Jaswinder Singh Virdi vs Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
106
CWP-23669-2026
Date of Decision : 10.09.2026
Jaswinder Singh Virdi …..Petitioner
Versus
Punjab State Power Corporation Limited and others ....Respondents
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Present : Mr. Arunjeet Singh Kakkar, Advocate for the petitioner
(through video conference).
Mr. Pawan Kumar, Advocate for the respondents.

NAMIT KUMAR, J. (ORAL)
1. The petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this
Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking
issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the punishment order dated
15.09.2017 (Annexure P-4), whereby punishment of ‘demotion to the
lower post of Assistant Executive Engineer for one year’ was imposed
upon the petitioner; charge-sheet dated 03.11.2014 (Annexure P-5); and
appellate order dated 19.08.2019 (Annexure P-7), whereby the
punishment imposed upon the petitioner, vide order dated 15.09.2017,
has been modified to ‘stoppage of one annual grade increment with
future effect’.
2. Brief facts, as have been pleaded in the petition, are that
the petitioner had joined the respondent-Corporation in the year 1995.
From 21.10.2013 to 01.10.2014, the petitioner was posted as Additional
Superintending Engineer, Division Commercial Jalandhar and he was
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CWP-23669-2026 2
also given the additional charge of Additional Superintending
Engineer/North Technical as the said officer was on leave from
29.07.2014 to 12.08.2014. During his additional charge, one Davinder
Kumar Ghai lodged a complaint through his mobile phone, alleging
therein that one Tirath Ram, J.E., had taken bribe of Rs.45,000/- from
him for providing commercial connection. Upon receipt of the said
complaint, respondent No.3, vide letter dated 12.09.2014 (Annexure P-
1), marked an enquiry to respondent No.5 against Tirath Ram, J.E..
During the preliminary enquiry, owing to some personal grudge, Tirath
Ram had shifted the blame of his own wrongdoing upon the petitioner.
Although, complainant-Davinder Kumar Ghai did not appear to depose
during the enquiry. However, when enquiry officer called him on his
mobile, then the complainant himself stated that he neither knew the
petitioner nor had he ever met him. It further emerged during the
enquiry that Tirath Ram had received the amount through a mediator,
namely Narinder Bajaj, Advocate. Narinder Bajaj, Advocate deposed
that Tirath Ram had taken Rs.15,000/- twice from him for the
commercial connection of complainant-Davinder Kumar Ghai. In his
statement, Narinder Bajaj, Advocate had also stated that he did not
know the petitioner and had never met him before. He had only met the
petitioner when Tirath Ram came to return the money and was
accompanied by the petitioner. Thereafter, charge-sheet dated
03.11.2014 (Annexure P-5) was issued to the petitioner. After
concluding the departmental enquiry against Tirath Ram and the
petitioner, the impugned order dated 15.09.2017 (Annexure P-4) was
passed by respondent No.6, whereby punishment of ‘demotion to the
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CWP-23669-2026 3
lower post of Assistant Executive Engineer for 01 year’ was imposed
upon the petitioner. Aggrieved against the said order, the petitioner filed
statutory appeal before the Appellate Authority. Thereafter, the
petitioner also approached this Court by filing CWP No.22166 of 2017
titled as ‘Jaswinder Singh Virdi Vs. Punjab State Power Corporation
Limited and others’ for quashing the punishment order dated 15.09.2017
and charge-sheet dated 03.11.2014. During the pendency of the said writ
petition, the statutory appeal filed by the petitioner was decided by the
Appellate Authority, vide order dated 19.08.2019 (Annexure P-7),
whereby the punishment of ‘demotion to the lower post of Assistant
Executive Engineer for one year’ was modified to ‘stoppage of one
annual grade increment with future effect’. In view of the said order
passed by the Appellate Authority, the abovesaid writ petition was
dismissed by this Court, vide order dated 19.01.2023 (Annexure P-8), as
having become infructuous with liberty to the petitioner to challenge the
order dated 19.08.2019, if so advised. Hence the instant petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, owing to
personal grudge, accused Tirath Ram falsely dragged the petitioner into
the bribe case. The only thing found against the petitioner is that, why
he accompanied Tirath Ram when he went to return the money
allegedly taken by him as bribe, whereas the reality is that upon coming
to know of the complaint made against Tirath Ram, the petitioner
confronted him and compelled him to return the money. He further
submits that after the passing of the order dated 19.08.2019 (Annexure
P-7) by the Appellate Authority, the petitioner was under a bona fide
impression that since the punishment had already been modified and he
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CWP-23669-2026 4
was due to retire shortly, the adverse consequences thereof would not
survive. However, after his retirement on 30.09.2025, the petitioner
came to know that the impugned punishment continues to adversely
affect his service record, retiral benefits and reputation. Therefore, the
instant petition may be allowed and the impugned punishment order be
set aside and direction may be issued to the respondent-Corporation to
grant all consequential benefits to the petitioner.
4. On receipt of advance copy of the petition, learned counsel
for the respondents have put in appearance and submits that the instant
petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as
the impugned order was passed by the Appellate Authority on
19.08.2019 and copy thereof was received by the petitioner on
24.09.2019, whereas the instant petition has been filed by him on
29.07.2026, i.e., after an inordinate and unexplained delay of about 07
years.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
relevant documents.
6. The facts are not in dispute that the petitioner had joined
the respondent-Corporation in the year 1995. During his service tenure
from 21.10.2013 to 01.10.2014, when he was posted as Additional
Superintending Engineer, Division, Commercial Jalandhar, he was also
given the additional charge of Additional Superintending
Engineer/North Technical. During his additional charge, one Davinder
Kumar Ghai had lodged a complaint that one Tirath Ram, J.E. had
demanded and accepted bribe of Rs.45,000/- from him for providing
him commercial connection. In preliminary enquiry, Tirath Ram had
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CWP-23669-2026 5
shifted the blame of his own wrongdoing upon the petitioner. After
completing all the formalities, including departmental inquiry, a
punishment of ‘demotion to the lower post of Assistant Executive
Engineer for 01 year’ was imposed upon the petitioner, vide order dated
15.09.2017 (Annexure P-4). The said punishment was modified to
‘stoppage of one annual grade increment with future effect’ by the
Appellate Authority, vide order dated 19.08.2019 (Annexure P-7).
7. Now after a lapse of period of about 07 years, the petitioner
has approached this Court challenging the order dated 19.08.2019
(Annexure P-7), passed by the Appellate Authority, and that too after he
had already retired from service. In the absence of any cogent
explanation, the delay cannot be treated as a mere procedural irregularity
and a litigant who has remained indolent and allowed his claim to
become stale cannot as a matter of right, seek interference of this Court.
Such an unexplained and prolonged delay renders the petitioner's claim
liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and latches.
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yunus (Baboobhai) A
Hamid Padvekar Vs. State of Maharashtra Through its Secretary and
others : 2009 (2) SCT 24 , while referring to the issue of delay and
laches, had held as follows:-
“8. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to
be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise
their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution’). In
an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke
its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or
omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as
taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other
circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even
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CWP-23669-2026 6
where fundamental right is involved the matter is still
within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga
Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (AIR
1970 Supreme Court 769) . Of course, the discretion has to
be exercised judicially and reasonably.
9. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurde etc., (1874) 5 PC 221 at page 239 was
approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial
Courts, (AIR 1967 SC 1450) and Maharashtra State
Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service
(AIR 1969 Supreme Court 329) , Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is
not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it
would be practically unjust to give a remedy either
because the party has, by his conduct done that
which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he
has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put
the other party in a situation in which it would not
be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must
be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two
circumstances always important in such cases are,
the length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval which might affect either
party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in
taking the one course or the other, so far as relates
to the remedy."
10. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of
this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in
relation with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent
that what has been stated as regards that Article would
apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in R.N
Bose v. Union of India (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 470)
that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without
any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under
Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though
Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow
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CWP-23669-2026 7
from this that it was the intention of the Constitution
makers that this Court should disregard all principles and
grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.
11. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal (AIR 1987
Supreme Court 251) that the High Court in exercise of
its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the
indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such
delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a
number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring in its trail new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it
may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was
pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party
rights in the meantime is an important factor which also
weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to
exercise such jurisdiction.
12. In view of the aforesaid position we are not inclined to
interfere in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.”
9. In a recent judgment by a Division Bench of this Court in
Ram Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and others : 2022 (3) SCT 346 ,
while rejecting the claim of the petitioner for counting of his ad hoc
service, for the purpose of seniority/pension and regularization in
service on completion of 02 years as per policy, held that the petition
filed by him suffered from gross, inordinate and unexplained delay in
approaching the High Court. In the said judgment, it has been held as
under:-
“10. What we wish to emphasize, in particular, is that
services of the appellant were regularized w.e.f.
01.04.1997. And, he was assigned a specific seniority
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CWP-23669-2026 8
position in the cadre. Whereafter, he continued to serve the
department for nearly twenty five years, before attaining
the age of superannuation in January, 2022. Needless to
assert that during all these years, he availed all admissible
benefits, promotions, and retired as Inspector. Thus, it
rather appears that institution of the petition by the
appellant was speculative and an attempt to resurrect a
stale and dead claim. The Supreme Court, in New Delhi
Municipal Council v. Pan Singh & Ors., 2007(9) SCC
278 , observed:
“15. There is another aspect of the matter which
cannot be lost sight of. Respondents herein filed a
Writ Petition after 17 years. They did not agitate
their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed
herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at
the earliest possible opportunity. They did not
implead themselves as parties even in the reference
made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is
not their case that after 1982, those employees who
were employed or who were recruited after the cut-
off date have been granted the said scale of pay.
After such a long time, therefore, the Writ Petitions
could not have been entertained even if they are
similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary
jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those
who approach the Court after a long time. Delay
and laches are relevant factors for exercise of
equitable jurisdiction. See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K.
Roy And Others [(2004) 1 SCC 347], Chairman,
U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh And Anr.
[2006 (12) SCALE 347] and Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing
Director and Another v. K. Thangappan and
Another [(2006) 4 SCC 322] ”
11. Similarly, in Jagdish Lal & Ors. Vs. State of
Haryana & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 538 , it was held by the
Supreme Court:
“That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the
delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief
under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. It is not
necessary to reiterate all catena of precedents in this
behalf. Suffice it to state that the appellant kept
sleeping over their rights for long and elected to
wake up when they had the impetus from Vir Pal
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CWP-23669-2026 9
Chauhan and Ajit Singh’s ratios……...............
Therefore, desperate attempts of the appellants to re-
do the seniority had by them in various
cadres/grades though in the same services according
to 1974 Rules or 1980 Rule, are not amenable to
judicial review at this belated stage….”
12. In the wake of the position as sketched out above, we
are dissuaded to interfere with the impugned order and
judgment rendered by the learned single Judge. The appeal
being bereft of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.”
10. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Prem Nath Vs.
State of Punjab : 2018(2) SCT 687 , while rejecting the claim of
additional increments on acquisition of higher qualifications has held as
under:-
“3. It is the case set up on behalf of the petitioners that
they had all been appointed before 19.02.1979 and had
even improved/acquired higher qualifications before
19.02.1979 and as such there would be no difference
between the employees working with the Punjab
Government, holding corresponding post and the
employees like the petitioners who have worked for Punjab
Privately Managed Recognised Aided Schools. It is also
the assertion made by counsel representing the petitioners
that their claim would be covered in terms of decision
dated 02.07.2013 rendered by this Court in a bunch of writ
petitions including CWP No.8083 of 1989 titled as Radha
Krishan Narang and others vs. State of Punjab and
others .
4. Having heard counsel for the petitioners at length,
this Court is of the considered view that the claim of the
petitioners would not require any consideration on merits
and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole
ground of delay and laches.
5. Placed on record and appended at Annexure P-1 are
the particulars of the petitioners. The tabulation at
Annexure P-1 would show that all the petitioners stand
retired on various dates between the years 1995 to 2012.
Out of 32 petitioners in all, 22 petitioners superannuated
more than 10 years back.
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CWP-23669-2026 10
6. There is no justification coming forth as regards the
inordinate delay in having approached the Writ Court.
There is also no explanation put forth by the petitioners as
to why the claim raised in the instant petition was not
agitated by the petitioners while they were in service. The
entire thrust of the submissions additionald by counsel is
that similarly situated employees had approached this
Court and have been granted releif.
7. The issue regarding delay in invoking the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India was considered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Chairman , U.P. Jal Nigam and another
v. Jaswant Singh and another, 2007(1) SCT 224 :
(2006)11 SCC 464 . In such case, certain employees raised
the issue that they were not liable to be retired at the age of
58 years but should be permitted to continue in service till
they attain the age of 60 years. Such employees were still
in service when the writ petitions were filed. The writ
petitions were ultimately allowed. Placing reliance upon
such judgment, some of the employees, who had already
superannuated, filed writ petitions seeking the same
benefit. Even such petitions were allowed by the High
Court in terms of following the earlier judgment. The
judgment of the High Court was challenged before the
Apex Court and wherein while referring to earlier
judgments in Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, (1989)2
SCC 356; Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, 1998(1) S.C.T.
26 : (1997)6 SCC 538 and Government of West Bengal v.
Tarun K. Roy, 2004(1) SCT 78 : (2004)1 SCC 347 , it was
opined that persons who approached the Court at a
belated stage placing reliance upon the order passed in
some other case earlier, can be denied the discretionary
relief on the ground of delay and laches. The relevant
observations made by the Supreme Court are contained in
Paras 5, 6 and 16 of the judgment and are extracted here
under:-
“5. So far as the principal issue is concerned, that
has been settled by this court. Therefore, there is no
quarrel over the legal proposition. But the only
question is grant of relief to such other persons who
were not vigilant and did not wake up to challenge
their retirement and accepted the same but filed writ
petitions after the judgment of this court in
Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer, Karmik,
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CWP-23669-2026 11
2006(1) SCT 541 : (2005) 13 SCC 300 . Whether
they are entitled to same relief or not? Therefore, a
serious question that arises for consideration is
whether the employees who did not wake up to
challenge their retirement and accepted the same,
collected their post-retirement benefits, can such
persons be given the relief in the light of the
subsequent decision delivered by this court?
6. The question of delay and laches has been
examined by this court in a series of decisions and
laches and delay has been considered to be an
important factor in exercise of the discretionary
relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a
person who is not vigilant of his rights and
acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be
heard after a couple of years on the ground that
same relief should be granted to him as was granted
to person similarly situated who was vigilant about
his rights and challenged his retirement which was
said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A
chart has been supplied to us in which it has been
pointed out that about 9 writ petitions were filed by
the employees of the Nigam before their retirement
wherein their retirement was somewhere between
30.6.2005 and 31.7.2005. Two writ petitions were
filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed.
They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate
of writ petitions followed in which employees who
retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and
2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 and 2006
much after their retirement. Whether such persons
should be granted the same relief or not?
xx xx xx
16. Therefore, in case at this belated stage if
similar relief is to be given to the persons who have
not approached the court that will unnecessarily
overburden the Nigam and the Nigam will
completely collapse with the liability of payment to
these persons in terms of two years' salary and
increased benefit of pension and other consequential
benefits. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any
relief to the persons who have approached the court
after their retirement. Only those persons who have
filed the writ petitions when they were in service or
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CWP-23669-2026 12
who have obtained interim order for their
retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand
to benefit and not others.
(Emphasis Supplied).”
8. The issue of delay was also dealt with by this Court
in Tarsem Pal vs. Punjab State Power Corporation
Limited and others, 2013 (3)SLR 314 . In the case of
Tarsem Pal(supra), the petitioner was serving as a Clerk
with the respondent-Corporation and had retired on
31.03.2005. Claim in the writ petition was to grant to him
the benefit of proficiency set up in the pay scale on
completion of 23 years of service from the due date as per
policy of the Corporation. During the service career, he
had not agitated the claim for increments. For the first
time, such claim had been made on 28.02.2005 i.e. just one
month prior to superannuation. While non-suiting the
petitioner on account of delay and laches it was held as
follows:-
“11. In the aforesaid judgments, it has been
clearly laid down that discretionary relief in a writ
jurisdiction is available to a party who is alive of
his rights and enforces the same in court within
reasonable time. The judgment in another case does
not give a cause of action to file a writ petition at a
belated stage seeking the same relief. Such petitions
can be dismissed on account of delay and laches.
As has already been noticed above in the present
case as well, the petitioner joined service in the
year 1965 and retired in the year 2005, but raised
the issue regarding benefit of proficiency step up in
the pay scale on completion of 23 years of service
from the due date more than five years after his
retirement referring to a judgment of this court and
filed the petition claiming the same relief.
12. The petitioner retired from service on
31.3.2005 and the claim pertaining to the benefit of
proficiency step up, which may be admissible to the
petitioner during his service career, was sought to be
raised more than five years after his retirement, the
claim made at such a late stage deserves to be
dismissed on account of delay and laches only. The
petitioner could raise a grievance about the pay
scales admissible to him or the last pay drawn by
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CWP-23669-2026 13
him within a reasonable time after his retirement. He
cannot be permitted to raise the same at any time on
the plea that the same is recurring cause of action.
13. Considering the enunciation of law, as
referred to above, in my opinion, the petitioner
herein is not entitled to the relief prayed for and the
petition deserves to be dismissed merely on account
of delay and laches.”
9. At this stage, counsel appearing for the petitioners
would make an attempt to overcome the obstacle of delay
by placing reliance upon a Full Bench Judgment of this
Court in Saroj Kumar vs. State of Punjab, 1998(3) SCT
664 . Counsel would argue that as per dictum laid down in
Saroj Kumar's case(supra), matters of pay fixation involve
a recurring cause of action and as such, writ petitions for
such claim cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches and the Court at the most, may restrict the arrears
upto 38 months from the date of filing of the petition and
disallow the arrears for the period for which even a suit
had become time barred.
10. The reliance placed by counsel upon the judgment in
Saroj Kumar's case, is wholly misplaced. The observations
and aspect of delay in Saroj Kumar's case, were in the light
of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta vs.
Union of India and others, 1996(1) SCT 8 : 1995(4) RSJ
502 . In M.R. Gupta's case(supra), it had been
categorically held that so long as an employee “is in
service” a fresh cause of action arises every month when
he is getting his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong
calculation made contrary to rules. It was further held that
the claim to be awarded the correct salary on the basis of a
proper pay fixation “is a right which subsists during the
entire tenure of service”.
11. In the present case, however the petitioners choose
not to agitate their claim while in service. It is much
subsequent to their superannuation that they have woken
up and seek to gain impetus from certain decisions that
may have been rendered in the case of similarly situated
employees .
12. Considering the dictum of law as laid down in
Chariman, U.P. Jal Nigam's case (supra), the petitioners
herein are not entitled to any releif as prayed for and the
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CWP-23669-2026 14
petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole ground of
delay and laches .
13. Ordered accordingly.”
11 . Subsequently, a three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance
Corporation of India and others Vs. Shree Lal Meena : (2019) 4 SCC
479 , considering the principle of delay and laches, opined as under:-
“36. We may also find that the appellant remained silent
for years together and that this Court, taking a particular
view subsequently, in Sheel Kumar Jain v. New India
Assurance Company Limited, (2011)12 SCC 197 would not
entitle stale claims to be raised on this behalf, like that of
the appellant. In fact the appellant slept over the matter for
almost a little over two years even after the pronouncement
of the judgment.
37. Thus, the endeavour of the appellant, to approach
this Court seeking the relief, as prayed for, is clearly a
misadventure, which is liable to be rejected, and the appeal
is dismissed.”
12. In the present case, the petitioner has approached this Court
after an inordinate and unexplained delay of about 07 years from the
date of passing the impugned order dated 19.08.2019 (Annexure P-7) by
the Appellate Authority, despite the fact that he had received the copy of
the said order on 24.09.2019.
13. Further, the petitioner had earlier approached this Court by
filing CWP-22166-2017, seeking quashing of the charge-sheet dated
03.11.2014 and the punishment order dated 15.09.2017. During the
pendency of the said writ petition, the impugned order dated 19.08.2019
(Annexure P-7) was passed by the Appellate Authority, whereby the
punishment imposed upon the petitioner was modified. Accordingly, the
petitioner could have challenged the said order at that stage by seeking
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CWP-23669-2026 15
amendment of the aforesaid writ petition, however, he chose not to do
so. Ultimately, vide order dated 19.01.2023, this Court dismissed the
said writ petition as having become infructuous, while granting liberty
to the petitioner to challenge the order dated 19.08.2019, if so advised.
In such circumstances, the petitioner ought to have filed a fresh petition
challenging the order dated 19.08.2019 passed by the Appellate
Authority within a reasonable period. However, he chose not to pursue
the matter for more than three years after the disposal of his earlier writ
petition and remained completely inactive. Such belated invocation of
the writ jurisdiction, without furnishing any satisfactory explanation for
the prolonged silence, defeats the very object of equitable relief and
disentitles the petitioner from any discretionary relief under Article 226
of the Constitution of India.
14. In view of the abovesaid discussion and the settled legal
position, the instant petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed
with costs of Rs.25,000/- to be deposited with High Court Lawyers
Welfare Fund within a period of two months from today, failing which,
the Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur, is directed to recover the same
as arrears of land revenue.
10.09.2026 (NAMIT KUMAR)
Kothiyal JUDGE
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
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