PRINCIPAL WOODLAND HOUSE SCHOOL, SHIVPORA,SONWAR SRINAGAR AND OTHERS vs SHAKEEL AHMAD MALIK

IN HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR

CM(M) 191/2026
CM. 3286/2026
CM 3287/2026

Reserved on: 01.06.2026
Pronounced on:06 .06.2026
Uploaded on:06.06.2026
Whether full judgment or
operative has been pronounced: Full


1. Principal, Woodland House School, Shivpora, Sonwar Srinagar
2. Mrs. shariefa Arshid, Academic Supervisor, W.H.S. Boys Wing
Sonwar
3.
Mrs. Fozia Majeed, Academic Supervisor W.H.S. Boys Wing
Gupkar

…..Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr. Anil Bhan, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Danish Majeed Dar & Ms. Moneesa Manzoor,
Advocates

Vs.
1. Shakeel Ahmad Malik

S/o Late Abdul Aziz Malik
R/o Sonwar Bagh, Srinagar …..Respondent(s)

Through:
CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE.

JUDGMENT
1.



PRAYER:
1. The Petitioners through the medium of instant petition has sought
followings reliefs from the Court:
i. Set aside/quash the impugned order dated 15.10.2025 passed
by the learned 4th Additional Munsiff, Srinagar, in the case
titled "Shakeel Ahmad Malik versus Principal, Woodland
House School, Shivpora, Sonwar, Srinagar &Ors.”, bearing
File No. 1977/2022, whereby the learned Trial Court has
allowed the application seeking execution/implementation of
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the interim order dated 14.06.2022 and has directed the
Petitioners to comply with the said order within a period of
four weeks, with further coercive observations regarding
attachment of the salary accounts of the Petitioner School
maintained with J&K Bank, Gupkar Branch, detention of the
Managing Directorand initiation of contempt proceedings;
ii. Set aside all consequential directions and observations
contained in the impugned order dated 15.10.2025, including
the directions/observations relating to attachment of the salary
accounts or any other bank accounts of the Petitioner School,
detention of the Managing Director or any
officer/representative of the Petitioner School, and initiation of
contempt proceedings on the basis of the alleged non-
compliance of the interim order dated 14.06.2022;
iii. Direct the learned Trial Court to decide the main suit strictly
in accordance with law and on its own merits, uninfluenced by
any observations made in the impugned order dated
15.10.2025, particularly the observations touching upon the
alleged merits of the Respondent's claim, alleged hardship,
alleged entitlement to salary, alleged conduct of the
Petitioners, and alleged entitlement of the Respondent to the
designation/benefits claimed in the suit;
iv. Direct that the Respondent shall not be permitted to pursue
parallel and overlapping coercive proceedings, namely
execution/implementation proceedings and contempt
proceedings, on the same cause of action and in respect of the
very same alleged non-compliance of the interim order dated
14.06.2022, except in accordance with the procedure known to
law and subject to such orders as may be passed by this
Hon'ble Court;

BRIEF FACTS:
2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent-plaintiff instituted a
civil suit seeking declaration that he was entitled to be treated/designated
as Supervisor and that the designation of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 therein
as Supervisors was illegal. Consequential relief regarding release of
salary was also sought. Alongside the suit, an application under Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC came to be filed.
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3. During pendency of the suit, the services of the respondent-plaintiff were
terminated by order dated 11.05.2022 with effect from 01.07.2021. The
said termination order was brought on record before the Trial Court.
4. The Trial Court, by order dated 14.06.2022, directed the petitioner-school
to pay 50% of the monthly salary to the respondent for the period from
April 2021 till 11.05.2022 subject to an undertaking that in the event the
plaintiff failed in the suit, he would reimburse the amount.
5. The aforesaid order was challenged before the appellate court and
thereafter before this Court. The challenge ultimately did not succeed. A
review petition against the order of this Court is stated to be pending.
6. Subsequently, the respondent-plaintiff moved an application seeking
implementation/execution of the interim order dated 14.06.2022.
7. Initially, the Trial Court passed an order dated 15.05.2024 directing
suspension of registration of the petitioner-school. The said order was
stayed by this Court in CM(M) No.166/2024 vide order dated 22.05.2024
while observing that the Trial Court would be at liberty to adopt any
mode available in law.
8. Thereafter, the impugned order dated 15.10.2025 came to be passed by
the learned Executing Court, whereby the execution application filed by
the respondent was allowed. The Court further directed that, in the event
of non-compliance with the order, it would be at liberty to attach the
salary account of the school maintained with J&K Bank, proceed against
the Managing Director by way of detention for disobedience of the
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Court's directions, and initiate contempt proceedings in accordance with
law.
9. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioners have invoked
the jurisdiction of this Court by way of the instant petition.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:
10. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the impugned order
suffers from patent lack of jurisdiction. It is argued that the order dated
14.06.2022 is merely an interlocutory order passed under Order XXXIX
Rules 1 and 2 CPC and cannot be equated with a decree within the
meaning of Section 2(2) CPC nor can it be executed under Section 36
CPC.
11. Learned counsel submits that where an allegation of breach of an
injunction order is made, the Code itself provides a specific mechanism
under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC and the Trial Court could not invent
a separate execution procedure unknown to law.
12. It is further argued that the Trial Court has misconstrued the liberty
granted by this Court in CM(M) No.166/2024. According to learned
counsel, this Court had permitted only such modes as are available in law
and not coercive methods beyond statutory authority.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order
rests substantially upon certain judicial precedents without furnishing
complete and accurate citations thereof, without identifying the legal
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principles or ratio decidendi emerging from the said decisions, and
without examining their applicability to the facts and circumstances of
the present case.
14. It is argued that the respondent's services already stood terminated and
the validity of such termination remains a disputed issue. Therefore, the
Trial Court could not indirectly grant final relief by compelling payment
through coercive process.
15. It is submitted that attachment of school accounts, detention of the
Managing Director and initiation of contempt proceedings have been
threatened without jurisdiction and in disregard of the settled distinction
between execution proceedings and proceedings for alleged disobedience
of injunction orders.
16. The learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that since the
Review Petition against the order dated 03.11.2023 is pending before this
Court, therefore, the Trial Court ought to have refrained from proceeding
with the matter or enforcing the order dated 14.06.2022.

17. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on
record.
LEGAL ANALYSIS:
18. Before adverting to the grounds urged in the instant petition, it would be
apposite to notice the sequence of proceedings that have ensued between
the parties. A careful examination thereof would reveal that the
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petitioners have consistently resisted compliance with the judicial
directions passed in favour of the respondent-plaintiff and have, at every
stage, sought to obstruct and delay their implementation. The record
discloses a continuous pattern of litigation undertaken by the petitioners,
not for securing any substantive adjudication of rights, but for avoiding
compliance with orders which have repeatedly been affirmed by the
competent Courts.
19. A bare perusal of the material on record reveals that respondent-plaintiff
instituted a civil suit for declaration and mandatory injunction before the
learned Trial Court and, during its pendency, moved an application
seeking interim relief for release of salary. The learned Trial Court, vide
order dated 14.06.2022, allowed the said interim application and directed
the petitioners-defendants to release 50% of the monthly salary of the
plaintiff for the period from April, 2021 till 11.05.2022, i.e., the date of
issuance of termination order, subject to furnishing of an undertaking by
the plaintiff to refund the amount in the event of failure in the suit. The
said order was passed as an interim arrangement and was stated to be
subject to the final outcome of the suit.
20. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioners preferred an appeal before the learned
1st Additional District Judge, Srinagar. The learned Appellate Court,
after hearing the parties, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the interim
direction passed by the learned Trial Court by virtue of an order dated.
05.09.2023. For the facility of reference operative part of judgment is
reproduced as under:
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“For what has been stated herein above it is established that the
order passed by the trial Court which is under challenge is well
reasoned and does not deserve any interference. Therefore, the
appeal is dismissed. The order dated 02.07.2022 passed by this court
shall stand vacated. Trial Court be informed accordingly. “
21. The petitioners thereafter invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by filing CM(M)
No.299/2023. This Court, upon consideration, declined to interfere with
the concurrent orders passed by the Courts below, and the interim
direction was accordingly upheld. For the facility of reference operative
part of judgment is reproduced as under:
“9. The counsel for the petitioners could not otherwise point out
any glaring miss in the orders which required interference by
this Court.
10. It is trite proposition of law that the powers and interfere in
the orders of the Courts below unless grave injustice appears
to have been. Even the mistake of fact or law will not prompt
this Court to set aside the orders, which may be impugned by
the petitioners in the petition filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
11. In view of above, the petition being without merit shall stand
dismissed along with connected CM(s).”
22. Thereafter, in view of non-compliance of the said order dated
14.06.2022, the respondent-plaintiff initiated execution proceedings
before the learned Trial Court for enforcement of the said direction. The
learned Executing Court, upon consideration of the matter, allowed the
execution application vide order dated 15.10.2025 and directed
compliance of the order dated 14.06.2022.
23. Aggrieved of same he again approached this Court contending that the
impugned order passed by the Learned Trial Court is beyond the scope of
provisions contained in order 39 rule 2A of Code of Civil Procedure. This
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Court by virtue of an order dated 22.05.2024 stayed the operation of
impugned order. However, it was directed that it shall be open to the
Learned Trial Court to adopt any other mode available in law for
executing the interim order. For the facility of reference operative part of
judgment is reproduced as under:
“Issue notice to the respondent subject to taking of
necessary steps by the petitioners within one week.
In the meantime, the impugned order passed by the learned
trial court shall remain stayed. However, it shall be open to
the learned trial court to adopt any other mode available in
law for executing the interim order. It shall also be open to
the petitioners to file objections to the execution petition and
project their stand before the learned trial court.”

24. Pursuant to the passing of the aforesaid order, the respondent instituted
an execution application before the learned 4th Additional Munsiff,
Srinagar. Upon consideration of the matter, the learned Executing Court
passed the impugned order dated 15.10.2025, whereby the execution
application was allowed. The Court further directed that, in the event of
non-compliance with the order, it would be at liberty to attach the salary
account of the school maintained with J&K Bank, proceed for the
detention of the Managing Director for disobedience of the Court's
directions, and initiate contempt proceedings in accordance with law.
25. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioners have invoked the
jurisdiction of this Court by way of the instant petition challenging the
legality and correctness of the aforesaid execution order.
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26. The aforesaid chronology of events unmistakably demonstrates the
persistent and deliberate attempt of the petitioners to evade compliance
with the judicial directions passed by the competent Courts. The interim
order dated 14.06.2022 directing release of 50% salary in favour of the
respondent-plaintiff was not only affirmed by the learned Appellate Court
vide judgment dated 05.09.2023, but was also upheld by this Court in
proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution. Thus, the petitioners
exhausted all available remedies against the said order and suffered
concurrent findings at every stage.
27. Despite the matter having attained finality insofar as the interim relief
was concerned, the petitioners chose not to comply with the directions
issued by the Courts. Their conduct compelled the respondent-plaintiff to
initiate execution proceedings for enforcement of an order that had
already been upheld by three judicial forums. Even thereafter, instead of
honouring the judicial mandate, the petitioners continued to devise means
to delay and obstruct its implementation.
28. Significantly, while this Court, vide order dated 22.05.2024, stayed only
the particular mode of execution adopted by the Trial Court, it expressly
left it open to the Executing Court to adopt any other mode permissible in
law for execution of the interim order. The said order neither diluted nor
suspended the obligation of the petitioners to comply with the order dated
14.06.2022. Rather, it reaffirmed the enforceability of the said direction
by permitting execution through alternative legal modes.
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29. Notwithstanding the aforesaid clarification by this Court, the petitioners
persisted in resisting execution and, upon the learned Executing Court
adopting another lawful mode for enforcement of the order, have once
again approached this Court challenging the execution proceedings. The
repeated institution of proceedings, not against the substantive order
which already stands affirmed up to this Court, but against every step
taken towards its execution, clearly reflects an intention to frustrate and
delay the implementation of the judicial directions rather than to seek any
bona fide adjudication of legal rights.
30. The conduct of the petitioners, viewed in its entirety, manifests a
calculated strategy of obstruction and non-compliance, which speaks
volumes about the conduct on part of the petitioners to frustrate the rights
of the respondents herein by indulging in uncalled for litigation. Having
failed before the three forums , i.e. Learned Trial Court, the Appellate
Court and this Court, and having suffered concurrent findings throughout,
the petitioners cannot be permitted to repeatedly invoke the jurisdiction
of this Court merely to postpone compliance with a binding order. The
present petition, therefore, appears to be a continuation of the same
endeavour to defeat and delay the execution of lawful judicial orders and
is liable to be viewed as lacking in bona fides.
31. The principal contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners
is that the order dated 14.06.2022 having been passed on an application
under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
merely an interlocutory order and, therefore, incapable of execution
under Section 36 of the Code of civil procedure. According to the
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petitioners, the only remedy available to the respondent, in the event of
alleged non-compliance, was to invoke the provisions of Order XXXIX
Rule 2-A CPC and not to seek implementation or execution of the said
order.
32. Since, section 36 of CPC is very relevant and germane to the controversy
at hand, it would be appropriate to reproduce Section 36 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which reads as under:
"36. Application to orders.—The provisions of this Code
relating to the execution of decrees shall, so far as they are
applicable, be deemed to apply to the execution of orders."
33. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that the
legislature has extended the scope of provisions relating to execution of
decrees to orders as well. Significantly, Section 36 CPC does not confine
its operation only to decrees, nor does it use the expression "final orders".
Instead, the legislature has used the broader expression "orders", thereby
indicating that certain orders of a civil court, though not amounting to
decrees, may also be enforced through the process of the Court.
34. The scope and ambit of Section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
extends the provisions relating to the execution of decrees to the
execution of orders, read conjointly with the provisions contained in
Order XXI CPC governing execution proceedings, came up for
consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sheela Jerald &Ors.
v. Pushpadasan, Civil Appeal No. 7650 of 2018 . The question before
the Court was whether an order of interim injunction could be enforced
through execution proceedings under the Code or whether the aggrieved
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party was confined only to the remedy contemplated under Order
XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC for disobedience of injunction orders.
35. Answering the issue in unequivocal terms, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that an interim injunction does not become inexecutable merely
because it is interlocutory in nature and that, by virtue of Section 36 CPC,
the execution machinery available for decrees is equally available for
enforcement of judicial orders. For the facility of reference relevant part
of judgement is reproduced as under:
“3. The High Court has refused to entertain an execution
petition filed by the appellants for enforcing the order of
interim injunction granted to them restraining the purchase
from disturbing the peaceful possession of the premises and
further directing him to vacate the premises in question.
4. The sole ground on which the High Court has refused to
permit execution of the order is that the order sought to be
enforced by execution is an interim order. This finding of the
High court is obviously untenable in view of Section 36, C.P.C.
which reads as under:
"36. Application to orders-The provisions of this Code relating
to the execution of decrees (including provisions relating to
payment under a decree) shall, so far as they are applicable, be
deemed to apply to the execution of orders (including payment
under an order."
5. In M.V.S. Manikyala Rao vs. M. Narasimhaswami&Ors.,
AIR 1966 SC 470, this Court rejected the contention that order
XXI Rule 35 (2) did not apply to the case in hand because the
order in question was only an order for delivery of joint
possession and not a decree. The Court observed that "this
contention cannot be accepted because underSection 36 of the
Code the provisions relating to the execution of decrees are
applicable to execution of orders."
We find that there is no material difference between the order
that fell for consideration in Manikayala Rao's case (supra)
and an order such as an order granting an interim njunction.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that an
interim order cannot be executed under the provisions of the
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CPC because Order 39 Rule 2 (a) provides for consequence of
disobedience of an injunction. It is not possible to hold that a
provision which provides for a consequence of disobedience of
an injunction has no relevance to whether an order passed
under the CPC validly by the competent Court can be executed
or not.
7. Indeed an order passed validly by a competent Court must
be capable of execution if it has to have any meaning for the
parties in litigation. "
36. The ratio emerging from the aforesaid judgment is that Section 36 CPC
statutorily incorporates orders within the framework of execution
proceedings and, consequently, interim injunction orders are executable
through the mechanism provided under Order XXI CPC. The availability
of proceedings under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC is, therefore,
supplemental and not destructive of the independent remedy of
execution.
37. The aforesaid position stands reinforced by the judgment of Bombay
High Court in Venkat Niloba Kabade v. Kishan Dadarao Dhuma ,
reported as 1983 SCC OnLine Bom 158 , wherein it was held that after
the amendment of Section 36 CPC by Act No. 104 of 1976, the
provisions governing execution of decrees became equally applicable to
the execution of orders. The Court specifically observed that where Order
XXI Rule 35 CPC prescribes the procedure for execution of a decree for
possession, the same procedure, by virtue of Section 36 CPC, would be
available for execution of orders as well. The relevant observations are
reproduced as under:;
“ In addition to this, Mr. Bajpai placed reliance upon sub-rule
(5) of Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code and it
runs as follows:—
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“(5) Where a decree for the specific performance of a contract
or for an injunction has not been obeyed, the Court may, in
lieu of or in addition to all or any of the processes aforesaid,
direct that the act required to be done may be done so “far as
practicable by the decree -holder or some other person
appointed by the Court, at the cost of the judgment-debtor, and
upon the act being done the expenses incurred may be
ascertained in such manner as the Court may direct and may
be recovered as if they were included in the decree.”
8. According to Mr. Bajpai, the remedy in sub-rule (5) is in
addition to the remedies provided for the decree-holder in the
other provisions of this very Rule and those other provisions
are for attachment of moveable property or for detention in
civil prison. Definitely there is some force in his submission.
Even otherwise I have pointed out earlier that even interim
orders of the Court can be executed in view of the clear
provisions of section 36 of the Civil Procedure Code and in
this view of the matter I do not find any error in the order of
the trial Court. “
38. In that view of the matter, this Court is unable to accept the broad
proposition canvassed by the petitioners that Order XXXIX Rule 2-A
CPC constitutes the sole and exclusive remedy available in every case of
non-compliance of an interim order.
39. Consequently, the contention of the petitioners that Order XXXIX Rule
2-A CPC constituted the only remedy available in law is misconceived,
and is accordingly rejected.
40. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the Learned Trial
Court violated the High Court’s earlier order dated 22.05.2024.It was
further contended that the learned Trial Court should not have passed
coercive directions because this Court, in its earlier order dated
22.05.2024 in CM(M) No.166/2024, had already stayed it.
41. Upon the perusal of the said order dated 22.05.2024, it is manifestly clear
that this Court had only stayed a specific coercive direction i.e the
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suspension of the school’s registration. It did not put a blanket bar on all
proceedings. Instead, it clearly permitted the Trial Court to proceed in
accordance with law and even observed that the Trial Court was “at
liberty to adopt any mode available in law.
42. This court is of the view that the coordinate bench of this Court did not
completely restrict the Trial Court rather, it left open lawful methods of
enforcement/implementation, while only restraining one particular
extreme measure.
43. The learned counsel for the petitioners next argued that since the Review
Petition against the order dated 03.11.2023 is pending before this Court,
therefore, the Trial Court ought to have refrained from proceeding with
the matter or enforcing the order dated 14.06.2022.
44. This Court is of the view that the mere filing or pendency of a review
petition does not, by itself, operate as a stay of the order under challenge.
Unless the order is specifically stayed by a competent Court, the same
continues to remain valid, binding and enforceable between the parties

45. In the present case, admittedly, no order of stay has been passed in the
pending Review Petition. The order dated 14.06.2022, therefore,
continues to remain operative and binding upon the parties.
46. Furthermore, a bare perusal of the record reveals that the respondent has
filed CM No. 3457/2025 before this Court seeking appropriate directions
for expeditious disposal of the suit pending before the learned Trial
Court. While disposing of the said application, this Court, after noticing
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that no order staying the proceedings before the Trial Court had been
passed in the pending review petition, expressly observed that the learned
Trial Court shall be at liberty to proceed with the matter in accordance
with law. Thus, this Court had already granted liberty to the learned Trial
Court to continue with and adjudicate the suit notwithstanding the
pendency of the review proceedings.

47. Viewed thus, this Court finds no merit in the contention that pendency of
the Review Petition affected the enforceability of the order dated
14.06.2022.
48. It is next contended by the petitioners that enforcement of the order dated
14.06.2022 would, in effect, amount to granting final relief in the suit.
49. The order dated 14.06.2022 was passed at an interlocutory stage and was
expressly made conditional in nature. The benefit granted thereunder was
subject to the final adjudication of the suit and was further safeguarded
by directing the respondent to furnish an undertaking to refund the
amount in the event of failure in the suit.The very incorporation of such a
safeguard clearly demonstrates that the relief granted was provisional,
interim in character, and not final or irreversible in nature.
50. It is well settled that interim reliefs are granted to balance equities
between the parties during the pendency of proceedings and to prevent
irreparable prejudice. Merely because some monetary benefit flows under
an interim order does not convert such relief into a final adjudication of
rights, particularly when the order itself is expressly subject to restitution.
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51. This court is of the view that the order dated 14.06.2022 was not a vague
the learned Trial Court specifically directed the defendants to pay fifty
percent of the salary payable to the respondent for a period, namely from
April 2021 till 11.05.2022. Merely because the order was passed at an
interlocutory stage does not render it incapable of implementation. An
order directing payment of a specified amount cannot be permitted to
remain a mere paper direction until conclusion of the suit. Such an
approach would defeat the very object of granting interim relief.
52. This Court is of the considered opinion that judicial orders are intended
to have practical effect and cannot be formalities. If a party against whom
a subsisting monetary direction has been issued is permitted to withhold
compliance and yet contend that the successful litigant must wait until
final disposal of the suit, the efficacy of the Court’s interim jurisdiction
would stand seriously undermined.
53. The purpose of interim relief is to afford immediate protection pending
final adjudication. Such protection would become wholly illusory if the
Court were rendered powerless to secure compliance with its own
directions.
54. This Court cannot ignore the manner in which the present proceedings
have been pursued by the petitioners. Instead of complying with the
judicial directions issued by the competent Courts, the petitioners have
continued to resist implementation of the same through successive rounds
of litigation. The present petition substantially seeks to reopen issues
which already stand concluded by orders passed by the appellate Court as
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well as by this Court. The conduct of the petitioners leaves little room for
doubt that the present proceedings have been instituted primarily to avoid
compliance with the subsisting judicial directions and to delay payment
of the amount directed to be paid under the order dated 14.06.2022.
55. This Court is of the considered opinion that once a judicial order has been
affirmed by the superior forums and continues to hold the field, the same
is required to be obeyed and given effect to. Judicial orders are not
intended to remain confined to the record and must receive due
compliance from the parties against whom they operate. Any other view
would seriously undermine the authority of Courts and the administration
of justice.
56. Such repeated challenges to substantially concluded issues cannot be
encouraged. Judicial orders cannot be permitted to be frustrated by filing
one proceeding after another. The rule of law demands obedience to
judicial orders unless they are stayed, modified or set aside by a
competent Court.

57. At this stage, it also deserves to be noted that substantially similar
contentions were raised by the petitioners while challenging the order
dated 14.06.2022 before the Appellate Court and thereafter before this
Court in CM(M) No.299/2023. The said challenges were repelled and the
orders passed by the Courts below were upheld. Having failed in the
earlier round of litigation, the petitioners cannot be permitted to reagitate
the same issues in the present proceedings under a different guise. The
principles of finality of judicial decisions and constructive res judicata
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operate against such an attempt. The petitioners are, therefore, estopped
from reopening matters which already stand concluded between the
parties and have attained finality at the interlocutory stage.
58. The present petition is nothing but another attempt to delay and obstruct
compliance with a subsisting judicial order. Such repeated litigation on
substantially identical grounds strikes at the very root of the principle of
finality of judicial proceedings. If litigants are permitted to challenge the
same order in successive rounds of proceedings merely by changing the
form of the challenge, no judicial decision would ever attain finality and
the administration of justice would be reduced to uncertainty.
59. The conduct of the petitioners demonstrates a deliberate attempt to avoid
compliance with the order dated 14.06.2022 and to prolong payment of
the amount directed to be released in favour of the respondent. Judicial
process cannot be permitted to be used as a tool for delaying the fruits of
an order which has already survived scrutiny before the appellate forum
as well as this Court.

60. The Hon'ble Supreme in Subrata Roy Sahara Vs Union of India
reported as (2014) 8 SCC 470 , expressed serious concern over the
growing tendency of litigants to misuse judicial proceedings by filing
frivolous and meritless cases. The relevant part of judgement is
reproduced as under:
“150. The Indian judicial system is grossly afflicted, with
frivolous litigation. Ways and means need to be evolved, to
deter litigants from their compulsive obsession, towards
senseless and ill-considered claims. One needs to keep in mind,
that in the process of litigation, there is an innocent sufferer
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on the other side, of every irresponsible and senseless claim.
He suffers long drawn anxious periods of nervousness and
restlessness, whilst the litigation is pending, without any fault
on his part.”
61. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalip Singh v. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others, reported as (2010) 2 SCC 114 , strongly
deprecated the tendency of litigants to misuse the judicial process for
securing undue advantage and to pollute the stream of justice. The Court
observed as under:
“1. In last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up.
Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for
truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical
means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge
posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time
to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a
litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who
touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not
entitled to any relief, interim or final.”
62. More recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PandurangVithalKevne v.
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited [2024 INSC 1051] reiterated its concern
over the increasing misuse of the judicial process and emphasized that
courts must adopt a firm approach against frivolous and vexatious
litigation intended only to delay proceedings or defeat the course of
justice. The relevant observations are reproduced hereunder:
“Considering that precious time of this Court and the High
Court was wasted by the petitioner, in our opinion the
petitioner deserves to be burdened with heavy cost, to give
clear message to the unscrupulous litigants like the petitioner
for not daring to play with the Judicial System. Such type of
litigants are not only polluting the stream of justice but putting
hurdles in its dispensation to others. The precious judicial time
which the petitioner has wasted, could very well be used for
taking up the cases of other litigants who are waiting for
justice. In fact these types of litigants are choking the system
of the court, which is resulting in delays in decision of other
cases. It is also the duty of the Courts at different levels to curb
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such type of litigation so that more time is available for dealing
with genuine litigation.”
63. Tested on the touchstone of the principles laid down in the aforesaid
judgments, the present petition is found to be wholly misconceived,
devoid of merit and a clear abuse of the process of law. The petitioners,
having failed before the competent forums and having unsuccessfully
invoked the jurisdiction of this Court on earlier occasions, cannot be
permitted to continue a course of litigation designed solely to delay
compliance with the order dated 14.06.2022. Such conduct not only
prejudices the respondent, who has been compelled to engage in
avoidable and repetitive litigation, but also results in an unwarranted
expenditure of valuable judicial time.
64. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs.
25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Thousand only), to be deposited with the
Registry within a period of two weeks from the date of this order. The
imposition of costs, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is
considered necessary to preserve the sanctity of judicial proceedings and
to deter similar abuse of the process of law in future.
65. It is further directed that, in the event the aforesaid costs are not
deposited within the stipulated period, the Registry shall place a note
before this Court for passing appropriate orders to secure compliance
with the present direction.
66. Accordingly, In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned order
dated 15.10.2025 passed by the learned 4th Additional Munsiff, Srinagar,
in the case titled "Shakeel Ahmad Malik v. Principal, Woodland House
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School, Shivpora, Sonwar, Srinagar &Ors.", bearing File No. 1977/2022,
is upheld. Consequently, the present petition, being devoid of merit, is
dismissed.
67. The petitioners are further directed to comply with the order dated
14.06.2022. In the event of failure to do so, it shall be open to the learned
Executing Court to proceed in accordance with law and adopt all
permissible measures for securing enforcement of the said order.
Postscript
68. Before parting with the matter, this Court deems it appropriate to advert
to an aspect arising from the record which merits serious consideration.
69. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order
rests substantially upon certain judicial precedents without furnishing
complete and accurate citations thereof, without identifying the legal
principles or ratio decidendi emerging from the said decisions, and
without examining their applicability to the facts and circumstances of
the present case.

70. Having regard to the aforesaid submission, this Court undertook an
independent verification of the judgments referred to and relied upon in
the impugned order. Upon such examination, it transpires that the
citations attributed to the two principal judgments forming the basis of
the impugned order are incorrect. In respect of one of the judgments, not
only is the citation erroneous, but the title of the decision, as recorded in
the impugned order, could not be traced despite diligent search and
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verification. The judgment, therefore, does not appear to exist in the form
in which it has been referred to by the learned Trial Court. Insofar as the
second judgment is concerned, while a decision bearing a similar title
could be located, the citation assigned thereto in the impugned order does
not correspond with the said decision and is patently incorrect.
71. Although this circumstance, by itself, does not persuade this Court to
interfere with the impugned order on merits, the matter nevertheless
raises a concern touching upon the quality and reliability of judicial
reasoning. Reliance upon judicial precedents constitutes an integral
component of the adjudicatory process and, therefore, the authorities
cited in support of a conclusion must be accurate, authentic and capable
of verification.
72. This Court has also noticed, in certain cases, a tendency to refer to the
ratio of judgments by paraphrasing the perceived principle in the words
of the author of the order rather than reproducing the relevant extracts
from the judgments themselves. Such a practice is best avoided. The ratio
decidendi of a judgment is to be gathered from what has actually been
held by the Court and not from an individual understanding thereof.
Reproduction of the relevant extracts ensures fidelity to the precedent
relied upon and minimizes the possibility of unintended distortion of the
legal principle laid down.
73. This Court is also conscious of the increasing use of artificial
intelligence-based tools and digital research platforms in legal and
judicial work. While such tools may serve as useful aids for research,
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they cannot substitute judicial scrutiny and verification. Any proposition
of law, citation, extract, or precedent generated or suggested by an
artificial intelligence tool must be independently verified from authentic
and authoritative sources before being relied upon in a judicial order.
Judicial officers must remain mindful that the ultimate responsibility for
the correctness, accuracy and authenticity of the contents of a judicial
order rests solely upon the authoring Judge. The use of technological
tools, therefore, must be accompanied by appropriate caution and
rigorous verification so as to ensure that judicial determinations are
founded only upon genuine and verifiable legal authorities.
74. In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court considers it appropriate to
caution the judicial officers to exercise greater care and circumspection
while citing judicial precedents in future. The judicial officer shall ensure
that the judgments relied upon are correctly cited, capable of verification
and faithfully reflect the proposition of law sought to be applied. It is
expected that due diligence shall be exercised in this regard so as to avoid
recurrence of such lapses.
75. This Court further considers it necessary to emphasize, for the guidance
of all Judicial Officers in the Union Territory, that:
(i) Any citation, precedent, extract, factual assertion or
proposition of law obtained through artificial
intelligence platforms or similar technological tools
must be independently verified from authentic and
authoritative sources before being relied upon or
incorporated in any judicial order.
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(ii) Every precedent relied upon in a judicial order shall
be accompanied by a complete and accurate citation;
(iii) Wherever a precedent constitutes the foundation of a
finding or conclusion, the relevant extract of the
judgment should, as far as practicable, be reproduced
verbatim rather than paraphrased;
(iv) Citations obtained from unofficial compilations,
secondary sources or electronic databases should be
cross-verified with authentic sources before being
incorporated into judicial orders;
76. Let a copy of this order be forwarded to the Registrar Judicial of both the
wings of this Court for circulation amongst all Judicial Officers in the
Union Territory for information and compliance.
(Wasim Sadiq Nargal)
Judge
Srinagar:
06.06.2026
“Mubashir”


i. Whether the Judgment is Reportable: Yes
ii. Whether the Judgment is Speaking: Yes
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