the same could not be produced before the court
earlier.
22 . The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very
connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from
the record of the case and does not require detailed
examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or
the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and
detection thereof requires long debate and process of
reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the
face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1CPC
or Section 22(3)( f ) of the Act. To put it differently an
order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely
because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a
different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal
on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the
power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in
appeal over its judgment/decision.”
An order can be reviewed only on the prescribed grounds
mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1CPC, 1908
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36. Shri Ram Sahu v. Vinod Kumar Rawat [ Shri Ram
Sahu v. Vinod Kumar Rawat , (2021) 13 SCC 1 : (2023) 2
SCC (Civ) 686] : (SCC pp. 25-26, para 10)
“ 10 . To appreciate the scope of review, it would be
proper for this Court to discuss the object and ambit of
Section 114CPC as the same is a substantive provision for
review when a person considering himself aggrieved
either by a decree or by an order of court from which
appeal is allowed but no appeal is preferred or where there
is no provision for appeal against an order and decree,
may apply for review of the decree or order as the case
may be in the court, which may order or pass the
decree. From the bare reading of Section 114CPC, it
appears that the said substantive power of review under
Section 114CPC has not laid down any condition as the
condition precedent in exercise of power of review nor the
said section imposed any prohibition on the court for
exercising its power to review its decision. However, an
order can be reviewed by a court only on the prescribed
grounds mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1CPC, which has
been elaborately discussed hereinabove. An application
for review is more restricted than that of an appeal and
the court of review has limited jurisdiction as to the
definite limit mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1CPC itself. The
powers of review cannot be exercised as an inherent
power nor can an appellate power be exercised in the
guise of power of review .”
(emphasis supplied)
Evidence cannot be reappreciated in review
37. Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower
Ltd. [ Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. ,
(2005) 6 SCC 651] : (SCC p. 656, para 10)
“ 10 . This Court has referred to several documents on
record and also considered the documentary evidence
brought on record. This Court on a consideration of the
evidence on record concluded that the respondent had
been denied power supply by the Board in appropriate
time which prevented the respondent from starting the
commercial production by 31-12-1996. This is a finding of
fact recorded by this Court on the basis of the appreciation
of evidence produced before the Court. In a review
petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the
evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is
possible . The learned counsel for the Board at best sought
to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between
the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this
Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be
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BHATIA
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permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The
appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the
domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the
evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and
reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed
in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an
error apparent on the face of the record or for some
reason akin thereto . It has not been contended before us
that there is any error apparent on the face of the
record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a
question of appreciation of evidence would amount to
converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise .”
(emphasis supplied)”

11. The jurisdiction of review, therefore, does not extend to a
rehearing of the matter on merits or to a reassessment of the evidence
with a view to arriving at a different conclusion. An error which
requires elaborate reasoning, a fresh appreciation of the material on
record, or an adjudication between competing interpretations cannot
ordinarily be characterised as an error apparent on the face of the
record. It is against this limited statutory framework that the grounds
urged by the Review Petitioner are required to be examined.
12. At the outset, it is clarified that the challenge pressed in the
present Review Petition is confined to the observations contained in
paragraph 36 and paragraph 39 of the Impugned Judgement dated
09.10.2025, as well as with the direction imposing costs of
₹5,00,000/- upon the Review Petitioner. The challenge to paragraph
31 has expressly not been pressed by learned counsel. Accordingly, no
adjudication is called for in respect of paragraph 31, and the present
analysis shall remain confined to the grounds which continue to be
pressed.
13. Insofar as paragraph 36 of the judgment is concerned, the
Review Petitioner objects to the observation which states: “even on a
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BHATIA
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prima facie evaluation, the indispensable element of valid
consideration was wholly absent”. It is the contention of the learned
counsel for the Review Petitioner that the said observation is
unsustainable. He submits that the Review Petitioner‟s case has prima
facie merits over that of the Respondents and, therefore, the adverse
observations made in the said paragraph warrant reconsideration. The
paragraph, however, does not rest upon an abstract or isolated
observation. It records that the Appellant therein had failed to
demonstrate that any payment had in fact been made, much less
accepted by the Respondents, and proceeds to observe that the
foundation of the suit appeared tenuous in such circumstances.
14. A perusal of the judgment as a whole demonstrates that the
aforesaid observation was made in the context of the material placed
before the Court while examining the challenge to the dismissal of the
application for interim injunction and the exemption of the suit
property from the operation of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882. The judgment had already considered the absence of a
receipt evidencing the alleged cash payment and the absence of
material demonstrating encashment of the cheques relied upon by the
Appellant. Paragraph 36, therefore, reflects the conclusion drawn from
the material considered in the judgment and cannot be read in isolation
from the reasoning preceding it.
15. The Review Petitioner has not demonstrated that the aforesaid
observation suffers from an error which is self-evident from the record
or that any new and important evidence, unavailable despite due
diligence at the relevant time, has been brought forward to warrant
review. The contention, in substance, seeks reconsideration of the
inference drawn by the Court from the material already examined.
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Such a request falls outside the limited scope of review jurisdiction.
Whether the material ought to have been appreciated differently is a
question concerning the merits of the adjudication and cannot, by
itself, furnish a ground for review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.
Accordingly, no ground for review is made out in respect of paragraph
36.
16. The next ground concerns paragraph 39 of the judgment,
wherein the Court, after referring to the legal principles governing
exemption from the operation of Section 52 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, observed that the present case fell within the
category of cases involving vexatious, frivolous or mala fide litigation
and the misuse of judicial process to create artificial obstacles in the
real estate market. Learned counsel for the Review Petitioner contends
that these observations are uncharitable and wrongly characterise the
Review Petitioner as a “land-grabber”.

17. The submission, however, also proceeds on a reading of
paragraph 39 in isolation. The paragraph must be understood in the
context of the discussion preceding and following it. The Court had
considered the legal position concerning the doctrine of lis pendens ,
the nature of the material relied upon by the Appellant, the terms of
the Memorandum of Understanding dated 02.06.2021, the
inconsistencies in the case pleaded, and the absence of credible
material demonstrating payment of consideration. The observations in
paragraph 39 were made while applying the legal principles
concerning the exemption of property from the operation of Section
52 of the Transfer of Property Act to the facts of the case.
18. The impugned paragraph does not, in any terms, record a
finding that the Review Petitioner is a „land-grabber‟. The expression
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relied upon by learned counsel forms part of the Court's discussion of
the class of litigation against which the legal principle is directed. The
conclusion that the present case fell within the scope of those
observations was drawn in the context of the reasoning recorded in the
judgment. The mere fact that the Review Petitioner considers the
language uncharitable, or disagrees with the inference drawn by the
Court, does not establish that the paragraph contains an error apparent
on the face of the record.
19. The Review Petitioner has not identified any mistake apparent
on the face of the record in the statement of law contained in
paragraph 39, nor has it demonstrated that the observation resulted
from an error which can be corrected without reopening the factual
and legal assessment undertaken in the appeal. The request to strike
off or expunge the observations is, in substance, founded upon
disagreement with the Court's assessment of the case. Such
disagreement cannot be converted into a ground for review merely by
describing the observations as uncharitable or unsustainable.
Consequently, the challenge to paragraph 39 does not satisfy the
requirements of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.
20. Adverting now to the challenge to the imposition of costs of
₹5,00,000/-. The Review Petitioner submits that the direction
imposing costs is unwarranted and carries a negative connotation. It
further contends that the case had prima facie merits and that the
imposition of costs was therefore unjustified and is also derived from
the observations on merits made in the Impugned Judgement. The
question for consideration in review, however, is not whether the
Review Petitioner would prefer a lesser amount or whether a different
view could have been taken in the matter. The question is whether the
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direction imposing costs discloses a reviewable error within the
meaning of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.
21. A perusal of the judgment demonstrates that the direction
imposing costs was not passed independently of the adjudication of
the Appeal. In paragraph 43, the Court concluded that the captioned
Appeal was devoid of merit and constituted an abuse of the process of
law, and accordingly dismissed it with exemplary costs of ₹5,00,000/-
payable to the Respondents.
22. The imposition of costs does not necessarily entail the casting
of aspersions on any litigant. Rather, it reflects the time and effort
expended by the Court in adjudicating various issues, particularly
where the Court finds that the litigation has been initiated on what
appeared, in the opinion of the Court, to be a clearly unsustainable
basis and has nonetheless been pursued. In such circumstances, it
becomes the bounden duty of the Courts to discourage such litigation,
and the imposition of costs is one means of doing so.
23. The Review Petitioner has not shown that the direction in the
present case suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or
any other defect falling within the limited statutory grounds for
review. The prayer to waive or set aside the costs, therefore, cannot be
granted merely on the basis of the Review Petitioner's dissatisfaction
with the conclusion reached in the judgment.
24. It is reiterated that the present proceedings cannot be converted
into an Appeal against the Impugned Judgement. The Court is not
required, in exercise of review jurisdiction, to undertake a fresh
assessment of the contractual documents, electronic communications,
alleged payments or the merits of the claim for interim relief. The only
inquiry is whether the specific grounds pressed by the Review
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Petitioner disclose a ground falling within Section 114 read with
Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. For the reasons recorded hereinabove,
neither the challenge to paragraph 36, nor the challenge to paragraph
39, nor the challenge to the direction imposing costs satisfies that
requirement.
25. Accordingly, the Review Petitioner has failed to establish any
error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new and
important matter or evidence despite due diligence, or any other
sufficient reason warranting the exercise of review jurisdiction. The
present Review Petition is, therefore, devoid of merit and is liable to
be dismissed.
26. At this juncture, it is also of import to note that the Application
seeking condonation of delay, in the view of this Court, has not
provided any satisfactory and sufficient cause, so as to condone the
delay.

27. The explanation furnished by the Review Petitioner is that the
Review Petition was initially e-filed on 08.11.2025 and thereafter re-
filed on 14.11.2025, but the Registry raised objections on account of
incorrect categorisation. It is further stated that the petition was filed
under the correct category on 16.01.2026, whereafter further Registry
objections were raised, including the requirement to file an application
for condonation of delay. It is, however, noted that the log sheet of the
Review Petition shows that the same came to be finally filed on
11.05.2026; it is unintelligible to the mind of this Court, from the
perusal of the Application, as to what was the reason for not filing the
Review Petition from 16.01.2026 to 11.05.2026.
28. The Review Petitioner attributes the delay to the successive
filings under an incorrect category and the objections raised by the
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Registry. However, the Application does not, merely by setting out
these events, dispense with the requirement of demonstrating
sufficient cause for the entire period of delay, along with the period of
16.01.2026 to 11.05.2026. The assertion that the Review Petitioner
acted diligently, or that it has a good case on merits, cannot
independently substitute for a satisfactory explanation accounting for
the delay.
29. In the present case, the explanation furnished does not
sufficiently account for the entire period of delay and is conspicuously
silent as to why the Review Petition was not diligently pursued during
the period from 16.01.2026 to 11.05.2026. The explanation, therefore,
does not warrant the exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, as the application fails to establish sufficient
cause for condonation of the delay of 130 days. This Court, therefore
finds no ground to condone the delay.
CONCLUSION:
30. Accordingly, while the application seeking condonation of
delay fails to establish sufficient cause for the delay of 130 days, this
Court finds that, even on merits, the Review Petition does not disclose
any ground warranting review under Section 114 read with Order
XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Consequently,
CM APPL. 35226/2026, as well as the Review Petition, are dismissed.
31. The Review Petition, along with the pending application(s), if
any, stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
OCTOBER 27, 2026/tk/va
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BHATIA
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