THASMITHA ABUKUTTY vs STATE OF KERALA
- Court
- Kerala High Court
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:1:-
2026:KER:66723
“ C.R. ”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SOUMEN SEN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
ND
WEDNESDAY, THE 2 DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026 / 11TH BHADRA, 1948
WP(CRL.) NO. 805 OF 2026
(CRIME NO.992/2025 OF PONNANI POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM)
PETITIONER/S:
THASMITHA ABUKUTTY, AGED 30 YEARS
W/O. SHAMEER, PALLI PURAYIDOM, BEACH WARD,
OPPOSITE LAJANATH SCHOOL, ALAPPUZHA, PIN – 688012.
BY ADVS. SRI.C.RAJENDRAN
SMT.R.S.SREEVIDYA
RESPONDENT/S:
1 STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY (HOME),
GOVERNMENT OF KERALA, SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN – 695001.
2 THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE,
CIVIL STATION, MALAPPURAM, PIN – 676505.
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:2:-
2026:KER:66723
3 THE DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF,
OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF
MALAPPURAM, PIN – 676509.
4 STATION HOUSE OFFICER,
PONNANI POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN – 679577.
5 STATION HOUSE OFFICER,
ALAPPUZHA SOUTH POLICE STATION,
ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT, PIN – 688001.
6 STATION HOUSE OFFICER,
VADAKKEKKADU POLICE STATION,
THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN – 679564.
7 THE SUPERINTENDENT CENTRAL PRISON,
VIYUR, THRISSUR, PIN – 680010.
BY SENIOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI. BIJU MEENATTOOR
THIS WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
01-09-2026, THE COURT ON 02-09-2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:3:-
2026:KER:66723
SOUMEN SEN, C.J.
&
SYAM KUMAR V.M., J.
----------------------------------------------------
W.P.(Crl.) No.805 of 2026
-----------------------------------------------------
nd
Dated this the 2 day of September, 2026
J U D G M E N T
Soumen Sen, C.J.
This writ petition is directed against an order of detention
th
dated 25 November, 2025, passed against Shameer @ Bellari
Shameer (the detenu), aged 35 years, under Section 3(1) of the
Kerala Anti-Social Activities Prevention Act, 2007 [“KAA(P)A”, for
brevity]. The petitioner herein is the wife of the detenu. The said
order of detention was confirmed by the Government under
th
Section 10(4) of KAA(P)A vide order dated 30 January, 2026, and
the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of one
year from the date of detention. Thereafter, the Government
reduced the period of detention from one year to six months by a
rd
subsequent order dated 3 March, 2026.
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:4:-
2026:KER:66723
2. The detention order was passed on the basis of a proposal
th
submitted by the District Police Chief, Malappuram, on 11
August, 2025. The said proposal was, however, rejected on the
ground that, at that point of time, the detenu had not applied for
th
bail. Subsequently, by letter dated 30 October, 2025, the
proposal was revived, alleging that the detenu was involved in the
following cases:
Crime No. Police Station Offences Charge Sheet
38/2019 Vadakkekad 392, 506(ii) r/w
34 IPC
13-05-2020
625/2021 Alappuzha South 392, 201 r/w 34
IPC
02-04-2022
62/2022 Ponnani 341, 323, 324
r/w 34 IPC
15-03-2022
1062/2023 Kuttipuram 419, 465, 394
IPC
22-11-2023
992/2025 Ponnani 126(2), 115(2),
351(3), 110,
111(2)(b), 111(3)
r/w 3(5) BNS
Under
investigation
3. Before dealing with the submissions of the parties, it appears
th
from the records that, on 19 March, 2024, proceedings under
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:5:-
2026:KER:66723
Section 3 of the KAA(P)A were initiated against the detenu by the
th
District Collector, Malappuram, and he was arrested on 25
March, 2024 pursuant to the order of detention. The order of
th
detention was approved by the Government on 5 April, 2024.
Thereafter, the matter was placed before the Advisory Board,
which, after hearing the detenu, recommended that he be
detained for a period of six months. Accepting the said
recommendation, the Government confirmed the detention by
th
order dated 25 June, 2024. Aggrieved thereby, the detenu
approached this Court by filing W.P.(Crl.) No.757 of 2024. This
th
Court, by judgment dated 30 July, 2024, allowed the writ
petition and set aside the order of detention, pursuant to which
the detenu was released from custody. Thereafter, according to
the respondents, the detenu again involved himself in Crime No.
th
992/2025 of Ponnani Police Station, registered on 30 July, 2025
for offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 351(3),
110, 111(2)(b), 111(3) read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. It is on the basis of the said subsequent
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:6:-
2026:KER:66723
involvement, along with the earlier antecedents, that the present
proceedings under Section 3 of the KAA(P)A came to be initiated.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the impugned
order of detention on several grounds. Firstly, it was contended
that the impugned order suffers from total non-application of
mind, as neither the sponsoring authority nor the Detaining
Authority independently recorded its satisfaction that the detenu
continued to be a "known rowdy" within the meaning of the
provisions of the KAA(P)A. According to the learned counsel, the
authorities merely proceeded on the basis of the registration of
criminal cases against the detenu without examining whether the
statutory requirements for classifying him as a "known rowdy"
were, in fact, satisfied. It was further argued that no independent
assessment was undertaken to ascertain whether the detenu was
habitually engaging in anti-social activities affecting public order
so as to warrant the invocation of the provisions of the KAA(P)A.
Consequently, it was contended that the subjective satisfaction of
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:7:-
2026:KER:66723
the Detaining Authority stands vitiated for want of proper
application of mind.
5. Secondly, the learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the
reliance placed by the respondents upon the earlier judgment of
this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No.757 of 2024 (Exhibit-P2). According to
the learned counsel, in Exhibit-P2 nowhere it is recorded that
there existed sufficient grounds for passing a fresh order of
preventive detention against the detenu. On the contrary, this
Court had quashed the earlier order of detention and directed the
release of the detenu. It was, therefore, argued that the
sponsoring authority and the Detaining Authority have misread
and misconstrued the observations contained in Exhibit-P2 and
have erroneously relied upon the same to justify the present order
of detention, thereby vitiating the subjective satisfaction arrived at
by the Detaining Authority.
6. Thirdly, it was submitted that the sponsoring authority proceeded
on the erroneous premise that the detenu had deliberately
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:8:-
2026:KER:66723
refrained from filing a bail application in order to evade preventive
detention proceedings under the KAA(P)A. According to the
learned counsel, such a conclusion is founded on mere
assumptions and conjectures unsupported by any material on
record. It was argued that the mere non-filing of a bail application
cannot, by itself, be construed as a deliberate attempt to avoid
preventive detention and, therefore, the subjective satisfaction
arrived at on the basis of such speculation is legally
unsustainable.
7. Fourthly, it was submitted that the respondents suppressed the
material fact that the earlier order of detention had been
challenged before this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No.757 of 2024 and that
the said detention order had been quashed by judgment dated
th
30 July, 2024. According to the petitioner, the failure to place
the said judgment before the Detaining Authority materially
affected the process of arriving at the subjective satisfaction and
has consequently vitiated the impugned order of detention.
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:9:-
2026:KER:66723
8. Fifthly, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
representations submitted by the detenu before the Government
and the Advisory Board were not duly considered before the
confirmation order was passed. According to the petitioner, such
non-consideration constitutes a violation of the constitutional
safeguard guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of
India and renders the continued detention illegal. Reliance was
placed upon the decisions in Bhupinder Kumar @ Papu v. UT of
1 2
J&K and Geetha v. State of Kerala .
9. Sixthly, it was contended that the Detaining Authority failed to
consider the adequacy of the bail conditions imposed upon the
detenu and did not record any reason as to why those conditions
were insufficient to prevent him from indulging in further criminal
activities. According to the learned counsel, the failure to advert
to this vital aspect vitiates the subjective satisfaction of the
Detaining Authority.
1 rd
Judgment dated 3 September, 2025 in HCP No. 43 of 2025
2
2024 (3) KLT 679; ILR 2024 (2) Ker. 999
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:10:-
2026:KER:66723
10. Seventhly, it was submitted that, before invoking the
extraordinary power of preventive detention under the KAA(P)A,
the respondents had not explored the preventive measures
available under the ordinary law, particularly the proceedings
contemplated under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. It was submitted that, in the absence of resorting to
such ordinary remedies, the invocation of the provisions of the
KAA(P)A was wholly unwarranted.
11. Eighthly, the learned counsel submitted that none of the criminal
cases relied upon by the Detaining Authority disclose any
disturbance to "public order" and, at the highest, relate only to
issues concerning "law and order". It was therefore submitted that
the essential jurisdictional requirement for invoking Section 3 of
the KAA(P)A was absent, rendering the impugned order of
detention unsustainable.
12. Apart from the above submissions raised by the learned counsel
for the petitioner, an argument note was also filed by pointing out
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:11:-
2026:KER:66723
that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the
detention order is snapped. The date of the last prejudicial activity
th th
is on 30 July, 2025 and the detention order was passed on 25
November, 2025, which is after a delay of three months and
twenty-five days. To support the above averment, reliance was
3
placed upon Anandhavally v. State of Kerala and Kumari A
4
v. State of Kerala .
13. It was further submitted that the investigation in the last
prejudicial activity, namely Crime No. 992/2023, relied upon by
the Detaining Authority, was not completed and, therefore, the
same cannot be taken as a case for passing the order of detention.
Reliance was placed upon Abdul Wahab v. State of Kerala and
5
Others .
14. It was also submitted that the detention order is silent as to the
fact whether the detenu has preferred any bail application before
the court or not in the last prejudicial case and whether the
3 th
Judgment dated 10 July 2026 in W.P (Crl.) No. 870 of 2026
4 th
Judgment dated 19 July 2026 in W.P (Crl.) No. 571 of 2024
5
2017 (4) KHC 1: 2017 (3) KLT 548
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:12:-
2026:KER:66723
Detaining Authority has resorted to cancellation of bail
proceedings after the conditions of bail gets violated. In order to
substantiate the above said submission reliance was placed on
6
Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu .
15. Lastly, it was submitted that the confirmation order passed by the
Government suffers from complete non-application of mind. The
learned counsel pointed out that the Government had initially
confirmed the detention for a period of one year and, thereafter,
by a subsequent order issued after thirty-three days, reduced the
period of detention to six months. According to the petitioner, the
subsequent modification of the detention period itself
demonstrates that the original confirmation order had been
passed mechanically and without a proper appreciation of the
relevant materials. It was, therefore, contended that the
contradictory stand adopted by the Government vitiates the
confirmation order as well as the continued detention of the
detenu.
6
(2011) 5 SCC 244
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:13:-
2026:KER:66723
16. Per contra, the learned Senior Government Pleader supported the
impugned order of detention and submitted that the detenu is a
habitual offender and a "known rowdy" within the meaning of
Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A. It was submitted that, at the time
of sponsoring the proposal, four of the five crimes relied upon had
culminated in the filing of final reports but the remaining crime,
namely Crime No.992/2025 of Ponnani Police Station, was charge
th
sheeted on 12 January, 2026. It was further submitted that two
earlier crimes of the years 2015 and 2017 were not relied upon,
as they fell beyond the statutory period prescribed under the
KAA(P)A, and the NDPS case registered as Crime No.253/2022 of
Alappuzha South Police Station was also not taken into
consideration since it did not fall within the ambit of Section 2(p)
(iii) of the KAA(P)A.
17. The learned Senior Government Pleader further submitted that, in
view of the continuous involvement of the detenu in criminal
activities, a Rowdy History Sheet had been opened against him as
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:14:-
2026:KER:66723
st
early as on 21 May, 2015. Despite the opening of the Rowdy
History Sheet and the initiation of proceedings under Section 107
of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the year 2017, the detenu
continued to indulge in several criminal offences, including
offences of robbery, causing hurt, attempt to commit culpable
homicide and offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. It was,
therefore, contended that the preventive measures available under
the ordinary law had proved ineffective in preventing the detenu
from indulging in anti-social activities. Reliance was also placed
upon the decision of this Court in Anita Antony v. State of
7
Kerala , to contend that proceedings under Section 107 of the
Cr.P.C. cannot be treated as a substitute for preventive detention
under the KAA(P)A.
18. It was further submitted that the detenu had repeatedly violated
the conditions imposed while granting him bail in earlier criminal
cases by involving himself in subsequent offences. Applications
for cancellation of bail had also been moved before the competent
7
2022 (4) KHC 427 (DB)
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:15:-
2026:KER:66723
courts. According to the learned Senior Government Pleader,
these circumstances clearly established that the bail conditions
imposed by the criminal courts had failed to deter the detenu
from continuing his criminal activities.
19. The learned Senior Government Pleader further submitted that
proceedings under Section 3 of the KAA(P)A had earlier been
initiated against the detenu in the year 2024 and, although the
said order of detention was subsequently quashed by this Court
in W.P.(Crl.) No.757 of 2024, immediately after his release the
detenu again involved himself in Crime No.992/2025 of Ponnani
Police Station. It was contended that the subsequent involvement
of the detenu in yet another serious offence clearly demonstrated
his propensity to continue indulging in anti-social activities and
justified the initiation of fresh proceedings under the KAA(P)A.
20. It was also submitted that there was no delay whatsoever in
initiating or completing the detention proceedings. The last
th
prejudicial activity occurred on 30 July, 2025 and the detenu
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:16:-
2026:KER:66723
nd
was arrested on 2 August, 2025. While he remained in judicial
custody, the Station House Officer submitted the preliminary
th
report on 11 August, 2025, whereupon the sponsoring authority
forwarded the proposal for preventive detention after examining
the relevant records. The Detaining Authority, being satisfied that
the detenu was a "known rowdy" and that his activities were
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, passed the
th
detention order on 25 November, 2025. Since the detenu
continued to remain in judicial custody, permission was obtained
from the competent court to execute the detention order inside
th
the prison, and the same was executed on 28 November, 2025
after completing all the formalities, as per Section 7(1)(2) of the
KAAPA without any delay.
21. Thereafter, the detention order was duly approved by the
Government, the matter was referred to the Advisory Board within
the statutory period, and the detention was confirmed in
accordance with the provisions of the Act.
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:17:-
2026:KER:66723
22. It was submitted that, though the detenu had not filed any bail
application in Crime No.992/2025 of Ponnani Police Station, such
non-filing was not a mere circumstance but a deliberate strategy
adopted by him to evade proceedings under the KAA(P)A. It was
contended that the investigation had revealed that the detenu had
consciously refrained from seeking bail anticipating the initiation
of preventive detention proceedings against him. At the same
time, having regard to the fact that he had remained in judicial
nd
custody since 2 August, 2025, there was a real possibility of his
being released on bail in the near future. It was, therefore,
submitted that the absence of a pending bail application did not
preclude the Detaining Authority from arriving at the subjective
satisfaction that the detenu was likely to be released from custody
and, upon such release, was likely to resume his anti-social
activities, particularly in view of his previous conduct of
repeatedly violating bail conditions.
23. Lastly, the learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that
every procedural safeguard contemplated under the KAA(P)A had
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:18:-
2026:KER:66723
been strictly complied with and that the subjective satisfaction
recorded by the Detaining Authority was founded on relevant
materials. It was, therefore, contended that none of the grounds
urged by the petitioner warrants interference and that the writ
petition is liable to be dismissed.
24. The merits of the detention order require consideration taking
into account the submissions made on behalf of the parties
and the original record produced by the learned Senior
Government Pleader.
25. The first issue that arises for consideration before us is whether
the statutory requirements for classifying the detenu as a "known
rowdy" under the KAA(P)A were duly satisfied and whether the
materials on record establish that he is a habitual offender
indulging in anti-social activities prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order so as to warrant the invocation of the provisions of
the KAA(P)A.
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:19:-
2026:KER:66723
26. To bring a detenu within the ambit of “known rowdy” as defined
under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A, he must be found on
investigation or enquiry by a competent Police Officer or other
authority on complaints initiated by persons other than Police
Officers in three separate instances, not forming part of the same
transaction to have committed any offence mentioned in Clause (t)
of Section 2 of the KAA(P)A.
27. Now, it is necessary to consider the definitions of “Rowdy” as
defined under Section 2(t) and “known rowdy” in Section 2(p),
which read as follows:
“‘rowdy’ means and includes a person who either by
himself or as a member of a gang commits or attempts to
commit, or abets the commission of any offences under
Sections 153A and 153B of Chapter VIII and Chapters
XV, XVI, XVII & XXII of the Penal Code, 1860 (Central Act
45 of 1860), or any offences under the provision of the
Arms Act, 1959 (Central Act 54 of 1959), or the Explosive
Substances Act, 1908 (Central Act 6 of 1908),—
(i) punishable with five or more years of imprisonment of
any type, or,
(ii) with less than five years of imprisonment of any type,
except those punishable with less than one year of
imprisonment, or
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:20:-
2026:KER:66723
(iii) such offence under any other law for the time being in
force, coming under item (i) or (ii), as may be notified by
the Government, from time to time.”
Section 2(p) reads —
“(p) “known rowdy” means any person, who had been, by
reason of acts done within the previous seven years as
calculated from the date of the order imposing any
restriction or detention under this Act,—
(i) made guilty, by a competent court at least once for an
offence of the nature under item (i) of clause (t) of section
2 or any offence notified as such under the said clause;
or
(ii) made guilty, by a competent court at least twice for
any offence of the nature mentioned under item (ii) of
clause (t) of section 2 or any offence notified as such
under the said clause; or
(iii) found on investigation or enquiry by a competent
police officer or other authority, on complaints initiated by
persons other than police officers, in three separate
instances not forming part of the same transaction to
have committed any offence mentioned in clause (t) of
section 2:”
28. On a consideration of the materials placed on record, we find no
merit in the aforesaid contention. The records reveal that the
Detaining Authority has relied upon five criminal cases, namely,
Crime No.38/2019 of Vadakkekad Police Station, Crime
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:21:-
2026:KER:66723
No.625/2021 of Alappuzha South Police Station, Crime
No.62/2022 of Ponnani Police Station, Crime No.1062/2023 of
Kuttipuram Police Station and Crime No.992/2025 of Ponnani
Police Station. The offences alleged in the said crimes
substantially fall under Chapters XVI, XVII and XXII of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860, or their corresponding provisions under the
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which are offences contemplated
under Section 2(t) of the KAA(P)A. Although certain offences, such
as Section 201 and Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,
do not independently fall within the ambit of Section 2(t), the
remaining offences in the very same crimes, including robbery,
voluntarily causing hurt, wrongful restraint, criminal intimidation
and attempt to commit culpable homicide, are offences
specifically covered by the said provision.
29. The materials further disclose that the detenu has been involved
in five separate criminal cases involving offences falling within the
ambit of Section 2(t) of the KAA(P)A. These offences were
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:22:-
2026:KER:66723
committed within the period of seven years as contemplated
under Section 2(p)(iii) of the Act and are sufficient to classify the
detenu as a "known rowdy".
30. In the above circumstances, we are satisfied that the Detaining
Authority had sufficient material before it to classify the detenu as
a "known rowdy" within the meaning of Section 2(p)(iii) of the
KAA(P)A and to arrive at the requisite subjective satisfaction for
invoking the provisions of the Act. We, therefore, find no
infirmity in the impugned order on this ground, and the first
contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is
liable to be rejected.
31. The second issue that arises for consideration is whether the
earlier judgment dated of this Court in W.P. (Crl.) No. 757 of
2024, whereby the previous order of detention was quashed and
the detenu was directed to be released, was duly considered by
the Detaining Authority and, if so, whether the authorities have
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:23:-
2026:KER:66723
misread or misconstrued the observations contained therein while
passing the impugned order of detention.
32. It is true that the impugned order of detention does not
specifically refer to the earlier judgment of this Court in W.P.(Crl.)
No.757 of 2024, whereby the previous order of detention was
quashed and the detenu was directed to be released. However, in
our considered view, the mere omission to make a specific
reference to the earlier judgment in the order of detention cannot,
by itself, be regarded as a material defect so as to vitiate the
impugned order. Reference to the said fact of setting aside the
previous detention order was duly taken note by the Government
in the confirming order of detention under the KAA(P)A.
33. In our considered view, the prime aspect to be looked into is the
subsequent commission of a fresh offence by the detenu after his
release pursuant to the earlier judgment of this Court. It is this
subsequent conduct, rather than the earlier detention
proceedings, that assumes significance while examining the
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:24:-
2026:KER:66723
validity of the impugned order of detention. The earlier order of
detention, which was founded on six criminal cases, came to be
quashed by this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No.757 of 2024 solely on the
ground of procedural infirmity, namely, the delay in passing the
order of confirmation. Subsequent thereto, the detenu allegedly
involved himself in yet another crime, namely, Crime No.
th
992/2025 of Ponnani Police Station, registered on 30 July, 2025.
It is this subsequent prejudicial activity, read along with the
antecedent criminal history of the detenu, that formed the basis
for the sponsoring authority to initiate fresh proceedings under
the KAA(P)A.
34. It also appears that, in the earlier order of detention, six criminal
cases were relied upon by the Detaining Authority. Out of those
six cases, four, namely, Crime No.38/2019 of Vadakkekad Police
Station, Crime No.625/2021 of Alappuzha South Police Station,
Crime No.62/2022 of Ponnani Police Station and Crime
No.1062/2023 of Kuttipuram Police Station, have once again
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:25:-
2026:KER:66723
been relied upon in the impugned order of detention. The only
additional material relied upon in the present proceedings is the
subsequent prejudicial activity in Crime No.992/2025 of Ponnani
Police Station, which was registered after the detenu was released
pursuant to the earlier judgment of this Court.
35. It is pertinent to refer to Section 13 of the KAA(P)A so as to
understand the necessity for passing a preventive detention order
even after the previous one. This section reads as follows:
“13. Revocation of detention order.--(1) A detention order
may, at any time, be revoked or modified by the
Government.
(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not
be a bar for the issuance of another detention order under
section 3 against the same person, if he continues to be a
person falling within the definition of known rowdy or
known goonda as given in section 2 (o) or section 2 (p)
and if,--
(i) after release, he is, found to have, again involved in an
offence of the nature described in section 2(o) or section 2
(p); or at least one instance; or
(ii) the facts, which came to the notice of the Government
or the authorised officer after the issuance of the earlier
detention order, considered along with previously known
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:26:-
2026:KER:66723
facts are sufficient to cause a reasonable apprehension
that he is likely to indulge in or promote or abet antisocial
activities; or
(iii) the procedural errors or omissions, by reason of which
the first order was revoked, are rectified in the procedure
followed with regard to the subsequent order, even if the
subsequent order is based on the very same facts as the
first order.”
36. The involvement of the detenu in a fresh offence, apart from the
offences which had already formed the basis of the earlier order of
detention, constitutes a significant intervening circumstance.
Such subsequent prejudicial activity provides a fresh cause of
action for initiating preventive detention proceedings and
distinguishes the present proceedings from the earlier order of
detention, which was set aside by this Court. Thus, we find
nothing wrong with the detention order on this ground.
37. The third issue for consideration before us is whether the mere
failure of the detenu to seek bail in the last prejudicial activity, by
itself, be treated as a conscious attempt to frustrate or avoid
preventive detention proceedings.
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:27:-
2026:KER:66723
38. It appears from the records that the detenu had repeatedly
violated the bail conditions imposed by the competent criminal
courts. In Vadakkedathu Police Station, Crime No.38/2019
registered for offences punishable under Sections 392 and 506(1)
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the detenu was
granted bail by the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-
nd
I, Kunnamkulam, on 22 February, 2019. While being on bail in
the said case, the detenu allegedly involved himself in Alappuzha
South Police Station Crime No.625/2021 registered for offences
punishable under Sections 392 and 201 read with Section 34 of
th
the Indian Penal Code, on 24 August, 2021, thereby violating the
bail conditions imposed upon him.
39. It also appears that, in Crime No.625/2021 of the said Alappuzha
South Police Station, the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate
nd
Court, Alappuzha, granted bail to the detenu on 2 April, 2022,
in C.M.P. No.798/2022, subject to specific conditions. However,
even thereafter, the detenu allegedly violated the said conditions
by involving himself in Kuttippuram Police Station Crime
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:28:-
2026:KER:66723
No.1062/2023 registered under Sections 419, 465 and 394 of the
Indian Penal Code and Ponnani Police Station Crime
No.992/2025 registered under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 351(3),
110, 111(2)(b), 111(3) read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, along with Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(2)(va) of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989. It is also seen from the records that
necessary applications have been submitted before the respective
courts seeking cancellation of the bail granted to the detenu.
40. The argument that the mere failure of the detenu to seek bail in
respect of the last prejudicial activity cannot, by itself, be treated
as a conscious attempt to frustrate or avoid preventive detention
proceedings is devoid of merit, as such a consideration is of no
relevance in the present context. The question that arises for
consideration is whether there exists any legal impediment in
passing an order of preventive detention while the detenu is in
judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity.
When a detenu is already in custody, the mandatory parameters
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:29:-
2026:KER:66723
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kamarunnissa v.
8
Union of India and Another for passing an order of preventive
detention against a person already in custody are required to be
satisfied, namely: (i) the Detaining Authority must be aware of the
fact that the detenu is in custody; (ii) there must be reliable
material indicating a real possibility of the detenu being released
on bail; and (iii) there must be a necessity to prevent the detenu
from indulging in prejudicial activities upon such release.
41. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that
there were no compelling circumstances warranting the
preventive detention of the detenu when he was already in judicial
custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. On
perusing the materials placed before us, we are of the view that
the first mandatory condition that the Detaining Authority shall
be aware of the fact that the detenu is in custody, is very well
taken note of by the Detaining Authority. As regards the second
8
(1991) 1 SCC 128
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:30:-
2026:KER:66723
and third requirements, though no bail application had been filed
by the detenu in the case in which he was in custody, the
Detaining Authority has recorded cogent reasons for arriving at
the subjective satisfaction that there existed a real possibility of
his securing release on bail. The detention order specifically notes
that, having regard to the detenu's past conduct and criminal
antecedents, there was every likelihood of his obtaining bail on
technical or other legal grounds. The authority has further taken
into account the consistent pattern exhibited by the detenu,
namely, that immediately after securing liberty in earlier cases, he
resumed his involvement in prejudicial activities without any sign
of reformation. On the contrary, the materials disclose that each
successive crime reflected an increased degree of audacity and
aggression, indicating that the detenu had remained undeterred
by previous prosecutions or periods of incarceration. The
apprehension entertained by the Detaining Authority that, upon
his release, the detenu would again indulge in activities
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order is, therefore,
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:31:-
2026:KER:66723
founded on objective materials and his antecedent conduct and
cannot be said to be either speculative or without basis. We are,
therefore, satisfied that the parameters prescribed in
Kamarunnissa (supra) stand duly complied with in the facts and
circumstances of the present case. Thus, the Detaining Authority
was satisfied that the existing bail conditions had proved
insufficient to deter the detenu from pursuing his prejudicial
activities.
42. The fourth issue that arises for consideration is whether the
th
representation submitted by the detenu on 19 December, 2025,
was duly considered by the Government and the Advisory Board
in accordance with law.
43. This Court while dealing with a similar issue of non-consideration
9
of the representation in Lamiya A.P. v. State of Kerala , has
held as follows:
“14. Section 7(2) of the KAA(P)A gives a right to the
detenu to make a representation before the Detaining
9 nd
Judgment dated 22 July 2026 in WP(CRL.) No. 753 OF 2026
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:32:-
2026:KER:66723
Authority as well as the Advisory Board. The procedure to
be adopted by the Advisory Board in considering and
deferring of such representation is mentioned in Section 10
of the KAA(P)A. There is no specific provision in the
KAA(P)A that mandates the Government to dispose of such
representation within a specified period or before or after
the disposal of the representation by the Advisory Board.
Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India also does not
mention any time period within which the representation,if
made, is required to be disposed of by the Government,
wherein Article 22(4), it has been stated that no law
providing for preventive detention shall authorise the
detention of a person for a longer period than 3 months
unless the circumstances mentioned in the said subclause
are fulfilled.
15. KAA(P)A is an enactment, specifically designed
to provide for the effective prevention and control of certain
kind of anti-social activities in the State of Kerala. In the
instant case, all the timelines required at every stage of
such proceedings culminating in an order of detention has
been followed. There is no time limit prescribed in the
KAA(P)A for the Government to consider his representation
under Section 7(2) of the KAA(P)A. Similarly, no timeline is
prescribed for the Advisory Board to conclude the
proceeding. However, having regard to the serious
consequence a person suffered by reason of preventive
detention, the constitutional courts have time and again
reiterated that every process should be completed within a
reasonable time and there should not be any inordinate
delay in concluding the proceeding. The law as it stands
appears to be that unexplained delay in initiating the
detention proceeding or in disposing of the representation
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:33:-
2026:KER:66723
may result in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India….”
(emphasis supplied)
44. The consideration of a representation made by or on behalf of a
detenu is not an empty formality but a valuable constitutional
safeguard flowing from Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.
The failure of both the Government and the Advisory Board to
advert to and consider the representation amounts to a serious
procedural irregularity, which has deprived the detenu of his
constitutional right to have his representation effectively
considered.
45. From the records produced before us, it appears that altogether
three representations were preferred by the detenu. One is
th
representation dated 5 December, 2025, filed by the detenu
before the Additional Chief Secretary, Home and Vigilance, S.S.A
th
Department, Thiruvananthapuram, the second one is of 19
December, 2025, filed by the detenu before the Chairman of the
rd
KAA(P)A Advisory Board and the third one is of 3 February, 2026
filed before the Home Department, Thiruvananthapuram.
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:34:-
2026:KER:66723
46. On perusal of the records we are duly satisfied that these
representations were duly considered and taken note of by the
Detaining Authority and the Advisory Board. The Government,
while considering the representation submitted by the detenu,
took note of the specific contention that the earlier order of
preventive detention had been set aside by this Court before
confirming the impugned order of detention. Therefore, the
submission that these representations were not considered is
devoid of merit.
47. The fifth issue that arises for consideration is whether the failure
of the authorities to initiate preventive proceedings under Section
107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C) before
invoking the provisions of the KAA(P)A renders the order of
preventive detention illegal or unsustainable.
48. The purpose and object of an order of detention under Section 3
of the KAA(P)A is different from the purpose and object of an order
under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. A Division Bench of this Court in
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:35:-
2026:KER:66723
10
Thejas v. Inspector General of Police, Kannur Range held
that the proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. is of a
lesser magnitude when compared to preventive detention order
under the laws of preventive detention. Simply because
proceedings were initiated against the person under Section 107
of the Cr.P.C., it cannot be said that an order of preventive
detention cannot be passed against him.
49. The object of proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. is
merely to require a person to execute a bond for keeping the
peace or maintaining good behaviour for the period stipulated by
the competent Magistrate. Such proceedings are preventive in
nature, but they operate in an entirely different field from a
preventive detention order under the KAA(P)A. While proceedings
under Section 107 are intended to secure future good conduct by
imposing a bond, an order of preventive detention is aimed at
preventing a person, whose activities are found to be prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order, from continuing such
10
2015 (3) KLT 1
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:36:-
2026:KER:66723
activities where the ordinary criminal law is found to be
inadequate to achieve that object.
50. In the present case, the records disclose that the detenu had been
repeatedly involved in serious criminal activities despite being
subjected to the ordinary criminal process and despite the
imposition of bail conditions by the competent courts. The
Detaining Authority has specifically recorded its satisfaction that
the existing measures available under the ordinary criminal law
had failed to deter the detenu from indulging in anti-social
activities and that his continued activities posed a threat to the
maintenance of public order. In such circumstances, the mere
fact that proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. were not
initiated would not, by itself, render the order of detention illegal
or vitiate the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority.
51. The sixth ground of challenge raised by the petitioner was that all
the alleged activities relied upon by the Detaining Authority does
not disclose any disturbance to "public order" and, at the highest,
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:37:-
2026:KER:66723
relate only to issues concerning "law and order". To understand
the above issue, it would be appropriate to refer to the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar v.
11
Delhi Administration , wherein it was held that the true
distinction between the areas of “public order” and “law and
order” lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree
and extent of its reach upon society. The relevant paragraph of
the said judgment is reproduced as follows:
“13. The true distinction between the areas of “public
order” and “law and order” lies not in the nature or
quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its
reach upon society. The distinction between the two
concepts of “law and order” and “public order” is a fine
one but this does not mean that there can be no
overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in
different contexts and circumstances might cause
different reactions. In one case it might affect specific
individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law
and order, while in another it might affect public order.
The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own
gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even
tempo of the life of the community which makes it
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That test
11
AIR 1982 SC 1143
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:38:-
2026:KER:66723
is clearly fulfilled in the facts and circumstances of the
present case.”
(emphasis supplied)
12
52. In Angoori Devi v. Union of India , the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held as follows:
“12. The impact on “public order” and “law and order”
depends upon the nature of the act, the place where it is
committed and motive force behind it. If the act is
confined to an individual without directly or indirectly
affecting the tempo of the life of the community, it may be
a matter of law and order only. But where the gravity of
the act is otherwise and likely to endanger the public
tranquility, it may fall within the orbit of the public order.
This is precisely the distinguishing feature between the
two concepts. Sometimes, as observed by
Venkatachaliah, J. in Ayya alias Ayub v. State of U.P:
“What might be an otherwise simple ‘law and order’
situation might assume the gravity and mischief of a
‘public order’ problem by reason alone of the manner or
circumstances in which or the place at which it is carried
out.”. Necessarily, much depends upon the nature of the
act, the place where it is committed and the sinister
significance attached to it.”
(emphasis supplied)
53. The interpretation of the term ‘public order’ by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Supdt., Central Prison v. Dr. Ram
13
Manohar Lohia , is as follows:
12
(1989) 1 SCC 385
13
AIR 1960 SC 633
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:39:-
2026:KER:66723
“Public order” is synonymous with public safety and
tranquillity: it is the absence of disorder involving
breaches of local significance in contradistinction to
national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war,
affecting the security of the State.”
54. In the instant case, the question that has to be considered is
whether the criminal incidents relied upon by the Detaining
Authority for passing an order of detention under the KAA(P)A
falls within the domain of ‘public order’ or ‘law and order’.
55. In examining this question, it is necessary to advert to the
statutory scheme of the KAA(P)A. Section 2(a) of the said Act
defines the expression "anti-social activity" to mean acting in such
a manner as to cause, or be likely to cause, directly or indirectly,
any feeling of insecurity, danger or fear among the general public
or any section thereof, or any danger to the safety of individuals,
public safety, public health or the ecological system, or any loss
or damage to the public exchequer or to any public or
private property, besides indulging in the activities enumerated in
clauses (c), (e), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m), (n), (q), (qb) and (s) of the
said section.
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:40:-
2026:KER:66723
56. While Section 2(a) defines the expression "anti-social activity",
Section 2(t) defines the expression "rowdy" as follows:
“‘rowdy’ means and includes a person who either by
himself or as a member of a gang commits or attempts to
commit, or abets the commission of any offences under
sections 153A and 153B of Chapter VIII and Chapters XV,
XVI, XVII & XXII of the Penal Code, 1860 (Central Act 45 of
1860), or any offences under the provision of the Arms Act,
1959 (Central Act 54 of 1959), or the Explosives
Substances Act, 1908 (Central Act 6 of 1908).”
57. On consideration of the materials placed on record, it could be
deduced that all the crimes relied upon by the Detaining
Authority for passing the detention order predominantly relate to
offences of robbery, voluntarily causing hurt in committing
robbery, criminal intimidation, causing disappearance of
evidence, cheating by personation, forgery, wrongful restraint,
voluntarily causing hurt, voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous
weapons or means and attempt to commit culpable homicide. The
detenu has a history of repeatedly involving himself in such
offences, and the incidents cannot be regarded as isolated or stray
occurrences. By their very nature and frequency, such activities
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:41:-
2026:KER:66723
have the tendency to create a sense of insecurity and fear
amongst members of the public regarding the safety of their
persons and properties.
58. The repeated criminal activities attributed to the detenu clearly
establishes his habitual criminal conduct that are capable of
disturbing the even tempo of life of the community as held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Angoori Devi (Supra) and also creates
a feeling of insecurity among the public, thereby attracting the
definition of "anti-social activity" under Section 2(a) of the
KAA(P)A. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the submission of
the learned counsel for the petitioner that the offences relied upon
by the Detaining Authority for ordering the preventive detention of
the detenu do not affect the maintenance of public order.
59. The final issue for consideration before us is whether the
subsequent modification of the period of detention by the
Government, reducing it from one year to six months, establishes
non-application of mind while passing the original order of
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:42:-
2026:KER:66723
confirmation and thereby vitiates the continued detention of the
detenu. To answer the said issue we refer to the case of Radhika
14
B. v. State of Kerala , wherein it was held as follows:
“5. Sub-section 1 of Section 13 of the Act provides for
revocation or modification of detention order by the State
Government. Section 13(2) provides, among other things,
that the revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not
be a bar for the issuance of another detention order under
Section 3 of the Act, if the person concerned continues to
be a person falling within the definition of ‘known rowdy’
or ‘known goonda’ as defined in the Act, and if any of the
situations enumerated in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of that
sub-section occurs.”
*
“8. A detention order may, at any time, be revoked or
modified by the Government. That power under Section
13(1) of the Act is a statutory one. It is a statutory power;
so positioned that it ought to be exercised maintaining the
requisite constitutional and statutory balance, bearing in
mind the constitutional rights of the person against whom
the detention order is issued vis-a-vis the powers to detain
and the grounds of detention as are provided for in the
Act; without forgetting the object and purpose of the Act.
Therefore, the issuance of an order of revocation under
Sub-section 1 of Section 13 cannot be made in derogation
of the constitutional principles governing the repository of
that statutory power; which is nothing short of fairness in
action, both in relation to the detenu, as also the public at
14
2015 SCC OnLine Ker 39505
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:43:-
2026:KER:66723
large; bearing in mind the mischiefs sought to be
prevented by such statutory provisions authorising
detention orders. Remember; the Act enacted in 2007,
stands now with no successful challenge to its
constitutional validity.”
(emphasis supplied)
60. It emerges from the aforesaid decision that the power conferred
upon the Government under Section 13(1) of the KAA(P)A to
revoke or modify a detention order is an independent statutory
power which can be exercised at any stage, provided such
exercise is fair, reasonable and in conformity with the object of
the Act. The mere fact that the Government, in exercise of the
said statutory power, subsequently modified the period of
detention from one year to six months does not, by itself, lead to
the inference that the original order of confirmation suffered from
non-application of mind. On the contrary, the subsequent order
reflects that the Government reconsidered the matter and
exercised the statutory discretion vested in it under Section 13(1)
of the Act. Thus, the contention raised by the learned counsel for
the petitioner is unsustainable and devoid of merit.
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:44:-
2026:KER:66723
61. As regards the delay in passing the order of detention it appears
that the proposal for preventive detention was initially submitted
th
by the District Police Chief, Malapuram, on 11 August, 2025,
which was rejected on the ground that the detenu had not at that
time applied for bail. But, later the said proposal was revived on a
request made by the District Police Chief.
62. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered
opinion that none of the grounds raised by the petitioner merit
acceptance. The materials placed before the Detaining Authority
were sufficient to classify the detenu as a "known rowdy" within
the meaning of Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A. The subjective
satisfaction recorded by the Detaining Authority is founded on
relevant and cogent materials and cannot be said to suffer from
non-application of mind or consideration of irrelevant factors. The
records further disclose that all the procedural safeguards
contemplated under the KAA(P)A have been duly complied with.
We also find that the repeated involvement of the detenu in
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:45:-
2026:KER:66723
serious offences, despite earlier preventive measures and the
imposition of bail conditions, justified the invocation of the
provisions of the KAA(P)A. The impugned order of detention
cannot, therefore, be said to be either arbitrary or illegal so as to
warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
63. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as
to costs.
Sd/-
SOUMEN SEN,
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
SYAM KUMAR V. M .,
JUDGE
krj
CNR: KLHC010368972026
WP(Crl.) No.805/2026 -:46:-
2026:KER:66723
APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) NO. 805 OF 2026
PETITIONER’S EXHIBITS:-
EXHIBIT P1 THE TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT OF THE 3RD RESPONDENT DATED
11.8.2025.
EXHIBIT P1(A) ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT P1.
EXHIBIT P2 THE TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGEMENT OF THIS HON’BLE COURT IN
WRIT PETITION (CRL) NO. 757/2924 DATED 30/07/2024.
EXHIBIT P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT OF THE 3RD RESPONDENT DATED
30/10/2025.
EXHIBIT P3(A) ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT P3.
EXHIBIT P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE CONFIRMATION ORDER OF THE 1ST
RESPONDENT DATED 30.01.2026.
EXHIBIT P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE AMENDED CONFIRMATION ORDER DATED
03.03.2026 PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT.