RAMESH CHANDRA PARIDA vs ODISHA GRAMYA BANK

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

W.P.(C ) Nos.19736,19730,19734 & 19737 of 2019
CNR No. ODHC010578742019

In the matter of an application under Article-226 &
227 of the Constitution of India

………………

Apurba Ranjan Mohanty &
Others
Petitioners

….


-versus-


Odisha Grameen Bank &
Others

Opposite Parties
….


For Petitioners : Ms. B. Senapati,
Advocate

For Opp. Parties : M/s.K.C. Kanungo,Adv.
(for the Bank)
Mr. A. Saa, CGC
(for O.P. No.4)

PRESENT:

THE HONBLE MR.JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY

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Date of Hearing: 17.09.2026 & Date of Judgment: 28.10.2026
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Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J .
1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid Mode.

// 2 //

2. Since the issue raised in all the Writ Petitions is
identical and challenge has been made to the rejection of
the claim of the Petitioners to get the benefit of
regularisation, all the Writ Petitions were heard
analogously and disposed of by the present common
order. However, for the sake of convenience, W.P.(C )
No.19736 of 2019 is taken as the lead case and for the
purpose of considering and noting down the pleadings.
3. It is the case of the Petitioner that all the Petitioners
were engaged on temporary basis as Drivers, Sweepers,
Messengers, DTP Operators, I.T Electrician, I.T
Networking and Hardware Workers in Odisha Gramya
Bank (now Odisha Grameen Bank) and on such
engagement, they were allowed to continue on temporary
basis.
3.1. It is contended that Odisha Grameen Bank (in
short, “Bank”) is having 500 branches all over the State
and Petitioners were engaged on temporary basis in
different branches of the Bank at different point of time.
It is further contended that for such appointment of
Officers and employees in different Regional Rural Banks,
Page 2 of 54

// 3 //

though the provisions contained under the Regional
Rural Banks (Appointment and Promotion of Officers and
Other Employees) Rules, 1987 governs the field, but
engagement of Sweepers and Messengers in various
branches of the Opp. Party-Bank were never made,
following the aforesaid provision. Rather engagement of
Sweepers and Messengers in various branches of the
Opp. Party-Bank were made through Contractor/Service
Provider or at the sweet-will of the Manager of the
concerned Branch.
3.2. It is contended that since such temporary Sweepers
and Managers on the face of their continuance were not
regularised, Workers Union of different Regional Rural
Banks
moved the Hon’ble Apex Court seeking
regularisation of such Sweepers and Messengers and for
allowing pay parity with the employees of the concerned
sponsored bank. It is contended that Hon’ble Apex Court
when directed the Central Government to constitute a
Tribunal to consider the issue relating to pay parity,
including regularisation of Sweepers and Messengers
working in different Regional Rural Bank, in terms of the
Page 3 of 54

// 4 //

said direction, Central Government constituted National
Industrial Tribunal under the Chairmanship of Shri S.
Obul Reddy, retired Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court. The Tribunal after hearing the parties
concerned, passed the award on 30.04.1990 and relevant
extract of the award so reflected in para 4.410 reads as
follows:
: In view of the authority pronouncements of
“4.410
the Supreme Court must be held that the part-time
sweepers-cum-messengers who were employed on
daily wages or on half of the salary or on some other
proportion of the salary of a regular messenger, will
be entitled to their various claims such as equal pay
and all other attendant benefits as are admissible to
regularly appointed full time messengers in the
respective RRBs. That there was / is no sanctioned
post of a regular messenger in a branch or the head
office is absolutely irrelevant and immaterial in view
of the proved facts that the so called part-time
messengers, whether on daily wages or on some other
basis, were made to work full time by their respective
managements. The Managements cannot extract full
time work and even beyond the working hours from
the so called part-time messengers by merely showing
them in the acquittance rolls as part-time employees
paid on either daily wages or some other basis, or on
some proportionate basis. Their services shall be
regularized with effect from the date of their
continuous engagement. necessary it will be open to
the Government or the RRBs as the case may be, to
sanction the required number of posts accommodate
the writ petitioner and all those belonging to their
class."

3.3. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners
contended that basing on the award passed by the
Page 4 of 54

// 5 //

Tribunal on 30.04.1990, when similarly situated
Sweepers and Messengers working in Cauvery Grameen
Bank moved the High Court of Karnataka, seeking
regularisation in their services from the date of their
initial engagement, such claim was allowed by the High
Court of Karnataka vide its judgment dtd.03.03.2006,
further confirmed in Writ Appeal No.630 of 2006, basing
on the compromise effected between the Bank and the
Union of Cauvery Grameen Bank vide order
dtd.27.07.2006 under Annexure-5 series.
3.4. It is contended that similar Writ Petitions filed by
the Sweepers and Messengers of Chaitanya Godavari
Grameena Bank when were moved before the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh, such claim was not only
allowed vide judgment dtd.27.12.2017 under Annexure-
2, in W.P.(C ) No.24779 of 2011, but also implemented.
3.5. Not only that, similar claim of Sweepers, Attenders,
Messengers working under Andhra Pradesh Grameena
Vikas Bank following the order in W.P.(C ) No.24779 of
2011, when was allowed vide a common judgment in
W.P.(C ) No. 15284 of 2014 and batch so passed on
Page 5 of 54

// 6 //

dtd.09.01.2020, the same was challenged by the Bank in
W.A No.147 of 2021 and batch. But all such appeals
were dismissed vide a common judgment dtd.25.04.2022
under Annexure-6 series. The bank though assailed the
judgment before the Apex Court in Special Leave to
Appeal (Civil) No.12973 of 2022, but the same was also
dismissed vide order dtd.22.08.2022 under Annexure-7.
3.6. It is also contended that similar claim of daily wage
employees working in Chhatisgarh Rajya Grameen Bank
was allowed in a batch of Writ Petitions in W.P.(C )
No.4092 of 2019 and batch vide judgment dtd.22.08.2022,
wherein the bank was directed to frame a Scheme from
such regularisation of the daily wage employees under
Annexure-9. Similar claim was also allowed by the High
Court at Tripura in W.P.(C ) No.321 of 2020 vide judgment
dtd.16.08.2022 under Annexure-10.
3.7. Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners
contended that in view of the nature of the award passed
by the National Industrial Tribunal on being so
constituted as per the direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court
and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Andhra
Page 6 of 54

// 7 //

Pradesh as well as High Court of Chhatisgarh and
Tripura, the present Petitioners claiming similar benefit of
regularisation, moved this Court in W.P.(C ) No.3325 of
2019. This Court vide its order dtd.14.02.2019 under
Annexure-3, while disposing the same, permitted the
Petitioners to move the Opp. Party-Bank in ventilating
their grievances and with a direction on the Opp. Party-
Bank to consider and pass appropriate order in the light of
the judgment passed in the case of Uma Devi, M.L.
Keshari, Amarkanta Ray and so also the decision of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court.
3.8. Uma Devi in Para-
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
44 of the said judgment has held as follows:-
. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be
“44
cases where irregular appointments (not illegal
appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa
(supra), R.N. Nanjundappa (supra) and B.N.
Nagarajan (Supra), and referred to in paragraph-15
above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned
vacant posts might have been made and the
employees have continued to work for ten years or
more but without the intervention of orders of courts or
of tribunals. The question of regularization of the
services of such employees may have to be considered
on merits in the light of the principles settled by this
Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of
this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the
State Governments and their instrumentalities should
take steps to regularize as a one- time measure, the
services of such irregularly appointed, who have
Page 7 of 54

// 8 //

worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts
but not under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals
and should further ensure that regular recruitments
are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts
that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary
employees or daily wages are being now employed.
The process must be set in motion within six months
from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if
any already made, but not subjudice, need not be
reopened based on this judgement, but there should
be no further by passing of the constitutional
requirement and regularizing or making permanent,
those not duly appointed as per the constitutional
scheme.”

3.9. Similarly, Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M.L.
Keshari in Para- 8 and 13 of the said judgment has held
as follows:-
“ 8 . Umadevi (3) casts a duty upon the Government or
instrumentality concerned, to take steps to regularise
the services of those irregularly appointed employees
who had served for more than ten years without the
benefit or protection of any interim orders of courts or
tribunals, as a one-time measure. Umadevi (3)
directed that such onetime measure must be set in
motion within six months from the date of its decision
(rendered on 10-4-2006).
13. The Division Bench of the High Court has directed
that the cases of the respondents should be
considered in accordance with law. The only further
direction that needs to be given, in view of Umadevi
(3), is that the Zila Panchayat, Gadag should not
undertake an exercise within six months, as a general
one-time regularisation exercise, to find out whether
there are dailywage/casual/adhoc employees serving
the Zila Panchayat and if so whether such employees
(including the respondents) fulfil the requirements
mentioned in para-53 of Umadevi (3). If they fulfill
them, their services have to be regularised. If such an
exercise has already been undertaken by ignoring or
omitting the cases of Respondents 1 to 3 because of
the pendency of these cases, then their cases shall
Page 8 of 54

// 9 //

have to be considered in continuation of the said one-
time exercise within three months. It is needless to
say that if the respondents do not fulfill the
requirements of para 53 of Umadevi (3), their services
need not be regularised. If the employees who have
completed ten years' service do not possess the
educational qualifications prescribed for the post, at
the time of their appointment, they may be considered
for regularisation in suitable lower posts.”

3.10. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Amarkanti
Rai , in Para-8, 9 & 11 to 14 has held as follows:-
Insofar as contention of the respondent that the
“8.
appointment of the appellant was made by the
Principal who is not a competent authority to make
such appointment and is in violation of the Bihar State
Universities Act and hence the appointment is illegal
appointment, it is pertinent to note that the
appointment of the appellant as night guard was done
out of necessity and concern for the College. As noticed
earlier, the Principal of the College vide letters dated
11-3-1988, 7-1-1993, 8-1- 2002 and 12-7-2004
recommended the case of the appellant for
regularisation on the post of night guard and the
University was thus well acquainted with the
appointment of the appellant by the then Principal even
though the Principal was not a competent authority to
make such appointments and thus the appointment of
the appellant and other employees was brought to the
notice of the University in 1988. In spite of that, the
process for termination was initiated only in the year
2001 and the appellant was reinstated w.ef. 3-1-2002
and was removed from services finally in the year
2007. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for
the appellant, for a considerable time, the University
never raised the issue that the appointment of the
appellant by the Principal is ultra vires the rules of the
BSU Act. Having regard to the various communications
between the Principal and the University and also the
educational authorities and the facts of the case, in our
view, the appointment of the appellant cannot be
termed to be illegal, but it can only be termed as
irregular.
Page 9 of 54

// 10 //

9. The Human Resources Development, Department of
Bihar Government, vide its Letter dated 11-7-1989
intimated to the Registrar of all the Colleges that as per
the settlement dated 26-4-1989 held between Bihar
State University and College Employees' Federation
and the Government it was agreed that the services of
the employees working in the educational institutions
on the basis of prescribed staffing pattern are to be
regularised. As per sanctioned staffing partien, in
Ramashray Baleshwar College, there were two vacant
posts of Class IV employees and the appellant was
appointed against the same. Further, Resolution No.
989 dated 10-5-1991 issued by the Human Resources
Development Department provides that employee
working up to 10-5-1986 shall be adjusted against the
vacancies arising in future. Although, the appellant
was appointed in 1983 temporarily on the post that
was not sanctioned by the State Government, as per
the above communication of the Human Resources
Development Department, it is evident that the State
Government issued orders to regularise the services of
the employees who worked up to 10-5-1986. In our
considered view, the High Court ought to have
examined the case of the appellant in the light of the
various communications issued by the State
Government and in the light of the circular, the
appellant is eligible for consideration for regularisation.

XXX XXX XXX
11. Elaboration upon the principles laid down in
Umadevi (3) Case and explaining the difference between
irregular and illegal appointments in State of Karnataka
Vs. M.L Kesari, this Court held as under (ML Kesari case
SSC p 250, para 7) 7. It is evident from the above that
there is an exception to the general principles against
'regularisation enunciated in Umadevi (3). if the
following conditions are fulfilled: (i) The employee
concerned should have worked for 10 years or more in
duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of
the interim order of any court or tribunal. In other words,
the State Government or its instrumentality should have
employed the employee and continued him in service
voluntarily and continuously for more than ten years. (ii)
The appointment of such employee should not be illegal,
even if irregular Where the appointments are not made
Page 10 of 54

// 11 //

or continued against sanctioned posts or where the
persons appointed do not possesses the prescribed
minimum qualifications, the appointments will be
considered to be illegal., But where the persons
employed possessed the prescribed qualifications and
was working against sanctioned posts, but had been
selected without undergoing the process of open
competitive selection, such appointments are considered
to be irregular.”
12. Applying the ratio of Umadevi (3) case, this Court in
Nihal Singh v. State of Punjab directed the absorption of
the Special Police Officers in the services of the State of
holding as under: (Nihal Singh Case, SCC pp. 79-80,
paras- 35-36) "35. Therefore, it is clear that the existence
of the need for creation of the posts is a relevant factor
with reference to which the executive government is
required to take rational decision based on relevant
consideration. In our opinion, when the facts such as the
ones obtaining in the instant case demonstrate that
there is need for the creation of posts, the failure
extracting work from persons such as the appellants
herein for decades together itself would he arbitrary
action (inaction) on the part of the State. 36. The other
factor which the State is required to keep in mind while
creating or abolishing posts is the financial implications
involved in such a decision. The creation of posts
necessarily means additional financial burden on the
exchequer of the State. Depending upon the priorities of
the State, the allocation of the finances is no doubt
exclusively within the domain of the legislature.
However in the instant case creation of new posts would
not create any additional financial burden to the State
as the Various banks at whose disposal the services of
each of the appellants is made available have agreed to
bear the burden. If absorbing the appellants into the
services of the State and providing benefits on a par
with the police officers of similar rank employed by the
State results in the banks to meet such additional
burden Apparently no such demand has ever been
made by the State. The result is the various banks
which avail the services of these appellants enjoy the
supply of cheap labour over a period of decades. It is
also pertinent to notice that these banks are public
sector banks
Page 11 of 54

// 12 //

13. In our view, the exception carved out in para 53 of
Umadevi (3)3 is applicable to the facts of the present
case. There is no material placed on record by the
respondents that the appellant has been lacking any
qualification or bore any blemish record during his
employment for over two decades. It is pertinent to note
that services of similarly situated persons on daily wages
for regularisation viz. one Yatindra Kumar Mishra who
was appointed on daily wages on the post of Clerk was
regularised w.e.f. 1987. The appellant although initially
working against unsanctioned post, the appellant was
working continuously since 3-1-2002 against sanctioned
post. Since there is no material placed on record
regarding the details whether any other night guard was
appointed against the sanctioned post, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, we are inclined to award
monetary benefits to be paid from 1.-1-2010.
14. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case
that the appellant has served the University for more than
29. years of the post of night guard and that he has
served the College on daily wages, in the interest of
justice, the authorities are directed to regularise the
services of the appellant retrospectively w.ef. 3-1-2002
(the date on which he rejoined the post as per the
direction of the Registrar).”

3.11. It is contended that in terms of such order passed
by this Court in W.P.(C ) No.3325 of 2019, Petitioners
though raised their grievance by making a common
representations on 07.03.2019, but such claim of the
Petitioners was rejected vide the common impugned order
dtd.27.05.2019 under Annexure-4 series.
3.12. It is contended that claim of the Petitioners to get
the benefit of regularisation was rejected by Opp. Party
No.1 only on the ground that Petitioners were never
Page 12 of 54

// 13 //

engaged with due issuance of any letter of
engagement/appointment and they were never engaged in
terms of any notification issued by the Bank at any point
of time. Claim of the Petitioners was also rejected on the
ground that it is not covered as per the decisions of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Uma Devi so also the
judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, confirmed by
the Apex Court.
3.13. While assailing the impugned rejection of the
Petitioners’ claim so made vide order dtd.27.05.2019
under Annexure-4 series, learned counsel appearing for
the Petitioners contended that Petitioners since are
continuing as Sweepers, Messengers, Attenders and in
other capacity in various batches of the Opp. Party-Bank,
in view of the decision passed by the National Industrial
Tribunal, so followed by the High Court of Karnataka,
Andhra Pradesh, Chhatisgarh and so also the State of
Tripura, Petitioners being similarly situated, they are also
eligible and entitled to get the benefit of regularisation.
However, without proper appreciation of the judgment of
Uma Devi and so
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Page 13 of 54

// 14 //

also the order passed by the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, confirmed by the Apex Court under Annexure-7,
claim of the Petitioners was rejected by Opp. Party No.1
under Annexure-4 series vide similar nature of order on
27.05.2019. It is accordingly contended that since
Petitioners are similarly situated as like the Petitioners
before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh as well as
Chhatisgarh, with quashing of the impugned rejection
dtd.27.05.2019, Opp. Party-Bank be directed to frame a
Scheme and regularise the services of the Petitioners in
due course of time. It is further contended that till such
regularisation of their services, the interim order passed in
each of the Writ Petitions be allowed to continue.
4. Mr. Kailash Chandra Kanungo, learned counsel
appearing for the Opp. Party-Bank in the batch of Writ
Petitions on the other hand made his submission basing
on the stand taken in the counter affidavit so filed.
4.1. It is first of all contended by the learned counsel
appearing for the Opp. Party-Bank that the Writ Petition is
not maintainable, as most of the Petitioners made their
claim to get the benefit of regularisation, after continuing
Page 14 of 54

// 15 //

for around 2 to 5 years on temporary basis in different
branches of the Bank. He further contended that by the
time Petitioners raised the claim for regularisation, since
they had not completed the required years of service in
terms of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Uma Devi so cited supra, Petitioners are not eligible and
entitled to get the benefit of regularisation, which has been
rightly rejected vide the impugned common order dtd.
27.05.2019 under Annexure-4 series. It is also
contended that after such rejection of the claim of the
Petitioners vide the impugned order, Petitioners are
continuing as on date, because of the interim order passed
by this Court in each of the Writ Petitions. It is
accordingly contended that since Petitioners are only
continuing because of the interim order passed by this
Court, their claim is not covered as per the decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Uma Devi.
4.2. It is also contended that similar claim made before
this Court in W.P.(C ) No.1276 of 2014 was not
entertained and Petitioners therein were permitted to
approach the Industrial Tribunal to get the benefit of
Page 15 of 54

// 16 //

regularisation vide judgment dtd.15.05.2024. It is further
contended that since Petitioners’ initial engagement is in
absence of any notification issued by the Bank at any
point of time and Petitioners were so engaged by the
different branches of the Bank without following due
process of selection, Petitioners are not eligible and
entitled to get the benefit of regularisation.
4.3 . It is also contended that decisions rendered by the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh is not applicable to the
facts of the present case, as the decision rendered by the
Apex Court in the case of Uma Devi governs the issue
with regard to regularisation of a temporary employee.
Not only that there is no such post as Driver, Sweeper,
Messengers, DTP Operators, IT Electrician, IT networking
and Hardware Worker under the provision of Regional
Ruler Bank(Appointment of Officers’ and Employees’)
Rules, 2010 as well as 2017. Since the posts in which
Petitioners are continuing are not available under the
Rules, no order of regularisation can be issued as against
those posts.
Page 16 of 54

// 17 //

4.4 . It is also contended that Petitioners are all working
on part-time basis and payments are being made by the
concerned branch from their sundry account. It is
accordingly contended that since the Petitioners as per the
requirement of the concerned branch are working on part-
time basis, they are not eligible to get the benefit of
regularisation and the Writ Petitions are liable for
dismissal.
4.5. While making all these submissions, learned counsel
appearing for the Opp. Party-Bank relied on the following
decisions:
1. Secretary, State of Karnataka Vrs. Uma Devi
and Others, 2006 SCC ( L & S) 753, para 37,43, &
53
2. Nanda Kumar Vs. State of Bihar & Others,
Civil Appeal No.2835 of 2014, disposed of on
25.02.2014, para 18 to 23
3. Upendra Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Others,
Civil Appeal NO.2356 of 2018, disposed of on
23.02.2018, para 7 & 8
4. Vibhuti Shankar Pandey Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh & Others, Civil Appeal NO.916 of
2023, disposed of on 08.02.2023, Para-3 & 4
Page 17 of 54

// 18 //

5. Himansu Parida and Others Vs. Union of
India and Others, W.P.(C ) No.1276 of 2014,
disposed of on 24.07.2024., Para-13.

4.6. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Uma Devi in para
37,43, & 53 of the said judgment has held as follows:
37. It is not necessary to multiply authorities on this
aspect. It is only necessary to refer to one or two of the
recent decisions in this context. In State of U.P. v. Neeraj
Awasthi [(2006) 1 SCC 667 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 190] this
Court after referring to a number of prior decisions held
that there was no power in the State under Article 162 of
the Constitution to make appointments and even if there
was any such power, no appointment could be made in
contravention of statutory rules. This Court also held that
past alleged regularisation or appointment does not
connote entitlement to further regularisation or
appointment. It was further held that the High Court has
no jurisdiction to frame a scheme by itself or direct the
framing of a scheme for regularisation. This view was
reiterated in State of Karnataka v. KGSD Canteen
Employees' Welfare Assn. [(2006) 1 SCC 567 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 158 : JT (2006) 1 SC 84]
43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality
in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution
and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a
court would certainly be disabled from passing an order
upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the
overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of
Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution.
Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public
employment, this Court while laying down the law, has
necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms
of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among
qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on
the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the
appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if
it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or
casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is
discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not
claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of
appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely
because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is
Page 18 of 54

// 19 //

continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment,
he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service
or made permanent, merely on the strength of such
continuance, if the original appointment was not made by
following a due process of selection as envisaged by the
relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular
recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose
period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc
employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do
not acquire any right. The High Courts acting under Article
226 of the Constitution, should not ordinarily issue
directions for absorption, regularisation, or permanent
continuance unless the recruitment itself was made
regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely
because an employee had continued under cover of an
order of the court, which we have described as “litigious
employment” in the earlier part of the judgment, he would
not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made
permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High
Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions,
since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is
found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould
the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will
be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue
his employment would hold up the regular procedure for
selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an
employee who is really not required. The courts must be
careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with
the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its
instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to
facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory
mandates.
53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases
where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as
explained in S.V. Narayanappa [(1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR
1967 SC 1071] , R.N. Nanjundappa [(1972) 1 SCC 409 :
(1972) 2 SCR 799] and B.N. Nagarajan [(1979) 4 SCC 507 :
1980 SCC (L&S) 4 : (1979) 3 SCR 937] and referred to in
para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly
sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the
employees have continued to work for ten years or more
but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of
tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of
such employees may have to be considered on merits in
the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases
abovereferred to and in the light of this judgment. In that
context, the Union of India, the State Governments and
their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a
one-time measure, the services of such irregularly
Page 19 of 54

// 20 //

appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly
sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the
courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that
regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant
sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases
where temporary employees or daily wagers are being
now employed. The process must be set in motion within
six months from this date. We also clarify that
regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice,
need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there
should be no further bypassing of the constitutional
requirement and regularising or making permanent, those
not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.

4.7. Nanda Kumar in
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
para 18,19,20,21,22 & 23 of the said judgment has held
as follows:
18. We have also noticed that Constitution Bench of this
Court in paras 44, 45 & 47 of Umadevi (supra) held :
“44. The concept of “equal pay for equal work” is different
from the concept of conferring permanency on those who
have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or
based on no process of selection as envisaged by the rules.
This Court has in various decisions applied the principle of
equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters
for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested
on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in
the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the
acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where
the court could direct that appointments made without
following the due procedure established by law, be deemed
permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent.
Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of
opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for
doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending
before this Court, would not normally be used for giving the
go-by to the procedure established by law in the matter of
public employment. Take the situation arising in the cases
before us from the State of Karnataka. Therein, after
the decision in Dharwad District PWD Literate Daily Wage
Employees Assn. v. State of Karnataka [1990 (2) SCC 396],
the Government had issued repeated directions and
mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc employment
or engagement be given. Some of the authorities and
departments had ignored those directions or defied those
Page 20 of 54

// 21 //

directions and had continued to give employment,
specifically interdicted by the orders issued by the
executive. Some of the appointing officers have even been
punished for their defiance. It would not be just or proper to
pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power
under Article 142 of the Constitution permitting those
persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent,
based on their appointments or engagements. Complete
justice would be justice according to law and though it
would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court
would not grant a relief which would amount to
perpetuating an illegality.
45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual,
be regularized or made permanent, the courts are swayed
by the fact that the person concerned has worked for some
time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It
is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either
temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of
his employment. He accepts the employment with open
eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain --
not at arm’s length -- since he might have been searching for
some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and
accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it
would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional
scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person
who has temporarily or casually got employed should be
directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be
creating another mode of public appointment which is not
permissible. If the court were to void a contractual
employment of this nature on the ground that the parties
were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not
enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total
embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not
possible, given the exigencies of administration and if
imposed, would only mean that some people who at least
get employment temporarily, contractually or casually,
would not be getting even that employment when securing
of such employment brings at least some succour to them.
After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in
search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a
casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go
in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has
to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted
fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing
from it. In other words, even while accepting the
employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his
employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real
sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in
Page 21 of 54

// 22 //

which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post
cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to
enable the giving up of the procedure established, for
making regular appointments to available posts in the
services of the State.
The argument that since one has been working for some
time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even
though he was aware of the nature of the employment when
he first took it up, is not one that would enable the
jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public
employment and would have to fail when tested on the
touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.
x x x x x x xxx
47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets
engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the
engagement is not based on a proper selection as
recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware
of the consequences of the appointment being temporary,
casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot
invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being
confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post
could be made only by following a proper procedure for
selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the
Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of
legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by
temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also
be held that the State has held out any promise while
engaging these persons either to continue them where they
are or to make them permanent. The State cannot
constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that
the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of
being made permanent in the post.”
19. Therefore, considering the facts of the present case, it
appears to us that the appellants were never appointed
through a proper procedure. It is not in dispute that they all
served as daily wagers. Therefore, it was within their
knowledge all the consequences of appointment being
temporary, they cannot have even a right to invoke the
theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the
post. Accordingly, we cannot accept the contention of the
appellants in the matter. We have further considered the
case of the appellants in the light of Section 6 of the Repeal
Act which has made it clear that the employees of the Board
and the appellants cannot be said to be of the same status
Page 22 of 54

// 23 //

and cannot enjoy the benefit given under Section 6(i) of the
Repeal Act, 2006. Therefore, we are unable to accept the
contention that the daily wagers would also come within the
meaning of “all officers and employees” as specifically
stated in Section 6 of the Repeal Act. In these
circumstances, we are unable to accept the submission of
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants.
We have also considered the decision in M.L.Kesari (supra)
of this Court which deals with the exception contained in
para 53 of Umadevi (supra) but considering the facts of this
case, we do not have any hesitation to hold that the said
decisions can not be a help to the appellants.
20. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We have
also perused the records placed before us. We find that the
status of the appellants was continuing to be as daily
wagers. They cannot be treated as permanent Government
employees. They all worked as employees of the Board. We
have also found that no steps were followed by the Board to
safeguard the service of these appellants. We have not been
able to find out whether any advertisement was issued by
the Government to regularise them. In these circumstances,
in view of the submission which has been advanced on
behalf of the appellants, we do not find that there is any
substance in the matter/arguments put forwarded before us
on behalf of the appellants as we have been able to find out
that the appellants have served as daily wagers and we do
find that Section 6(i) makes it clear that after the repeal of
the Agriculture Produce Act, 1960, all officers and
employees of the Board are to continue in employment and
they shall continue to be paid what they were getting earlier
as salary and allowance till such time the State Government
takes an official decision as per the further provisions of
Section 6 . Such provision certainly allows continuance of the
officers and employees of the Board to continue in
employment in the same status. The status of the daily
wage employees and regular employees of the Board is
eminent from the said provision. It cannot be said that the
status of the daily wage employees can enjoy or acquire the
same status as that of the regular employees. In these
circumstances, we do not find that there was any
discrimination between the daily wage employees and the
regular employees as is tried to be contended before us.
Therefore, such submission has no substance, in our
opinion, for the reason that the difference continues and is
recognised under the said provision of the Repeal Act. So far
as the power of the Committee of Secretaries constituted in
Page 23 of 54

// 24 //

terms of section 6(ii) of the Repeal Act is concerned, it is to
prepare a scheme of absorption as well as of retirement,
compulsory retirement or voluntary retirement and other
service conditions of officers and employees of the Board. In
our opinion, the scheme which was prepared by the
Committee of Secretaries is only in the nature of
recommendation and the State has the power either to
accept, modify or amend the same before granting its official
approval. Therefore, after the sanction is granted by the
Government in respect of the said scheme, it would gain the
status of statutory scheme framed under the said Act and
would be enforced within the time to be indicated in section
6(iii) of the Repeal Act, 2006.
21. Therefore, in the light of the said provision, we do not
find that the Committee of Secretaries can be faulted in
treating the daily wage employees on a different footing and
deciding for removal of their services.
22. We have consciously noted the aforesaid decisions of
this Court. The principle as has been laid down in Umadevi
(supra) has also been applied in relation to the persons who
were working on daily wages. According to us, the daily
wagers are not appointees in the strict sense of the term
‘appointment’. They do not hold a post. The scheme of
alternative appointment framed for regular employees of
abolished organisation cannot, therefore, confer a similar
entitlement on the daily wagers of abolished organisation to
such alternative employment. [See Avas Vikas Sansthan v.
Avas Vikas Sansthan Engineers Association (2006 (4) SCC
132)]. Their relevance in the context of appointment arose by
reason of the concept of regularisation as a source of
appointment. After Umadevi (supra), their position continued
to be that of daily wagers. Appointment on daily wage basis
is not an appointment to a post according to the rules.
Usually, the projects in which the daily wagers were
engaged, having come to an end, their appointment is
necessarily terminated for want of work. Therefore, the
status and rights of daily wagers of a Government concern
are not equivalent to that of a Government servant and his
claim to permanency has to be adjudged differently.
23. In these circumstances, in our considered opinion, the
regularisation/absorption is not a matter of course. It would
depend upon the facts of the case following the rules and
regulations and cannot be de hors the rules for such
regularisation/absorption.
Page 24 of 54

// 25 //

18. We have also noticed that Constitution Bench of this
Court in paras 44, 45 & 47 of Umadevi (supra) held :
“44. The concept of “equal pay for equal work” is different
from the concept of conferring permanency on those who
have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or
based on no process of selection as envisaged by the rules.
This Court has in various decisions applied the principle of
equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters
for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested
on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in
the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the
acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where
the court could direct that appointments made without
following the due procedure established by law, be deemed
permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent.
Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of
opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for
doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending
before this Court, would not normally be used for giving the
go-by to the procedure established by law in the matter of
public employment. Take the situation arising in the cases
before us from the State of Karnataka. Therein, after
the decision in Dharwad District PWD Literate Daily Wage
Employees Assn. v. State of Karnataka [1990 (2) SCC 396],
the Government had issued repeated directions and
mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc employment
or engagement be given. Some of the authorities and
departments had ignored those directions or defied those
directions and had continued to give employment,
specifically interdicted by the orders issued by the
executive. Some of the appointing officers have even been
punished for their defiance. It would not be just or proper to
pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power
under Article 142 of the Constitution permitting those
persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent,
based on their appointments or engagements. Complete
justice would be justice according to law and though it
would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court
would not grant a relief which would amount to
perpetuating an illegality.
45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual,
be regularized or made permanent, the courts are swayed
by the fact that the person concerned has worked for some
time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It
is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either
temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of
his employment. He accepts the employment with open
eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain --
Page 25 of 54

// 26 //

not at arm’s length -- since he might have been searching for
some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and
accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it
would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional
scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person
who has temporarily or casually got employed should be
directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be
creating another mode of public appointment which is not
permissible. If the court were to void a contractual
employment of this nature on the ground that the parties
were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not
enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total
embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not
possible, given the exigencies of administration and if
imposed, would only mean that some people who at least
get employment temporarily, contractually or casually,
would not be getting even that employment when securing
of such employment brings at least some succour to them.
After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in
search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a
casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go
in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has
to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted
fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing
from it. In other words, even while accepting the
employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his
employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real
sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in
which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post
cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to
enable the giving up of the procedure established, for
making regular appointments to available posts in the
services of the State.
The argument that since one has been working for some
time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even
though he was aware of the nature of the employment when
he first took it up, is not one that would enable the
jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public
employment and would have to fail when tested on the
touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.
x x x x x x xxx
47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets
engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the
engagement is not based on a proper selection as
recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware
Page 26 of 54

// 27 //

of the consequences of the appointment being temporary,
casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot
invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being
confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post
could be made only by following a proper procedure for
selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the
Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of
legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by
temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also
be held that the State has held out any promise while
engaging these persons either to continue them where they
are or to make them permanent. The State cannot
constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that
the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of
being made permanent in the post.”
19. Therefore, considering the facts of the present case, it
appears to us that the appellants were never appointed
through a proper procedure. It is not in dispute that they all
served as daily wagers. Therefore, it was within their
knowledge all the consequences of appointment being
temporary, they cannot have even a right to invoke the
theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the
post. Accordingly, we cannot accept the contention of the
appellants in the matter. We have further considered the
case of the appellants in the light of Section 6 of the Repeal
Act which has made it clear that the employees of the Board
and the appellants cannot be said to be of the same status
and cannot enjoy the benefit given under Section 6(i) of the
Repeal Act, 2006. Therefore, we are unable to accept the
contention that the daily wagers would also come within the
meaning of “all officers and employees” as specifically
stated in Section 6 of the Repeal Act. In these
circumstances, we are unable to accept the submission of
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants.
We have also considered the decision in M.L.Kesari (supra)
of this Court which deals with the exception contained in
para 53 of Umadevi (supra) but considering the facts of this
case, we do not have any hesitation to hold that the said
decisions can not be a help to the appellants.
20. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We have
also perused the records placed before us. We find that the
status of the appellants was continuing to be as daily
wagers. They cannot be treated as permanent Government
employees. They all worked as employees of the Board. We
have also found that no steps were followed by the Board to
Page 27 of 54

// 28 //

safeguard the service of these appellants. We have not been
able to find out whether any advertisement was issued by
the Government to regularise them. In these circumstances,
in view of the submission which has been advanced on
behalf of the appellants, we do not find that there is any
substance in the matter/arguments put forwarded before us
on behalf of the appellants as we have been able to find out
that the appellants have served as daily wagers and we do
find that Section 6(i) makes it clear that after the repeal of
the Agriculture Produce Act, 1960, all officers and
employees of the Board are to continue in employment and
they shall continue to be paid what they were getting earlier
as salary and allowance till such time the State Government
takes an official decision as per the further provisions of
Section 6 . Such provision certainly allows continuance of the
officers and employees of the Board to continue in
employment in the same status. The status of the daily
wage employees and regular employees of the Board is
eminent from the said provision. It cannot be said that the
status of the daily wage employees can enjoy or acquire the
same status as that of the regular employees. In these
circumstances, we do not find that there was any
discrimination between the daily wage employees and the
regular employees as is tried to be contended before us.
Therefore, such submission has no substance, in our
opinion, for the reason that the difference continues and is
recognised under the said provision of the Repeal Act. So far
as the power of the Committee of Secretaries constituted in
terms of section 6(ii) of the Repeal Act is concerned, it is to
prepare a scheme of absorption as well as of retirement,
compulsory retirement or voluntary retirement and other
service conditions of officers and employees of the Board. In
our opinion, the scheme which was prepared by the
Committee of Secretaries is only in the nature of
recommendation and the State has the power either to
accept, modify or amend the same before granting its official
approval. Therefore, after the sanction is granted by the
Government in respect of the said scheme, it would gain the
status of statutory scheme framed under the said Act and
would be enforced within the time to be indicated in section
6(iii) of the Repeal Act, 2006.
21. Therefore, in the light of the said provision, we do not
find that the Committee of Secretaries can be faulted in
treating the daily wage employees on a different footing and
deciding for removal of their services.
22. We have consciously noted the aforesaid decisions of
this Court. The principle as has been laid down in Umadevi
Page 28 of 54

// 29 //

(supra) has also been applied in relation to the persons who
were working on daily wages. According to us, the daily
wagers are not appointees in the strict sense of the term
‘appointment’. They do not hold a post. The scheme of
alternative appointment framed for regular employees of
abolished organisation cannot, therefore, confer a similar
entitlement on the daily wagers of abolished organisation to
such alternative employment. [See Avas Vikas Sansthan v.
Avas Vikas Sansthan Engineers Association (2006 (4) SCC
132)]. Their relevance in the context of appointment arose by
reason of the concept of regularisation as a source of
appointment. After Umadevi (supra), their position continued
to be that of daily wagers. Appointment on daily wage basis
is not an appointment to a post according to the rules.
Usually, the projects in which the daily wagers were
engaged, having come to an end, their appointment is
necessarily terminated for want of work. Therefore, the
status and rights of daily wagers of a Government concern
are not equivalent to that of a Government servant and his
claim to permanency has to be adjudged differently.
23. In these circumstances, in our considered opinion, the
regularisation/absorption is not a matter of course. It would
depend upon the facts of the case following the rules and
regulations and cannot be de hors the rules for such
regularisation/absorption.
4.8. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Upendra Singh in
para 7 & 8 of the said judgment has held as follows:
7. After considering the respective arguments, we are of the
view that the impugned judgment is without any blemish
and no interference is called for. In fact, the whole premise
on which the case is founded by the appellant seems to be
incorrect. We note that the cases of these persons, including
the appellant, were duly considered by the University, on the
basis of which order dated 13-8-2003 were passed refusing
regularisation. This order specifically states that the initial
appointment of the appellant and others was not in
accordance with law. It was made without advertisement
and there was no recommendation of panel by the Selection
Committee. So much so, the appointments were not made by
the competent authority. We find that the University, or for
that matter, the Government had agreed to regularise the
services of those employees of the colleges, which had
Page 29 of 54

// 30 //

become the Constituent Colleges, only on the condition that
their initial appointment was after following the due
procedure and that too against the sanctioned post. A
statement was made at the Bar by the learned counsel for
the respondent that there were no sanctioned posts even
now.
8. The law pertaining to regularisation has now been
authoritatively determined by a Constitution Bench judgment
of this Court in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S)
753] . On the application of law laid down in that case, it is
clear that the question of regularisation of daily wager
appointed contrary to law does not arise. This ratio of the
judgment could not be disputed by the learned counsel for
the appellant as well. That is why she continued to plead
that the appointment of the appellant was made after
following due procedure and in accordance with law.
However, that is not borne out from the records. Pertinently,
order dated 13-8-2003, vide which the appellant was
refused regularisation on the aforesaid ground was not even
assailed by the appellant at that time. It may be mentioned
that in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3),
(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , the Court left a small
window opened for those who were working on ad
hoc/daily-wage basis for more than ten years, to regularise
them as a one-time measure. However, that was also subject
to the condition that they should have been appointed in
duly sanctioned post. Further, while counting their ten years'
period, those cases were to be excluded where such persons
continued to work under the cover of orders of the courts or
the tribunal. The High Court has, in the impugned judgment,
discussed these nuances and has also referred to the
judgment in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3),
(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] and held that the
benefit of one-time measure suggested in that case could not
be extended to the appellant because of the following
reasons: (Nand Lal Bhagat case [Nand Lal Bhagat v. State of
Bihar, 2013 SCC OnLine Pat 1568] , SCC OnLine Pat paras
11-13)
“11. The appellants clearly fall in the exception noticed in
para 53 of Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3),
(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] as their claims were
sub judice on the date the pronouncement of the Constitution
Bench was made in view of pendency of CWJC No. 12235 of
Page 30 of 54

// 31 //

2005 disposed subsequently on 29-8-2006 [Suresh Yadav v.
State of Bihar, 2006 SCC OnLine Pat 796 : (2006) 4 PLJR 77]
. Such litigious continuation in employment stands excluded
from the directions of Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v.
Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] .
12. The appellants claim to have been regularised within the
staffing pattern. In our opinion, it is not the crux of the
matter. The crucial question is if their initial appointment by
the Managing Committee was in consonance with Article 14
of the Constitution of India by open advertisement and
competitive merit selection. On account of various
interpretations by more than one Bench of M.L. Kesari [State
of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 : (2010) 2
SCC (L&S) 826] reference was made to the Full Bench. We
have already noticed from the order refusing regularisation
dated 13-8-2003 that the appointment of the appellants on
daily wage was not in consonance with the law.
13. The conclusion in Ram Sevak Yadav [Ram Sevak Yadav
v. State of Bihar, 2013 SCC OnLine Pat 67 : (2013) 1 PLJR
964] at para 43 is as follows: (SCC OnLine Pat)
‘43. (A) Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3),
(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] prohibits
regularisation of daily wage, casual, ad hoc, and temporary
appointments, the period of service being irrelevant;
(B) An illegal appointment void ab initio made contrary to the
mandate of Article 14 without open competitive selection
cannot be regularised under any circumstances.
(C) Irregular appointments can be regularised if the
appointment was made by an authority competent to do so,
it was made on a vacant sanctioned post, in accordance
with Article 14 of the Constitution with equal opportunity for
participation to others eligible by competitive selection and
the candidate possessed the eligibility qualifications for a
regular appointment to the post.
(D) The appointment must not have been an individual
favour doled out to the appointee alone and the person must
have continued in service for over ten years without
intervention of any court orders.’”

Page 31 of 54

// 32 //

4.9. Vibhuti Shankar
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Pandey in para 3 & 4 of the said judgment has held as
follows:
3. The case of the appellant is that he was engaged in 1980
as a Supervisor, on daily rated basis, under a project Date:
2023.02.08 16:38:38 IST Reason:
State Water Resources Department of Madhya Pradesh. The
appellant sought regularization on the post of
Supervisor/Time Keeper. Admittedly, the minimum
qualification for the said post was matriculation with
mathematics; a qualification which the appellant did not
possess. These qualifications were relaxed by a
Government Circular dated 31.12.2010 and the appellant
sought his regularization on the post of Supervisor/Time
Keeper, as he was qualified for the post and had been
working on daily wage basis for a long period of time. In
fact, in another writ petition (W.P. 13997/2010) filed by the
appellant earlier, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh vide
order dated 02.11.2017, had given directions to the State
Government to decide the claim of the writ petitioner in
accordance with law. Vide order dated 18.06.2018 issued
by the Office of Chief Engineer, Rani Avanti Bai Lodhi Sagar
Project, the claim of the appellant for regularization was
rejected for the reasons that though the minimum
qualifications of matriculation with mathematics will not
come in the way for his regularization, but the fact remains
that the appellant was never appointed against any post.
Moreover, his appointment was never made by the
competent authority and there were no posts available at
the time for regularization. The appellant on the other hand,
had set his claim for regularization as persons who were
junior to him as daily wagers were regularized in the year
1990 or even before. The learned Single Judge while
allowing the writ petition gave directions for regularization
of the appellant from the date on which his juniors were
regularized. This order was challenged by the State
Government before a Division Bench which allowed the
appeal of the State Government. The Division Bench rightly
held that the learned Single Judge has not followed the
principle of law as given by this Court in Secretary, State of
Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors.1 , as initial
appointment must be done by the competent authority and
there must be a sanctioned post on which the daily rated
Page 32 of 54

// 33 //

employee must be working. These two conditions were
clearly missing in the case of the present appellant. The
Division Bench of the High Court therefore has to our mind
rightly allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated
27.06.2019.
4. In view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Uma Devi (supra), the appellant had no case
for regularization. There is no scope, hence, for our
interference with the order of the Division Bench of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court. Appeal is dismissed.
4.10. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Himansu Parida

in para 13 of the said judgment has held as follows:
13.Considering the submissions made by the learned
counsel for both the Parties and the averments made in the
Writ Petition so also taking note of the aforesaid decisions of
the Apex Court relied upon by the Opposite Party Nos.5 and
6, this Court is of the view that mere continuation of service
by a temporary or ad hoc or daily-wage employee would not
confer upon him/ her any right to be absorbed into service.
Even temporary, ad hoc or daily-wage service for a long
number of years, let alone service for one or two years, will
not entitle such employee to claim regularization, if he is not
working against a Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK Date: 26-Jul-2024 15:06:39 sanctioned post. Here
the posts are not sanctioned posts even though the
requirement of such jobs/ posts are of perennial in nature.
5. To the submission made by the learned counsel
appearing for the Opp.Party-Bank, learned counsel
appearing for the Petitioners contended that taking into
account the continuance of the Petitioners under the Opp-
Party-Bank and the period of engagement now they have
undergone, Petitioners in view of the recent decisions of
the Apex Court in the case of Jaggo vs. Union of India
Page 33 of 54

// 34 //

& Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; Shripal & Anr. vs.
Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221,
as well as Dharam Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. &
Anr. (Civil Appeal No(s).8558 of 2018, decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Bhola Nath Vs. State of
Jharkhand and Others , 2026 INSC 99 and so also
Sukhendu Bhatacharjee & Ors. vs. the State of Assam
& Ors. reported in 2026 INSC 523, have accrued a right of
regularization.
5.1.
View expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Jaggo in Para-22 to 25 and 27 reads as follows:-
“22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment
contracts, as exemplified in this case, reflects a broader
systemic issue that adversely affects workers' rights and
job security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig
economy has led to an increase in precarious employment
arrangements, often characterized by lack of benefits, job
security, and fair treatment. Such practices have been
criticized for exploiting workers and undermining labour
standards. Government institutions, entrusted with
upholding the principles of fairness and justice, bear an
even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative
employment practices. When public sector entities engage
in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the
detrimental trends observed in the gig economy but also
sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in
governmental operations.

23. The International Labour Organization (ILO), of which
India is a founding member, has consistently advocated for
employment stability and the fair treatment of workers. The
ILO's Multinational Enterprises Declaration6 encourages
Page 34 of 54

// 35 //

companies to provide stable employment and to observe
obligations concerning employment stability and social
security. It emphasizes that enterprises should assume a
leading role in promoting employment security, particularly
in contexts where job discontinuation could exacerbate long-
term unemployment.

24. The landmark judgement of the United State in the case
of Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation7 serves as a pertinent
example from the private sector, illustrating the
consequences of misclassifying employees to circumvent
providing benefits. In this case, Microsoft classified certain
workers as independent contractors, thereby denying them
employee benefits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit determined that these workers were, in fact,
common-law employees and were entitled to the same
benefits as regular employees. The Court noted that large
Corporations have increasingly adopted the practice of
hiring temporary employees or independent contractors as a
means of avoiding payment of employee benefits, thereby
increasing their profits. This judgment underscores the
principle that the nature of the work performed, rather than
the label assigned to the worker, should determine
employment status and the corresponding rights and
benefits. It highlights the judiciary's role in rectifying such
misclassifications and ensuring that workers receive fair
treatment.

25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees,
particularly in government institutions, often face
multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the foundational
purpose of temporary contracts may have been to address
short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly
become a mechanism to evade long-term obligations owed
to employees. These practices manifest in several ways:

• Misuse of "Temporary" Labels:
Employees engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and
integral to the functioning of an institution are often labeled as
"temporary" or "contractual," even when their roles mirror
those of regular employees. Such misclassification deprives
workers of the dignity, security,
and benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite
performing identical tasks.

Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are
•
frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the
Page 35 of 54

// 36 //

present case. This practice undermines the principles of
natural justice and subjects workers to a state of constant
insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their
service.

• Lack of Career Progression: Temporary employees often
find themselves excluded from opportunities for skill
development, promotions, or incremental pay raises. They
remain stagnant in their roles,
creating a systemic disparity between them and their
regular counterparts, despite their contributions being
equally significant.

• Using Outsourcing as a Shield:
Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles
performed by temporary employees, effectively replacing
one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not
only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a
deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular
employment.

• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits:
Temporary employees are often denied
fundamental benefits such as pension,
provident fund, health insurance, and paid
leave, even when their tenure spans decades.
This lack of social security subjects them and
their families to undue hardship, especially in
cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen
circumstances.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxx

27. In light of these considerations, in our opinion, it is
imperative for government departments to lead by example
in providing fair and stable employment. Engaging
workers on a temporary basis for extended periods,
especially when their roles are integral to the
organization's functioning, not only contravenes
international labour standards but also exposes the
organization to legal challenges and undermines employee
morale. By ensuring fair employment
practices, government institutions can reduce the burden of
unnecessary litigation, promote job security, and uphold
the principles of justice and fairness that they are meant to
embody. This approach aligns with international
standards and sets a positive precedent for the private
sector to follow, thereby contributing to the overall
betterment of labour practices in the country.”

Page 36 of 54

// 37 //

5.2. Shripal in Para-
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
14, 15, 17 & 18(IV) of the said judgment has held as
follows:-
“ 14. ...... More importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as
a shield to justify exploitative engagements persisting
for years without the Employer undertaking legitimate
recruitment.
15. ……. Indian labour law strongly disfavors
perpetual daily-wage or contractual engagements in
circumstances where the work is permanent in nature.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
17. Indeed, bureaucratic limitations cannot trump the
legitimate rights of workmen who have served
continuously in de facto regular roles for an extended
period.

18.(IV) The Respondent Employer is directed to initiate a
fair and transparent process for regularizing the Appellant
Workmen within six months from the date of
reinstatement, duly considering the fact that they have
performed perennial municipal duties akin to permanent
posts. In assessing regularization, the Employer shall not
impose educational or procedural criteria retroactively if
such requirements were never applied to the Appellant
Workmen or to similarly situated regular employees in the
past. To the extent that sanctioned vacancies for such
duties exist or are required, the Respondent Employer
shall expedite all necessary administrative processes to
ensure these longtime employees are not indefinitely
retained on daily wages contrary to statutory and
equitable norms. ”

5.3. Placing reliance on the decision in the case of Jaggo
and Shripal , Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dharam
Singh, in Paragraph-13, 14, 15 & 17, 18, 19 & 20 has
held as follows:
Page 37 of 54

// 38 //

As we have observed in both Jaggo (Supra) and
“13.
Shripal (Supra) , outsourcing cannot become a convenient
shield to perpetuate precariousness and to sidestep fair
engagement practices where the work is inherently
perennial. The Commission’s further contention that the
appellants are not “full-time” employees but continue only
by virtue of interim orders also does not advance their
case. That interim protection was granted precisely
because of the long history of engagement and the
pendency of the challenge to the State’s refusals. It neither
creates rights that did not exist nor erases entitlements
that may arise upon a proper adjudication of the legality of
those refusals.

14 . The learned Single Judge of the High Court also
declined relief on the footing that the petitioners had not
specifically assailed the subsequent decision dated
25.11.2003. However, that view overlooks that the writ
petition squarely challenged the 11.11.1999 refusal as the
High Court itself directed a fresh decision during
pendency, and the later rejection was placed on record by
the respondents. In such circumstances, we believe that
the High Court was obliged to examine the legality of the
State’s stance in refusing sanction, whether in 1999 or
upon reconsideration in 2003, rather than dispose of the
matter on a mere technicality. The Division Bench of the
High Court compounded the error by affirming the
dismissal without engaging with the principal challenge or
the intervening material. The approach of both the Courts,
in reducing the dispute to a mechanical enquiry about
“rules” and “vacancy” while ignoring the core question of
arbitrariness in the State’s refusal to sanction posts
despite perennial need and long service, cannot be
sustained.

15. Therefore, in view of the foregoing observations, the
impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained.
The State’s refusals dated 11.11.1999 and 25.11.2003,in
so far as they concern the Commission’s proposals for
sanction/creation of Class-III/Class-IV posts to address
perennial ministerial/attendant work, are held
unsustainable and stand quashed.

xxx xxx xxx

17. Before concluding, we think it necessary to recall that
the State (here referring to both the Union and the State
governments) is not a mere market participant but a
constitutional employer. It cannot balance budgets on the
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// 39 //

backs of those who perform the most basic and recurring
public functions. Where work recurs day after day and year
after year, the establishment must reflect that reality in its
sanctioned strength and engagement practices. The long-
term extraction of regular labour under temporary labels
corrodes confidence in public administration and offends
the promise of equal protection. Financial stringency
certainly has a place in public policy, but it is not a talisman
that overrides fairness, reason and the duty to organise
work on lawful lines.

18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that “ad-
hocism” thrives where administration is opaque. The State
Departments must keep and produce accurate
establishment registers, muster rolls and outsourcing
arrangements, and they must explain, with evidence, why
they prefer precarious engagement over sanctioned posts
where the work is perennial. If “constraint” is invoked, the
record should show what alternatives were considered,
why similarly placed workers were treated differently, and
how the chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and 21
of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human
consequences of prolonged insecurity is not sentimentality.
It is an institutional discipline that should inform every
decision affecting those who keep public offices running.

19. Having regard to the long, undisputed service of the
appellants, the admitted perennial nature of their duties,
and the material indicating vacancies and comparator
regularisations, we issue the following directions:

i. Regularization and creation of Supernumerary posts: All
appellants shall stand regularized with effect from
24.04.2002, the date on which the High Court directed a
fresh recommendation by the Commission and a fresh
decision by the State on sanctioning posts for the
appellants. For this purpose, the State and the successor
establishment (U.P. Education Services Selection
Commission) shall create supernumerary posts in the
corresponding cadres, Class-III (Driver or equivalent) and
Class-IV (Peon/Attendant/Guard or equivalent) without
any caveats or preconditions. On regularization, each
appellant shall be placed at not less than the minimum of
the regular pay-scale for the post, with protection of last-
drawn wages if higher and the appellants shall be entitled
to the subsequent increments in the pay scale as per the
pay grade. For seniority and promotion, service shall count
from the date of regularization as given above.

Page 39 of 54

// 40 //

ii. Financial consequences and arrears: Each appellant shall
be paid as arrears the full difference between (a) the pay
and admissible allowances at the minimum of the regular
pay-level for the post from time to time, and (b) the amounts
actually paid, for the period from 24.04.2002 until the date
of regularization /retirement/death, as the case may be.
Amounts already paid under previous interim directions
shall be so adjusted. The net arrears shall be released
within three months and if in default, the unpaid amount
shall carry compound interest at 6% per annum from the
date of default until payment.

iii. Retired appellants: Any appellant who has already
retired shall be granted regularization with effect from
24.04.2002 until the date of superannuation for pay
fixation, arrears under clause (ii), and recalculation of
pension, gratuity and other terminal dues. The revised
pension and terminal dues shall be paid within three
months of this Judgment.

iv. Deceased appellants: In the case of Appellant No. 5 and
any other appellant who has died during pendency, his/her
legal representatives on record shall be paid the arrears
under clause (ii) up to the date of death, together with all
terminal/retiral dues recalculated consistently with clause
(i), within three months of this Judgement.

v. Compliance affidavit: The Principal Secretary, Higher
Education Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh, or the
Secretary of the U.P. Education Services Selection
Commission or the prevalent competent authority, shall file
an affidavit of compliance before this Court within four
months of this Judgement.

20. We have framed these directions comprehensively
because, case after case, orders of this Court in such
matters have been met with fresh technicalities, rolling
“reconsiderations,” and administrative drift which further
prolongs the insecurity for those who have already laboured
for years on daily wages. Therefore, we have learned that
Justice in such cases cannot rest on simpliciter directions,
but it demands imposition of clear duties, fixed timelines,
and verifiable compliance .As a constitutional employer, the
State is held to a higher standard and therefore it must
organise its perennial workers on a sanctioned footing,
create a budget for lawful engagement, and implement
judicial directions in letter and spirit. Delay to follow these
obligations is not mere negligence but rather it is a
conscious method of denial that erodes livelihoods and
Page 40 of 54

// 41 //

dignity for these workers. The operative scheme we have
set here comprising of creation of supernumerary posts, full
regularization, subsequent financial benefits, and a sworn
affidavit of compliance, is therefore a pathway designed to
convert rights into outcomes and to reaffirm that fairness in
engagement and transparency in administration are not
matters of grace, but obligations under Articles 14, 16 and
21 of the Constitution of India.”


5.4. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bhola Nath in
Para-13.5 to 14 of the judgment has held as follows:-
“13.5. Such a decision must necessarily be a conscious and
reasoned one. An employee who has satisfactorily
discharged his duties over several years and has been
granted repeated extensions cannot, overnight, be treated as
surplus or undesirable. We are unable to accept the
justification advanced by the respondents as the obligation of
the State, as a model employer, extends to fair treatment of
its employees irrespective of whether their engagement is
contractual or regular.
13.6. This Court has, on several occasions, deprecated the
practice adopted by States of engaging employees under the
nominal labels of “part-time”, “contractual” or “temporary” in
perpetuity and thereby exploiting them by not regularizing
their positions. In Jaggo v. Union of India , this Court
underscored that government departments must lead by
example in ensuring fair and stable employment, and
evolved the test of examining whether the duties performed
by such temporary employees are integral to the day-to-day
functioning of the organization.
13.7. In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam , and Vinod Kumar v.
Union of India , this Court cautioned against a mechanical
and blind reliance on Umadevi (supra) to deny regularization
to temporary employees in the absence of statutory rules. It
was held that Umadevi (supra) cannot be employed as a
shield to legitimise exploitative engagements continued for
years without undertaking regular recruitment. The Court
further clarified that Umadevi itself draws a distinction
between appointments that are “illegal” and those that are
merely “irregular”, the latter being amenable to regularization
upon fulfilment of the prescribed conditions.
13.8. In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P ., this Court strongly
deprecated the culture of “ad-hocism” adopted by States in
Page 41 of 54

// 42 //

their capacity as employers. The Court criticised the practice
of outsourcing or informalizing recruitment as a means to
evade regular employment obligations, observing that such
measures perpetuate precarious working conditions while
circumventing fair and lawful engagement practices.
13.9. The State must remain conscious that part-time
employees, such as the appellants, constitute an integral part
of the edifice upon which the machinery of the State
continues to function. They are not merely ancillary to the
system, but form essential components thereof. The equality
mandate of our Constitution, therefore, requires that their
service be reciprocated in a manner free from arbitrariness,
ensuring that decisions of the State affecting the careers and
livelihood of such part-time and contractual employees are
guided by fairness and reason.
13.10. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to persuade
ourselves to accept the respondent-State’s contention that the
mere contractual nomenclature of the appellants’ engagement
denudes them of constitutional protection. The State, having
availed of the appellants’ services on sanctioned posts for
over a decade pursuant to a due process of selection and
having consistently acknowledged their satisfactory
performance, cannot, in the absence of cogent reasons or a
speaking decision, abruptly discontinue such engagement by
taking refuge behind formal contractual clauses. Such action
is manifestly arbitrary, inconsistent with the obligation of the
State to act as a model employer, and fails to withstand
scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution.
FINAL CONCLUSION:
14. In light of our discussion, in the foregoing paragraphs, we
summarize our conclusions as follows:
I. The respondent-State was not justified in continuing the
appellants on sanctioned vacant posts for over a decade
under the nomenclature of contractual engagement and
thereafter denying them consideration for regularization.
II. Abrupt discontinuance of such long-standing engagement
solely on the basis of contractual nomenclature, without
either recording cogent reasons or passing a speaking order,
is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
III. Contractual stipulations purporting to bar claims for
regularization cannot override constitutional guarantees.
Acceptance of contractual terms does not amount to waiver of
Page 42 of 54

// 43 //

fundamental rights, and contractual stipulations cannot
immunize arbitrary State action from constitutional scrutiny.
IV. The State, as a model employer, cannot rely on
contractual labels or mechanical application of Umadevi
(supra) to justify prolonged ad-hocism or to discard long-
serving employees in a manner inconsistent with fairness,
dignity and constitutional governance.
V. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct the
respondent-State to forthwith regularize the services of all the
appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they were
initially appointed. The appellants shall be entitled to all
consequential service benefits accruing from the date of this
judgment.”
5.5 . Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sukhendu
Bhattacharjee in Para-73 to 79 of the said judgment has
held as follows:-
73. As regards the contention of Shri Gupta that after the
decision in Umadevi (supra) no regularization can be
effected in respect of employees who were not appointed
against duly sanctioned posts, we are unable to accept
such a sweeping proposition in the facts of the present
case. The submission proceeds on the premise that
Umadevi (supra) lays down an absolute and inflexible
embargo against all forms of regularization irrespective of
the surrounding circumstances. Such an interpretation, in
our considered view, does not reflect the true scope and
ratio of the decision.
74. This Court in Jaggo (supra), deprecated the tendency
of the State to take mechanical shelter under Umadevi
(supra) to deny relief to employees who had been
performing work of a permanent and essential nature for
long years. This Court observed as follows: -
“12. Despite being labelled as “part-time
workers,” the appellants performed these
essential tasks on a daily and continuous basis
over extensive periods, ranging from over a
decade to nearly two decades. Their engagement
Page 43 of 54

// 44 //

was not sporadic or temporary in nature;
instead, it was recurrent, regular, and akin to
the responsibilities typically associated with
sanctioned posts. Moreover, the respondents did
not engage any other personnel for these tasks
during the appellants' tenure, underscoring the
indispensable nature of their work.
13. The claim by the respondents that these
were not regular posts lacks merit, as the nature
of the work performed by the appellants was
perennial and fundamental to the functioning of
the offices. The recurring nature of these duties
necessitates their classification as regular posts,
irrespective of how their initial engagements
were labelled. It is also noteworthy that
subsequent outsourcing of these same tasks to
private agencies after the appellants' termination
demonstrates the inherent need for these
services. This act of outsourcing, which
effectively replaced one set of workers with
another, further underscores that the work in
question was neither temporary nor occasional.
19. It is evident from the foregoing that the
appellants' roles were not only essential but also
indistinguishable from those of regular
employees. Their sustained contributions over
extended periods, coupled with absence of any
adverse record, warrant equitable treatment and
regularization of their services. Denial of this
benefit, followed by their arbitrary termination,
amounts to manifest injustice and must be
rectified.
20. It is well established that the decision in
Uma Devi (supra) does not intend to penalize
employees who have rendered long years of
service fulfilling ongoing and necessary functions
of the State or its instrumentalities. The said
judgment sought to prevent backdoor entries and
illegal appointments that circumvent
constitutional requirements. However, where
appointments were not illegal but possibly
Page 44 of 54

// 45 //

“irregular,” and where employees had served
continuously against the backdrop of sanctioned
functions for a considerable period, the need for
a fair and humane resolution becomes
paramount. Prolonged, continuous, and
unblemished service performing tasks inherently
required on a regular basis can, over the time,
transform what was initially ad-hoc or
temporary into a scenario demanding fair
regularization. In a recent judgment of this Court
in Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, it was held
that held that procedural formalities cannot be
used to deny regularization of service to an
employee whose appointment was termed
“temporary” but has performed the same duties
as performed by theregular employee over a
considerable period in the capacity of the regular
employee.
22. The pervasive misuse of temporary
employment contracts, as exemplified in this
case, reflects a broader systemic issue that
adversely affects workers' rights and job
security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig
economy has led to an increase in precarious
employment arrangements, often characterized
by lack of benefits, job security, and fair
treatment. Such practices have been criticized for
exploiting workers and undermining labour
standards. Government institutions, entrusted
with upholding the principles of fairness and
justice, bear an even greater responsibility to
avoid such exploitative employment practices.
When public sector entities engage in misuse of
temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the
detrimental trends observed in the gig economy
but also sets a concerning precedent that can
erode public trust in governmental operations.
25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary
employees, particularly in government
institutions, often face multifaceted forms of
exploitation. While the foundational purpose of
temporary contracts may have been to address
short-term or seasonal needs, they have
increasingly become a mechanism to evade long-
term obligations owed to employees. These
practices manifest in several ways:
Page 45 of 54

// 46 //

• Misuse of “Temporary” Labels: Employees
engaged for work that is essential, recurring,
and integral to the functioning of an institution
are often labeled as “temporary” or
“contractual,” even when their roles mirror those
of regular employees. Such misclassification
deprives workers of the dignity, security, and
benefits that regularemployees are entitled to,
despite performing identical tasks.
• Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees
are frequently dismissed without cause or notice,
as seen in the present case. This practice
undermines the principles of natural justice and
subjects workers to a state of constant
insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration
of their service.
• Lack of Career Progression: Temporary
employees often find themselves excluded from
opportunities for skill development, promotions,
or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant
in their roles, creating a systemic disparity
between them and their regular counterparts,
despite their contributions being equally
significant.
• Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions
increasingly resort to outsourcing roles
performed by temporary employees, effectively
replacing one set of exploited workers with
another. This practice not only perpetuates
exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate
effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular
employment.
• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary
employees are often denied fundamental
benefits such as pension, provident fund, health
insurance, and paid leave, even when their
tenure spans decades. This lack of social
security subjects them and their families to
undue hardship, especially in cases of illness,
retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.
26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra)
sought to curtail the practice of backdoor entries
and ensure appointments adhered to
constitutional principles, it is regrettable that its
principles are often misinterpreted or misapplied
Page 46 of 54

// 47 //

to deny legitimate claims of long-serving
employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish
between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments. It
categorically held that employees in irregular
appointments, who were engaged in duly
sanctioned posts and had served continuously
for more than ten years, should be considered for
regularization as a onetime measure. However,
the laudable intent of the judgment is being
subverted when institutions rely on its dicta to
indiscriminately reject the claims of employees,
even in cases where their appointments are not
illegal, but merely lack adherence to procedural
formalities. Government departments often cite
the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) to argue that
no vested right to regularization exists for
temporary employees, overlooking the
judgment's explicit acknowledgment of cases
where regularization is appropriate. This
selective application distorts the judgment's spirit
and purpose, effectively weaponizing it against
employees who have rendered indispensable
services over decades.
27. In light of these considerations, in our
opinion, it is imperative for government
departments to lead by example in providing fair
and stable employment. Engaging workers on a
temporary basis for extended periods, especially
when their roles are integral to the organization's
functioning, not only contravenes international
labour standards but also exposes the
organization to legal challenges and undermines
employee morale. By ensuring fair employment
practices, government institutions can reduce the
burden of unnecessary litigation, promote job
security, and uphold theprinciples of justice and
fairness that they are meant to embody. This
approach aligns with international standards
and sets a positive precedent for the private
sector to follow, thereby contributing to the
overall betterment of labour practices in the
country.”
75. Recently, this Court in Bhola Nath (supra) while relying
on the judgment of Jaggo (supra), Shripal (supra), and
Dharam Singh (supra) observed as follows:-
Page 47 of 54

// 48 //

“13.6. This Court has, on several occasions, deprecated
the practice adopted by States of engaging employees
under the nominal labels of “part-time”, “contractual” or
“temporary” in perpetuity and thereby exploiting them by
not regularizing their positions. In Jaggo v. Union of
India, this Court underscored that government
departments must lead by example in ensuring fair and
stable employment, and evolved the test of examining
whether the duties performed by such temporary
employees are integral to the day-to-day functioning of the
organization.
13.7 In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, and Vinod Kumar v.
Union of India, this Court cautioned against a mechanical
and blind reliance on Umadevi (supra) to deny
regularization to temporary employees in the absence of
statutory rules. It was held that Umadevi (supra) cannot
be employed as a shield to legitimise exploitative
engagements continued for years without undertaking
regular recruitment. The Court further clarified that
Umadevi itself draws adistinction between appointments
that are “illegal” and those that are merely “irregular”,
the latter being amenable to regularization upon fulfilment
of the prescribed conditions.
13.8. In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P., this Court strongly
deprecated the culture of “adhocism” adopted by States in
their capacity as employers. The Court criticised the
practice of outsourcing or informalizing recruitment as a
means to evade regular employment obligations,
observing that such measures perpetuate precarious
working conditions while circumventing fair and lawful
engagement practices.
13.9. The State must remain conscious that part-time
employees, such as the appellants, constitute an integral
part of the edifice upon which the machinery of the State
continues to function. They are not merely ancillary to the
system, but form essential components thereof. The
equality mandate of our Constitution, therefore, requires
that their service be reciprocated in a manner free from
arbitrariness, ensuring that decisions of the State affecting
the careers and livelihood of such part-time and
Page 48 of 54

// 49 //

contractual employees are guided by fairness and
reason.”
76. What emerges from the principles enunciated in the
aforesaid decisions is that the State cannot rely upon the
mere form of engagement to deny fair and equitable
treatment to employees who have served it for long years.
The consistent thread runningthrough these judgments is
that Umadevi (supra) cannot be invoked as a blanket barrier
to justify prolonged and continued engagements of a
temporary or ad hoc nature, especially where the employees
have been discharging essential and recurring functions of
the State. The Court has repeatedly emphasised that the
distinction between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments
must be kept in view, that long and continuous service is a
relevant consideration, and that the State, as a model
employer, is under a constitutional obligation to act with
fairness, consistency and reasonableness. The practice of
retaining employees for decades under deceptively titled
designations, while simultaneously extracting regular work
integral to the administration, has been disapproved
consistently.
77. Applying these principles to the present case, it is evident
that engaging workers on muster rolls was a consistently
employed policy of the State which continued for prolonged
period of time. The appellants were not engaged for sporadic
or seasonal purposes but were taken on muster rolls and
have rendered continuous service for decades in departments
performing regular governmentalfunctions. The State itself
acknowledged the magnitude of the issue and framed a
Cabinet policy to regularize similarly situated workers, acting
upon it in respect of nearly 30,000 employees. In such
circumstances, to deny consideration to the fraction of
remaining eligible workers including the appellants, by
taking shelter under a rigid reading of Umadevi (supra)
would defeat the very principles of fairness and non-
arbitrariness that this Court has consistently upheld.
78. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to accept the
contention of the State that the appellants cannot be granted
regularization on the ground that they were not initially
appointed against duly sanctioned posts. The State, having
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engaged the appellants prior to 1st April, 1993, utilised their
services continuously for decades, and having itself framed
and implemented a Cabinet policy regularizing nearly 30,000
similarly situated workers, cannot now exclude the
appellants by taking shelter behind a rigid or technical
reading of Umadevi (supra). In absence of any cogent
distinction or reasoned decision justifying such exclusion, the
action of the State is manifestlyarbitrary. It is inconsistent
with its obligation to function as a model employer and does
not withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution.
79. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the
impugned judgment dated 8th June, 2017 passed by the
Division Bench cannot be sustained and is set aside and the
judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 20th December,
2013 is affirmed. Consequently, we pass the following
directions:-
I. The appellants shall be treated as regularised in service in
terms of the Cabinet decision dated 22nd July, 2005 and
from the date on which similarly placed 30,000 employees
were given benefit of the said Cabinet decision.
II. The State of Assam shall identify and verify the eligible
appellants and, where necessary, create supernumerary
posts to facilitate their regularization.
III. Upon regularization, the appellants shall be entitled to all
consequential benefits, including fixation of pay in the
regular scale, continuity of service, and all applicable
pensionary and postretiral benefits in the same terms, as
wereextended to similarly situated 30,000 employees.
IV. In case of retired appellants, they shall be granted
notional regularization with consequential monetary benefits
and arrears from the relevant date until their superannuation
for the purpose of recalculating pension, gratuity, and
terminal dues.
V. In case of deceased appellants, arrears and other benefits
shall be released to their legal heirs in accordance with law.
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VI. The entire exercise, including the calculation and payment
of all financial arrears, shall be completed within a period of
one year from the date of this judgment.
VII. We make it clear that the benefit of the above directions
shall only be applicable to the appellants who were working
in the departments of the State before the cut-off date
prescribed in Cabinet decision dated 22nd July, 2005 i.e.
before 1st April, 1993.”
6. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the
parties and considering the submission made, it is found
that all the Petitioners were engaged in different branches
of the Opp. Party-Bank at different point of time in
different capacity. It is also found that with regard to
engagement of such temporary employees such as
Sweepers and Messengers in different Regional Rural
Banks, pursuant to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex
Court and with constitution of National Industrial
Tribunal, the Tribunal passed an award on 30.04.1990
by directing that such temporary/part-time Sweeper-
cum-Messengers are required to be regularised from the
date of their initial continuance.
6.1. By following the award so passed by the National
Industrial Tribunal, similar claim of Sweepers and
Messengers working under Chaitanya Godavari
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Grameena Bank when was allowed by the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh vide order dtd.27.12.2017 in W.P.(C )
No.24779 of 2011 under Annexure-2, the same was also
implemented. Similarly, following the order passed in
W.P.(C ) No.24779 of 2011, similar claim was also
allowed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in a batch
of Writ Petitions in W.P.(C ) No.15284 of 2014 and such
order passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was
not only upheld in Writ Appeal No.147 of 2021 and
batch under Annexure-6, but also by the Apex Court with
dismissal of the appeal vide order available under
Annexure-7.
6.2. It is found that relying on the order passed by the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh, when Petitioners raised a
claim to get the benefit of regularisation and this Court
directed for its consideration in W.P.(C ) No.3325 of 2019,
such claim of the Petitioners has been rejected vide the
impugned common order dtd.27.05.2019 under
Annexure-4 series on the ground that Petitioners since
have been engaged without following due procedure of
law and their claim is not covered as per the decision of
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the Apex Court in the case of Uma Devi , they are not
entitled to get the benefit.
6.3. This Court taking into account the nature of the
award passed by the Tribunal and the decision of the
High Court of Karnataka as well as High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, Chhatisgarh and Tripura so available under
Annexure-2, Annexure-5 series to Annexure-10, is of the
view that with regard to regularisation of the Petitioners,
who are continuing as Sweepers and Messengers and in
other works on temporary basis, Opp. Party-Bank is
required to frame a Scheme. On framing of such a
Scheme, the services of the Petitioners as against those
posts and/or in any posts of similar nature be
regularised in due course of time.
6.4. This Court directs the Opp. Party-Bank to complete
the exercise with regard to framing of a Scheme so
directed hereinabove, in the light of the Scheme framed
by Andhra Pradesh Grameena Vikash Bank, within a
period of 4(four) months from the date of receipt of this
order. On such framing of the Scheme, services of the
Petitioners be regularised in due course of time, however
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with due regard to seniority. Consequentially, order
dtd.27.05.2019 stand quashed.
7. All the Writ Petitions accordingly stand disposed of.
Photocopy of the order be placed in the connected
cases.
(Biraja Prasanna Satapathy)
Judge

Orissa High Court, Cuttack
th
Dated the 28 October, 2026/Sangita
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SANGITA PATRA
Reason: authentication of order
Location: high court of orissa, cuttack
Date: 28-Oct-2026 16:02:33
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