Preetibala vs Kantabai
- Court
- Madhya Pradesh High Court
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:27904
1 MP-5773-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANDEEP N. BHATT
st
ON THE 1 OF OCTOBER, 2026
MISC. PETITION No. 5773 of 2026
CNR No.: MPHC020371902026
PREETIBALA
Versus
KANTABAI AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Makbool Ahmad Mansoori - Advocate for the petitioner.
ORDER
The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has
been filed praying for the following reliefs:
"7. RELIEF PRAYED FOR:
It is therefore most humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to:
7.1 Allow this petition and set-aside the impugned common order dated
31/08/2026 Annexure P/1 passed by the Court of 1st District Judge, District -
Mandsaur in MCA No.84/2025 and MCA No. 86/2025;
7.2 Allow the appeal (MCA No.86/2025) preferred by the petitioner (plaintiff)
and set aside the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court in its order dated
12/08/2025 (Annexure P/2) to the extent whereby the plaintiff has been held to
be not in possession of the suit property;
7.3 Dismiss the appeal (MCA No.84/2025) preferred by respondent No. 5
(defendant No. 5) and consequently restore the order dated 12/08/2025
Annexure P/2 passed by the Court of learned 1st Civil Judge, Junior Division,
Mandsuar in RCS-A/21/2024.
7.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court deem fit under the peculiar facts
and circumstances of the case, may kindly be granted in favour of the
petitioner."
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2. The petitioner(plaintiff) is challenging a common order dated
31.08.2026 (AnnexureP-1) passed by the learned lower Appellate Court
arising out of order dated 12.08.2025, by which the lower appellate Court
has reversed the findings given by the trial Court.
3. It is submitted by the counsel for petitioner that two appeals were
filed; one is filed by the respondent no.5 challenging the grant of injunction
order in favour of the petitioner whereas the petitioner preferred appeal
challenging the findings recorded by the trial Court the extent that petitioner
was not in possession of the suit property. Both the appeals were heard
together and decided by a common order and, therefore, the present petition
is filed.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the deceased
brother of petitioner has executed mortgage in favour of respondent
no.5/bank and the petitioner is having 1/3 right property, which was
mortgaged in the bank . He has submitted that the bank has initiated
proceedings u/S 13 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act[for short, referred to as
'SARFAESI Act' hereinafter]. It is also submitted by the counsel that since
there is serious grievance of the petitioner that deceased Sunil Kumar could
not mortgage the property in which the petitioner is having 1/3rd share. He
has filed the suit as he was also not the consenting party in the mortgage. He
has raised the contention that Sunil Kumar has claimed that he has received
the property in question by way of gift deed from his mother and, therefore
Sunil Kumar could not have mortgage the property in the bank. The
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petitioner has contended that since the mother is also having 1/3rd share,
therefore, she could not execute gift deed for the entire property. He has
further contended that the trial Court has granted interim injunction as
prima-facie case is made out with a view to protect his right, the petitioner is
also granted further injunction regarding the alienation. It is further submitted
that though the lower Appellate Court has accepted the contention that the
petitioner can file a suit for such prayers, but has not reversed the findings
given by the trial Court mainly by considering that in view of Section 34 of
SARFAESI Act where the respondent no.5 has initiated proceeding,
injunction is not required to be granted. He has submitted that Section 34 of
SARFAESI Act cannot be applicable in the facts o the case where petitioner
has admittedly having 1/3rd right in the property in question and, therefore it
is submitted that if further alienation is permitted then the petitioner will face
great difficulty. All the factors are in favour of the petitioner and, therefore,
the order passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is passed by giving
findings which are not only perverse, but erroneous and, therefore, the order
impugned is required to be interfered by this Court.
5. I have considered the submission made by the counsel for
petitioner at the Bar and also the contentions raised by the petitioner and
have perused the memo of petition and the impugned order passed by the
learned lower Appellate Court and has framed points of determination.
6. It transpires that the learned lower Appellate Court has also
considered the issue regarding prima-facie case by referring to the judgment
passed in the case of Shankarlal Rathore Vs. State of M.P. reported in 1978
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JLJ 51.
7. Relevant para 14 of the judgment of appellate Court is as under:
"14.
थम या मामला या है इस संबंध म माननीय उ च यायालय म यदेश ने
1978 51
याय ांत शंकर लाल राठौर बनाम म. . रा "य जे.एल.जे. म अिभिनधा ()रत
-
कया है क
"Although it is often said that a plaintiff must show a prima facie case in
support of the right claimed by him in the suit before he can be granted
temporary injunction, the real thing to be seen only is that plaintiff's
claim is not frivolous or vexatious; in other words, that there is a serious
question to be tried. It is not the function of the Court at this stage to
resolve disputed questions of fact or difficult questions of law which
should be left to be decided at conclusion of the trial These principles are
to be generally observed in the grant of temporary injunction, but there
may be special factors of a particular case which mapy require a
different approach. For example in case where the plaintiff and
defendant both claim to be in possession of the suit property, temporary
injunction should not be granted restraining the defendant from
interfering with the plaintiff's possession unless the Court finds a very
strong probability that the plaintiff is in possession."
8. It is also observed by the learned lower Appellate Court in para
16-19 about the contentions raised regarding 1/3 share of the property.
Attempt was made by the appellant in that appeal to produce evidence by
way of additional evidence by filing application under Order 41 Rule 27 of
CPC which was not accepted by the learned lower Appellate Court. It is
further transpired that learned lower appellate Court has considered these
factual aspects of the matter. and also considered Section 34 of the
SARFAESI Act.
9. It further transpired that the learned lower Appellate Court has
considered law laid down in the case of Central Bank of India Vs. Prabha
Jain reported in (2025) 4 SCC 38. The said judgment is based on almost
identical facts where the issue of overriding effect of SARFAESI Act and
RDBFI Act, 1993 has been discussed. The learned lower appellate Court has
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further referred to the case of Babeeta Goyal Vs. Ratana Bai and Others
reported in 2026 SCC Online MP 12522. In this regard para 22 to 25 of the
impugned order is worthy of reference wherein both the cases have been
discussed:
" 22. / 5
अपीलाथ , ितवाद. कमांक के /व0ान अिधव 1ा के तक 2 के आलोक म /व5ीय आ 67तय2 का
2002 34
ितभूितकरण और पुनग (ठन तथा ितभूित *हत का वत(न अिधिनयम क = धारा 6जसका शीष (क
,
िस /वल यायालय क = अिधका )रता न होना है पर /वचार कया जाए तो उ 1 धारा के अनुसार कसी भी
िस /वल यायालय को ऐसे मामले के संबंध म 6जसम ऋण वसूली अिधकरण या अपीलं अिधकरण को इस
अिधिनयम 0ारा या इसके अधीन अवधारण के िलये सश 1 *कया गया है कोई वाद या काय (वाह. Bहण
करने क = अिधका )रता नह .ं होगी और इस अिधिनयम 0ारा या इसके अधीन ब Cक2 या /व5ीय सं 7थाओं को
1993 (1993 51)
शो य ऋण वसूली अिधिनयम का के अधीन द5ु *कसी श /1 के अनुसरण म क = गई या
क = जाने वाली कसी काय (वाह. क = बावत् कसी यायालय या *कसी अ य ािधकार. 0ारा कोई Fयादेश
अनुद 5 नह .ं *कया जाएगा।
23. Central Bank of India v.
माननीय उ च यायालय म. . 0ारा यायांत
Prabha Jain, (2025) 4 SCC 38 Babeeta Goyal
को /वचार म लेते यायांत
हुए
Versus Ratana Bai and Others 2026 SCC OnLine MP 12522
क = कं *डका Iमांक
22 24 - 22. In view of the aforesaid
से म िन Jनानुसार अवधा )रत *कया गया है
pronouncement of law, it is evident that the suit filed by plaintiff is very much
maintainable before the learned trial court inasmuch as a declaration that the
property is coparcenary and the plaintiff has right/interest therein since birth;
that the will executed by Chameli Bai in favour of Defendant 1 be declared
null & void; that the family settlements be declared null & void; that the
interest created in suit property in favour of Defendant 9 to 11, by way of
mortgage, is illegal, cannot be adjudicated by DRT and can only be adjudicated
by civil court. The learned trial court is justified in holding the suit to be
maintainable.
23. The issue do not conclude here. Section 34 firstly debars suit before civil
court in relation to matters which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate
Tribunal is empowered by or under the Act, to determine. However, section
further debars any other court or other authority from issuing any injunction in
respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred
by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and
Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Thus, where the first part of section bars
jurisdiction of civil court only, the second part of section is wider enough
which debars any court or authority from issuing any injunction.
24. If it is held that the suit is not maintainable, the question of issuance of
temporary injunction by civil court does arise. Further, if it is
old that the suit is maintainable before civil court, there was no occasion for
the legislature to have prescribed second part of Section 34, if it intended to
enable the civil court to issue injunction. Apparently, the legislature intended
that no injunction should be issued by any court or authority in respect of any
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action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under the
SRFAESI Act or under the RDBFI Act, 1993. Therefore, it is to held that, even
where the suit is maintainable, the civil court is not competent to issue any
injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any
power conferred by or under SRFAESI Act or under the RDBFI Act, 1993.
24. 226/2025
माननीय उ च यायालय म. . 0ारा )रट /पट.शन कमांक नीरज कुमार
जैन एवं अ य /वLM िन Nल जैन एवं अ य म यह अिभिनधा ()रत कया गया है क
Therefore, once there is a lien of the financial institution on the property by
way of mortgage or otherwise for repayment of loan taken by the defendant
Nos. 182 then the device of filing a suit will not prevent the defendant Nos.182
from fulfilling their obligation of repayment or the rights of the financial
institution to recover their dues and if any order would have been passed
granting injunction in favour of the plaintiffs then that would have prejudiced
the interest of the financial institution and that being not the spirit of the
provisions as contained in the Securitisation And Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.
25.
उ 1 िन OकषP के आलोक म ह 7तगत करण क = प )र67थितय2 को देखा जाए तो
/ ,
अपीलाथ , वाद . का वाद य R/प क = पोषणीय है *कंतु ब Cक 0ारा वाद B7त भवन को
नीलाम कर /वIय के िलये क = जा रह . काय (वाह. या क = जाने वाली काय (वाह. को
िनषेिधत कये जाने हेतु कसी कार का Fयादेश जार . नह .ं *कया जा सकता है। /व5ीय
आ 67तय2 का ितभूितकरण और पुनग (ठन तथा ितभूित *हत का वत(न अिधिनयम
2002 34
क = धारा के ावधान2 से यह 7प है क य द वाद पोषणीय नह .ं है तब
,
िनषेधा Sा का कोई T उ Uपन नह .ं होता और य *द वाद पोषणीय है तब उ 1
1993
अिधिनयम अथवा /व5ीय सं 7थाओं को शो य ऋण वसूली अिधिनयम के अधीन
द5 कसी श /1 के अनुसरण म ब Cक 0ारा क = गई या क = जाने वाली कसी काय (वाह.
के बावत् *कसी यायालय या अ य ािधकार. 0ारा कोई िनषेधा Sा जार . नह .ं क =
,
जाएगी। उ 1 ावधान आ Sापक कृित का है 6जस पर /व0ान /वचारण यायालय
35
0ारा Tगत आदेश म /वचार नह .ं *कया गया है। उ 1 अिधिनयम क = धारा से यह
भी 7प है क इस अिधिनयम के उपबंध त Uसमय वृ5 कसी अ य /विध म अंत /व(
इससे असंगत कसी बात या ऐसी कसी /विध के कारण भावी *कसी िलखत के होते
भी भावी ह 2गे । /व0ान /वचारण यायालय 0ारा Tगत आदेश म उ 1 ावधान2
हुए
,
पर /वचार नह .ं *कया गया है 6जससे Tगत आदेश दोषपूण ( होकर 67थर रखे जाने
/ 5
यो Wय नह .ं है। प )रणाम7वLप अपीलाथ , ितवाद. कमांक 0ारा 7तुत /व/वध
84/25 "
अपील 7वीकार कर Tगत आदेश अपा 7त *कया जाता है।
10. Considering the fact that from the material available on the
record, the findings given by the appellate Court is in consonance with the
factual aspects in accordance with law, as learned appellate Court has rightly
considered the aspect of Section 34 and 35 of the SARFAESI Act.
11. For convenience and ready reference, Section 34 and 34 of the
SARFAESI Act are reproduced below:
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"34. Civil Court not to have jurisdiction.
- No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in
respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate
Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction
shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken
or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or
under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993
( 51 of 1993 ).
35. The provisions of this Act to override other laws.
- The provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or
any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law."
12. It is also transpired that there is no dispute about the fact that
petitioner is the brother of deceased Sunil Kumar. In the year, 2022, Sunil
Kumar has availed the loan by executing mortgage. The amount of loan and
outstanding amount is now more than Rs. 75 lakhs. Pursuant to the fact that
Sunil Kumar has expired after availing loan after a period of two years, bank
has initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act. It further came to light
from the record that suit is filed in the year 2024 when the bank has initiated
proceedings pursuant to SARFAESI Act. It is also relevant to note that the
said Sunil Kumar had claimed the right in the property on the basis of 'dan
patra'[gift deed] and it is the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner
has 1/3 share in the property and the gift deed is given by the mother of the
petitioner.
13. Considering the fact that prima-facie the suit is filed with a view
to defeat the legitimate process of recovery of the amount of loan by the
bank, pursuant to proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act as it is
observed by the learned lower Appellate Court also that the trial Court has
committed error in not considering these aspects that all the three factors of
prima-face case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss cannot be
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considered in favour of the present petitioner as respondent no.5/bank is
having valid mortgage deed executed in its favour and pursuant to that,
proceedings under the 13(2) of SARFAESI Act have already been initiated
for recovery of huge amount of money from the legal heirs of the deceased
Sunil Kumar, therefore, such findings regarding the factors of prima-facie
case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss which are given in favour
of the petitioner are reversed by the learned lower Appellate Court .
14. I find that the learned lower Appellate Court has rightly come to
the conclusion and dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. Even
otherwise, assuming that at the end of said proceedings Court will come to
the conclusion that there is some interest still existing in the suit property,
though prima-face from the material on record, more particularly the gift
deed and mortgage, prima-facie case is made out, even then, after full-
fledged trial, Court came to the conclusion regarding any interest in the
property then, it can be compensated in terms of money. On that count also,
other factors are not in favour of the petitioner.
15. Considering the scope of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 r/w Section 151
CPC
ORDER XXXIX
TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS AND INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
Temporary injunctions
1. Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted.-3[*] Where in any suit
it is proved by affidavit or otherwise-
(a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged
or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a
decree, or
: (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his
property with a view to ¹[defrauding] his creditors,
2[(c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess, the plaintiff or otherwise cause
injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit,]
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the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or
make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting,
damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property [or
dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in
relation to any property in dispute in the suit] as the Court thinks fit, until the
disposal of the suit or until further orders. 4[*]
2. Injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach.-(1) In any suit for
restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury
of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff
may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after
judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the
defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained, of, or
any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract
or relating to the same property or right. (2) The Court may by order grant such
injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an
account, giving security, or otherwise as the Court thinks fit.
Section 151 CPC
"151.Saving of inherent powers of Court-Nothing in this Code shall be deemed
to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders
as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of
the Court."
16. The learned lower Appellate Court has exercised power under
Order 43 Rule 1 CPC has dismissed the appeal by the impugned order.
17. In this regard, Order 43 Rule 1 CPC is worthy of reference:
ORDER XLIII
APPEALS FROM ORDERS
1. Appeal from orders. An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the
provisions of section 104, namely:-
(a) an order under rule 10 of Order VII returning a plaint to be presented to the
proper Court [except where the procedure specified in rule 10A of Order VII has
been followed];
(r) an order under rule 1, rule 2 8 [rule 2A], rule 4 or rule 10 of Order XXXIX
18. In view of the above discussion, I found no illegality, infirmity,
impropriety or perversity in the findings recorded by the learned lower
Appellate Court.
19. Even other wise, considering the totality of facts and
circumstances of the case and the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another Vs. Rajendra Shankar
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Patil reported in 2010(8) SCC 329 this Court has very limited power to
interfere in the order impugned. Relevant para 39-43 & 47 to 49 are
reproduced below for convenience and ready reference:
" 37. The Constitution Bench in Nagendra Nath [AIR 1958 SC 398] ,
unanimously speaking through B.P. Sinha, J. (as His Lordship then was)
pointed out that High Court's power of interference under Article 227 is not
greater than its power under Article 226 and the power of interference under
Article 227 of the Constitution is limited to ensure that the tribunals function
within the limits of its authority.
(emphasis supplied)
38. The subsequent Constitution Bench decision of this Court on Article 227 of
the Constitution, rendered in State of Gujarat v. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji
Vaghela [AIR 1968 SC 1481] also expressed identical views. Bachawat, J.
speaking for the unanimous Constitution Bench opined that the power under
Article 227 cannot be fettered by the State Legislature but this supervisory
jurisdiction is meant to keep the subordinate tribunal within the limits of their
authority and to ensure that they obey law.
39. So the same expression, namely, to keep the courts and tribunals
subordinate to the High Court “within the bounds of their authority” used in
Manmatha Nath Biswas [AIR 1933 Cal 132] , to indicate the ambit of High
Court's power of superintendence has been repeated over again and again by
this Court in its Constitution Bench decisions.
40. Same principles have been followed by this Court in Mani Nariman
Daruwala v. Phiroz N. Bhatena [(1991) 3 SCC 141] , wherein it has been held
that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set
aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case where
there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come
to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. This Court made it
clear that except to this “limited extent” the High Court has no jurisdiction to
interfere with the findings of fact (see SCC pp. 149-50, para 18). In coming to
the above finding, this Court relied on its previous decision rendered in
Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [(1986) 4 SCC 447] . The
decision in Chandavarkar [(1986) 4 SCC 447] is based on the principle of the
Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh [AIR 1954 SC 215] and
Nagendra Nath [AIR 1958 SC 398] discussed above.
41. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in Laxmikant Revchand
Bhojwani v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi [(1995) 6 SCC 576] . In SCC
para 9 at pp. 579-80 of the Report, this Court clearly reminded the High Court
that under Article 227 that it cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all
species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave
dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and
justice.
42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High
Court's power under Article 227 in Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi
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[AIR 1968 SC 222] (see AIR pp. 222-34, para 5 of the Report) and the
decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathankhan [(1970) 2 SCC
717] . The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh [AIR 1954 SC 215]
about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Ahmedabad Mfg. &
Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnand [(1972) 1 SCC 898] .
43 [Ed.: Para 43 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./84/2010
dated 26-8-2010.] . In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in Surya
Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675] , a two-Judge Bench of this
Court discussed the principles of interference by the High Court under Article
227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675] this Court held that a writ
of certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil court, subordinate to the
High Court (SCC p. 688, para 19 of the Report). The correctness of that ratio
was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam v.
Chhabi Nath [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for
a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But insofar as the formulation of the
principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is
concerned, there is no divergence of views.
47. The jurisdiction under Article 227 on the other hand is not original nor is it
appellate. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both
administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred
under Articles 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different
fields. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article
226, the High Court normally annuls or quashes an order or proceeding but in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from
annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order
which the inferior tribunal should have made. (See Surya Dev Rai [(2003) 6
SCC 675] , SCC p. 690, para 25 and also the decision of the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque [AIR 1955 SC
233] , AIR p. 243, para 20.)
48. The jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is
affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo
motu as a custodian of justice. In fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised
in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or
other statutory rights. The jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the
High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the
State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the
relief under Article 226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex debito justitiae or
as a matter of right. But in cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction
under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no person can
claim it as a matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed under
Article 226, a letters patent appeal or an intra-court appeal is maintainable. But
no such appeal is maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a
High Court in exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all the High
Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High
Court's power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the
domain of the discretion of High Court.
49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following
principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution may be formulated:
a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a
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petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High
Court under these two articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ
petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High
Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the
power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have
been discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of
superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the
orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this
power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal
subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of
redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the
exercise of this power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their
power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court.
In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down
by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh [AIR 1954 SC
215] and the principles in Waryam Singh [AIR 1954 SC 215] have been
repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various
other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh [AIR 1954 SC 215] ,
followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the
tribunals and courts subordinate to it, “within the bounds of their
authority”.
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by
exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to
exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can
interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been
a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to
it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the
basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot
interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another
view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a
possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly
exercised.
(i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot
be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC
(L&S) 577] and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is
also very doubtful.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable
principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the
High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this
article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High
Court on the administration of justice within its territory.
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(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to
maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire
machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any
disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the
minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and
the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain
public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts
subordinate to the High Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to
be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be
directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of
justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for
protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article
227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of
judicial discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be
counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength
and vitality."
20. In view of the above settled position of law, the supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the
subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate
court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a
jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being
exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or
grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its
supervisory jurisdiction which is not the case herein as the learned appellate
Court below has not committed any error while dismissing the appeal
warranting
interference of this Court in exercise of the limited supervisory jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
21. Petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.
(SANDEEP N. BHATT)
JUDGE
sh
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