DIPAK RAMCHANDRA GHORPADE vs TEJASWINI DHANANJAY MORE, VAIBHAV KASHINATH KERIPALE, CO OP. MARKETING AND TEXTILE DEPARTMENT DIRECTORATE OF TEXTILE NAGPUR

GOODS AND SERVICES TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
PUNE BENCH
APL/3/PUN/2026
………….Appellant
M/s RELIANT BUILDUP, SANGLI
Versus
THE COMMISSIONER OF STATE
TAX, MAHARASHTRA
………….Respondent
Quorum:
Hon’ble Shridhar Mahadeo Bhosale, Member (Judicial)
Hon’ble Dr. Nirmal Kumar Soren, Member (Technical)
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Respondent
Shri Prashant Kumar Chipare,
GST Practitioner
Shri Prakash V. Kulkarni,
Deputy Commissioner
FINAL ORDER
Date of Last Hearing: 23.10.2026
Date of Order: 05.11.2026
Per: Dr. Nirmal Kumar Soren, Technical Member:
The Appeal
1. This appeal has been preferred under Section 112(1) of the
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Maharashtra
Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (hereinafter together referred to
as “the CGST Act”) against the Order-in-Appeal dated 13.10.2025
passed by the Deputy Commissioner of State Tax (Appeals),
Kolhapur, as the first appellate authority. By the said order, the first
appellate authority partly allowed the Appellant’s appeal against the
order-in-original dated 15.01.2024 (“the OIO”) passed by the State
Tax Officer, Sangli, as the proper officer, under Section 73(9), for
the period April 2018 to March 2019.
Brief Facts
2. The Appellant, a partnership firm carrying on business at
Sangli as a Government contractor and builder, is registered under
the CGST Act. During 2018-19 it executed works contracts for four
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co-operative spinning mills, namely, Loknete Gopinath Mundhe
Sahkari Soot Girani, Kej; Matoshri Triveni Bonde Magasvargiya
Sahkari Soot Girani, Morshi; Govind Magasvargiya Sahkari Soot
Girani, Majalgaon; and Shri Swami Samarth Soot Girani, Igatpuri
(together, “the societies”), and levied tax at 12% on those supplies.
3. Following an audit for 2018-19, the State Tax Officer, Sangli
issued under Section 73(1) a show cause notice in FORM GST
DRC-01, No. STO/SAN-VAT-C-007/Audit Finding/2018-19/B-989
dated 18.10.2023 (“the SCN”). On the rate, the SCN states that
“The taxpayer has levied the Tax @12% instead of 18% as these
are not the Government entities”, and proposes a penalty under
Section 122(1)(iii) and (x). It further proposes the disallowance of
“Excess ITC claimed in GSTR 3B/9 which is not confirmed in
2A/8A of GSTR-9”, the difference shown in its table being Rs.
4,19,476/-, and of input tax credit of Rs. 1,29,81,687/- availed after
the time limit in Section 16(4), and differential tax of Rs. 36,720/-
between FORM GSTR-9 and FORM GSTR-3B. It calls upon the
Appellant “to show cause as to why the above tax should not be
levied along with applicable interest and penalty as mentioned
above”. In its reply in FORM GST DRC-06 dated 04.12.2023, the
Appellant contended, on the rate, that “the said entities are not
Govt. Entities by its constitutional Status, however, the entity’s all
activities are totally controlled by the Department of Co-operation,
Marketing and Textile, Maharashtra”, and that it had “not collected
GST more than 12% from these entities”; and, on the credit, that
“The difference is due to the supplier of goods / service party has
not shown the bills on our GST Number on GSTN Portal”.
4. By the OIO, issued under No. STO/SANGLI_705/GST
AUDIT/DRC-07/2018-2019/B-22, the proper officer confirmed the
demands on the rate, on the excess credit and on the credit availed
after the time limit in Section 16(4), with interest. It imposed a
penalty under Section 122 on the rate head and penalties under
Section 73(9) on the two heads of credit. The differential tax of Rs.
36,720/- was “accepted and closed”, having been paid in FORM
GST DRC-03 on 27.10.2020 “along with applicable interest”. On
the rate, the OIO records that the letter of the Textile Department
dated 20.12.2016 relied upon by the Appellant was “only an
approval of budgetary provisions submitted by Soot girani itself”,
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and that the letter “directs that all the agreements with the
contractor and further related activities are to be completed by the
Soot Girani itself”; and it holds: “Sine these are private firms the
woks Contract done has to be taxed at 18%, irrespective of other
facts such as who is governing or sanctioning the work.” It adds:
“Merely saying that the customer has not accepted 18% tax and
given only 9% is not sustainable and further not justified, since such
things are not provided in the statute.” The proper officer put the
receipts from the societies for the year at Rs. 14,41,20,812/-, the tax
on them at 12% at Rs. 1,54,41,516/- and at 18% at Rs.
2,19,84,531/-, a difference of Rs. 65,43,015/-, and demanded Rs.
65,43,016/- (CGST Rs. 32,71,508/- and SGST Rs. 32,71,508/-). On
the credit of Rs. 4,19,476/-, the OIO holds that the excess claim “is
required to be disallowed as per the provision under section 16(2)
(C) and section 42(1) of CGST Act 2017”, and records that the
Appellant “was at the option to produce Ledger Confirmation as
required as per circular No. 183/15/2022-GST dated 27/12/2022.
But no any confirmations documents are produced.”
5. The Appellant appealed against the OIO to the first appellate
authority on 13.04.2024. As recorded in the impugned order, it
contended on the rate that “The activities of above entities are
controlled by Department of Co-operation, marketing and textile,
Maharashtra. Hence, they are treated these entities as Government
Entities”. It also contended that “All the above tenders are issued by
the Department of Textile, Government of Maharashtra”. On the
credit, it stated that “We will be providing the declarations from our
suppliers confirming the ITC claimed by us and paid by them”, and
that “The said confirmations are being taken in conformity with
CBIC Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST dated 27th Dec 2022”. On the
credit availed after the time limit, it contended that the credit “may
be allowed considering the provisions of sec 16(5)”. By an
additional ground against the penalty under Section 122, it
contended that “Mere difference of opinion on tax rate cannot be
equated with deliberate evasion”. The Appellant was heard on
22.08.2025 and 03.10.2025.
6. By the impugned order, No. DCST/APP/GST/1072/24-25/
DRC-07/A.O./25-26/No.251, the first appellate authority held,
“After analysing tender document, work order and payments for the
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F.Y. 2018-19 submitted by appellant”, that the Textile Department
“is mere the controlling and regulatory body who provided funds as
per budgetary provisions”. It further held that “The agreement and
other related activities are completed by Co- oprative Soot Giranis
which are the nongovernment entities hence the works contract
service provided to them is taxable at the rate 9% under CGST
ACT”. On the credit, it held: “The contention of the appellant is not
accepted as they have not submitted any ledger confirmations
during the appeal proceedings”.
7. The first appellate authority reduced to nil the demand of Rs.
1,29,81,687/- raised under Section 16(4), applying Section 16(5). It
held the penalty under Section 122 “nullified”. The tax, interest and
penalty levied by the OIO were otherwise “modified accordingly”:
tax of Rs. 69,62,492/- (CGST Rs. 34,81,246/- and SGST Rs.
34,81,246/-), interest of Rs. 65,05,878/- and penalty under Section
73(9) of Rs. 6,96,250/-; in all Rs. 1,41,64,620/-. The tax comprises
Rs. 65,43,016/- on account of the difference between tax at 18%
and tax at 12% on the works contracts executed for the societies.
The balance of Rs. 4,19,476/- is on account of input tax credit
disallowed. The interest comprises Rs. 60,25,718/- under Section
50(1) and Rs. 4,80,160/- under Section 50(3). It held that the
balance part payment of IGST of Rs. 95,840/- made at that stage “is
eligible for refund after recovery of Tax, interest, and penalty”.
Proceedings before the Tribunal
8. The appeal was filed on 12.01.2026 and registered on
22.07.2026. The Appellant filed Additional Grounds of Appeal,
with Annexures I to XXIII, on 26.08.2026 and, on 22.10.2026, the
bye-laws and the certificate of registration of the Igatpuri society,
with an English translation (“the Igatpuri bye-laws”). The appeal
was heard on 06.08.2026, 27.08.2026, 08.09.2026 and 05.10.2026,
and finally on 23.10.2026.
9. The Grounds of Appeal state two grounds. The first is that
the State Tax Officer “erred in making aadition by considering that
the taxpayer has short declared or concealed the outward tax
liability and charging interest u/s.50(1) and penalty u/s.122 of the
Act”. The second is that he “erred in disallowing the ITC claimed
by the taxpayer u/s.16(2) (c) of the CGST Act and charging interest
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u/s.50(1) and penalty u/s.73(9) of the Act”. On the rate, it is
contended that the orders below are “not in accordance with law as
the Outward Liability declared and paid by taxpayer is clearly
matched with the books of accounts of FY2018-19”. The societies,
it is said, “have paid to the taxpayer either 12% of the Works
Contract Service Amount or less than 12% as GST”, while the
Appellant “has totally discharged the tax liability to the
Government @12%”. The Appellant reiterates that “The activities
of above entities are controlled by Department of Co-operation,
marketing and textile, Maharashtra. Hence, they are treated these
entities as Government Entities”. It states that, in the work order of
the Igatpuri society, “the entity has accepted to pay GST liability
separately up to 9% only out of 12%”. It further states that “the
Architect Engineer appointed by the Soot Girani who finalizes each
and every bill, has recommended to pay GST on the said bills @
9% out of 12% and not 18%”, and that it has “not collected GST
more than 12% from these entities”. It contends that “All the above
tenders are issued by the Department of Textile, Government of
Maharashtra. Therefore, all above tenders are applicable for GST
Rate @ 12% as per Notification No. 11/2017- Central Tax (Rate)”.
The Grounds also take exception to the OIO’s reliance on the
auditor’s Note 4 to FORM GSTR-9C. They further state that “the
department have not deduct TDS under GST Act because of the
department had transfer the fund to Co-Operative Sootgirani
Account and amount received by the taxpayer from Co-Operative
Sootgirani”. This, it is said, is “only accounting effect but actual
this contract is totally Governed by Government”. On the credit, the
Grounds contend that the conditions of Section 16 are satisfied. The
check whether the tax charged has been paid, it is said, “seems
impossible as there is no invoice level linkage with GSTR-3B of the
supplier”. The credit is said to have been availed “provisionally
under Section 41”, and it is stated that “section 43A of CGST Act is
not yet notified to be effective”. Reliance is placed on Suncraft
Energy . The Grounds pray that the impugned order be set aside,
with “The confirmation of GST demand Rs.69,62,492/-”, the
interest under Sections 50(1) and 50(3) and the penalty under
Section 73(9).
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10. The Appellant has also filed Additional Grounds of Appeal
on the rate of tax (“Additional Ground No. 1” and “Additional
Ground No. 2”) and on the input tax credit (“Point No. 2”).
Additional Ground No. 1 states that the period of supply “falls
wholly prior to 01.01.2022”, from which Notification No. 15/2021-
Central Tax (Rate) restricted the entry. It states that the notification
“has no application, retrospective or otherwise, to the present
dispute”. The Appellant, it is said, “accordingly remained,
throughout the disputed period, entitled to claim the concessional
rate of 12% as available to supplies made to a Government Entity
under the unamended Sl. No. 3(vi) of Notification No. 11/2017-
Central Tax (Rate)”. It states that in the audit the proper officer
“thoroughly examined the books of account, records, and all
supporting documents produced by the Appellant”. This
verification, it is said, “has been specifically recorded in Form GST
DRC-07, particularly at Point No. 1, and has also been
acknowledged in the Appellate Order”. It contends that the
documents “clearly establish that the works contract relates to the
construction of the Sut Girani (Textile Mill) Building, which was
undertaken pursuant to the Scheme of the Department of Textiles,
Government of Maharashtra, and was financed through
Government grants sanctioned by the said Department”. It further
contends that the “Government Orders, sanction letters, and other
official communications issued by the Directorate of Textiles,
Government of Maharashtra, expressly prescribed the applicable
GST rate of 12%”. The Appellant, it is said, charged and discharged
tax at that rate “strictly in accordance with the Government
directions”.
11. It is further contended that the Government documents
“specifically governed the execution of the project and formed the
contractual foundation between the parties”. A meeting is said to
have been convened by the Minister of Textiles “in the presence of
the Principal Secretary of the Finance Department, wherein specific
instructions were issued regarding the applicable GST rate”. The
Appellant states that it has “relied upon and enclosed copies of all
relevant correspondence exchanged with the Finance Department in
this regard”. According to the Appellant, the Architect “was
appointed by the Directorate of Textiles, Government of
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Maharashtra, for and on behalf of the Department”. The agreements
with the societies, it is said, were executed in his presence as the
Architect “representing the Directorate of Textiles, Government of
Maharashtra”. The three work orders produced are said to have
“clearly mentioned that the tender was approved and monitored by
the State-Level Monitoring Committee”. The original agreement for
the Morshi mill, it is said, “could not be traced and is therefore
unavailable”.
12. On the entry itself, Additional Ground No. 1 contends that
“both limbs of this entry are satisfied on the facts of the present
case”. It contends that “The entrustment condition under the proviso
to Sl. No. 3(vi) is accordingly squarely met”. It also contends that
Vijai Electricals and the ruling concerning “TSIICL” are
“distinguishable on facts”. According to it, the societies “are
entities specially created under a State Government scheme for the
socio-economic upliftment and employment generation of
designated backward-class communities”. The contract, it is said,
“is a one-time capital construction contract for creation of the
underlying civil structure”, while “The subsequent operation of the
completed mill, if and when it commences commercial production,
is a distinct activity carried out by the cooperative society in its own
right”. It further contends that the non-business question “was never
examined or recorded as a finding in the impugned order at all”. It
adds that “The demand cannot be sustained on a ground never put
to the Appellant or considered by the Adjudicating Authority in the
first instance”.
13. Additional Ground No. 1 further contends that the impugned
order proceeds “without recording any finding as to the
applicability or otherwise of the relevant entries” of Notification
No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate). It contends that the impugned
order “completely ignores” the Government Letters and Minutes of
Meetings issued by the Department of Textiles. These, it is said,
“legitimately formed the basis for determining the applicable GST
rate”. The ground states that the impugned order is “therefore
contrary to the provisions of” Sections 9, 50 and 73 and of
Notification Nos. 11/2017, 20/2017 and 24/2017-Central Tax
(Rate), with their subsequent amendments. It invokes the
presumption under illustration (e) to Section 114 of the Indian
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Evidence Act, 1872 (“corresponding to Section 119 of the
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023”) that judicial and official acts
have been regularly performed. It contends that the Respondent
“has neither challenged the validity of these documents nor
produced any evidence to rebut the statutory presumption”.
Additional Ground No. 2 contends that, as to these documents, the
impugned order “neither discusses nor records any finding
regarding their evidentiary value”. The impugned order is said to be
“a non-speaking order insofar as it ignores the material Government
records and documentary evidence produced by the Appellant”.
14. On interest and penalty, Additional Ground No. 1 contends
that “The dispute involved is purely one of classification and
interpretation of the applicable rate notification”. It contends that
there is “neither suppression of facts, fraud, wilful misstatement nor
any intention to evade payment of tax”, and that “All facts relating
to the contract, invoices, turnover and GST payment were fully
disclosed in the books of account and statutory GST returns”.
Interest, it is said, is unsustainable as the Appellant “discharged the
entire tax collected from the recipient in accordance with a bona
fide interpretation of the applicable notification and Government
directions”. The penalty under Section 73 is said to be “wholly
illegal”. It pleads promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation,
relying on Indo-Afghan Agencies and Motilal Padampat , on the
footing that the rate of 12% was “expressly and repeatedly
prescribed, in writing, by the Department of Textiles, Government
of Maharashtra”. It states that the doctrine “does not permit a
private party to override a statutory rate of tax where none was
legally available”. It invokes the doctrine instead “for the distinct
and narrower purpose of demonstrating the complete absence of
culpability, wilful default or lack of bona fides on the part of the
Appellant”. Culpability, wilful default or lack of bona fides, it says,
are “the very foundation on which interest under Section 50 and
penalty under Section 73 rest”. As the Appellant acted on the
written direction of the Department of Textiles, said to be “also the
recipient of the supply”, it contends that interest and penalty “ought
accordingly to be waived in full even if the primary rate
classification is decided against the Appellant”.
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15. In the alternative, Additional Ground No. 1 reiterates the
prayer that “the benefit of cum-tax value be extended to the
Appellant”, since the Appellant “has at no stage collected any
amount from the recipient beyond GST @ 12%”. The Appellant
prays that it be held to have “rightly discharged GST at 12% on the
impugned works contract”, that the demand of differential tax at
18% be set aside, and that interest and penalty be deleted.
16. Under “Point No. 2”, it is contended that the disputed
transactions are “genuine business transactions supported by
original physical tax invoices”. It is also contended that “the alleged
mismatch is substantially attributable to supplier-side reporting in
FORM GSTR-1”. The Appellant submits that the fact that a
supplier has not furnished the “ledger confirmation/certificate”
contemplated by Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST (“the Circular”)
“cannot, by itself, be treated as conclusive evidence that the
underlying purchase transaction is bogus”. It submits that the
requirements of Section 16(2) “relating to the possession of valid
tax invoices and the actual receipt of goods and/or services, have
been duly satisfied”. Where credit is denied only because a supplier
has not furnished a confirmation or an invoice does not appear in
FORM GSTR-2A, the department, it is said, “ought to undertake
appropriate verification of the supplier and the underlying
transaction rather than shifting the entire consequence of supplier-
side reporting failure upon a bona fide recipient”. Reliance is placed
on Suncraft Energy , D.Y. Beathel Enterprises and Arise India .
Copies of the relevant invoices, GSTN portal printouts stated to
evidence the filing status of FORM GSTR-3B by the suppliers, and
details of payment of the consideration to the suppliers are stated to
be enclosed as Annexure I. The Appellant further submits that there
is “no allegation or finding in the impugned order that the purchases
were fictitious, that the suppliers were non-existent, that the goods
were not received, that the consideration was not paid, that the
invoices were fabricated, or that the Appellant had colluded with
the suppliers for wrongful availment of ITC”. It states that it “is
willing to place before the Hon’ble Tribunal” the invoice-wise
reconciliation and supporting records. It also “craves leave” to
submit the portal-generated records. If further verification is
considered necessary, it asks for an opportunity to produce further
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documents and that “the matter may be restored for limited
verification”. It prays that the disputed credit be allowed and the
consequential demand of tax, interest and penalty deleted.
Alternatively and without prejudice, it prays that “the matter may
be remanded for invoice-wise verification”.
17. In a written submission dated 02.09.2026, the Appellant
states that the State-Level Committee “constituted by the
Government” negotiated the tendered rates. The Committee, it says,
offered the work “at a negotiated rate of 35% above the estimated
tender cost, plus GST (As per Rule)”, and “the negotiated amount
accepted by the Appellant was exclusive of applicable taxes”. It
states that the Committee “communicated/represented that GST
would be applicable at the rate of 12% in respect of the work”. It
adds that, “in the subsequent billing/payment arrangement, GST to
the extent of 9% was reflected/considered by the concerned
authorities and the balance 3% was required to be borne by the
Appellant”. The submission states that the Appellant “accepts that a
statutory rate of tax, if otherwise applicable under the GST law,
cannot be altered merely by a private understanding between the
parties”. The reliance upon the Government directions, it says, is
made “for the limited and distinct purpose of establishing the
Appellant’s bona fides and absence of culpable conduct”. Relying
on P. Venugopal Naidu , it states that the High Court “directed the
competent authorities to examine whether the actual works satisfied
the notification conditions”. Here, it says, the authorities must
likewise examine the project “rather than proceeding merely on the
assumption that the standard rate of 18% is applicable”. It prays that
the concessional rate be allowed. Without prejudice, it prays that
the Appellant’s “bona fide conduct and reliance upon express
Government directions be accepted”, and that “the allegation of
wilful default, suppression or intention to evade tax be held
unsustainable”. It also prays that “the penalty proposed/imposed
upon the Appellant be dropped in full”, and that the interest demand
“be deleted/waived to the extent permissible in law”.
18. The Respondent supports the impugned order. Its reply, filed
on 05.09.2026, states that, “Upon a detailed review of the tender
documents, work orders, and payment terms”, the Textile
Department “acted strictly as a controlling and regulatory body
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providing budgetary funds”. It states that “The actual execution of
agreements and related operational activities was performed
directly by the Co-operative Soot Giranis, which operate as non-
government entities”. It concludes that, “because the contracting
party is a non-governmental entity, the concessional rate is
inapplicable, and the services are legally taxable at the standard rate
of 9% CGST (total 18% GST)”. On the credit, it states that the
Appellant “failed to submit the mandatory supplier ledger
confirmations or reconciliation documentation to substantiate the
credit claimed”. It adds that “In the absence of verifiable third-party
evidence to reconcile the mismatch, the contention of the appellant
cannot be accepted”. The reply does not deal with the Additional
Grounds or the Annexures. No further reply by the Respondent is
on record.
19. In its rejoinder to the reply, dated 03.09.2026 and filed on
05.09.2026, the Appellant contends that the reply itself
acknowledges that the Textile Department “acted as the controlling
and regulatory authority and provided budgetary support to the
projects”. It contends that “The transaction must be examined as a
whole”. It also contends that the State-Level Committee
“constituted a Government authority responsible for the sanctioning
and implementation of the concerned projects”. It contends that
later amendments “cannot be invoked retrospectively”, and relies
on P. Venugopal Naidu v. Union of India . On the credit, it contends
that the difference “cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that
the underlying purchases were fictitious”. It states that “the only
discrepancy was that the suppliers had not uploaded the
corresponding invoices in their GSTR-1 returns, although the
respective suppliers had duly filed their GSTR-3B returns”. It
contends that the principles of natural justice require “a meaningful
opportunity to reconcile the disputed credit”. It adds that recovery
on the basis of FORM GSTR-2A “would result in double taxation”.
It states that the Appellant “has duly fulfilled the conditions
prescribed under Section 16(2)(a)(b)(c)(d) of the CGST Act, 2017
except section 16(2)(aa)”.
20. In an Additional Rejoinder dated 01.10.2026, the Appellant
contends that the Government “exercised Substantive control over
the project”; that the Government machinery was involved
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“commencing from the formulation and implementation of the
scheme” through sanction, funding, tendering and negotiation to
completion; and that the work orders and agreements, though
executed by the societies, “were executed pursuant to and within
the framework of the Government-sanctioned project”. It relies on
Bagalkot Nirmithi Kendra for the principle that the Governmental
character of an entity is to be examined on its actual framework,
while stating that the Appellant “does not submit that the Bagalkot
Nirmithi Kendra judgment mechanically determines the GST rate
applicable to the contracts involved in the present appeal”. It relies
on three Government documents of 07.02.2018, 21.04.2018 and
03.12.2018, which, it says, “are not relied upon as an independent
source of exemption”, and, on the strength of Shapoorji Pallonji ,
contends that the Respondent “cannot, by interpretation, read the
expression “or” as “and”” in the expression “equity or control”. It
contends that GST liability “cannot be determined merely from the
nomenclature or legal status of the ultimate recipient”, and that the
Respondent “cannot introduce conditions which are not expressly
contained in the notification”. It prays that the rate be determined
upon “the complete factual matrix” rather than “merely on the basis
of the co-operative society status of the ultimate recipient”.
21. At the final hearing on 23.10.2026, the learned Authorised
Representatives of both parties appeared, and the learned
Authorised Representative for the Appellant was heard. The entry at
Sl. No. 3(vi), relied upon in Additional Ground No. 1, was
discussed with him. “It was pointed out to him that the end use of
the buildings constructed may not be in line with that provided in
the said entry, namely, original works “meant predominantly for
use other than for commerce, industry, or any other business or
profession””. The learned Authorised Representative “agreed with
the same, while submitting that the construction was broadly for the
purpose of the socio-economic upliftment and employment
generation of the designated backward-class communities”. As
regards the input tax credit, he submitted “that the invoices, proof
of payment and ledgers have been furnished; that the suppliers have
filed their returns in FORM GSTR-3B; that ledger confirmations
could not be obtained from the suppliers; and that the denial of the
credit would result in double taxation”. Asked whether the
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Appellant had any grievance with regard to the calculation, and
whether it had been done on a net basis, he “stated that it was on a
net basis only”. The matter was reserved for final order.
The Legal Framework
22. Section 9(1) of the CGST Act levies tax on all intra-State
supplies of goods or services or both “on the value determined
under section 15 and at such rates, not exceeding twenty per cent.,
as may be notified by the Government on the recommendations of
the Council”. The rates for services are notified in Notification No.
11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017.
23. Item (vi) against Sl. No. 3 of that notification, as substituted
by Notification No. 24/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 21.09.2017
and amended by Notification No. 31/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated
13.10.2017, read, during the period in dispute, as follows (central
tax at 6%):
(vi) Services provided to the Central Government, State
Government, Union Territory, a local authority, a
Governmental Authority or a Government Entity by way
of construction, erection, commissioning, installation,
completion, fitting out, repair, maintenance, renovation,
or alteration of —
(a) a civil structure or any other original works meant
predominantly for use other than for commerce,
industry, or any other business or profession;
(b) a structure meant predominantly for use as (i) an
educational, (ii) a clinical, or (iii) an art or cultural
establishment; or
(c) a residential complex predominantly meant for self-
use or the use of their employees or other persons
specified in paragraph 3 of the Schedule III of the
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
24. With effect from 27.07.2018, Notification No. 17/2018-
Central Tax (Rate), issued under Section 11(3) of the CGST Act
“for the purpose of clarifying the scope and applicability” of the
notification, inserted in item (vi) the following Explanation: “For
the purposes of this item, the term ‘business’ shall not include any
activity or transaction undertaken by the Central Government, a
State Government or any local authority in which they are engaged
as public authorities.” Item (vi) was not otherwise amended during
the period in dispute.
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25. Notification No. 31/2017-Central Tax (Rate) also inserted
paragraph 4(x), which defines the expression:
(x) “Government Entity” means an authority or a board
or any other body including a society, trust, corporation,
i) set up by an Act of Parliament or State Legislature; or
ii) established by any Government,
with 90per cent. or more participation by way of equity
or control, to carry out a function entrusted by the
Central Government, State Government, Union Territory
or a local authority.
26. Supplies not covered by any of the preceding items fall under
item (xii) against Sl. No. 3, as substituted by Notification No.
1/2018-Central Tax (Rate) dated 25.01.2018: “Construction
services other than (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x)
and (xi) above”, at central tax of 9%. With effect from 01.01.2019,
Notification No. 27/2018-Central Tax (Rate) inserted after “(xi)
above” the words “and serial number 38 below”.
27. As to value, Section 15(1) provides that the value of a supply
“shall be the transaction value, which is the price actually paid or
payable for the said supply of goods or services or both where the
supplier and the recipient of the supply are not related and the price
is the sole consideration for the supply”.
28. As to interest and penalty, Section 50(1) provides:
(1) Every person who is liable to pay tax in accordance
with the provisions of this Act or the rules made
thereunder, but fails to pay the tax or any part thereof to
the Government within the period prescribed, shall for
the period for which the tax or any part thereof remains
unpaid, pay, on his own, interest at such rate, not
exceeding eighteen per cent., as may be notified by the
Government on the recommendations of the Council. …
29. Section 50(3), as substituted by section 111 of the Finance
Act, 2022 with effect from 01.07.2017, provides:
(3) Where the input tax credit has been wrongly availed
and utilised, the registered person shall pay interest on
such input tax credit wrongly availed and utilised, at
such rate not exceeding twenty-four per cent. as may be
notified by the Government, on the recommendations of
the Council, and the interest shall be calculated, in such
manner as may be prescribed.
30. Sub-sections (8) and (9) of Section 73 read:
Page 14 of 36

(8) Where any person chargeable with tax under sub-
section (1) or sub-section (3) pays the said tax along
with interest payable under section 50 within thirty days
of issue of show cause notice, no penalty shall be
payable and all proceedings in respect of the said notice
shall be deemed to be concluded.
(9) The proper officer shall, after considering the
representation, if any, made by person chargeable with
tax, determine the amount of tax, interest and a penalty
equivalent to ten per cent. of tax or ten thousand rupees,
whichever is higher, due from such person and issue an
order.
31. As to input tax credit, Section 16(2), as it stood during the
period in dispute, provides, so far as material:
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section,
no registered person shall be entitled to the credit of any
input tax in respect of any supply of goods or services or
both to him unless,—
(a) he is in possession of a tax invoice or debit note
issued by a supplier registered under this Act, or such
other tax paying documents as may be prescribed;
(b) he has received the goods or services or both. …
(c) subject to the provisions of section 41, the tax
charged in respect of such supply has been actually paid
to the Government, either in cash or through utilisation
of input tax credit admissible in respect of the said
supply; and
(d) he has furnished the return under section 39: …
32. Section 155 provides:
Where any person claims that he is eligible for input tax
credit under this Act, the burden of proving such claim
shall lie on such person.
33. Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST dated 27.12.2022 states, in its
opening paragraph, that “during the financial years 2017-18 and
2018-19, in many cases, the suppliers have failed to furnish the
correct details of outward supplies in their FORM GSTR-1, which
has led to certain deficiencies or discrepancies in FORM GSTR-2A
of their recipients”. Para 4 sets out the steps for the proper officer:
to “seek the details from the registered person regarding all the
invoices on which ITC has been availed by the registered person in
his FORM GSTR 3B but which are not reflecting in his FORM
GSTR 2A”, and then to ascertain the fulfilment of the conditions of
Section 16. Para 4.1 and its sub-paragraphs then set out:
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4.1 In order to verify the condition of clause (c) of sub-
section (2) of Section 16 of CGST Act that tax on the
said supply has been paid by the supplier, the following
action may be taken by the proper officer:
4.1.1 In case, where difference between the ITC claimed
in FORM GSTR-3B and that available in FORM GSTR
2A of the registered person in respect of a supplier for
the said financial year exceeds Rs 5 lakh, the proper
officer shall ask the registered person to produce a
certificate for the concerned supplier from the Chartered
Accountant (CA) or the Cost Accountant (CMA),
certifying that supplies in respect of the said invoices of
supplier have actually been made by the supplier to the
said registered person and the tax on such supplies has
been paid by the said supplier in his return in FORM
GSTR 3B. …
4.1.2 In cases, where difference between the ITC
claimed in FORM GSTR-3B and that available in
FORM GSTR 2A of the registered person in respect of a
supplier for the said financial year is upto Rs 5 lakh, the
proper officer shall ask the claimant to produce a
certificate from the concerned supplier to the effect that
said supplies have actually been made by him to the said
registered person and the tax on said supplies has been
paid by the said supplier in his return in FORM GSTR
3B.
34. By para 6, the instructions “will apply in those cases for FY
2017-18 and 2018-19 where any adjudication or appeal proceedings
are still pending”.
35. As to advance rulings, Section 103(1) provides:
(1) The advance ruling pronounced by the Authority or
the Appellate Authority under this Chapter shall be
binding only—
(a) on the applicant who had sought it in respect of any
matter referred to in sub-section (2) of section 97 for
advance ruling;
(b) on the concerned officer or the jurisdictional officer
in respect of the applicant.
36. As to the powers of this Tribunal, Section 113(1) provides
that the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties an
opportunity of being heard, “pass such orders thereon as it thinks
fit, confirming, modifying or annulling the decision or order
appealed against or may refer the case back to the Appellate
Authority, or the Revisional Authority or to the original
adjudicating authority, with such directions as it may think fit, for a
Page 16 of 36

fresh adjudication or decision after taking additional evidence, if
necessary”.
Points for Determination
37. Having heard the learned Authorised Representative for the
Appellant, and considered the reply of the Respondent and the
record, we find that the following points arise for determination:
(i) Whether the Additional Grounds of Appeal and the
Appellant’s later filings are to be taken on record;
(ii) Whether the supplies to the societies were liable to tax
at the concessional rate of 12% under Sl. No. 3(vi) of
Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate);
(iii) Whether the interest under Section 50(1) and the
penalty under Section 73(9) call for interference, and whether
the ground against the penalty under Section 122 survives;
(iv) Whether the differential tax calls for recomputation on
a cum-tax basis; and
(v) Whether the disallowance of input tax credit of Rs.
4,19,476/-, with interest under Section 50(3), calls for
interference.
Discussion and Findings
Point (i)
38. The Additional Grounds were filed with Annexures running
to over a thousand pages. They do not set up a new case on facts:
they elaborate the grounds already taken against the rate and the
disallowance of credit, and the principal documents relied upon (the
tender documents, work orders and the Textile Department’s
letters) were in substance before the authorities below, which refer
to them. The Respondent’s reply does not object to their being
taken on record. In the interest of justice we take the Additional
Grounds and the Annexures on record, together with the
Appellant’s written submission, its Additional Rejoinder, the two
decisions filed with it and the Igatpuri bye-laws, all of which the
Appellant relies upon and none of which the Respondent has
opposed. Point (i) is answered in the affirmative.
Page 17 of 36

Point (ii)
39. The Appellant’s case is that the supplies were made to a
Government Entity; it does not claim that the societies are a
Governmental Authority. The burden lies on the Appellant, which
claims the concession, to bring the supply within the terms of the
entry. The concession under Sl. No. 3(vi) turns on two conditions:
the status of the recipient, and the use for which the works are
meant. We take first the documents on which the Appellant relies
and the identity of the recipient, and then each condition.
40. With Additional Ground No. 1 the Appellant has placed on
record Annexures II to XXIII. The case built on them is set out in
that ground. The Respondent’s reply does not deal with the
documents individually; it states that, upon a review of “the tender
documents, work orders, and payment terms”, the Textile
Department “acted strictly as a controlling and regulatory body
providing budgetary funds”. We have examined the documents with
that case in view. They may be taken in groups.
41. Minutes of the State-level Monitoring Committee and
covering letters (Annexures III to VI). These documents are in
Marathi; the Appellant has filed certified English translations of
them, and we have read them in those translations. As translated,
the minutes for the Kej, Morshi and Igatpuri mills record that the
State-level Monitoring Committee was constituted under the
Government Resolution dated 15.06.2006, and those for the
Majalgaon mill that it was constituted “by the Directorate vide letter
dated 1/06/2018”. For each mill, the meeting that approved the
tender was held under the chairmanship of the Minister (Textiles),
and the Committee negotiated with the Appellant as the lowest
tenderer and approved its tender. The covering letters for the
Majalgaon and Morshi mills forward the minutes to the society with
the direction that “an agreement shall be executed with the
contractor” (Majalgaon) and that “necessary further action may be
taken by entering into an agreement with the contractor” (Morshi).
What the Committee approved in each case was the contract price,
expressed as a premium over the Schedule of Rates or the e-tender
price, with a stated component of GST: in the translation of the
minutes for the Morshi mill, “35% above + 9% GST (Out of 12%)”.
Page 18 of 36

For the Majalgaon mill the approved value, as carried into the work
order, is “Rs. 6,23,22,454/- plus G.S.T. @ 6% extra”.
42. A decision on how much tax a co-operative society would
bear within an approved contract price is a decision on price, not a
determination of the rate at which the supply is exigible to tax. That
rate is fixed by notification issued under Section 9(1) of the CGST
Act on the recommendations of the GST Council; no department of
the State can alter it by administrative decision, and the minutes do
not purport to examine whether the supply fell within Sl. No. 3(vi).
43. It is contended in Additional Ground No. 1 that the Textile
Department’s letters and minutes “constitute contemporaneous
official documents issued by the competent Government authority
and legitimately formed the basis for determining the applicable
GST rate”. The difficulty is with the description of the authority as
“competent”. A department of the State that sanctions and
supervises a project is not competent to determine the rate at which
a supply is taxed, and the Monitoring Committee did not claim to
do so. The letter of 20.12.2016, relied upon before the authorities
below, sanctioned the Kej tender some six months before GST
came into force. The Additional Rejoinder relies on three of the
Government documents while stating that they “are not relied upon
as an independent source of exemption”. That accords with our
reading of them: they settle the GST component of the contract
price, not the rate at which the supply is taxed. As to the contention
that instructions regarding the applicable GST rate were issued at a
meeting in the presence of the Principal Secretary of the Finance
Department, the minutes of one meeting of the Monitoring
Committee under the Minister record that a “Finance Department
representative” was present; but, like the other minutes, they settle
only the GST component of the price. We find on record no
correspondence of the Finance Department recording instructions
on the rate; and no department of the State can alter the rate notified
under Section 9(1).
44. Additional Ground No. 1 also invokes the presumption that
official acts have been regularly performed. Section 119(1) of the
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, a copy of which the Appellant
has itself filed, provides that the Court “may presume the existence
Page 19 of 36

of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened”, and illustration
(e) is that “judicial and official acts have been regularly
performed”: the presumption is discretionary, of fact, and
rebuttable. Its subject is the regularity of an official act, not the
legal effect a party attributes to it. The Respondent does not
question that the letters and minutes were regularly issued, and we
proceed on that footing; but no presumption can give a
departmental minute on contract price the force of a notification
under Section 9(1). The contention that the impugned order is
contrary to Sections 9, 50 and 73 and to the notifications identifies
no particular contravention.
45. Appointment of the Architect (Annexures VII to X). The
Appellant’s case is that M/s Shrikant Patil & Associates, Kolhapur,
were appointed by the Directorate “for and on behalf of the
Department”. The letters say otherwise. Each refers to the mill’s
own letter (for example, “Reference: Mill’s letter dated
28/12/2015”) requesting approval for the Architect’s appointment,
and grants the approval subject to a ceiling on the fee, payable from
the provision for construction in the mill’s approved project report.
The Appellant’s own Grounds of Appeal describe him as “the
Architect Engineer appointed by the Soot Girani”. The Architect
was engaged by each society, with the Directorate’s approval given
in its supervisory role.
46. Work orders and agreements (Annexures XII to XIV). Each
work order and each agreement on record is issued or signed by the
Chairman or the Executive Director of the society concerned. The
agreement for the Igatpuri mill, for instance, is made “BETWEEN
THE CHAIRMAN, SHREE SWAMI SAMARTH ANUSUCHIT
JATI MAHILA SAHAKARI SOOT GIRNI LTD., IGATPURI”,
“hereinafter referred to as the ‘owner’”, and the Appellant, and
fixes the contract sum at “35% above the estimated cost of tender of
Rs.7,37,57,714/-+ G.S.T. @ 9%”. The Directorate appears only as
the authority that sanctioned the tender. The work order for the Kej
mill is dated 24.12.2016, before the levy of GST, and provides that
the tenderer “shall be entitled to receive service tax reimbursement
after payment”. The agreement for the Morshi mill is stated to be
untraceable.
Page 20 of 36

47. Tender documents (Annexure XV). The tender documents
were issued on behalf of each society. The work is described as
“Construction of Main Factory Building and Allied Works”; the
Employer is “The Chairman” of the society; clause 2.1 of the
Instructions to Bidders, “Source of Funds”, states that “The
expenditure on this project will be met from the budget of Spinning
Mill”; and the rates quoted are “deemed to be inclusive of the sales
and other taxes that the Contractor will have to pay for the
performance of this Contract”.
48. Invoices and running-account bills (Annexure XI). The
invoices are raised on each society as buyer. On their face they
charge CGST and SGST at 6% each on the contract receipts and
then deduct an amount described as “Reduction in GST -
Soothgirani”; the running-account bills certified by the Architect
add “G.S.T. @ 9%” to the value of work done. This accords with
the Appellant’s own statement in its Grounds of Appeal that, in the
work order of the Igatpuri society, “the entity has accepted to pay
GST liability separately up to 9% only out of 12%”. The written
submission is to similar effect: “in the subsequent billing/payment
arrangement, GST to the extent of 9% was reflected/considered by
the concerned authorities and the balance 3% was required to be
borne by the Appellant”.
49. Read as a whole, the documents establish that the four
projects were sanctioned, monitored and supervised under a scheme
of the Government of Maharashtra for co-operative spinning mills,
and that tender approvals passed through a Committee chaired by
the Minister. That much is not in dispute. They do not bear out the
case built on them. First, each society, and not the Government or
the Directorate, invited the tender, was named as the Employer,
entered into the agreement as the “owner”, and was billed for the
work. The Appellant’s own Grounds of Appeal bear this out: no tax
was deducted at source under Section 51 because the funds were
transferred to the societies’ accounts and the amounts were
“received by the taxpayer from Co-Operative Sootgirani”.
Secondly, the tender documents state that the expenditure was to be
met from the budget of the spinning mill. Thirdly, no document
purports to fix the rate of tax under the notification: the references
to 12% record the rate assumed in settling the GST component of
Page 21 of 36

an approved contract price. The State-level Monitoring Committee
and the Directorate of Textiles sanctioned the tenders and
supervised the projects; they did not receive the supply. The
description of the Committee in the rejoinder, as “a Government
authority responsible for the sanctioning and implementation of the
concerned projects”, may be accepted; it does not make the
Committee the recipient of the works. The recipient of each supply
was the society concerned.
50. We turn to the first condition, that the recipient be a
“Government Entity”. The first limb of the definition is not
attracted. The certificate filed on 22.10.2026 shows that the Igatpuri
society was registered on 04.08.2001 under Section 9(1) of the
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, and classified under
Section 12(1) of that Act as a processing society; it is not suggested
that the other three societies were constituted any differently. A
body so registered is not, for that reason, “set up by an Act of
Parliament or State Legislature”. The Supreme Court in
Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax, Patna
v. Shapoorji Pallonji and Company Pvt. Ltd. , Civil Appeal No.
3991 of 2023, decided on 13.10.2023, relied upon in the Additional
Rejoinder, construing the corresponding definition of
“governmental authority” in the service tax exemption notification,
held (para 24):
24. In the present case, the word “or” between sub-
clauses (i) and (ii) indicates the independent and
disjunctive nature of sub-clause (i), meaning thereby that
“or” used after sub-clause (i) cannot be interpreted as
“and” so as to tie it with the condition enumerated in the
long line of clause 2(s) which is applicable only to sub-
clause (ii).
51. The decision thus enables a body set up by statute (there, the
Indian Institute of Technology, Patna and the National Institute of
Technology, Rourkela, established under their own Acts) to qualify
under the first limb without the ninety per cent condition attached to
the second. The societies were not set up by any statute, and the
first limb is not available to them. The Additional Rejoinder relies
on the decision for a different proposition, that the Respondent
cannot read “or” as “and” in the expression “equity or control”.
That reading may be accepted. It does not, however, dispense with
Page 22 of 36

the requirement of the second limb that the body be “established by
any Government”.
52. The second limb requires that the body be “established by
any Government”, with ninety per cent or more participation by
way of equity or control, to carry out a function entrusted by the
Government. None of the Grounds of Appeal, the Additional
Grounds or the rejoinder pleads ninety per cent participation by way
of equity or control; the case pleaded is one of sanction, supervision
and budgetary support and, in Additional Ground No. 1,
entrustment of the works. The same ground describes the societies
as “entities specially created under a State Government scheme”;
but a society formed under a scheme and registered under the
general law of co-operative societies is not, for that reason,
established by the Government. The Additional Rejoinder goes
further and pleads Government control; but the control it pleads is
control over the projects, and it points to no document showing that
any society was established by the Government. Of the societies’
own constitutive documents, only the Igatpuri bye-laws have been
filed. Bye-law 5.1 provides for share capital to be raised from
members and from “the Government, co-operative societies, and
autonomous bodies sanctioned by the Registering Authority”, and
bye-law 5.3 fixes the authorised share capital at Rs. 25.00 crore;
neither discloses the extent of any Government holding. The Board
of Directors consists of fourteen directors elected from
constituencies of the members, with power to co-opt expert
directors and functional directors, the latter being officers in the
service of the mill (bye-law 8). Nothing has been filed for the other
three societies. The Appellant’s own translations of two
Government Resolutions dated 07.06.2023, concerning the Kej and
Igatpuri mills and filed with Additional Ground No. 1, do record
that those mills were “selected for Government financial assistance”
under “the 5:45:50 pattern” by the Government Resolution dated
18.11.2015, that the ratio of members’ share capital to Government
share capital is to be 1:9, and that an amendment of 2016 to the
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, providing for the
appointment of two Government members on co-operative
societies, is binding on them. That material bears on participation
by way of equity or control. The Appellant has not relied on it for
Page 23 of 36

that purpose, and the parties have not addressed it. We do not
decide whether the Government’s participation in any society, by
way of equity or control, meets the ninety per cent test.
53. The second limb is not satisfied in any event, because it also
requires that the body be “established by any Government”. The
Igatpuri society was registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative
Societies Act, 1960 in 2001, and was selected for Government
financial assistance only by the Government Resolution of
18.11.2015. Where the Monitoring Committee minutes speak of
financial assistance “for establishment of the Spinning Mill”, they
refer to the setting up of the mill as a project, not to the constitution
of the society. As to the other three societies, nothing has been
placed on record to show how they came to be constituted, and the
burden on that question lay on the Appellant. The Appellant’s case
on the second limb has not been made good.
54. The Appellant has also placed on record the decision of the
High Court of Karnataka in M/s Bagalkot Nirmithi Kendra v. Union
of India , 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 21240. There a society registered
pursuant to a Government Order of 1990, whose governing body
consisted of the Deputy Commissioner of the District as Chairman
and other ex officio officers of the State and the Zilla Panchayat,
was held to be a Government Entity. The High Court observed:
11. … The petitioner is headed by the Chairman, the
Chairman is the Deputy Commissioner. Therefore, the
petitioner is completely controlled by the government.
…
… It is again a matter of record that the Society is
controlled by the State Government and funded inter alia
by the State Government. Therefore, undoubtedly the
petitioner fits into the definition of Clause (zfa) - a
‘Government Entity’. …
55. The decision turned on facts established from the society’s
memorandum and rules, under which it was headed by the Deputy
Commissioner and governed by officers of the Government. On the
composition of the governing body, the only material before us, the
Igatpuri bye-laws, points the other way: the Board of that society
consists of directors elected by its members. The Additional
Rejoinder relies on the decision only for the principle that the
Governmental character of an entity is to be examined on its actual
Page 24 of 36

framework, and states that it does not submit that the decision
“mechanically determines the GST rate”. We have examined the
framework on the record. The decision, of another High Court and
on a different entry (a supply made by a Government Entity), does
not assist the Appellant.
56. The broader submission in the rejoinder is that “The
transaction must be examined as a whole” and not by isolating the
identity of the “operational recipient” from the Government-
sponsored nature of the projects. The entry, however, makes the
status of the recipient a condition of the concession, and the
definition prescribes how that status is to be tested; Government
sponsorship, however strongly established, cannot take the place of
those tests. The Additional Rejoinder develops the same
submission: the work orders and agreements were executed
“pursuant to and within the framework of the Government-
sanctioned project”, and GST liability “cannot be determined
merely from the nomenclature or legal status of the ultimate
recipient”. The test the notification lays down is not one of
nomenclature; it is one of establishment and of equity or control,
and it is applied to the body that receives the supply.
57. Three subsidiary contentions may be disposed of here.
(a) It is urged that Notification No. 15/2021-Central Tax
(Rate), which restricted the entry with effect from
01.01.2022, cannot apply retrospectively. That is correct but
not in issue: no authority has invoked the amended entry, and
we have examined the claim under the entry as it stood in
2018-19.
(b) It is urged that the books were examined in the audit.
Verification of records in an audit is not an acceptance of the
rate at which tax was paid; it was the audit itself that gave
rise to the SCN.
(c) The Grounds of Appeal take exception to the reliance
in the OIO on the auditor’s Note 4 to FORM GSTR-9C. The
note, as reproduced by the Appellant, records that the
taxpayer charged 12% on the basis of the Textile
Department’s letter dated 20.12.2016, that “the 12% GST
Page 25 of 36

rate on Works Contract is applicable only on Govt.
Contracts”, and that “due to above information the taxpayer
has applied the 12% GST rate and we also accepted the
same”. The OIO’s paraphrase, that the auditor
“recommended that it should be levied @18 %”, goes further
than the note. But the auditor accepted the rate on the footing
of the Textile Department’s letter dated 20.12.2016, and on
the premise that “the 12% GST rate on Works Contract is
applicable only on Govt. Contracts”; that letter is the sanction
of the Kej tender, issued before GST and followed by an
agreement providing for “Service tax as applicable”; and the
impugned order does not rest on the note. Nothing turns on it.
58. We turn to the second condition, the use of the works. Even
where the recipient is a Government Entity, item (a) of Sl. No. 3(vi)
does not extend the concessional rate to every work: it covers only
works “meant predominantly for use other than for commerce,
industry, or any other business or profession”. The condition is part
of the very entry under which the concession is claimed, and the
burden of satisfying it lies on the Appellant. It is contended that the
question “was never examined or recorded as a finding in the
impugned order at all”. The authorities below did rest on the status
of the recipients; but the Appellant raised the condition itself,
contending that “both limbs of this entry are satisfied”; the
Respondent has had notice of the Additional Grounds; and the point
was put to the learned Authorised Representative for the Appellant
at the hearing on 23.10.2026, when he “agreed with the same, while
submitting that the construction was broadly for the purpose of the
socio-economic upliftment and employment generation of the
designated backward-class communities”. The general submission
in the Additional Rejoinder that the Respondent “cannot introduce
conditions which are not expressly contained in the notification”
does not touch a condition in the words of the entry itself.
59. The test is the use for which the structure is meant. It is to be
judged objectively, from what the works are and the purpose for
which they were contracted, and not from the status of the person
who owns them or the social purposes for which it was formed.
Every tender and agreement on record is for the “Construction of
Main Factory Building and Allied Works” of a co-operative
Page 26 of 36

spinning mill. Bye-law 4.1 of the Igatpuri society states its objects.
Item 2 reads: “The object of the Mill is mainly to produce yarn of
different counts”. By item 5, cotton is to be purchased from the
members and, after ginning and spinning, “the finished goods
produced shall be sold”; by item 4, the Mill may purchase
machinery “for the efficient working of the Mill and for its allied
industries and businesses”. A factory building in which cotton is
spun into yarn for sale is meant for industry and commerce.
Additional Ground No. 1 itself speaks of the operation of the
completed mill “if and when it commences commercial
production”. Nor does the Explanation inserted by Notification No.
17/2018-Central Tax (Rate) bear on the question: it excludes from
“business” only an activity of the Central Government, a State
Government or a local authority “in which they are engaged as
public authorities”, and the societies are none of these. We do not
rest on the concession recorded on 23.10.2026; the record bears it
out.
60. The Appellant’s answer is twofold. It is said, first, that the
societies were created under a State scheme “for the socio-
economic upliftment and employment generation of designated
backward-class communities”. That is a statement about the owner
and its purpose, not about the use of the building. Item (a) asks
what the structure is meant to be used for; the beneficent objects of
the person who owns or operates it do not change the character of a
factory building, and an industry carried on for the benefit of a
disadvantaged community remains an industry. It is said, secondly,
that the contract is a one-time capital construction, distinct from the
subsequent operation of the mill. Every construction contract is a
one-time capital work; if that were enough, the words of item (a)
would have no field of operation. The word “meant” directs
attention to the use for which the structure is built, which is
necessarily the use that follows its completion.
61. The Appellant has itself placed on record the ruling of the
Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling, Andhra Pradesh in Vijai
Electricals Ltd. , Order No. AAAR/AP/03(GST)/2019 dated
24.04.2019 (Annexure XVI), and refers to a ruling concerning
“TSIICL” for which no citation is given. As the Appellant describes
them, works for a power-distribution utility and for rentable
Page 27 of 36

commercial warehousing were there held ineligible for the
concessional rate “on the ground that the recipient’s own activity
was commercial in nature”, and it distinguishes them on the ground
that those recipients were ongoing commercial utilities. The
distinction does not assist it: a mill which buys cotton and sells yarn
is engaged in industry and commerce no less. We refer to these
rulings only because the Appellant has placed them on record and
seeks to distinguish them; under Section 103(1), an advance ruling
is “binding only” on the applicant and on the concerned or
jurisdictional officer in respect of the applicant.
62. Nor does P. Venugopal Naidu v. Union of India , W.P. No.
33250 of 2022 and batch, decided on 03.03.2026 (High Court of
Andhra Pradesh), relied upon in the rejoinder and in the written
submission, help the Appellant. Having held the Tirumala Tirupati
Devasthanams Board to be a Governmental Authority and a
Government Entity for the purposes of the notification, the High
Court held that the reduced rate “would be available only if the
works, which have been executed by these petitioners, are falling
within the nature of works stipulated under the notifications”, which
was “a question of fact” (para 16), and remitted that question to the
assessing authorities (para 17). Here the question of fact is
answered by the record.
63. We accordingly hold that the societies are not shown to be a
“Government Entity” within paragraph 4(x) of Notification No.
11/2017-Central Tax (Rate); and, independently, that the works
were not meant predominantly for use other than for commerce,
industry, or any other business or profession within item (a) of Sl.
No. 3(vi). Either finding is sufficient. Since the societies are not
shown to be Government Entities, the condition in column (5) that
services supplied to a Government Entity “should have been
procured by the said entity in relation to a work entrusted to it” does
not arise, and we do not decide the contention that the works were
so entrusted. The concessional rate under Sl. No. 3(vi) was not
available, and the supplies were liable to central tax at 9% and State
tax at 9% under item (xii) against Sl. No. 3. Subject to Point (iv),
the differential tax of Rs. 65,43,016/- was rightly confirmed.
Page 28 of 36

64. Additional Ground No. 2 remains. The OIO gave reasons for
rejecting the reliance on the letter of 20.12.2016 and the tender
documents, and the impugned order, after “analysing tender
document, work order and payments”, recorded findings on the role
of the Textile Department and the status of the societies. The
reasons are brief, but brevity is not absence of reasons, and an
authority does not fail in its duty because it does not discuss each
document separately where its reasons answer the case put to it. In
any event, under Section 113(1) this Tribunal may itself confirm,
modify or annul the order appealed against, and need refer the case
back only where a fresh adjudication is necessary. All the
documents are now on record and we have examined them above. A
remand would serve no purpose, and none is sought on this issue.
What we have said also answers the contention in Additional
Ground No. 1 that the impugned order did not examine the
applicable entries or the Government documents. Additional
Ground No. 2 fails. Point (ii) is answered in the negative.
Point (iii)
65. Additional Ground No. 1 contends that the dispute is one of
classification, that all facts were disclosed and there was no
suppression, and that interest and penalty are therefore
unsustainable. The authorities below proceeded under Section 73
and not Section 74, and the first appellate authority held the penalty
under Section 122 “nullified”, accepting that “no men’s rea was
present”. The written submission prays that the Appellant’s bona
fide conduct be accepted and that the allegation of wilful default,
suppression or intention to evade tax be held unsustainable. No
such allegation is made: the proceedings are under Section 73, and
the penalty under Section 122 is no longer in issue. The question is
whether bona fides also displace interest and the penalty under
Section 73(9).
66. Section 50(1) charges interest for the period for which tax
payable “remains unpaid”; the provision makes no reference to the
taxpayer’s state of mind. The Supreme Court in Pratibha
Processors v. Union of India , (1996) 11 SCC 101, explained the
character of interest in a fiscal statute (para 13):
Page 29 of 36

13. In fiscal Statutes, the import of the words -- ‘tax’,
‘interest’, ‘penalty’, etc. are well known. They are
different concepts. Tax is the amount payable as a result
of the charging provision. It is a compulsory exaction of
money by a public authority for public purposes, the
payment of which is enforced by law. Penalty is
ordinarily levied on an assessee for some contumacious
conduct or for a deliberate violation of the provisions of
the particular statute. Interest is compensatory in
character and is imposed on an assessee who has
withheld of any tax as and when it is due and payable.
The levy of interest is geared to actual amount of tax
withheld and the extent of the delay in paying the tax on
the due date. Essentially, it is compensatory and
different from penalty — which is penal in character.
67. The Appellant’s formulation that it “discharged the entire tax
collected from the recipient” misstates the measure: interest is
computed on tax payable and not paid, not on tax collected. The
Grounds of Appeal themselves state that the societies paid “either
12% of the Works Contract Service Amount or less than 12% as
GST”. The interest under Section 50(1), determined by the
impugned order at Rs. 60,25,718/-, follows.
68. The only surviving penalty is under Section 73(9). Section 73
is the provision for cases in which there is no fraud, wilful
misstatement or suppression; the circumstances the Appellant relies
upon are what bring the case within it, and cannot also be a reason
for not applying it. Within Section 73 the legislature has fixed the
penalty at ten per cent of the tax or ten thousand rupees, whichever
is higher, and, once the notice had issued, left sub-section (8) as the
route to avoid it: payment of the tax with interest within thirty days
of the notice, which the Appellant did not make. Sub-section (9)
leaves no discretion to reduce or waive the penalty on a finding of
bona fides. The penalty of Rs. 6,96,250/- (CGST Rs. 3,48,125/- and
SGST Rs. 3,48,125/-) is ten per cent of the tax of Rs. 69,62,492/-
(the differential tax and the input tax credit disallowed), computed
head-wise, and accords with the statute.
69. The Appellant pleads promissory estoppel and legitimate
expectation, relying on Union of India v. Indo-Afghan Agencies
Ltd. , (1968) 2 SCR 366, and Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. (P)
Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (1979) 2 SCC 409. The plea fails at
three levels. First, no document purports to fix the rate of tax under
the notification; any representation was as to the GST component of
Page 30 of 36

the price. Secondly, any representation was made by the Textile
Department as the authority that sanctioned and funded the projects,
not by the authorities administering the tax, and could not bind
them. Thirdly, the liability to tax at the notified rate, to interest
under Section 50(1) and to the penalty fixed by Section 73(9) arises
by force of the statute, and there can be no estoppel against it. In
Kasinka Trading v. Union of India , (1995) 1 SCC 274, the Supreme
Court, after referring to Indo-Afghan Agencies and Motilal
Padampat , said:
13. It has been settled by the Court that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel is applicable against the
Government also particularly where it is necessary to
prevent fraud or manifest injustice. The doctrine,
however, cannot be pressed into aid to compel the
Government or the public authority “to carry out a
representation or promise which is contrary to law or
which was outside the authority or power of the officer
of the Government or of the public authority to make.”
…
16. In M.P. Sugar Mills case (supra) it was observed that
the doctrine of promissory estoppel would not apply in
the teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law and
that there can be no promissory estoppel against the
exercise of legislative power.
70. The Appellant states that the doctrine “does not permit a
private party to override a statutory rate of tax where none was
legally available”, and invokes it instead to show an absence of
culpability, wilful default or lack of bona fides, which it describes
as “the very foundation on which interest under Section 50 and
penalty under Section 73 rest”. Interest under Section 50(1) is
compensatory, and the penalty under Section 73(9) is fixed by the
statute for cases in which there is no fraud or suppression;
culpability is the foundation of neither. The premise that the Textile
Department was “also the recipient of the supply” is contradicted by
the record: the supplies were received by the societies. The written
submission takes the same position: the Appellant “accepts that a
statutory rate of tax, if otherwise applicable under the GST law,
cannot be altered merely by a private understanding between the
parties”, and relies on the Government directions only for its bona
fides. Its prayer that interest “be deleted/waived to the extent
permissible in law” finds no footing in Section 50(1), which makes
no provision for waiver.
Page 31 of 36

71. The ground in the original Grounds of Appeal against the
penalty under Section 122 does not survive, that penalty having
been held “nullified” by the impugned order. Point (iii) is answered
in the negative.
Point (iv)
72. In the alternative, Additional Ground No. 1 prays that the
differential liability be recomputed on a “cum-tax” basis, since the
Appellant “has at no stage collected any amount from the recipient
beyond GST @ 12%”. The plea does not appear in the Grounds of
Appeal or in the orders below; as it is a question of valuation on
facts already on record, we have considered it. Under Section 15(1),
the value is the transaction value, “the price actually paid or payable
for the said supply”. The Appellant asks, in substance, that the
receipts be treated as inclusive of tax.
73. The plea proceeds on the premise that the receipts included
the tax. The Appellant’s own documents do not support that
premise: its invoices state the “Contract Receipts (Exclusive of
Taxes)” and charge CGST and SGST on them, and its sales register
(Annexure XI) records the receipts of the year under the column
“Exclusive”, with nil under “Inclusive”. Where the tax is charged
over and above the price, there is no occasion to treat the price as
inclusive of tax, and we do not enter upon any recomputation of the
differential. Point (iv) is answered in the negative.
Point (v)
74. The Appellant claims the credit, and under Section 155 the
burden of proving the claim is its own. Under the corresponding
provision of the Karnataka VAT Act, the Supreme Court held in
State of Karnataka v. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading Pvt. Ltd. , (2023) 18
SCC 809:
11. … unless and until the purchasing dealer discharges
the burden cast under Section 70 of the KVAT Act, 2003
and proves the genuineness of the transaction/purchase
and sale by producing the aforesaid materials, such
purchasing dealer shall not be entitled to Input Tax
Credit.
75. The Circular does not alter the conditions of Section 16(2).
For a supplier-wise difference of up to Rs. 5 lakh, para 4.1.2 called
Page 32 of 36

for a certificate from the supplier that the supplies had been made
and the tax on them paid in its return in FORM GSTR-3B.
76. The Appellant has had ample opportunity to produce such
certificates. Before the first appellate authority it stated that the
declarations of its suppliers were “being taken in conformity with”
the Circular, and produced none. Before us it filed Annexure I with
Point No. 2. Nothing further has been filed, and at the hearing on
23.10.2026 the learned Authorised Representative for the Appellant
submitted that ledger confirmations could not be obtained from the
suppliers.
77. Annexure I comprises ledger accounts, some invoices, and
printouts from the GST portal, dated August 2026, for ten suppliers.
It does not establish the claim. First, there is no reconciliation
identifying the invoices that make up the difference of Rs.
4,19,476/-; the credit in the ledgers exceeds that figure, and it
cannot be ascertained which invoices are not reflected in FORM
GSTR-2A, or why. Secondly, there is no certificate from any
supplier or Chartered Accountant of the kind contemplated by the
Circular. A printout showing that a supplier filed a return for a
month says nothing about whether the supplies to the Appellant
were declared in it and the tax on them paid, which is what Section
16(2)(c) requires. Thirdly, the Appellant’s own pleading
acknowledges the gap: it “is willing to place before the Hon’ble
Tribunal” the invoice-wise reconciliation and supporting records,
but has not done so.
78. The decisions relied upon do not assist the Appellant.
Suncraft Energy Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner, State Tax ,
2023 SCC OnLine Cal 2226, held that, absent action against the
selling dealer and an exceptional case such as collusion or a missing
supplier, the officer “was not justified in directing the appellant to
reverse the input tax credit availed by them” (para 9). The special
leave petition against it (SLP (C) Nos. 27827–27828 of 2023,
decided on 14.12.2023) was dismissed without reasons, and such an
order does not attract the doctrine of merger. In Kunhayammed v.
State of Kerala , (2000) 6 SCC 359, the Supreme Court held (para
44):
Page 33 of 36

(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a
non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it
does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing
special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in
place of the order under challenge. All that it means is
that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion
so as to allow the appeal being filed.
79. More importantly, this is not a mechanical reversal. The OIO
records that the Appellant “was at the option to produce Ledger
Confirmation as required as per circular”, and before the first
appellate authority the Appellant undertook to produce supplier
declarations; it has not produced them. D.Y. Beathel Enterprises v.
State Tax Officer (Data Cell) , 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2108, was a
remand on its own facts (para 16); and Arise India Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Trade & Taxes , W.P.(C) No. 2106 of 2015,
decided on 26.10.2017 (Delhi High Court), arose under the Delhi
VAT Act and does not displace the express conditions of Section
16(2) or the burden under Section 155.
80. Nor is there substance in the submission that the denial of
credit would result in double taxation. If a supplier has in fact paid
the tax on a supply to the Appellant, that is the very fact which the
certificate contemplated by the Circular would establish, and the
credit would follow. The credit is denied because that fact has not
been established, not because the same tax is levied twice.
81. The disallowance does not rest on a finding that the
purchases were fictitious, that the suppliers did not exist or that the
goods were not received, and the contentions to that effect in Point
No. 2 and in the rejoinder answer a case that is not made. Nor does
it rest on want of invoices or of receipt. The claim fails on clause
(c) of Section 16(2) and on Section 155: it has not been shown that
the tax charged on the supplies was paid to the Government. The
difficulty urged in the Grounds of Appeal, that there is “no invoice
level linkage” with the supplier’s return in FORM GSTR-3B, is the
very difficulty the Circular meets by the certificate it contemplates.
The provisions of Sections 41 and 43A, on which the Grounds of
Appeal also rely, do not relieve the Appellant of the burden under
Section 155 of showing that the tax charged was paid. The
opportunity sought in the rejoinder has been given, and has not been
used.
Page 34 of 36

82. The alternative prayer that the matter be “remanded for
invoice-wise verification”, and the request that it be “restored for
limited verification”, must also be declined. A remand is ordered
where a party has been denied the opportunity to place its evidence,
or where the record cannot be completed without further enquiry
below. Neither is the case. The evidence is in the Appellant’s own
hands or obtainable from its own suppliers, and the Appellant has
had every opportunity to produce it. The disallowance of Rs.
4,19,476/- was rightly confirmed.
83. Interest under Section 50(3) has been confirmed at Rs.
4,80,160/- (CGST Rs. 2,40,080/- and SGST Rs. 2,40,080/-). Section
50(3) charges interest where input tax credit has been “wrongly
availed and utilised”. Asked at the hearing whether it had any
grievance with regard to the calculation and whether the calculation
had been done on a net basis, the learned Authorised Representative
for the Appellant stated that it was on a net basis only. The
challenge to the interest rests on the challenge to the disallowance
itself, which has failed. The penalty under Section 73(9) on this
head forms part of the penalty dealt with under Point (iii). Point (v)
is answered in the negative.
Order
84. In view of the above findings, the following order is passed:
(a) The appeal is dismissed.
(b) The impugned order, Order-in-Appeal No. DCST/
APP/GST/1072/24-25/DRC-07/A.O./25-26/No.251 dated
13.10.2025, is upheld.
(c) The demand accordingly stands determined as follows:
differential tax of Rs. 65,43,016/- (CGST Rs. 32,71,508/- and
SGST Rs. 32,71,508/-) and interest under Section 50(1) of
Rs. 60,25,718/- (CGST Rs. 30,12,859/- and SGST Rs.
30,12,859/-); penalty under Section 73(9) of Rs. 6,96,250/-
(CGST Rs. 3,48,125/- and SGST Rs. 3,48,125/-); and input
tax credit disallowed of Rs. 4,19,476/- (CGST Rs. 2,09,738/-
and SGST Rs. 2,09,738/-) and interest under Section 50(3) of
Rs. 4,80,160/- (CGST Rs. 2,40,080/- and SGST Rs.
2,40,080/-); in all Rs. 1,41,64,620/-.
Page 35 of 36

(d) The proper officer shall adjust the amounts of CGST
Rs. 9,49,289/- and SGST Rs. 9,49,289/- paid at the stage of
the first appeal, and any further amount paid by the
Appellant, against the demand so determined, and
communicate to the Appellant the balance payable, if any.
The impugned order’s holding that the balance part payment
of IGST of Rs. 95,840/- “is eligible for refund after recovery
of Tax, interest, and penalty” is not disturbed.
(e) There shall be no order as to costs.
(Final Order pronounced in the open court on 05.11.2026)
Digitally signed by
NIRMAL KUMAR SOREN
Date: 2026.11.05
13:07:28 +05'30'
SHRIDHAR
MAHADEO
BHOSALE
NIRMAL
KUMAR SOREN
Digitally signed by
SHRIDHAR MAHADEO
BHOSALE
Date: 2026.11.05
13:23:21 +05'30'
(Dr. Nirmal Kumar Soren)
(Shridhar Mahadeo Bhosale)
Member (Technical)
Member (Judicial)
Page 36 of 36

FORM GST APL-04A
[See rule 113(2)]
Summary of the order and demand after issue of order by the Goods and Services Tax Appellate
Tribunal
Whether remand order No
Date of order 05.11.2026
1. GSTIN / Temporary ID / UIN 27AAMFR5128G1Z0
2. Appeal Case Reference No. /
Date
APL/3/PUN/2026 dated 22.07.2026
3. Name of the appellant M/s RELIANT BUILDUP, SANGLI
4. Name of the Respondent THE COMMISSIONER OF STATE TAX, MAHARASHTRA
5. Order appealed against
(a) Order Type
(b) Ref. Number / Date
(a) Demand
(b) Order-in-Appeal No. DCST/APP/GST/1072/24-25/DRC-07/
A.O./25-26/No.251 dated 13.10.2025, passed by the Deputy
Commissioner of State Tax (Appeals), Kolhapur (arising from the
order dated 15.01.2024 passed under Section 73(9) by the State
Tax Officer, Sangli)
6. Personal Hearing (all hearing
dates)
06.08.2026, 27.08.2026, 08.09.2026, 05.10.2026 and 23.10.2026
7. Status of Order under Appeal Confirmed
8. Order in brief
Facts: In 2018-19 the Appellant executed works contracts for the factory buildings of four co-operative
spinning mills, charging tax at 12%. On a show cause notice dated 18.10.2023, the State Tax Officer, Sangli, by
order No. STO/SANGLI_705/GST AUDIT/DRC-07/2018-2019/B-22 dated 15.01.2024 under Section 73(9),
confirmed differential tax at 18% on those supplies, the societies not being Government entities, and disallowed
input tax credit of Rs. 4,19,476/- availed in FORM GSTR-3B in excess of FORM GSTR-2A. By Order-in-
Appeal No. DCST/APP/GST/1072/24-25/DRC-07/A.O./25-26/No.251 dated 13.10.2025, the first appellate
authority reduced to nil the demand under Section 16(4), held the penalty under Section 122 nullified, and
modified the demand to tax of Rs. 69,62,492/-, interest of Rs. 65,05,878/- and penalty of Rs. 6,96,250/-.
Decision: The appeal is dismissed and the Order-in-Appeal is upheld. The societies are not shown to be a
“Government Entity” under paragraph 4(x) of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate), not having been set
up by statute or shown to have been established by any Government; and, independently, the works were not
meant predominantly for use other than for commerce or industry (item (a) of Sl. No. 3(vi)); 12% was not
available. Interest under Section 50(1) and the penalty under Section 73(9) follow; neither bona fides nor
estoppel displaces them. No cum-tax recomputation arises, the receipts being tax-exclusive on the Appellant’s
own invoices. The disallowance of input tax credit of Rs. 4,19,476/- is upheld, the Appellant not having
discharged the burden under Section 155 or produced the certificates contemplated by Circular No.
183/15/2022-GST, and interest under Section 50(3) follows. The demand stands determined as follows:
differential tax Rs. 65,43,016/- and interest under Section 50(1) Rs. 60,25,718/-; penalty under Section 73(9)
Rs. 6,96,250/-; input tax credit disallowed Rs. 4,19,476/- and interest under Section 50(3) Rs. 4,80,160/-; in all
Rs. 1,41,64,620/-. The proper officer shall adjust the amounts of CGST Rs. 9,49,289/- and SGST Rs. 9,49,289/-
paid at the stage of the first appeal, and any further amount paid by the Appellant, against the demand so
determined, and communicate to the Appellant the balance payable, if any. The impugned order’s holding that
the balance part payment of IGST of Rs. 95,840/- “is eligible for refund after recovery of Tax, interest, and
penalty” is not disturbed. No order as to costs.
9. If demand order, then whether demand quantified: Yes.
Disputed amounts are those confirmed by the Order-in-Appeal. Interest comprises Rs. 60,25,718/- under Section 50(1) and Rs. 4,80,160/- under Section
50(3).
Section-I
Particulars Central tax State/UT tax Integrated tax Cess Total
Disputed
Determined
Disputed
Determined
Disputed
Determined
Disputed
Determined
Disputed
Determined
Amount
Amount
Amount
Amount
Amount
Amount
Amount
Amount
Amount
Amount
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
(a) Tax 34,81,246 34,81,246 34,81,246 34,81,246 0 0 0 0 69,62,492 69,62,492
(b) Interest 32,52,939 32,52,939 32,52,939 32,52,939 0 0 0 0 65,05,878 65,05,878
(c) Penalty 3,48,125 3,48,125 3,48,125 3,48,125 0 0 0 0 6,96,250 6,96,250
(d) Fees 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(e) Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(f) Refund 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Section-II: Not applicable (no integrated tax is demanded).
10. For other orders and demand orders which are not quantified: Not applicable.
11. If remanded with directions: Not applicable.
Section-III (Anti-profiteering) — 12. Order in brief: Not applicable.
NIRMAL
KUMAR
SOREN
Digitally signed by
NIRMAL KUMAR
SOREN
Date: 2026.11.05
13:08:17 +05'30'
Place: Pune
Date: 05.11.2026
Jurisdiction: GST Appellate Tribunal, Pune Bench
(Dr. Nirmal Kumar Soren)
Member (Technical)