G.T DINESH KUMAR vs DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
1
R
Reserved on : 16.06.2026
Pronounced on : 01.07.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
ST
DATED THIS THE 01 DAY OF JULY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.7565 OF 2026
BETWEEN:
G.T.DINESH KUMAR
S/O THIPPE RUDRAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
FLAT NO. A1-107, BLOCK-A,
VAISHNAVI NORTH,
HEBBAL, BENGALURU – 560 024
(CURRENTLY, THE PETITIONER IS
IN JUDICIAL CUSTODY)
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI SANDESH J. CHOUTA, SR. ADVOCATE A/W
SRI SUNIL KUMAR S., ADVOCATE)
AND:
DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT
REPRESENTED BY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
REPRESENTED SPECIAL PP.,
BENGALURU ZONAL OFFICE,
RD
3 FLOOR, B BLOCK, BMTC,
SHANTHINAGARA-TTMC, K.H.ROAD,
SHANTHINAGARA,
Digitally signed by
PADMAVATHI B K
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
2
BENGALURU – 560 027.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI K. ARVIND KAMATH, ASG A/W
SRI MADHU N.RAO, SPL.PP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 483 OF
THE BNSS, 2023, (SECTION 439 OF CR.P.C.,) PRAYING TO
ENLARGE THE PETITIONER ON REGULAR BAIL IN
ECIR/BGZO/25/2024 REGISTERED FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCE
P/U/S 3 AND 4 OF THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT
2002 (PMLA), WHICH IS NOW PENDING IN SPL.C.NO.917/2026 ON
THE FILE OF THE HON’BLE PRINCIPAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS
JUDGE, BENGALURU (CCH-1).
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 16.06.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court seeking his enlargement on
grant of regular bail in No.ECIR/BGZO/25/2024 registered for
offences punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for
short).
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2. Heard Sri Sandesh J. Chouta, learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner and Sri K. Arvind Kamath, learned
Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondent.
3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -
3.1. A private complaint by one Snehamayi Krishna comes to
be filed invoking Section 223 of the BNSS against several persons
including the then Chief Minister of Karnataka. Pursuant to the
investigation conducted, accused Nos. 1 to 4 were dropped from
the array of accused in the predicate offence which had become
Crime No.11 of 2024. Who remained in the fray were other
accused, one of whom is the petitioner. The issue in the lis does not
pertain to the predicate offence. The issue pertains to the
Enforcement Case Information Report (‘ECIR’) registered by the
Enforcement Directorate against the petitioner and others. The
petitioner, in the said ECIR, is accused No.1. The Enforcement
Directorate on conduct of investigation and after registration of
ECIR filed its complaint before the concerned Court under Sections
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44 and 45 of the Act on 14-11-2025 now arraigning the petitioner
as the sole accused in the ECIR.
3.2. The petitioner prefers an application seeking his
enlargement on bail before the concerned Court, which comes to be
rejected. After rejection of bail application before the concerned
Court, the petitioner knocks at the doors of this Court in Criminal
Petition No.14793 of 2025. A coordinate Bench by an order dated
20-01-2026 while answering the application seeking enlargement
on bail, rejected it and has however observed that the petitioner
could re-approach this Court on any changed circumstances within
3 months from the date of its rejection. Alleging that there is no
progress in the trial, the petitioner/accused No.1 again knocks at
the doors of the concerned Court seeking his enlargement on bail.
For the second time, the application seeking bail comes to be
rejected. The petitioner is now before this Court seeking his
enlargement on bail, taking cue from the order passed by the
coordinate Bench.
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3.3. The coordinate Bench, while reserving liberty to the
petitioner to approach this Court yet again, had observed as
follows:
[VII] LONG INCARCERATION AND DELAYED TRIAL AS A
“
CONSIDERATION FOR GRANT OF BAIL:
64. While the satisfaction of twin conditions under
Section 45 of PMLA are indeed necessary in order to
consider grant of bail, the question as to whether general
principles of bail which may be considered to be the
facets of Article 21 of the Constitution of India could be
read into so as to enlarge the accused on bail in case the
circumstances are made out, is a matter that has been
dealt with by the Apex Court. The observations made by
Apex Court in Manish Sisodia v. Central Bureau of
Investigation – (2024) 12 SCC 691 [Manish Sisodia-1] are
extracted hereinbelow:-
"28. In view of the aforesaid discussion and for
the reasons stated, we are not inclined to accept the
prayer for grant of bail at this stage.
29. However, we are also concerned about the
prolonged period of incarceration suffered by the
appellant Manish Sisodia. In P. Chidambaram v.
Enforcement Directorate – (2020) 13 SCC 791, the
appellant therein was granted bail after being kept in
custody for around 49 days [(2020) 13 SCC 337, the
appellant therein was granted bail after being kept in
custody for around 62 days], relying on the Constitution
Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab –
(1980) 2 SCC 565 and Sanjay Chandra v. CBI – (2012)
1 SCC 40, that even if the allegation is one of grave
economic offence, it is not a rule that bail should be
denied in every case. Ultimately, the consideration has
to be made on a case-to-case basis, on the facts. The
primary object is to secure the presence of the accused
to stand trial. The argument that the appellant therein
was a flight risk or that there was a possibility of
tampering with the evidence or influencing the
witnesses, was rejected by the Court.
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30. Again, in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI –
(2022) 10 SCC 51, this Court referred to Surinder Singh
v. State of Punjab – (2005) 7 SCC 387 and Kashmira
Singh v. State of Punjab – (1977) 4 SCC 291, to
emphasise that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental
right within the broad scope of Article 21 of the
Constitution.
31. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary – (2023)
12 SCC 1, this Court while highlighting the evil of
economic offences like money-laundering, and its
adverse impact on the society and citizens,
observed that arrest infringes the fundamental
right to life. This Court referred to Section 19 of
the PML Act, for the in-built safeguards to be
adhered to by the authorised officers to ensure
fairness, objectivity and accountability [See also
Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India – (2024) 7 SCC
576].
32.Vijay Madanlal Choudhary – (2023) 12 SCC 1,
also held that Section 436-A of the Code can apply to
offences under the PML Act, as it effectuates the right to
speedy trial, a facet of the right to life, except for a valid
ground such as where the trial is delayed at the instance
of the accused himself. In our opinion, Section 436-A
should not be construed as a mandate that an accused
should not be granted bail under the PML Act till he has
suffered incarceration for the specified period. This Court
in Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra,
held that while ensuring proper enforcement of criminal
law on one hand, the court must be conscious that
liberty across human eras is as tenacious as tenacious
can be.
34. Detention or jail before being pronounced
guilty of an offence should not become punishment
without trial. If the trial gets protracted despite
assurances of the prosecution, and it is clear that case
will not be decided within a foreseeable time, the prayer
for bail may be meritorious. While the prosecution may
pertain to an economic offence, yet it may not be proper
to equate these cases with those punishable with death,
imprisonment for life, ten years or more like offences
under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985, murder, cases of rape, dacoity, kidnaping for
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ransom, mass violence, etc. Neither is this a case where
100/1000s of depositors have been defrauded. The
allegations have to be established and proven.
35. The right to bail in cases of delay,
coupled with incarceration for a long period,
depending on the nature of the allegations, should
be read into Section 439 of the Code and Section
45 of the PML Act. The reason is that the
constitutional mandate is the higher law, and it is
the basic right of the person charged of an offence
and not convicted, that he be ensured and given a
speedy trial. When the trial is not proceeding for
reasons not attributable to the accused, the court,
unless there are good reasons, may well be guided
to exercise the power to grant bail. This would be
truer where the trial would take years."
65. The observations at para-35 referred to above would
indicate that constitutional protection flowing from a higher law
could be read into the jurisprudence of bail and into Section 439
of Cr.P.C. and Section 45 of PMLA. The said principle has been
reiterated in Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement
– (2024) 123 SCC 660 [Manish Sisodia -3] . The relevant
portions of the decision are extracted hereinbelow:-
"25. Before considering the submissions of the
learned ASG with regard to maintainability of the
present appeals on account of the second order of this
Court, it will be apposite to refer to certain observations
made by this Court in its first order.
66. The Court had reiterated the observation made in
paras-29 to 35 of Manish Sisodia-1 and has made certain
other relevant observations that are extracted below:-
36. In view of the assurance given at the Bar on
behalf of the prosecution that they shall conclude the
trial by taking appropriate steps within next six to eight
months, we give liberty to the appellant Manish Sisodia
to move a fresh application for bail in case of change in
circumstances, or in case the trial is protracted and
proceeds at a snail's pace in next three months. If any
application for bail is filed in the above circumstances,
the same would be considered by the trial court on
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merits without being influenced by the dismissal of the
earlier bail application, including the present judgment.
Observations made above, re.: right to speedy trial, will,
however, be taken into consideration. The appellant
Manish Sisodia may also file an application for interim
bail in case of ill health and medical emergency due to
illness of his wife. Such application would be also
examined on its own merits.”
67. The relevant facts indicating the length of
imprisonment are:-
(a) Date of registration of FIR:- 27.09.2024 - Pursuant
to direction of the Special Court in PCR
No.28/2024, wherein matter was referred for
investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C.
(b) Date of arrest:- 16.09.2025
(c) Period of incarceration as on date of
pronouncement of order:- 127 days (from the
date of arrest till the date of pronouncement).
68. It is to be examined as to whether such period of
incarceration would be sufficient to treat it as infringing upon
rights of the petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India and thus entitling the petitioner to be enlarged on bail.
69. It is to be noticed that the Apex Court in Manish
Sisodia-3 (supra) while dealing with request for being enlarged
on bail in light of the liberty granted under Manish Sisodia -
1(supra) has granted bail on the sole ground of long
incarceration compounded by prospects of a delayed trial. –
70. The Apex Court, while considering the objection of
learned ASG that provisions of Section 45 of PMLA would come
in the way of consideration of grant of bail to the accused has
observed that the observations made in Manish Sisodia -1
(supra) at para-34 would be sufficient to proceed to consider
grant of bail despite restrictions under Section 45 of PMLA. Para-
37 of the decision in Manish Sisodia-3 (supra) is extracted
hereinbelow:-
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"37. In the light of the specific observations of
this Court in para 34 of the first order – [Manish Sisodia
v. CBI – (2024) 12 SCC 691, we are not inclined to
accept the submission of the learned ASG that the
provisions of Section 45 of the PMLA would come in the
way of consideration of the application of the appellant
for grant of bail."
71. A close scrutiny of the context in which bail was
rejected in Manish Sisodia-1 (supra) would reveal that the
application for bail was rejected on its merits after recording a
finding regarding prima facie case made out as regards the
ingredients of the offence of money laundering. Such rejection is
detailed in the discussion at para-1 to para-25, what would be
of substantial significance is the latter part of the order from
para-26 onwards. The Apex Court has consciously adverted
to the effect of long incarceration and the object of bail
being to secure the accused to stand trial. The Apex Court
has referred to the right of speedy trial flowing from
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. A specific
reference is made to the judgment in Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary (supra) insofar as it refers to Section 436A of
the Code as being applicable to offences under PMLA and
observes that Section 436A effectuates the right to
speedy trial being a facet of right to life, except where
such delay is attributable to the accused himself. It re-
emphasizes that:-
"34. Detention or jail before being
pronounced of guilty of an offence should not
become punishment without crime. If the trial gets
protracted despite assurances of the Prosecution
and it is clear that case will not be decided within
a foreseeable time, the prayer for bail may be
meritorious…."
72. It is relevant to notice that it is in the context
of an order granting bail under PMLA that the Apex Court
has reiterated the principle, 'bail is rule and jail is
exception'. The observations at para-52 of Manish
Sisodia-3 reads as follows:-
“52. The Court in JavedGulam Nabi Shaikh
case – (2024 9 SCC 813 further observed that,
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over a period of time, the trial courts and the High
courts have forgotten a very well-settled principle
of law that bail is not to be withheld as a
punishment. From our experience, we can say that
it appears that the trial courts and the High Courts
attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail.
The principle that bail is a rule and refusal is an
exception is, at times, followed in breach. On
account of non-grant of bail even in
straightforward open-and-shut cases, this Court is
flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby
adding to the huge pendency. It is high time that
the trial courts and the High Courts should
recognize the principle that “bail is rule and jail is
exception”.
73. It is significant that the decision in Manish
Sisodia - 3(supra) reiterates that Section 45 of PMLA
would not come in the way of considering grant of bail
due to long incarceration and delay in time.
74. That apart, what is noticeable is that the
reiteration of the principle, 'bail is rule and jail is
exception', which observation is made even in the
context of PMLA.
75. The other orders of the Apex Court in the same line of
reasoning would require reference. The Apex Court in
Padamchand Jain v. Enforcement Directorate – SLP
No.(Crl.) 17476/2025 has specifically clarified that the law laid
down in Manish Sisodia-3 (supra) was not under Article 142
of the Constitution of India and that the twin conditions under
Section 45 of PMLA cannot override the constitutional safeguard
as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The
observations at paras-6 and 7 of the decision would read as
hereunder:-
"6. Learned Single Judge of the High Court, while
considering the law laid down by this Court in Manish
Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine
1920, has observed that this Court has granted bail in
the said matter in exercise of powers under Article 142
of the Constitution of India.
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7. We may clarify that in the case of Manish
Sisodia (supra) the Court has not exercised the powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The Court
has held that the twin conditions under Section 45 of the
PMLA cannot override the constitutional safeguards, as
provided under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
This Court has held that a prolonged incarceration
cannot be permitted to be converted pre-trial detention
into a sentence without trial. Like in the case of Manish
Sisodia (supra) in the present case also thousands of
documents are required to be considered at the stage of
trial, so also around 50 witnesses are required to be
examined. The main evidence in the present case is
documentary in nature, which is already seized by the
prosecution agency. As such, there is no possibility of
the same being tampered with."
76. What would be of significance is that the
observations were made by the Apex Court as extracted
hereinabove, while specifically dealing with the
contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General
that, no bail could be granted unless twin conditions of
Section 45 of PMLA are complied with (see para-4).
77. Accordingly, the Three Judge Bench of Apex
Court while reiterating the order in Manish Sisodia-3
(supra) has set at rest the primacy of constitutional
rights flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India
vis-à vis the statutory provisions of Section 45 of PMLA.
78. It is also an independent principle of bail
jurisprudence that the object of pre-trial detention
cannot be punitive nor could it be construed to constitute
moral conviction.
79. The Apex Court has reiterated that the right to
personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India that is to be safeguarded where there is indefinite
detention in cases involving voluminous documents and
heavy material where trial is unlikely to begin promptly.
The observations of Apex Court at para-27 in V. Senthil Balaji
v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement – 2024
SCC OnLine SC 2626 [Senthil Balaji (supra)] is extracted
hereinbelow:-
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"27. Under the Statutes like PMLA, the minimum
sentence is three years, and the maximum is seven
years. The minimum sentence is higher when the
scheduled offence is under the NDPS Act. When the trial
of the complaint under PMLA is likely to prolong beyond
reasonable limits, the Constitutional Courts will have to
consider exercising their powers to grant bail. The
reason is that Section 45(1)(ii) does not confer
power on the State to detain an accused for an
unreasonably long time, especially when there is
no possibility of trial concluding within a
reasonable time. What a reasonable time is will
depend on the provisions under which the accused
is being tried and other factors. One of the most
relevant factor is the duration of the minimum and
maximum sentence for the offence. Another
important consideration is the higher threshold or
stringent conditions which a statute provides for
the grant of bail. Even an outer limit provided by
the relevant law for the completion of the trial, if
any, is also a factor to be considered. The
extraordinary powers, as held in the case of K.A.
Najeeb – (2021) 3 SCC 713, can only be exercised
by the Constitutional Courts. The Judges of the
Constitutional Courts have vast experience. Based
on the facts on record, if the Judges conclude that
there is no possibility of a trial concluding in a
reasonable time, the power of granting bail can
always be exercised by the Constitutional Courts
on the grounds of violation of Part III of the
Constitution of India notwithstanding the
statutory provisions. The Constitutional Courts can
always exercise its jurisdiction under Article 32 or
Article 226, as the case may be. The Constitutional
Courts have to bear in mind while dealing with the
cases under the PMLA that, except in a few
exceptional cases, the maximum sentence can be
of seven years. The Constitutional Courts cannot
allow provisions like Section 45(1)(ii) to become
instruments in the hands of the ED to continue
incarceration for a long time when there is no
possibility of a trial of the scheduled offence and
the PMLA offence concluding within a reasonable
time. If the Constitutional Courts do not exercise
their jurisdiction in such cases, the rights of the
undertrials under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India will be defeated. In a given case, if an undue
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delay in the disposal of the trial of scheduled
offences or disposal of trial under the PMLA can be
substantially attributed to the accused, the
Constitutional Courts can always decline to
exercise jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs. An
exception will also be in a case where, considering
the antecedents of the accused, there is every
possibility of the accused becoming a real threat
to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to
issue prerogative writs is always discretionary."
80. It thus becomes clear that the Apex Court has
reiterated the supremacy of rights flowing from Part-III
of the Constitution of India which stand abridged where
there is no possibility of trial concluding within a
reasonable time and the constitutional courts on such
principle enlarge the accused on bail "notwithstanding
the statutory provisions".
81. The observations in Senthil Balaji (supra) has
been reiterated by the latest judgment of the Apex Court
in Mahesh Joshi v. Directorate of Enforcement – SLP
(Crl.) No.13737/2025 vide order dated 3-12-2025 at
paras-13 and 14.
"13. In V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director,
Directorate of Enforcement, of which, one of us
was a member (Augustine George Masih, J.,), this
Court, particularly in para 27, held that where a
trial cannot be reasonably concluded and
incarceration becomes prolonged, constitutional
courts must intervene to safeguard the right to
personal liberty under Article 21. The Court further
emphasised that Section 45(1)(ii) of the PMLA
cannot be interpreted to justify indefinite
detention in cases involving voluminous,
document-heavy material where trial is unlikely to
begin promptly.
14. Upon considering the material placed before
us, we find that several co-accused, whose alleged roles
will ultimately be evaluated at trial, have already been
granted bail. The Appellant has remained in custody for
over seven months. The record is entirely documentary,
as of now there are 66 witnesses, 184 documents, and
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more than 14,600 pages are involved, and the
proceedings are still at the stage of supply of copy of the
police report and other documents under Section 207,
CrPC. In our view, these circumstances indicate that the
commencement of trial is not imminent and that the trial
itself is not likely to conclude once started in the near
future. The continued detention of the Appellant requires
closer scrutiny in light of constitutional considerations.
82. The Apex Court in Udhaw Singh v. Enforcement
Directorate – Crl.A.No.799/2025 vide order dated 17-02-2025
has noticed the judgment in Union of India Through
Assistant Director v. Kanhaiya Prasad – 2025 SCC
OnLinwe SC 306 [Kanhaiya Prasad (supra)] which appeared
to strike a discordant note has specifically observed at para-5
that the observations made in the said judgment was in the
context of a particular factual matrix where the orders in
Senthil Balaji (supra) were not applicable and accordingly,
the order in Kanhaiya Prasad (supra) does not refer to the
judgment in Senthil Balaji (supra) .
83. The latest judgment of the Apex Court in the context
of long detention being a ground to seek release on bail is that
of the Apex Court in Arvind Dham v. Directorate of
Enforcement – 2026 SCC OnLine SC 30. The observations at
para-15 to para-18 reiterate and sum up the legal position,
which is as follows:-
"15. We have given our thoughtful consideration
to the rival submissions and have carefully perused the
record. The court while dealing with the prayer for grant
of bail has to consider gravity of offence, which has to
be ascertained in the facts and circumstances of each
case. One of the circumstances to consider the gravity of
offences is also the term of sentence i.e., prescribed for
the offence, the accused is alleged to have committed –
[P.Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement (2020)
13 SCC 791]. The court has also to take into account the
object of the special Act, the gravity of offence and the
attending circumstances along with period of sentence.
All economic offences cannot be classified into one group
as it may involve various activities and may differ from
one case to another. Therefore, it is not advisable on the
part of the Court to categorize all the offences into one
group and deny bail on that basis – [Satender Kumar
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Antil v. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51. It is well settled that
if the State or any prosecuting agency including,
the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide
or protect the fundamental right of an accused, to
have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21
of the Constitution, then the State or any other
prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for
bail on the ground that the crime committed is
serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies
irrespective of the nature of the crime –
[JavedGulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra
– (2024) 9 SCC 813]. The aforesaid proposition
was quoted with approval by another two-Judge
Bench of this Court and it was held that long
period of incarceration for around 17 months and
the trial not even having commenced, the
appellant in that case has been deprived of his
right to speedy trial–[Manish Sisodia v.
Enforcement Directorate (2024) 12 SCC 660].
16. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in V.
Senthil Balaji’s case – [V.Sentil Balaji v. Deputy
Director, Enforcement Directorate 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 2626] has held that under the statutes
such as PMLA, where maximum sentence is seven
years, prolonged incarceration pending trial may
warrant grant of bail by Constitutional Courts, if
there is no likelihood of the trial concluding within
a reasonable time. Statutory restrictions cannot be
permitted to result in indefinite pretrial detention
in violation of Article 21.
17. A three Judge Bench of this Court in
Padam Chand Jain (supra), reiterated that
prolonged incarceration cannot be allowed to
convert pretrial detention into punishment and
that documentary evidence already seized by the
prosecution eliminates the possibility of tampering
with the same.
18. The right to speedy trial, enshrined
under Article 21 of the Constitution, is not eclipsed
by the nature of the offence. Prolonged
incarceration of an undertrial, without
commencement or reasonable progress of trial,
cannot be countenanced, as it has the effect of
converting pretrial detention into form of
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punishment. Economic offences, by their very
nature, may differ in degree and fact, and
therefore cannot be treated as homogeneous class
warranting a blanket denial of bail."
84. The Apex Court took note of the arrest of only the
petitioner therein who was one of the 28 individuals, that the
maximum sentence was seven years, that there was no
likelihood in the commencement of trial in the near future. It is
observed at para-19 as follows:-
"19. ..There is no likelihood of trial commencing
in the near future. The continued incarceration in such
circumstances particularly where the evidence which is
primarily documentary in nature, is already in custody of
the Prosecution, violates the right of the appellant to
speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India."
Accordingly, taking note of all the above factors, the
Court in the above factual matrix enlarged the accused on bail.
85. The consistent legal reasoning adopted while
enlarging the accused on bail is in the context of long
detention, factually dense material relied upon and
absence of any possibility of trial being concluded early.
Further, the Apex Court in Senthil Balaji (supra) has
emphasized that judicial discretion is vested in the
constitutional courts which is to be exercised in light of
the particular factual matrix.
86. Accordingly, it is clear that the ground of
speedy trial, context of delay in trial and long
incarceration are by itself independent grounds to seek
for being enlarged on bail on the premise of rights
flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India which
could be pressed into service de hors merits of the
application in terms of Section 45 of PMLA. The Apex
Court has referred to constitutional mandate being higher
law must be read into Section 439 of Cr.P.C.
87. In light of the above legal framework, the
request of the petitioner for being enlarged on bail in the
present case is to be considered.
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88. However, taking note that the length of
incarceration is 127 days as of now, it can be stated that
it would not qualify to be long incarceration entitling the
petitioner to be released on bail for the present.
[VIII] CONCLUSION:
89. The approach of Apex Court in Manish Sisodia -
1 (supra) could be adopted in the present case as well.
The Apex Court while recording a positive finding though
for the purposes of Section 45 of PMLA that the prayer for
grant of bail could not be considered, as a prima facie
case of involvement of the petitioner was made out,
however, reserved liberty to approach, if there was delay
in the trial while discussing the effect of prolonged
incarceration.
90. The observations made at paras-29 to 32
extracted supra in Manish Sisodia-1 (supra) as well as
the observation at para-36 which is extracted as
hereunder:-
"36. In view of the assurance given at the
Bar on behalf of the prosecution that they shall
conclude the trial by taking appropriate steps
within next six to eight months, we give liberty to
the appellant Manish Sisodia to move a fresh
application for bail in case of change in
circumstances, or in case the trial is protracted
and proceeds at a snail's pace in next three
months. If any application for bail is filed in the
above circumstances, the same would be
considered by the trial court on merits without
being influenced by the dismissal of the earlier bail
application, including the present judgment.
Observations made above, re.: right to speedy
trial, will, however, be taken into consideration.
The appellant Manish Sisodia may also file an
application for interim bail in case of ill health and
medical emergency due to illness of his wife. Such
application would be also examined on its own
merits.”
18
would indicate that the Apex Court taking note of the
stand of the Prosecution regarding trial, reserved liberty
to the appellant therein to move a fresh application for
bail in case of change in circumstances or if trial is
protracted and proceeds at a snail's pace in the next
three months or if the trial is not concluded within six to
eight months.
91. Subsequently, in Manish Sisodia v. Directorate
of Enforcement – 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1498 [Manish
Sisodia-2] when the accused had approached the Apex
Court once again, the Apex Court noticing that the period
of six to eight months fixed by the previous order
[Manish Sisodia-1 (supra)] not having expired, reserved
liberty to revive his prayer to move afresh after filing of
complaint/charge-sheet.
92. Finally, the Apex Court in the third round of
approach whereby a challenge was made to the rejection
of application by the High Court in Manish Sisodia-3
(supra) enlarged the petitioner on bail recording that
there was remote possibility of trial being concluded in
the near future, that keeping the appellant behind the
bars for an unlimited period of time would deprive his
fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, that prolonged incarceration before
being pronounced guilty of an offence should not be
permitted to become punishment without trial.
93. Finally, the Apex Court proceeded to grant bail
after taking note of the aspect of long incarceration. In
the present case as well having held that the length of
incarceration cannot qualify to be long incarceration, as
the petitioner has been in custody for 127 days as of now,
it would be appropriate to reserve liberty to the
petitioner to approach this Court after a lapse of three
months.
94. The petitioner then would have to point out as
regards Prosecution having taken steps for commencement of
trial and that there may be the possibility of joint trial
contributing to further delay and that there was no possibility of
trial concluding within a reasonable time.
19
95. The Prosecution also would have to keep such aspects
in mind so as to demonstrate that trial would be concluded
within a reasonable time. Upon consideration of such aspects,
the Court may take an appropriate decision.
96. Reserving liberty would be justified while
noticing that, as on date, it is the petitioner alone who
has been arrested amongst the several accused, that
prior to his arrest, he had subjected himself to
interrogation and that the investigation of the predicate
offence is not yet concluded.
97. Accordingly, in light of the observations made
above, the grant of bail for the present is rejected.
However, liberty is reserved to the petitioner to re-
approach after a period of three months directly before
this Court and to make a renewed plea for bail.
98. Accordingly, the petition is rejected , while reserving
liberty to the petitioner to approach afresh in terms of the
relevant observations supra.”
4. The learned senior counsel Sri Sandesh J. Chouta
appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the
coordinate Bench had in fact permitted the petitioner to knock at
the doors of this Court yet again on twin circumstances viz., if there
was no progress in the trial for over three months coupled with
changed circumstances. He would submit that there are 9 changed
circumstances in the case at hand for the petitioner to knock at the
doors of this Court. He would further contend that at the time when
the delay in trial was projected for the petitioner to be enlarged on
20
bail, the proceedings were only 127 days old. Today, the
proceedings are about 275 days old and the stage remains the
same. It is at a pre-cognizance stage. Therefore, the petitioner
must be enlarged on bail owing to the facts obtaining at this
juncture and change in circumstances.
5. Per contra , the learned Additional Solicitor General
Sri K. Arvind Kamath would vehemently refute the submissions in
contending that merely because changed circumstances have come
about, the earlier order rejecting the bail cannot be brushed aside.
NARCOTICS CONTROL
He would submit that the Apex Court in
BUREAU v. MOHIT AGGARWAL reported in (2022) 18 SCC 374
has clearly held that delay in trial alone cannot be the reason for
grant of bail to an accused, particularly when the offences are found
to be grave. By taking this Court through the statement of
objections, he would contend that economic offences must not be
shown any indulgence, particularly for the petitioner to be enlarged
on bail. He seeks dismissal of the petition.
21
6. The learned senior counsel for petitioner would join issue in
contending that the coordinate Bench holds that the petitioner can
approach this Court directly after completion of the period of three
months. The period is now 6 months old. Law permits accused to be
enlarged on bail, particularly on the facts obtaining in the case at
hand, as identical allegations were made against one Natesh whose
proceedings had been quashed.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The order
passed by the coordinate Bench is on 20-01-2026. The Court had
clearly observed that if the trial does not progress in three months
or there were any changed circumstances, the petitioner was
entitled to re-approach this Court seeking enlargement on bail.
Therefore, I deem it appropriate to notice the contentions of
changed circumstances post the order passed by the coordinate
Bench. The changed circumstances that are projected are that the
22
petitioner is enlarged on bail in the predicate offence just two
months after the order of the coordinate bench on 16-03-2026;
that charge sheet is filed in the predicate offence; that cognizance
is taken against the petitioner after the Enforcement Directorate
filed its final report/complaint before the concerned Court; that
against accused Nos.2 to 4 also supplementary prosecution
complaint is filed in the ECIR; that the allegations are verbatim
similar; that supplementary prosecution complaint filed by the
Enforcement Directorate bring in accused Nos. 2 to 4; that
Enforcement Directorate did not choose to arrest those accused
Nos. 2 to 4; that the petitioner stands on the same footing; that
there is no progress in the trial, as the issue is still at the pre-
cognizance stage; that there are innumerable witnesses to be
examined and documents running into 11400 pages; that witnesses
in the predicate offences are CW-1 to CW-24. On the aforesaid
changed circumstances, the learned senior counsel submits that
liberty the coordinate Bench granted must enure to the benefit of
the petitioner for his release on bail.
23
9. I therefore, deem it appropriate to notice the judicial
landscape with regard to grant of bail on changed circumstances.
9.1. The Apex Court in LT. COL. PRASAD SHRIKANT
1
PUROHIT v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
30. Before concluding, we must note that though an
accused has a right to make successive applications for
grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail
applications has a duty to consider the reasons and
grounds on which the earlier bail applications were
rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to
record the fresh grounds which persuade it to take a view
different from the one taken in the earlier applications.
31. At the stage of granting bail, a detailed
examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of
the merits of the case has not to be undertaken. The
grant or refusal to grant bail lies within the discretion of
the court. The grant or denial is regulated, to a large
extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular
case. But at the same time, right to bail is not to be
denied merely because of the sentiments of the
community against the accused.”
9.2. In JAVED GULAM NABI SHAIKH v. STATE OF
2
MAHARASHTRA the Apex Court has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
1
(2018) 11 SCC 458
2
(2024) 9 SCC 813
24
7. Having regard to the aforesaid, we wonder by what
period of time, the trial will ultimately conclude. Howsoever
serious a crime may be, an accused has a right to speedy
trial as enshrined under the Constitution of India. Over a
period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have
forgotten a very well-settled principle of law that bail is
not to be withheld as a punishment.
8. In the aforesaid context, we may remind the trial
courts and the High Courts of what came to be observed
by this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of
[ v. , (1978)
A.P. Gudikanti Narasimhulu High Court of A.P.
1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] We quote: (SCC p. 243,
para 5)
“ 5 . … What is often forgotten, and therefore
warrants reminder, is the object to keep a person
in judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an
appeal. Lord Russel, C.J.,
said R. v. Rose [ R. v. Rose , (1898) 18 Cox CC 717]
:
‘I observe that in this case bail was refused
for the prisoner. It cannot be too strongly
impressed on the magistracy of the country that
bail is not to be withheld as a punishment, but that
the requirements as to bail are merely to secure
the attendance of the prisoner at trial.’ ”
9. The same principle has been reiterated by this
Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of
Punjab [ Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab , (1980)
2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] that the object of bail is
to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that
the proper test to be applied in the solution of the
question whether bail should be granted or refused is
whether it is probable that the party will appear to take
his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be
withheld as a punishment.
10. Long back, in v.
Hussainara Khatoon (1) State
of Bihar [ Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar ,
(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had
declared that the right to speedy trial of offenders facing
25
criminal charges is “implicit in the broad sweep and
content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court”.
Remarking that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one
which contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair and
just” it was held that: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
“ 5 . … Now obviously procedure prescribed
by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot be
“reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure
ensures a speedy trial for determination of the
guilt of such person. No procedure which does
not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be
regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it
would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore,
be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial
we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an
integral and essential part of the fundamental
right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21.
The question which would, however, arise is as
to what would be the consequence if a person
accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and
is sought to be deprived of his liberty by
imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial
in violation of his fundamental right under Article
21.”
11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and
again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya v. State of
Bihar [ Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar , (1981) 3 SCC 671:
1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [ Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak , (1992) 1 SCC
225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter the court re-
emphasised the right to speedy trial, and further held
that an accused, facing prolonged trial, has no option:
( Abdul Rehman Antulay case [ Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak , (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri)
93], SCC p. 269, para 84)
“ 84 . … The State or complainant prosecutes
him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the
complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with
the case with reasonable promptitude.
Particularly, in this country, where the large
majority of accused come from poorer and weaker
sections of the society, not versed in the ways of
26
law, where they do not often get competent legal
advice, the application of the said rule is wholly
inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an
accused demands speedy trial and yet he is not
given one, may be a relevant factor in his favour.
But we cannot disentitle an accused from
complaining of infringement of his right to speedy
trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist
upon a speedy trial.”
12. In Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi) [ Mohd.
Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi) , (2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023
SCC OnLine SC 352: 2023 INSC 311], this Court observed
as under: (SCC pp. 178-79, paras 23-25)
“ 23 . Before parting, it would be important to
reflect that laws which impose stringent
conditions for grant of bail, may be necessary in
public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in
time, the injustice wrecked on the individual is
immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded and their living
conditions, more often than not, appalling. According to
the Union Home Ministry's response to Parliament, the
National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on
31-12-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in
jails against total capacity of 4,25,069 lakhs in the
country [ National Crime Records Bureau, “Prison
Statistics in India”
<https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI-
2021/Executive_ncrb_Summary-2021.pdf>.]. Of these
1,22,852 were convicts; the rest 4,27,165 were
undertrials.
24 . The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that
inmates are at risk of “prisonisation” a term described
by the Kerala High Court in A Convict
Prisoner v. State [ A Convict Prisoner v. State , 1993 SCC
OnLine Ker 127], as “ a radical transformation ” whereby
the prisoner: (SCC OnLine Ker para 13)
‘ 13 . … loses his identity. He is known by a
number. He loses personal possessions. He has no
personal relationships. Psychological problems result
from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity any
autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison
turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile
by ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.’
27
25 . There is a further danger of the prisoner
turning to crime, ‘ as crime not only turns admirable, but
the more professional the crime, more honour is paid to
the criminal ’ [ Working Papers — Group on Prisons &
Borstals — 1966 U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer's “ The
Prison Community ” published in 1940 [ Donald
Clemmer, The Prison Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart
& Winston, which is referred to in Tomasz Sobecki,
“Donald Clemmer's Concept of Prisonisation”, available
at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/
2020/12/Sobecki_sklad.pdf> accessed on 23-3-2023).]
). Incarceration has further deleterious effects — where
the accused belongs to the weakest economic strata:
immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases,
scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and
alienation from society. The courts therefore, have to be
sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an
acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and
ensure that trials — especially in cases, where special
laws enact stringent provisions, are taken up and
concluded speedily.”
(emphasis in original)
13. The requirement of law as being envisaged under
Section 19 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008
(hereinafter being referred to as “the 2008 Act”) mandates that
the trial under the Act of any offence by a Special Court shall be
held on day-to-day basis on all working days and have
precedence over the trial of any other case and Special Courts
are to be designated for such an offence by the Central
Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High
Court as contemplated under Section 11 of the 2008 Act.
14. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of
India v. K.A. Najeeb [ Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb , (2021) 3
SCC 713] had an occasion to consider the long incarceration and
at the same time the effect of Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act
and observed as under : (SCC p. 722, para 17)
“ 17 . It is thus clear to us that the presence of
statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) UAPA per se
does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to
grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the
Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a
28
statute as well as the powers exercisable under
constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised.
Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the
courts are expected to appreciate the legislative
policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such
provisions will melt down where there is no
likelihood of trial being completed within a
reasonable time and the period of incarceration
already undergone has exceeded a substantial
part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach
would safeguard against the possibility of
provisions like Section 43-D(5) UAPA being used
as the sole metric for denial of bail or for
wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy
trial.”
… … …
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still
an accused; not a convict. The over-arching postulate of
criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be
innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside
lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be.
19. We are convinced that the manner in which the
prosecuting agency as well as the Court have proceeded,
the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be
said to have been infringed thereby violating Article 21 of
the Constitution.
20.
In view of the aforesaid, this appeal succeeds and is
hereby allowed. The impugned order [ JavedGulamnabi
Shaikh v. NIA , 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2372] passed by the High
Court is set aside.
21. The appellant is ordered to be released on bail
subject to the terms and conditions which the trial court may
deem fit to impose. However, we on our own would impose the
condition that the appellant shall not leave the limits of Mumbai
City and shall mark his presence at the NIA office or police
station concerned once every fifteen days. Any other condition
which the trial court may deem fit to impose, it may do so in
accordance with law.”
29
MANISH SISODIA v. DIRECTORATE OF
9.3. In
3
ENFORCEMENT the Apex Court has held as follows:
“..... ….. .……
34. Insofar as the contention of the learned ASG that since
the conditions as provided under Section 45 of the PMLA are not
satisfied, the appellant is not entitled to grant of bail is
concerned, it will be apposite to refer to the first order [ Manish
Sisodia v. CBI , (2024) 12 SCC 691] of this Court. No doubt that
this Court in its first order [ Manish Sisodia v. CBI , (2024) 12
SCC 691] in para 28, after recapitulating in para 27 as to what
was stated in the charge-sheet filed by CBI against the
appellant, observed that, in view of the aforesaid discussion, the
Court was not inclined to accept the prayer for grant of bail at
that stage. However, certain paragraphs of the said order
cannot be read in isolation from the other paragraphs. The
order will have to be read in its entirety. In para 36 of the
said order, this Court observed that the right to bail in
cases of delay, coupled with incarceration for a long
period, depending on the nature of the allegations,
should be read into Section 439CrPC and Section 45 of
the PMLA. The Court held that the constitutional mandate
is the higher law, and it is the basic right of the person
charged of an offence and not convicted that he be
ensured and given a speedy trial. It further observed that
when the trial is not proceeding for reasons not
attributable to the accused, the court, unless there are
good reasons, would be guided to exercise the power to
grant bail. The Court specifically observed that this would
be true where the trial would take years. It could thus
clearly be seen that this Court, in the first round of
litigation between the parties, has specifically observed
that in case of delay coupled with incarceration for a long
period and depending on the nature of the allegations,
the right to bail will have to be read into Section 45 of
PMLA.
3
(2024) 12 SCC 660
30
35. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramkripal
Meena v. Enforcement Directorate [ Ramkripal
Meena v. Enforcement Directorate , (2024) 12 SCC 682] was
considering an application of the petitioner therein who was to
receive a bribe of rupees five crore and from whom, an amount
of Rs 46,00,000 was already recovered. In the said case, the
petitioner was arrested on 26-1-2022 in connection with FIR No.
402 of 2021 registered against him for the offences punishable
under Sections 406, 420, 120-BIPC and Sections 4/6 of the
Rajasthan Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act,
1992. He was released on bail by this Court vide order dated
18-1-2023 [ Ram Kripal v. State of Rajasthan , (2024) 12 SCC
686] . Thereafter, the petitioner was arrested by ED on 21-6-
2023.
36.
The Court observed thus: ( Ram Kripal case [ Ram
Kripal v. State of Rajasthan , (2024) 12 SCC 686] , SCC para 7)
“ 7 . Adverting to the prayer for grant of bail in the instant
case, it is pointed out by learned counsel for ED that the
complaint case is at the stage of framing of charges and 24
witnesses are proposed to be examined. The conclusion of
proceedings, thus, will take some reasonable time. The
petitioner has already been in custody for more than a year.
Taking into consideration the period spent in custody and
there being no likelihood of conclusion of trial within a short
span, coupled with the fact that the petitioner is already on
bail in the predicate offence, and keeping in view the peculiar
facts and circumstances of this case, it seems to us that the
rigours of Section 45 of the Act can be suitably relaxed to
afford conditional liberty to the petitioner. Ordered
accordingly.”
37. In the light of the specific observations of this Court in
para 34 of the first order [ Manish Sisodia v. CBI , (2024) 12 SCC
691] , we are not inclined to accept the submission of the
learned ASG that the provisions of Section 45 of the PMLA
would come in the way of consideration of the application
of the appellant for grant of bail.
38. From the first order [ Manish Sisodia v. CBI , (2024) 12
SCC 691] of this Court, it would be clear that an assurance was
given at the Bar on behalf of the prosecution that they shall
31
conclude the trial by taking appropriate steps within next 6-8
months. In view of the said statement, this Court did not
consider the application of the appellant for bail at that stage,
however, granted liberty to the appellant to move a fresh
application for bail in case of change in circumstances, or in
case the trial is protracted and proceeded at a snail's pace in
next three months. Though, this Court observed that if any
application for bail was filed on the grounds mentioned in para
36 of Manish Sisodia case [ Manish Sisodia v. CBI , (2024) 12
SCC 691] , the same would be considered by the trial court
without being influenced by the dismissal of the earlier bail
applications including the present judgment, however, it
clarified that the observations made by the Court with regard to
right to speedy trial would be taken into consideration. The
liberty was also granted to the appellant to file an application
for interim bail in case of ill health and medical emergency due
to illness of his wife.
39. A perusal of the impugned judgment and order [ Manish
Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate , 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3731]
would reveal that though the learned Single Judge of the High
Court has dismissed the applications for bail on merits, on
medical grounds, it has permitted the appellant to visit his
residence to meet his wife in custody once every week.
40. It could thus clearly be seen that this Court expected the
trial to be concluded within a period of 6-8 months. The liberty
was reserved to approach afresh if the trial did not conclude
within the period of 6-8 months. The liberty was also granted in
case the trial proceeded at a snail's pace in next three months.
41.
A perusal of the material placed on record would clearly
reveal that far from the trial being concluded within a period of
6-8 months, it is even yet to commence. Though in the first
order [ Manish Sisodia v. CBI , (2024) 12 SCC 691] of this Court,
liberty was reserved to move afresh for bail if the trial
proceeded at a snail's pace within a period of three months from
the date of the said order, the commencement of the trial is yet
to see the light of the day. In these circumstances, in view of
the first order [ Manish Sisodia v. CBI , (2024) 12 SCC 691] of
this Court, the appellant was entitled to renew his request.
When the appellant renewed his request, the learned Special
32
Judge (trial court) as well as the High Court was required to
consider the said applications in the light of the observations
made by this Court in paras 34 and 36 of the first order [ Manish
Sisodia v. CBI , (2024) 12 SCC 691] . In para 36 of the first
order [ Manish Sisodia v. CBI , (2024) 12 SCC 691] , this Court
though the observations on the
specifically observed that
aspect of merit were not binding, the observations of
right to speedy trial were required to be taken into
consideration.
42. The learned Special Judge and the learned Single Judge
of the High Court have considered the applications on merits as
well as on the grounds of delay and denial of right to speedy
trial. We see no error in the judgments and orders of the
learned Special Judge as well as the High Court in considering
the merits of the matter. In view of the observations made by
this Court in the first order [ Manish Sisodia v. CBI , (2024) 12
SCC 691] , they were entitled to consider the same. However,
the question that arises is as to whether the trial court
and the High Court have correctly considered the
observations made by this Court with regard to right to
speedy trial and prolonged period of incarceration. The
courts below have rejected the claim of the appellant
applying the triple test as contemplated under Section 45
of the PMLA. In our view, this is in ignorance of the
observations made by this Court in para 34 of the first
order [ Manish Sisodia v. CBI , (2024) 12 SCC 691]
wherein this Court specifically observed that right to bail
in cases of delay coupled with incarceration for a long
period should be read into Section 439CrPC and Section
45 of the PMLA.
43. The trial court, in its order, has held that the appellant
individually and along with different accused persons have been
filing one or the other applications/making oral submissions
frequently. It further observed that some of them were
frivolous. It was observed that this was apparently done as a
concerted effort for accomplishing the shared purpose of
causing delay in the matter. The trial court therefore rejected
the contention of the appellant that he had not contributed to
delay in proceedings or that the case has been proceeding at a
snail's pace. However, in the very subsequent paragraph i.e.
33
para 80, the court observed that, in order to avoid any delay
and considering the time being taken by the counsel for the
accused in inspecting the “un-relied upon documents”, it had
vide order dated 18-4-2024 put a query to the prosecution if
the entire “un-relied upon documents” can be provided to the
accused persons in a digitised form. It further recorded that ED
accepted the suggestion that it would expedite the proceedings.
However, some time was sought to consider the same. A
perusal of the compliance report filed by the Assistant Director
of ED dated 7-5-2024 which could be found at p. 757 of the
paper book would reveal that the Cyber Lab has informed that it
would take 70-80 days to prepare one copy (cloning) of the
data contained in the said un-relied digital devices.
44. It could further be seen that, though it has been
submitted on behalf of ED that hundreds of applications have
been filed for supply of “un-relied upon documents”, the record
would not substantiate the said position. Though various
applications have been filed by different accused persons,
insofar as the present appellant is concerned, he has filed only
13 applications in CBI matter and 14 in ED matter. It would
reveal that some of the applications are for seeking permission
to meet his wife or permission to file vakalatnama, to put
signature on the documents, seeking permission to sign a
cheque, etc. Most of the applications are for supply of missing
documents and legible copies under Sections 207/208CrPC.
Some of the applications are for inspection of the “un-relied
upon documents”. It is pertinent to note that all these
applications have been allowed by the learned trial court. It is
further pertinent to note that some of these orders were also
challenged before the High Court wherein stay was granted.
However, a statement was made on behalf of the prosecution
before this Court when the first order [ Manish Sisodia v. CBI ,
(2024) 12 SCC 691] was passed that the said petitions filed
under Section 482CrPC would be withdrawn. The said statement
is recorded in para 33 of the first order [ Manish Sisodia v. CBI ,
(2024) 12 SCC 691] of this Court. We may state that, when we
specifically asked the learned ASG to point out any order
wherein the learned trial Judge found any of the applications of
the appellant to be frivolous, not a single order could be pointed
out.
34
45. In that view of the matter, we find that the finding of the
learned trial Judge that it is the appellant who is responsible for
delaying the trial is not supported by the record. The learned
Single Judge of the High Court endorses the finding of the trial
court on the ground that the accused persons have taken three
months' time from 19-10-2023 to 19-1-2024 for inspection of
“un-relied upon documents” despite repeated directions from
the learned trial court to conclude the same expeditiously. It is
to be noted that there are around 69,000 pages of documents
involved in both CBI and ED matters. Taking into consideration
the huge magnitude of the documents involved, it cannot be
stated that the accused is not entitled to take a reasonable time
for inspection of the said documents. In order to avail the right
to fair trial, the accused cannot be denied the right to have
inspection of the documents including the “un-relied upon
documents”.
46. It is further to be noted that a perusal of the second
order [ Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate , 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 1498] of this Court would itself reveal that this Court
recorded the submissions of the learned Solicitor General, which
were made on instructions, that the investigation would be
concluded and final complaint/charge-sheet would be filed
expeditiously and at any rate on or before 3-7-2024.
Accordingly, 8th charge-sheet has been filed on 28-6-2024 by
ED. It could thus be seen that, even according to the
respondents, the investigation was to be concluded on or before
3-7-2024. In that view of the matter, we find that the
contention raised by the learned ASG is self-contradictory. If the
investigation itself was to conclude on or before 3-7-2024, the
question is how could the trial have commenced prior to that? If
the investigation itself was to conclude after a period of 8
months from the date of the first order [ Manish Sisodia v. CBI ,
(2024) 12 SCC 691] of this Court, there was no question of the
trial being concluded within a period of 6-8 months from the
date of the first order [ Manish Sisodia v. CBI , (2024) 12 SCC
691] of this Court. We find that both the High Court and the
trial court have failed to take this into consideration.
35
47. We find that, on account of a long period of incarceration
running for around 17 months and the trial even not having
been commenced, the appellant has been deprived of his right
to speedy trial.
48. As observed by this Court, the right to speedy trial
and the right to liberty are sacrosanct rights. On denial of
these rights, the trial court as well as the High Court
ought to have given due weightage to this factor.
49. Recently, this Court had an occasion to consider an
application for bail in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of
Maharashtra [ Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra ,
(2024) 9 SCC 813 : (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 222] wherein the
accused was prosecuted under the provisions of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. This Court surveyed the entire
law right from the judgment of this Court in Gudikanti
Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P. [ Gudikanti
Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P. , (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978
SCC (Cri) 115] , Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of
Punjab [ Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab , (1980) 2
SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , Hussainara Khatoon
(1) v. State of Bihar [ Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar ,
(1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] , Union of India v. K.A.
Najeeb [ Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb , (2021) 3 SCC 713 : 2021
INSC 50] and Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI [ Satender Kumar
Antil v. CBI , (2022) 10 SCC 51 : (2023) 1 SCC (Cri) 1] .
50. The Court observed thus: ( Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh
case [ Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra , (2024)
9 SCC 813 : (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 222] , SCC p. 820, para 17)
“ 17 . If the State or any prosecuting agency
including the court concerned has no wherewithal to
provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused
to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of
the Constitution then the State or any other
prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail
on the ground that the crime committed is serious.
Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of
the nature of the crime .”
36
51. The Court also reproduced the observations made
in Gudikanti Narasimhulu [ Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court
of A.P. , (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] , which read
thus: ( Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh case [ Javed Gulam Nabi
Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra , (2024) 9 SCC 813 : (2025) 1
SCC (Cri) 222] , SCC p. 816, para 8)
“ 8. In the aforesaid context, we may remind the trial
courts and the High Courts of what came to be observed by
this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of
A.P. [ Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P. , (1978) 1
SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] We quote (SCC p. 243, para
5):
‘ 5 . … What is often forgotten, and therefore
warrants reminder, is the object to keep a person
in judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an
appeal. Lord Russel, C.J., said [ R. v. Rose [ R. v. Rose ,
(1898) 18 Cox CC 717] ]:
“I observe that in this case bail was
refused for the prisoner. It cannot be too
strongly impressed on the magistracy of the
country that bail is not to be withheld as a
punishment, but that the requirements as
to bail are merely to secure the attendance
of the prisoner at trial. ” ’ ”
52. The Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh case [ Javed
Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra , (2024) 9 SCC 813 :
(2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 222] further observed that, over a period
of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have
forgotten a very well-settled principle of law that bail is
not to be withheld as a punishment. From our experience,
we can say that it appears that the trial courts and the
High Courts attempt to play safe in matters of grant of
bail. The principle that bail is a rule and refusal is an
exception is, at times, followed in breach. On account of
non-grant of bail even in straightforward open-and-shut
cases, this Court is flooded with huge number of bail
petitions thereby adding to the huge pendency. It is high
time that the trial courts and the High Courts should
recognise the principle that “bail is rule and jail is
exception”.
37
53. In the present case, in ED matter as well as CBI
matter, 493 witnesses have been named. The case
involves thousands of pages of documents and over a
lakh pages of digitised documents. It is thus clear that
there is not even the remotest possibility of the trial
being concluded in the near future. In our view, keeping
the appellant behind bars for an unlimited period of time
in the hope of speedy completion of trial would deprive
his fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the
Constitution. As observed time and again, the prolonged
incarceration before being pronounced guilty of an
offence should not be permitted to become punishment
without trial.
54. As observed by this Court in Gudikanti
Narasimhulu [ Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P. ,
(1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] , the objective to
keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal
of an appeal is to secure the attendance of the prisoner
at trial.
55.
In the present case, the appellant is having deep roots
in the society. There is no possibility of him fleeing away from
the country and not being available for facing the trial. In any
case, conditions can be imposed to address the concern of the
State.
56. Insofar as the apprehension given by the learned ASG
regarding the possibility of tampering the evidence is
concerned, it is to be noted that the case largely depends on
documentary evidence which is already seized by the
prosecution. As such, there is no possibility of tampering with
the evidence. Insofar as the concern with regard to influencing
the witnesses is concerned, the said concern can be addressed
by imposing stringent conditions upon the appellant.”
38
4
MUKESH SALAM v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
9.4. In
the Apex Court has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
5.
Bearing in mind the above circumstances and the
nature of the alleged case, we are of the considered view that
the continued detention of the petitioner would not subserve the
ends of justice. There is no likelihood of the early conclusion of
the trial. The petitioner is in custody since 6 May 2020. We
accordingly order and direct that the petitioner be released on
bail, subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed
by the Special Judge (NIA Act), Kanker, in connection with FIR
No 9 of 2020.”
9.5. In ARVIND DHAM v. DIRECTORATE OF
5
ENFORCEMENT the Apex Court has held as follows:
“…. …. …
14. It is submitted that out of 210 witnesses to be
examined during the trial, 25 witnesses are common in both the
prosecution complaints. It is pointed out that out of 63,691
pages of relied upon documents, only few pages are relevant to
prove the loss. It is further pointed out that ED has filed an
application on 27.09.2025 for day-to-day hearing. It is
submitted that the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
Alternatively, it is also pointed out that in many serious cases,
this Court has directed the parties to re-apply for bail after
sometime and the appellant, depending upon the progress of
the trial, be directed to renew the prayer for bail after six
months.
15. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
rival submissions and have carefully perused the record. The
court while dealing with the prayer for grant of bail has
4
2024 SCC OnLine SC 4021
5
2026 SCC OnLine SC 30
39
to consider gravity of offence, which has to be
ascertained in the facts and circumstances of each case.
One of the circumstances to consider the gravity of
offences is also the term of sentence i.e., prescribed for
the offence, the accused is alleged to have committed.
The court has also to take into account the object of the
special Act, the gravity of offence and the attending
circumstances along with period of sentence. All
economic offences cannot be classified into one group as
it may involve various activities and may differ from one
case to another. Therefore, it is not advisable on the part
of the Court to categorize all the offences into one group
and deny bail on that basis. It is well settled that if the
State or any prosecuting agency including, the court,
concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the
fundamental right of an accused, to have a speedy trial as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the
State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose
the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed
is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies
irrespective of the nature of the crime. The aforesaid
proposition was quoted with approval by another two-
Judge Bench of this Court and it was held that long period
of incarceration for around 17 months and the trial not
even having commenced, the appellant in that case has
been deprived of his right to speedy trial.
16. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in V. Senthil
Balaji's case has held that under the statutes such as
PMLA, where maximum sentence is seven years,
prolonged incarceration pending trial may warrant grant
of bail by Constitutional Courts, if there is no likelihood of
the trial concluding within a reasonable time. Statutory
restrictions cannot be permitted to result in indefinite
pretrial detention in violation of Article 21.
17. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Padam
Chand Jain (supra), reiterated that prolonged
incarceration cannot be allowed to convert pretrial
detention into punishment and that documentary
evidence already seized by the prosecution eliminates the
possibility of tampering with the same.
40
18. The right to speedy trial, enshrined under
Article 21 of the Constitution, is not eclipsed by the
nature of the offence. Prolonged incarceration of an
undertrial, without commencement or reasonable
progress of trial, cannot be countenanced, as it has the
effect of converting pretrial detention into form of
punishment. Economic offences, by their very nature,
may differ in degree and fact, and therefore cannot be
treated as homogeneous class warranting a blanket
denial of bail.
19.
In the backdrop of aforesaid well settled parameters
with regard to exercise of jurisdiction for grant of bail in
economic offences, we now advert to the facts of the case in
hand. The appellant has joined the investigation even prior to
his arrest i.e., 19.06.2024 and 02.07.2024 as well as on
09.07.2024. Thus, he has cooperated with the investigation. Out
of 28 individuals, only the appellant has been arrested. The
order dated 20.08.2025 of the Special Court records the
submission of ED that investigation qua the appellant has
concluded. The maximum sentence which can be imposed on
the appellant is seven years. The appellant is in custody for past
around 16 months and 20 days. It is pertinent to note that
various Benches of this Court, while taking into account
the period of incarceration which ranges from 3 months
to 17 months in several cases have granted bail to the
appellants therein. In the instant case, no cognizance has
been taken on the prosecution complaint and the
proceeding is at the stage of scrutiny of documents. No
material has been placed on record to show the fate of
the application filed by the ED on 27.09.2025 seeking
day-to-day hearing even after period of approximately
three months has expired. There are 210 witnesses to be
examined in the proceeding. There is no likelihood of trial
commencing in the near future. The continued
incarceration in such circumstances, particularly where
the evidence which is primarily documentary in nature, is
already in custody of the prosecution, violates the right of
the appellant to speedy trial under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
41
10. The Apex Court, even in cases of offences under Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 has chosen to grant bail on
grounds of delayed trial or on changed circumstances. The Apex
Court holds that at the stage of granting bail, a detailed
examination of evidence and elaborate documentation on merits
should not be undertaken. The accused has a right to file successive
applications for grant of bail. The Court entertaining such
subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and
grounds on which the earlier bail application was rejected; the
Court has a duty to record fresh grounds which persuaded it to take
a different view from the one earlier taken on the bail application.
11. The Apex Court in ARVIND DHAM supra holds that right
to speedy trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution should
not be eclipsed by the nature of the offence. Prolonged
incarceration of an undertrial cannot be countenanced. Likewise,
the Apex Court in each of the cases has considered the right of the
accused to file bail applications on changed circumstances. The
changed circumstances contended are quoted hereinabove.
Those should merit acceptance for the reason that in the
42
predicate offence, the petitioner is enlarged on bail on
16-03-2026, two months after earlier rejection of bail. This
would be the first changed circumstance. Charge sheet is
filed in the predicate offence on 16-03-2026 and only after
that bail is granted. This would be the second changed
circumstance. Supplementary prosecution complaint is filed
by the Enforcement Directorate bringing in three other
accused – accused Nos. 2 to 4. This is on 28-03-2026. The
Enforcement Directorate has not chosen to arrest them and
the contention is that the petitioner stands on the same
footing as accused Nos. 2 to 4. This is the third changed
circumstance. The concerned Court on hearing the ECIR has
taken cognizance on the prosecution complaint on 24-04-
2026. This is the fourth changed circumstance. The
coordinate Bench had permitted the petitioner to re-
approach this Court in three months’ time if the trial would
not progress. The trial is still in pre-cognizance stage as
against accused Nos. 2 to 4 who are now drawn in terms of
the supplementary complaint. This is the fifth changed
circumstance. These five circumstances are undoubtedly
43
changed circumstances to the order passed by the
coordinate Bench on 20-01-2026, as every circumstance has
happened subsequent to the rejection of bail application by
the coordinate Bench.
12. The documents run to about 12000 pages is an admitted
fact and a plethora of witnesses to be examined is again an
admitted fact. The vehement opposition of the learned Additional
Solicitor General would have merited acceptance if there was no
changed circumstance at all. As contended by him and also settled
principle of law that merely because trial would take a long time it
would not give a right to the accused to seek bail. The judgment
relied on by the learned Additional Solicitor General in the case of
MOHIT AGGARWAL supra brooks no qualm about the principles
laid down. The applicability is what is doubtful. The Apex Court
was considering a case of drug trafficking in the case of MOHIT
AGGARWAL . Therefore, the Apex Court observed that merely
because the trial has not been conducted for one long year, the
accused cannot claim that he should be released on bail, owing to
seriousness of the offence. Before the Apex Court MOHIT
44
AGGARWAL
was punishable with imprisonment of 20 years or
more. The offences in the case at hand are the ones which bear
imprisonment to a maximum of seven years, both in the predicate
offence and in the Act. Therefore, the said judgment has become
inapplicable to the facts obtained in the case at hand.
13. The coordinate Bench had clearly observed that bail is a
rule and jail is an exception, reiterating the principles enunciated by
the Apex Court throughout, but had observed with a rider that it
would become applicable only in a subsequent bail application. In
the aforesaid circumstances, I deem it appropriate to allow the
petition and enlarge the petitioner on bail with stringent conditions.
14. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
The Criminal Petition is allowed . The petitioner-accused No.1
shall be released on bail in connection with ECIR/BGZO/25/2024
pending on the file of the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru in Spl.C.No.917 of 2026 for the aforesaid offences,
subject to the following conditions:
45
(i) The petitioner shall execute a personal
bond for a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees
Five Lakhs only) with two solvent sureties
for the like-sum to the satisfaction of the
jurisdictional Court.
(ii) The petitioner shall not indulge in
tampering the prosecution witnesses or
hamper the investigation, either directly or
indirectly.
(iii) The petitioner shall appear before the
jurisdictional Court on all the future
hearing dates, unless exempted by the
Court for any genuine cause.
(iv) The prosecution is at liberty to prefer an
application for cancellation of bail, if there
is any violation of the aforesaid conditions.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Bkp
CT:MJ