Rajinderpal Singh vs State Of Punjab And Others
- Court
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(1)
E HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
IN THE
B AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
H
CWP-19823-2026 (O&M)
Singh
Rajinderpal S
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Punj
ab & others
...Respondents
Sr.
No.
Partic
culars
Details
1. The d
2. The d
3. The d
4. Wheth
or full
5. The d
and re
date when the judgment is reserved
date when the judgment is pronounc
date when the judgment is uploaded
01.10.2026
ced 02.11.2026
d on the website 02.11.2026
ment is pronounced Full
her only operative part of the judgm
l judgment is pronounced
delay, if any, of the pronouncement o
of full judgment, N.A.
easons thereof
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NA
AMIT KUMAR
Present:
Mr. A.K.Virdi, Advocate,
for the petitioner.
Mr. Siddharth Sandhu, AAG, Pu
unjab.
NAMIT KU
UMAR, J.
1.
The petitioner has filed the i
instant petition under Articles
s
226/227 of th
he Constitution of India, seeking
g issuance of a writ of certiorari
i
for quashing
g/setting aside the order dated
d 06.08.2021 (Annexure P-1),
,
whereby the
petitioner has been dismissed fr
from service by invoking Article
e
311(2)(b) of
the Constitution of India read w
with Rule 16.2(1) of the Punjab
b
Police Rules
s, 1934, without holding a reg
gular departmental enquiry and
d
order dated
19.06.2025 (Annexure P-5)
), whereby the appeal dated
d
07.08.2021 p
preferred by the petitioner, has
s been consigned to record by
y
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.11.02 18:21
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(2)
No.2. Further, a writ of mandam
respondent N
mus has been sought for directing
g
the responden
nts to grant all consequential ben
nefits along with interest arising
g
therein to the
e petitioner in the event of quas
shing of impugned order/s dated
d
06.08.2021 a
and 19.06.2025 as well as to resto
ore the status of the petitioner to
o
the position
which existed prior to the pas
ssing of impugned order dated
d
06.08.2021.
2.
Briefly stated, the facts of the ca
ase are that the petitioner joined
d
the Punjab P
Police as a Constable on 07.11.
.1989 and was promoted to the
e
rank of Head
d Constable in the year 1995 a
and thereafter as Assistant Sub
b
Inspector in t
the year 2008. In the year 2021,
, the petitioner was implicated in
n
FIR No.126
dated 06.08.2021, registered a
at Police Station STF, Phase-4,
,
SAS Nagar, M
Mohali, under Sections 15 & 29
9 of the NDPS Act (Annexure P-
-
2), on the al
llegations that he (petitioner), a
along with others, was found in
n
possession o
of 350 kgs. of poppy-husk while
e travelling in a white coloured
d
Scorpio vehi
icle bearing registration No.DL
L-4C-NB-5595. The petitioner
r
was arrested
d on the same day, i.e. 06.08.20
021. On the same very day i.e.
.
06.08.2021, t
the Commissioner of Police, Lud
dhiana - respondent No.4, being
g
the competen
nt authority, passed the order da
ated 06.08.2021 (Annexure P-1),
,
dismissing h
him from service by invoking p
powers conferred under Article
e
311(2)(b) of
the Constitution of India read w
with Rule 16.2(1) of the Punjab
b
Police Rules
, without holding a regular depa
artmental inquiry. The relevant
t
extract from
the said order reads as under:
“Whereas, it has been br
rought to my notice that ASI/LR
R
Rajinderpal Singh No.302/LDH p
posted in Police Commissionerate
e
L
Ludhiana being the member of a
a disciplined force is indulging in
n
illegal NARCO trade activities by
misusing his official status. In this
s
regard, AIG (Special Task Force)
), Ludhiana Range vide his report
t
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.11.02 18:21
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(3)
No. 725/Reader/AIG/STF, dated
N
06/08/2021 has reported that a
a
criminal case bearing FIR No.1
26 dated 06/08/2021 u/s 15, 29
9
N
NDPS Act, 1985 was registered a
against him and others at PS STF,
D
District STF, Phase-4, SAS Nagar
on the basis of secret information.
He has been apprehended while
travelling in a car make Scorpio
o
bearing registration No.DL-4C-NB
B-5595 and Poppy Husk weighing
g
3 Qtls 50 Kgs has been recovered
d from his conscious possession. In
n
this way ASI/LR Rajinderpal Sing
gh No 302/Ldh being a member of
f
discipline force has shown gra
ve misconduct on his part and
d
misused his official position whic
ch has brought an adverse in the
e
general public.
Whereas, after perusing the
e official record and after applying
g
my unbiased independent mind, I
I, being the competent authority,
after examining and considering
all the aspects, has made up my
y
mind that it is not at all desirab
ble to retain ASI/LR Rajinderpal
l
Singh No.302/LDH in service at
the public expense. His retention
n
and continuation in service may be
e detrimental to the interests of the
e
state as well as the general publi
c and to safeguard these interests
s
with immediate effect, I consider
that in view of the indulgence of
f
A
ASI/LR Rajinderpal Singh No.30
02/LDH in illegal NARCO trade
e
activities, it is not reasonably p
practicable to hold any enquiry
y
against him at this stage. I being
g the competent authority, is also
o
well aware that the penalty of dis
smissal from service is very harsh
h
and oppressive for a public serva
nt, but no sympathy can outweigh
h
the consideration of the protectio
n of the interests of the state and
d
the regard for public good.
Therefore, I, Rakesh Agraw
wal, IPS, Commissioner of Police,
L
Ludhiana being the competent au
uthority and having the powers to
o
dismiss ASI/LR Rajinderpal Singh
h No.302/LDH from service, while
e
exercising those powers conferred
d under rule 16.2 (1) of PPR and
d
under article 311 (2) (b) of the Co
onstitution of India, hereby dismiss
s
A
ASI/LR Rajinderpal Singh No.302/
/LDH from service with immediate
e
effect.”
Aggrieved by the order of dismi
3.
issal from service, the petitioner
r
preferred an
appeal dated 07.08.2021 (Anne
exure P-6). However, when the
e
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.11.02 18:21
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(4)
t decided for a considerable peri
same was no
iod of time, the petitioner after a
a
period of 4 y
years approached this Court by w
way of CWP-14698-2025, which
h
was disposed
d of vide order dated 21.05.2025
5 (Annexure P-9) by passing the
e
following ord
der:
“1. The petitioner through insta
ant petition under Articles 226 and
d
227 of the Constitution of India
is seeking setting aside of order
r
dated 06.08.2021 (Annexure P-1)
) whereby he was dismissed from
m
service by Commissioner of Police
e, Ludhiana.
2. Mr. Aman Dhir, DAG, Pu
unjab, who on advance notice is
s
p
present in Court, submits that appe
eal of the petitioner is under active
e
consideration and final order shal
ll be passed within one month from
m
today.
3. Faced with this, Mr. Raj Ku
umar Arya, learned counsel for the
e
p
petitioner seeks permission to with
hdraw instant petition with liberty
y
to avail remedies against order
passed by Director General of
f
Police.
4. Dismissed as withdrawn wit
th aforesaid liberty.
It is made clear that if o
order is not passed by Director
r
General of Police within 1 month
h from today, it would be viewed
d
dy pending for almost 4 years.”
adversely because appeal is alread
It was, in compliance of the sa
4.
aid order, that the appeal of the
e
petitioner w
was consigned to the office,
vide order dated 19.06.2025
5
(Annexure P
-5). The relevant extract from th
he order dated 19.06.2025 reads
s
as under:
“xx xx
Subject:- Appeal against ord
Rajinderpal Singh No
xx
der of dismissal by former ASI
No. 302/Ludhiana.
I
In reference of your office letter no
o. 64803/Law & Order-5 dated 17-
-
06-2025 regarding above mentione
ed subject matter.
2. Through the above refe
erence, comments and records
s
regarding the appeal of the above
e employee have been sent to this
s
office. That the appellant's appeal
against the orders of his dismissal
l
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.11.02 18:21
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(5)
was filed in this office even before
e the final orders of the Appellate
e
A
Authority (yourself), it was receiv
ved in this office on 24-04-2025.
Whereas as per the rules, a revis
sion petition can be filed after the
e
f
final orders of the Appellate Auth
ority. Therefore, the appeal of the
e
above petitioner has been consigne
ed to the office.
3. Therefore, it is written to
o you by returning the relevant
t
records to inform the appellant in
this regard.”
5.
Reply by way of an affidavit
of Mr. Vaibhav Sehgal, PPS,
,
Addl. Deputy
y Commissioner of Police (Hea
adquarters), Ludhiana, has been
n
filed on beha
alf of the respondents, wherein th
he facts stated hereinabove have
e
not been disp
puted. However, with regard to
o dispensing with the enquiry, it
t
has been stat
ed in paras 4 & 5 as under:
“4. That it is further submitte
ed that as far as the question of
f
holding a departmental inquiry
is concerned, in cases involving
g
serving police officers, witnesses
may be reluctant to depose freely
y
due to apprehension of pressure or
r intimidation. Such circumstances
s
may enable the accused officer to
o influence the witnesses, thereby
y
making a fair, impartial and effec
ctive departmental inquiry difficult
t
to conduct. It is submitted the dis
sciplinary authority after carefully
y
considering the facts and circum
mstances and after examining the
e
seriousness of the conduct was
satisfied that the petitioner has
s
severely tarnished the image of th
he Punjab Police and has acted in
n
violation of the discipline and cond
duct rules of the Punjab Police.
5. That for the reasons
stated hereinabove, regular
r
departmental enquiry was dispen
nsed on cogent material and not
t
solely on the ‘ipse dixit’ of the
e concerned competent punishing
g
authority. The condition preceden
nt was satisfied before the action
n
under Article 311(2)(b) of the s
second proviso taken against the
e
p
petitioner is that holding of enquir
ry is not reasonably practicable in
n
the opinion of a reasonable pruden
nt person taking a reasonable view
w
of the prevailing situation.”
Learned counsel for the peti
6.
tioner has submitted that the
e
impugned or
rder of dismissal from service d
does not contain any cogent or
r
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.11.02 18:21
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(6)
ainable reason for dispensing w
legally susta
with the departmental enquiry.
.
Learned coun
nsel further submitted that dismi
issal from service, being a major
r
penalty, ord
dinarily cannot be imposed w
without conducting a regular
r
departmental
l enquiry in accordance with the
e prescribed procedure and that
t
recourse to
Article 311(2)(b) of the Cons
stitution is permissible only in
n
exceptional
circumstances where the co
ompetent authority records a
a
constitutiona
ally sufficient satisfaction that it
is not reasonably practicable to
o
hold such en
nquiry. Learned counsel further
r submitted that the punishment
t
imposed upo
on the petitioner is also contra
ary to Rule 16.2 of the Punjab
b
Police Rules,
, particularly when the petitioner
r had rendered approximately 31
years of serv
vice and had a clean service r
record. Further, the punishing
g
authority als
o failed to take into considerati
ion the claim of pension of the
e
petitioner be
efore passing the punishment o
order. Learned counsel for the
e
petitioner ha
as lastly submitted that there i
is yet another infirmity in the
e
decision-mak
king process, inasmuch as r
respondent No.2 has merely
y
consigned th
he petitioner’s appeal to the o
office without considering the
e
grounds raise
ed therein or ensuring its adjudic
cation on merits. It is, therefore,
,
contended th
hat respondent No.2 ought to h
have directed respondent No.3,
,
being the app
pellate authority, to consider the
grounds raised by the petitioner
r
and decide th
he appeal on merits, in accordanc
ce with law.
7.
Per contra, learned State couns
sel has submitted that since the
e
petitioner alo
ong with others was found in po
ossession of 350 kgs. of poppy-
-
husk, while t
travelling in a white coloured Sc
corpio vehicle, therefore, he has
s
rightly been
dismissed from service by in
nvoking the exceptional power
r
contained in
Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constit
tution of India.
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.11.02 18:21
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(7)
I have heard learned counsel fo
8.
or the parties and have perused
d
the record wi
ith their able assistance.
9.
Admittedly, the petitioner was
dismissed from service on the
e
basis of the
registration of the aforesaid FIR
R by invoking clause (b) of the
e
second provi
iso to Article 311(2) of the Con
nstitution of India. The relevant
t
constitutiona
al provision reads as under:
“ 311. Dismissal, removal or r
reduction in rank of persons
s
employed in civil capacities
s under the Union or a State –
(1) No person who is a
a member of a civil service of the
e
Union or an all India servi
ice or a civil service of a State or
r
holds a civil post under
the Union or a State shall be
e
dismissed or removed by a
a authority subordinate to that by
y
which he was appointed.
(2) No such person as
aforesaid shall be dismissed or
r
removed or reduced in rank
k except after an inquiry in which
h
he has been informed of th
he charges against him and given
n
a reasonable opportunity o
of being heard in respect of those
e
charges ;
Provided that where it is
proposed after such inquiry, to
o
impose upon him any suc
ch penalty, such penalty may be
e
imposed on the basis of th
he evidence adduced during such
h
inquiry and it shall not be n
necessary to give such person any
y
opportunity of making
representation on the penalty
y
proposed:
Provided further that this cl
lause shall not apply-
(a) where a pers
son is dismissed or removed or
r
reduced in rank on
the ground of conduct which has
s
led to his conviction
on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the au
uthority empowered to dismiss or
r
remove a person or
to reduce him in rank is satisfied
d
that for some reason
n, to be recorded by that authority
y
in writing, it is no
t reasonably practicable to hold
d
such inquiry ; or
VIMAL KUMAR
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I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(8)
(c) where the Pr
resident or the Governor, as the
e
case may be, is sat
tisfied that in the interest of the
e
security of the State
e, it is not expedient to hold such
h
inquiry.”
A plain reading of the aforesaid
10.
d Article makes it clear that the
e
authority, wh
ho is empowered to dismiss or re
emove a person or to reduce his
s
rank, without
t holding a departmental inquiry
y, is required to record reasons in
n
writing expl
aining why it is not reasonabl
ly practicable to hold such an
n
inquiry.
The scope and ambit of clause
e (b) of the second proviso to
o
11.
Article 311(2
2) of the Constitution of India ca
ame up for consideration before
e
the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Union of Ind
dia v. Tulsiram Patel , (1985) 3
SCC 398, wh
herein it was held that the discip
plinary authority is not expected
d
to dispense
with a departmental enquir
ry lightly or arbitrarily. The
e
satisfaction
of the competent authority m
must be founded upon relevant
t
material and
cannot rest merely upon its ow
wn assertion. Following the law
w
laid down by
y the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
n Tulsiram Patel’s case (supra) ,
,
as subseque
ently reiterated in a catena o
of judgments, and taking into
o
consideration
n the guidelines/instructions da
ated 02.09.2022 issued by the
e
Director Gen
neral of Police, Punjab, Chandig
garh, pursuant to the directions
s
issued by thi
s Court vide order dated 04.07.2
2022 in CWP-13285-2022, titled
d
as Ex. Consta
able Vikas No.950/FZR v. State o
of Punjab and others , this Court
t
in Gursher S
ab and others , 2026 Law Finder
Singh Sandhu v. State of Punja
r
on 01.09.2026) , examined the
e
(P&H) 2647
71 (CWP-878-2025 decided o
manner in w
which the provisions of Article 3
311(2)(b) of the Constitution of
f
India had be
een invoked by the State of Pun
njab in a large number of cases,
,
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.11.02 18:21
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(9)
ct adherence to the constitutio
without stric
onal safeguards governing the
e
dispensing w
with of a regular departmental en
nquiry. In the said judgment, this
s
Court observ
ved as under:
“35. It is trite law that the decis
sion of the appointing authority on
n
the issue of ‘recording reasons in
n writing on its satisfaction as to
o
why holding an inquiry is not reaso
onably practicable’ may be subject
t
to judicial review under Article
226 by the High Court. The
e
Constitution Bench of the Hon'b
ble Supreme Court in Tulsiram
m
Patel’s case (supra) , has reit
terated the legal position and
d
authoritatively explained the scop
pe and ambit of Article 311(2) and
d
the second proviso thereto. The
Court has made it clear that the
e
p
power under Article 311(2)(b) is
an exceptional power and cannot
t
be exercised arbitrarily or merel
ly for the purpose of avoiding a
a
departmental enquiry. The conditi
ion precedent for invoking Clause
e
(b) is the existence of circumstanc
ces which render the holding of an
n
enquiry not reasonably practicabl
le and the recording, in writing, of
f
reasons for the satisfaction of th
he disciplinary authority. It has
s
been held as under:
“32. The arguments adva
anced on behalf of the government
t
servants on the pleasure
doctrine and the second proviso
o
to Article 311 (2) may be sk
ketched in broad outlined as under:
(1) The pleasure doctri
ine in England is a part of the
e
special prerogative of the
Crown and has been inherited by
y
India from England and
should, therefore, be construed
d
strictly, that is, strictly aga
ainst the Government and liberally
y
in favour of government ser
rvants.
(2) The second proviso w
which withdraws from government
t
servants the safeguards p
provided by clause (2) of Article
e
311 must be also similarly
y construed for, unless a liberal
l
construction were placed up
pon it, great hardship would result
t
to government servants as
they could be arbitrarily thrown
n
out of employment and the
ey and their dependents would be
e
left without any means of su
ubsistence.
(3) There are several sta
ages before a government servant
t
can be dismissed or remo
oved or reduced in rank, namely,
serving upon him of a show
w cause notice or a charge-sheet,
VIMAL KUMAR
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I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-19823-2026 (O&M)
(10)
giving him inspection of doc
cuments, examination of witnesses,
arguments and imposition
of penalty. An inquiry starts only
y
after a show cause notic
ce is issued and served upon a
a
government servant. A show
w cause notice is thus preparatory
y
to the holding of an inquiry
ry and even if the entire inquiry is
s
dispensed with, the giving o
of a show cause notice and asking
g
for the explanation of the
government servant with respect
t
there to are not excluded.
(4) It is not obligatory u
upon the disciplinary authority to
o
dispense with the whole of
f the inquiry. Depending upon the
e
circumstances of the case
e, the disciplinary authority can
n
dispense with only a part of
f the inquiry.
(5) Imposition of penalty
ty is not a part of the inquiry and
d
once an inquiry is dispens
sed with, whether in whole or in
n
part, it is obligatory upon th
he disciplinary authority to give an
n
opportunity to the gov
vernment servant to make a
a
representation with respec
ct to the penalty proposed to be
e
imposed upon him.
(6) Article 311 is subje
ect to Article 14. Principles of
f
natural justice and the au
udi alteram partem rule are part
t
of Article 14 and, therefore
e, a show cause notice asking for
r
the explanation of the gove
ernment servant with respect to the
e
charges against him as al
lso a notice to show cause with
h
respect to the proposed p
penalty are required to be given
n
by Article 14 and the not g
giving of such notices or either of
f
them renders the order of d
dismissal, removal or reduction in
n
rank invalid.
33. The submissions on b
behalf of the Union of India can be
e
thus summarized :
(1) The second proviso m
must be construed according to its
s
terms. It is unambiguous
and does not admit of any such
h
interpretation as canvassed
d for on behalf of the government
t
servants.
(2) Where under the sec
cond proviso, clause (2) of Article
e
311 is made inapplicable, t
there is no scope for holding any
y
partial inquiry.
VIMAL KUMAR
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I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-19823-2026 (O&M)
(11)
(3) In any event, the ver
ry contents of the three clauses of
f
the second proviso show
that it is not necessary or not
t
practicable or not expedien
nt that any partial inquiry could be
e
or should be held, dependin
ng upon which clause applies.
(4) Article 14 does not gov
vern or control Article 311. The
e
Constitution must be
read as a whole. Article
e
311(2) embodies the princip
ples of natural justice including the
e
audi alteram partem rule.
It thus expressly states what is
s
required under Article 14
as a result of the interpretation
n
placed upon it by recent d
decisions of this Court. Once the
e
application of clause(2)
is expressly excluded by the
e
Constitution itself, there c
can be no question of making
g
applicable what has been
so excluded by seeking recourse
e
to Article 14.
(5) Consideration of
sympathy for the government
t
servants who may be dism
missed or removed or reduced in
n
rank are irrelevant to the c
construction of the second proviso.
The doctrine of tenure at
t pleasure in Article 310 and the
e
safeguards given to a gove
ernment servant under clauses (1)
)
and (2) of Article 311 as als
so the withdrawal of the safeguard
d
under clause (2) by the se
econd proviso are all enacted in
n
public interest and where pu
ublic interest conflicts with private
e
interest, the latter must yield
d to the former.
The Ple
easure Doctrine:
34. The concept of civil
l service is not now or of recent
t
origin. Governments - wh
hether monarchial, dictatorial or
r
republican - have to fun
nction; and for carrying on the
e
administration and the var
ried functions of the government a
a
large number of persons ar
re required and have always been
n
required, whether they are
constituted in the form of a civil
l
service or not. Every king
gdom and country of the world
d
throughout history had a g
group of persons who helped the
e
ruler to administer the lan
nd, whether according to modern
n
notions we may call that gr
roup a civil service or not, because
e
it is not possible for one m
man by himself to rule and govern
n
the land and look after
and supervise all the details of
f
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.11.02 18:21
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-19823-2026 (O&M)
(12)
administration. As it was th
hroughout history, so it has been in
n
England and in India.
xx
xx xx
The Second P
Proviso to Article 311(2):
60. Clause (2) of Arti
icle 311 gives a constitutional
l
mandate to the principles of
of natural justice and audi alteram
m
partem rule by providing t
that a person employed in a civil
l
capacity under the Union o
or a State shall not be dismissed or
r
removed from service or red
duced in rank until after an inquiry
y
in which he has been inform
med of the charges against him and
d
has been given a reasonab
ble opportunity of being heard in
n
respect of those charges. To
To this extent, the pleasure doctrine
e
enacted in Article 310(
(1) is abridged because Article
e
311(2) is a express prov
vision of the Constitution. This
s
safeguard provided for a g
government servant by clause (2)
)
of Article 311 is, however,
r, taken away when the second
d
proviso to that clause bec
comes applicable. The safeguard
d
provided by clause(1) of Ar
rticle 311, however, remains intact
t
and continues to be availab
ble to the government servant. The
e
second proviso to Article 3
311(2) becomes applicable in the
e
three cases mentioned in c
clauses (a) to (c) of that proviso.
These cases are:-
(a) where a person is di
ismissed or removed or reduced in
n
rank on the ground of condu
duct which has led to his conviction
n
on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the authority e
empowered to dismiss or remove a
a
person or to reduce him i
in rank is satisfied that for some
e
reason, to be recorded by
that authority in writing, it is not
t
reasonably practicable to ho
old such inquiry; and
(c) where the President
or the Governor, as the case may
y
be, is satisfied that in the in
nterest of the security of the State it
t
is not expedient to hold such
h inquiry.
The Construction to be pla
aced upon the second proviso and
d
the scope and effect of that
proviso were much debated at the
e
Bar. In Hira Lal Rattan L
Lal etc. v. State of U.P. & Anr.,
,
[1973] 2 S.C.R. 502 this Co
ourt observed (at page 512) ;
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CWP-19823-2026 (O&M)
(13)
"In construing a statutory p
provision, the first and the foremost
t
rule of construction is the
literary construction. All that we
e
have to see at the very outse
et is what does that provision say?
?
If the provision is unambigu
uous and if from that provision, the
e
legislative intent is clear, w
we need not call into aid the other
r
rules of construction of
f statutes. The other rules of
f
construction of statutes ar
re called into aid only when the
e
legislature intention is not
t clear. Ordinarily a proviso to a
a
section is intended to take
out a part of the main section for
r
special treatment. It is not
t expected to enlarge the scope of
f
the main section. But cases
s have arisen in which this Court
t
has held that despite the
e fact that a provision is called
d
proviso, it is really a sepa
arate provision and the so called
d
proviso has substantially al
tered the main section."
In Commissioner of Incom
me Tax, Madras v. Madurai Mills
s
62 , this Court said (at page 669):
Co. Ltd., [1973] 3 S.C.R. 66
"A proviso cannot be const
trued as enlarging the scope of an
n
enactment when it can b
be fairly and properly construed
d
without attributing to it tha
t effect. Further, if the language of
f
the enacting part of the stat
tute is plain and unambiguous and
d
does not contain the provis
sions which are said to occur in it,
one cannot derive those p
provisions by implication from a
a
proviso."
61. The language of t
the second proviso is plan and
d
unambiguous. The key-wor
rds in the second proviso are "this
s
clause shall not apply". By
y "this clause" is meant clause(2).
As clause(2) requires an
inquiry to be held against a
a
government servant, the on
nly meaning attributable to these
e
words is that this inquiry sh
hall not be held. There is no scope
e
for any ambiguity in these
e words and there is no reason to
o
given them any meaning diff
fferent from the plain and ordinary
y
meaning which they bear. T
The resultant effect of these words
s
is that when a situation env
visaged in any of the three clauses
s
of the proviso arises and th
hat clause becomes applicable, the
e
safeguard provided to a go
overnment servant by clause (2) is
s
taken away. As pointed out
t earlier, this provision is as much
h
in public interest and for p
public good and a matter of public
c
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CWP-19823-2026 (O&M)
(14)
policy as the pleasure do
octrine and the safeguards with
h
respect to security of tenure
re contained in clauses (1) and (2)
)
of Article 311.
xx
xx xx
129. The next contentio
on was that even if it is not
t
reasonably practicable to
hold an inquiry, a government
t
servant can be placed und
der suspension until the situation
n
improves and it becomes p
possible to hold the inquiry. This
s
contention also cannot be
accepted. Very often a situation
n
which makes it not reasona
ably practicable to hold an inquiry
y
is of the creation of the
e concerned government servant
t
himself or of himself acting
g in concert with others or of his
s
associates. It can even be
that he himself is not a party to
o
bringing about that situatio
on. In all such cases neither public
c
interest nor public good re
equires that salary or subsistence
e
allowance should be contin
nued to be paid out of the public
c
exchequer to the concerne
ed government servant. It should
d
also be borne in mind that
t in the case of a serious situation
n
which renders the holding
g of an inquiry not reasonably
y
practicable, it would be d
difficult to foresee how long the
e
situation will last and wh
en normalcy would return or be
e
restored. It is impossible to
o draw the line as to the period of
f
time for which the suspen
nsion should continue and on the
e
expiry of that period action
n should be taken under clause (b)
)
of the second proviso. Fur
rther, the exigencies of a situation
n
may require that promp
t action should be taken and
d
suspending the government
t servant cannot serve the purpose.
Sometimes not taking promp
pt action may result in the trouble
e
spreading and the situation
worsening and at times becoming
g
uncontrolable. Not taking
g prompt action may also be
e
construed by the trouble-
makers and agitators as sign of
f
weakness on the part of th
he authorities and thus encourage
e
them to step up the tempo o
of their activities or agitation. It is
s
true that when prompt actio
on is taken in order to prevent this
s
happening, there is an elem
ment of deterrence in it but that is
s
an unavoidable and nece
essary concomitance of such an
n
action resulting from a situ
uation which is not of the creation
n
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CWP-19823-2026 (O&M)
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of the authorities. After al
ll, clause (b) is not meant to be
e
applied in ordinary, norma
al situations but in such situations
s
where is not reasonably pra
acticable to hold an inquiry.
130. The condition preced
dent for the application of clause
e
(b) is the satisfaction of th
e disciplinary authority that "it is
s
not reasonably practicable
to hold" the inquiry contemplated
d
by clause (2) of Article 311
1. What is pertinent to note is that
t
the words used are "not
reasonably practicable" and not
t
"impracticable". According
g to the Oxford English Dictionary
y
"practicable" means "Cap
pable of being put into practice,
carried out in action, ef
ffected, accomplished, or done;
;
feasible". Webster's Third
d New International Dictionary
y
defines the word "pract
ticable" inter alia as meaning
g
"possible to practice or pe
erform: capable of being put into
o
practice, done or accomplis
shed : feasible". Further, the words
s
used are not "not pra
acticable" but "not reasonably
y
practicable". Webster's Th
ird New International Dictionary
y
defines the word "reasonab
bly" as "in a reasonable manner :
:
to a fairly sufficient extent"
". Thus, whether it was practicable
e
to hold the inquiry or not
must be judged in the context of
f
whether it was reasonably
practicable to do so. It is not a
a
total or absolute impractica
ability which is required by clause
e
(b). What is requisite is tha
at the holding of the inquiry is not
t
practicable in the opinion
n of a reasonable man taking a
a
reasonable view of the prev
vailing situation. It is not possible
e
to enumerate the cases in
which it would not be reasonably
y
practicable to hold the inqu
uiry, but some instances by way of
f
illustration may, however
r, be given. It would not be
e
reasonably practicable to
o hold an inquiry where the
e
government servant, particu
ularly through or together with his
s
associates, so terrorizes, t
threatens or intimidate witnesses
s
who are going to given ev
vidence against him with fear of
f
reprisal as to prevent the
em from doing so or where the
e
government servant by him
mself or together with or through
h
other threatens, intimidates
s and terrorizes the officer who is
s
the disciplinary authority o
or member of his family so that he
e
is afraid to hold the inquir
ry or direct it to be held. It would
d
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CWP-19823-2026 (O&M)
(16)
also not be reasonably pra
cticable to hold the inquiry where
e
an atmosphere of violence
e or of general indiscipline and
d
insubordination prevails, a
and it is immaterial whether the
e
concerned government serv
vant is or is not a party to bringing
g
about such an atmosphere.
In this connection, we must bear
r
in mind that numbers coerc
rce and terrify while an individual
l
may not. The reasonable pr
racticability of holding an inquiry
y
is a matter of assessment
t to be made by the disciplinary
y
authority. Such authority is
s generally on the spot and knows
s
what is happening. It is bec
cause the disciplinary authority is
s
the best judge of this that c
clause (3) of Article 311 makes the
e
decision of the disciplinary
authority on this question final. A
A
disciplinary authority is n
not expected to dispense with a
a
disciplinary inquiry lightly
y or arbitrarily or out of ulterior
r
motives or merely in order
to avoid the holding of an inquiry
y
or because the Departmen
nt's case against the government
t
servant is weak and mus
st fail. The finality given to the
e
decision of the disciplinary
y authority by Article 311(3) is not
t
binding upon the court so fa
ar as its power of judicial review is
s
concerned and in such a c
ase the court will strike down the
e
order dispensing with the i
nquiry as also the order imposing
g
penalty. The case of Arjun
Chaubey v. Union of India and
d
02 , is an instance in point. In that
t
others, [1984] 3 S.C.R. 30
case, the appellant was wor
rking as a senior clerk in the office
e
of the Chief Commercial S
Superintendent, Northern Railway,
Varanasi. The Senior Comm
mercial Officer wrote a letter to the
e
appellant calling upon him
m to submit his explanation with
h
regard to twelve charges of
f gross indiscipline mostly relating
g
to the Deputy Chief C
Commercial Superintendent. The
e
appellant submitted his exp
planation and on the very next day
y
the Deputy Chief Commerci
ial Superintendent served a second
d
notice on the appellant say
ying that his explanation was not
t
convincing and that another
r chance was being given to him to
o
offer his explanation with
h respect to those charges. The
e
appellant submitted his fur
rther explanation but on the very
y
next day the Deputy Chief C
Commercial Superintendent passed
d
an order dismissing him on
n the ground that he was not fit to
o
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CWP-19823-2026 (O&M)
(17)
be retained in service. Th
his Court struck down the order
r
holding that seven out of
of twelve charges related to the
e
conduct of the appellant w
with the Deputy Chief Commercial
l
Superintendent who was the
e disciplinary authority and that if
f
an inquiry were to be he
eld, the principal witness for the
e
Department would have be
een the Deputy Chief Commercial
l
Superintendent himself, res
sulting in the same person being
g
the main accuser, the chief
f witness and also the judge of the
e
matter.
xx
xx xx
133. The second condi
ition necessary for the valid
d
application of clause (b) o
of the second proviso is that the
e
disciplinary authority shou
ld record in writing its reason for
r
its satisfaction that it was n
not reasonably practicable to hold
d
the inquiry contemplated
d by Article 311(2). This is a
a
Constitutional obligation an
nd if such reason is not recorded in
n
writing, the order dispensin
ng with the inquiry and the order of
f
penalty following thereup
pon would both be void and
d
unconstitutional.”
xx
xx xx
41. In view of the settled propo
osition of law, as discussed above,
and on overall analysis of the
e intent of Article 311(2) of the
e
Constitution, it is vivid that an em
mployee can only be dismissed or
r
removed or reduced in rank aft
fter an inquiry by supplying the
e
charges against him and giving a
a reasonable opportunity of being
g
heard in respect of those charges,
, however, the applicability of the
e
exceptional proviso of clause (b)
of second proviso to Article 311
(2) of Constitution of India is r
restricted to a situation, wherein
n
conduct of the delinquent led to his
s conviction of criminal charges or
r
where the authority empowered w
who dismissed, removed or reduced
d
in rank, records reason in writin
ng upon satisfaction that it is not
t
‘reasonably practicable’ to hold
d an enquiry against him. The
e
disciplinary authority must not dis
spense with an enquiry merely on
n
the basis of its subjective sa
atisfaction or by mechanically
y
reproducing the language of Arti
icle 311(2)(b) of the Constitution.
The reasons must demonstrate the
e existence of circumstances which
h
genuinely render the holding
of the enquiry impracticable.
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CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(18)
Ordinarily, circumstances such
as witnesses being unwilling to
o
depose on account of threats,
intimidation or coercion may
y
constitute relevant considerations.
However, the mere seriousness of
f
the allegations or the possibility
that the delinquent employee may
y
not cooperate cannot, by its
tself, satisfy the constitutional
l
requirement. The wording as u
used in clause (b) of the second
d
p
proviso indicates the satisfaction
of the Disciplinary Authority by
y
using the word “it is not reasonab
ly practicable to hold” the inquiry
y
contemplated by clause (2) of A
rticle 311. The Hon’ble Supreme
e
Court emphasized the meaning of
f “not reasonably practicable” as
s
j
juxtaposed against not “impract
ticable”. The Hon’ble Supreme
e
Court clarified that the disciplin
nary authority is not expected to
o
dispense with a departmental inqu
uiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of
f
ulterior motives or merely in order
r to avoid the holding of an inquiry
y
or because the Department’s case
against the government servant is
s
weak and may fail. Further, the C
Court emphasised the words used in
n
clause (b) of second proviso that
t the disciplinary authority should
d
record its reasons in writing for
r its satisfaction that holding an
n
inquiry is not reasonably practic
able. In case, such reason is not
t
recorded in writing or not valid an
nd justifiable, the order dispensing
g
with the inquiry and the order of p
penalty flowing therefrom would be
e
void and unconstitutional. In tha
t situation, it remains always open
n
to the Court to take the case out
of purview of that clause and the
e
order of penalty would stand inval
idated.
42. This Court has also noticed
d the manner in which the State of
f
Punjab has invoked Article 311(2)
)(b) of the Constitution in a large
e
number of cases. In CWP-13285-
-2022 titled ‘Ex. Constable Vikas
s
b & others’ this Court, vide order
N
No.950/FZR Vs. State of Punjab
r
dated 04.07.2022 , observed as und
der:
“xx
xx xx
This Court has notic
ced while dealing with the current
t
roster, that a large numbe
er of writ petitions are being filed
d
against the order of dismis
ssal invoking Article 311(2)(b) of
f
the Constitution of India.
. The competent authorities are
e
ignoring the law as settled
d by the Supreme Court regarding
g
dismissal of an employee
e under Article 311(2)(b) of the
e
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CWP-19823-2026 (O&M)
(19)
Constitution of India, whic
ch leads to the impugned orders
s
being set aside.
It might be appropr
riate for the State Governments to
o
look into this issue and a
apprise the competent authorities
s
about the relevant case la
aw pertaining to invoking Article
e
311(2)(b) of the Constitutio
on of India at the time of seeking to
o
summarily dismiss the Gove
ernment employees.
Let a copy of this
order be conveyed to the Chief
f
Secretaries of the States of
f Punjab and Haryana as well as
s
the Advisor to Administrato
or, U.T., Chandigarh.”
43. In compliance of said dire
ections, the office of the Director
r
General of Police, Punjab,
Chandigarh, issued guidelines/
/
instructions dated 02.09.2022, whi
ich reads thus:
“Subject:- Guidelines/Ins
Orders of th
High Court, p
(2) (B) of th
involving dism
Memo
structions for compliance of the
he Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana
e
a
1
pertaining to invoking Article 311
he Constitution of India in cases
s
missal of an employee/official.
1. In this regard, the H
Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High
h
Court has issued directions
s in the Civil Writ Petition 13285
5
of 2022 titled as Ex Consta
able Vikas No. 950/FZR Vs State
e
4.07.2022 that:-
of Punjab and others on 04
"xx
xx xx"
2. That in compliance w
with the aforesaid directions of the
e
Hon'ble High Court,
this office is issuing
g
guidelines/instructions for
the basic understanding of the
e
Article 311 (2) (b) while
invoking the same in cases of
f
dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank of the
e
employee/official. It has b
een seen in many cases that the
e
order passed by the Compe
etent Authorities under Article 311
(2) (b) have failed in the
Hon'ble Courts and the Hon'ble
e
Courts have set aside such
dismissal order of the personnels
s
time and again and reinsta
ated them in service. The Hon'ble
e
Courts have also observed
in numerous cases that decision to
o
dispense with the departm
mental enquiry cannot be rested
d
solely on the ipse dixit of th
he concerned authorities. It is well
l
settled proposition of law t
that due reasons are necessary to
o
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CWP-19823-2026 (O&M)
(20)
be recorded in writing as
s to why it was not practicably
y
possible to conduct an enqu
uiry.
3. That the Hon'ble Sup
preme Court of India and Hon'ble
e
High Courts, in catena of j
judgments have specifically made
e
clear that order of dism
issal is not to be passed in a
a
mechanical manner. It has
also been held that only in cases
s
where disciplinary authori
ities are satisfied on the basis of
f
material available on file th
hat the case is of such a nature that
t
it is not practicable possib
ble to hold an enquiry in view of
f
threat, inducement, affiliati
ion with criminals etc. that article
e
311(2) (b) of Constitution of
of India, is to be invoked.
4. That the Hon'ble Su
upreme Court of India and High
h
Courts have delivered
various judgments on the
e
interpretations of Article 31
11 (2) (b). Few are mentioned here
e
and are required to be fo
ollowed in letter and spirit while
e
dealing in cases involvin
ng Article 311 (2) (b) of the
e
Constitution of India.
1. The Hon'ble S
Supreme Court of India in Union
n
am Patel & others , judgment dated
d
of India Vs Tulsi Ra
11.07.1985 is well
traversed and has clarified the
e
constitutional provis
ions as embodied in Article 311(2)
)
of the Constitution.
The judgment is detailed and is a
a
settled law pertaini
ing to matters involving article
e
311(2)(b) of the Cons
stitution of India.
2. In CWP No.1
15903 titled as Dinesh Singh Vs
s
others decided on 30.08.2016 , the
e
State of Punjab & o
Hon'ble Court has h
held "Constitution of India, 1950
0
Article 311 (2) du
ue reasons are necessary to be
e
recorded as to why
it was not practicably possible to
o
conduct an enquiry
or how it was not convenient to
o
authority or inquiry
officer to conduct an enquiry-said
d
provisions are attra
acted by exercising extraordinary
y
powers under extrao
ordinary circumstances- absence of
f
extraordinary circum
mstances while invoking provisions
s
of article 311 (2) (b)
can be termed as misuse of power
r
and as such, action
of the authority is not sustainable
e
in the eyes of law.
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CWP-19823-2026 (
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(21)
3. The Hon'ble P
Punjab & Haryana High Court in
n
CWP No. 10423 of 2
2020 titled Sarabjit Singh Vs State
e
s has held that authority chose to
o
of Punjab & others
dismiss petitioner w
without holding Inquiry- careful
l
reading of the impug
gned order shows that there is total
l
absence of reasons
in this regard- mere observation
n
that departmental
enquiry at this stage does not
t
appear to be justified
d is not sufficient to invoke powers
s
under clause (b) of th
he 2nd proviso to article 311(2) of
f
the Constitution of I
India. Petitioner directly to be re-
-
instated.
5. It should also be ens
sured that recording in writing of
f
the reasons for dispensing
with the enquiry must precede an
n
order imposing the penalty
. Legally speaking the reasons for
r
dispensing with the enquiry
ry need not find place in the final
l
order itself though they sho
ould be recorded separately in the
e
relevant file. In spite of th
his legal position, it would be of
f
advantage to incorporate
e the reasons which lead the
e
disciplinary authority to
the conclusion that it was not
t
reasonably practicable to
hold an enquiry. The reasons so
o
given should not be vagu
ue or they should not be just a
a
repetition of the language of
of the relevant rules.
6. That the aforementi
ioned guidelines/instructions and
d
the relevant detailed case
e laws are to be examined and
d
followed by the concern
ned disciplinary authority while
e
invoking article 311(2)(b)
b) Constitution of India. These
e
guidelines/instructions alon
ngwith relevant case laws are to be
e
strictly adhered and their
meticulous compliance is to be
e
ensured.”
44. It has also been noticed by
y this Court that, in a number of
f
cases, Police Officers/Officials ha
ave been dismissed from service by
y
invoking the provisions of Artic
cle 311(2)(b) of the Constitution
n
merely on account of registration o
of an FIR against them…………
xxx
xxx xxx
54. It is also apt to state here
e that the State Government itself,
f
through the guidelines/instruction
ns dated 02.09.2022, issued by the
e
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CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(22)
office of the Director General of
f Police, Punjab, had drawn the
e
attention of the competent author
rities to the settled legal position
n
that orders under Article 311(2)(b)
b) of the Constitution should not be
e
p
passed mechanically and that r
reasons for dispensing with the
e
enquiry must be supported by mate
erial available on record. The said
d
guidelines specifically caution tha
at the decision to dispense with a
a
departmental enquiry cannot rest
merely upon the ipse dixit of the
e
competent authority and that the
e reasons must not be vague or
r
merely reproduction of the langu
uage of the relevant constitutional
l
p
provision.
xxx
xxx xxx
56. While considering the provi
isions of Article 311(2)(b) vis-à-vis
s
Punjab Police Rules, 1934, a Coo
ordinate Bench in Baljinder Singh
h
v. State of Punjab & others ,
, ( CWP-8612-2021 decided on
n
13.05.2024 ), observed as under:
“3. Mr. Anupam Bhardw
dwaj, Advocate submits that there
e
was no occasion to dis
spense with mandatory inquiry
y
contemplated by Article 3
11 of Constitution of India read
d
with Rule 16.24 of the 1934
4 Rules. The respondents acting in
n
a mechanical manner disp
ensed with inquiry and dismissed
d
the petitioner from servic
ce. The co-accused was initially
y
suspended and he has been
re-instated.
4. Per contra, Mr. Paw
wan Kumar, DAG, Punjab submits
s
that petitioner accepted ille
egal gratification from accused in
n
aforementioned FIRs, thus
s, it was indispensable to dismiss
s
him from service. It was no
t possible to conduct inquiry, thus,
he was dismissed without co
onducting inquiry.
xx
xx xx
8. The reason advanc
ced by SSP for dispensing with
h
inquiry is not the actual r
reason because same reason has
s
been advanced in every c
case where there is FIR against
t
serving police officer. Th
he respondent can dispense with
h
inquiry if actually it is not
practicable to hold inquiry. Mere
e
writing one line in the
impugned order that it is not
t
practicable to hold inquiry
y is not compliance of mandate of
f
either Constitution of Ind
dia or Rule 16.24 of the Punjab
b
Police Rules. The respon
ndent instead of straight away
y
VIMAL KUMAR
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CWP-19823-2026 (O&M)
(23)
dismissing the petitioner co
ould put him under suspension and
d
thereafter conduct inquiry.
This course was adopted in the
e
case of co-accused, thus,
there was no reason to adopt
t
different course in the case
e of petitioner. It is interesting to
o
note that FIR was registere
ed against the petitioner as well as
s
HC Jatinder Singh and
he has been re-instated before
e
awaiting conclusion of crim
minal proceedings.
9. In the wake of abo
ove discussion and findings, this
s
Court is of the considered
opinion that respondents without
t
any logical reason dispens
sed with mandatory inquiry. The
e
impugned orders deserve to
o be set aside and accordingly set
t
aside.
It is made clear that
t petitioner, as conceded, shall not
t
be entitled to back wages. T
The respondent shall be free either
r
to conduct departmental
l inquiry after following due
e
procedure prescribed by
Punjab Police Rules or take
e
appropriate decision af
after conclusion of criminal
l
proceedings.”
57. In Rakesh Kumar v. State o
of Punjab & others , ( CWP-14712-
-
2017 decided on 25.04.2022 ), this
Court observed as under:
“8. The petitioners were
e appointed as Constables with the
e
Punjab Police and were di
ismissed from service by invoking
g
Article 311(2) (b) of the C
Constitution of India as FIR No.74
4
dated 25.07.2014, under Se
ection 384 of the IPC and Section 7
7
and 8 of the Prevention of
f Corruption Act, 1988 came to be
e
registered against them. T
The date of dismissal is the same
e
date as the date of registrat
tion of the FIR. While dismissing a
a
government servant under A
Article 311 (2) (b), the appropriate
e
disciplinary authority has t
to record reasons in writing that it
t
does not consider it reaso
onably practicable to give to the
e
person an opportunity of
showing cause. The satisfaction
n
under this clause has to be
e of the disciplinary authority that
t
has the power to dismiss, r
remove or reduce the Government
t
servant in rank. As a chec
ck against an arbitrary use of this
s
exception, it has been provi
ided that the reasons for which the
e
competent authority decide
es to do away with the prescribed
d
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CWP-19823-2026 (O&M)
(24)
procedure must be record
ded in writing setting out why it
t
would not be practicable.
9. On perusal of impu
ugned order of termination, it is
s
apparent that no reasons w
whatsoever have been recorded to
o
show as to how the provisio
ons of Article 311 (2) (b) have been
n
attracted. A reading of the
impugned order would show that
t
the reason for dispensing of
of holding a regular enquiry is that
t
a finding is given that no
witness is likely to come forth to
o
depose and that the petitio
oner has a criminal mentality, but
t
there is no material availab
ble to support this ground.
xx
xx xx
11. The law is this regar
rd is no longer res intergra, as can
n
be noticed from the judgem
ments as cited above. Therefore the
e
impugned orders would not
t be sustainable.
12. Another reason for s
setting aside the impugned orders
s
is that a co-accused in the
e FIR, who was also dismissed by
y
the authorities while dispe
ensing with regular enquiry, had
d
filed an appeal before
the Additional Chief Secretary
y
Government of Punjab, D
Department of Home Affairs and
d
Justice and the said appea
l was allowed holding that it was
s
not fair to dismiss the a
appellant with hearing and that
t
departmental proceedings
were liable to be initiated. The
e
appellant Harjap Singh sto
ood reinstated and the period from
m
date of dismissal till reinst
tatement was to be treated as Non
n
Duty Period. The petitione
ers who are similarly situated as
s
said Harjap Singh, too sh
hould be given an opportunity of
f
hearing.
13. Consequently the w
rit petitions are allowed and the
e
impugned order dismissing
g the petitioners from service vide
e
order 25.07.2014 (Annexur
re P-3) and the orders passed on
n
the statutory appeal dated
d 02.03.2016 (Annexure P-6), by
y
respondent No.4 and order
r dated 16.04.2016 (Annexure P-8)
)
passed by respondent No.3
in revision, are set aside leaving it
t
open to the department to
take departmental action against
t
the petitioners in accordanc
ce with law, if needed.”
58. The power under Article
311(2)(b) cannot, therefore, be
e
invoked merely because the discip
plinary authority apprehends that
t
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CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(25)
the delinquent employee may not
t cooperate with the proceedings.
There must exist some objective
circumstance which makes a fair
r
enquiry genuinely impracticable.
Circumstances, such as, threats,
intimidation or coercion of witnes
sses, interference with the Enquiry
y
Officer, or tampering with eviden
nce may ordinarily furnish a valid
d
basis. However, no such circumsta
ance has been demonstrated in the
e
present case.”
p
Recently, the Hon’ble Suprem
12.
me Court in Manohar Lal v.
SCC OnLine SC 363 has again
n
Commission
er of Police & others, 2026 S
held that the
e reasons recorded by the discip
plinary authority must establish
h
the existence
e of circumstances which render
r the holding of a departmental
l
enquiry not
reasonably practicable. The pow
wer cannot be exercised on the
e
basis of a me
ere ‘ ipse dixit’ or an unsubstant
tiated apprehension. It has been
n
held as under
r:
“35. In the case at hand after
registration of the FIR when the
e
appellant was in custody the order
r of dismissal was passed. He was
s
released only thereafter. As such,
without indicating any instance of
f
intimidation, traumatising, thr
reatening or persuading the
e
complainant or the witness to tur
rn hostile from inside the jail, the
e
belief or presumption as recorded
by the disciplinary authority is not
t
sufficient to bring the present cas
se within the exception to Article
e
311 (2) by applying clause (b) of se
econd proviso thereto. Thus, in our
r
view, the reasoning contemplated
in the judgment of Jaswant Singh
h
(Supra) applies in the case at hand
d.
xx
xx xx
40. On overall analysis of the
intent of Article 311(2), it is vivid
d
that an employee holding a post i
in Union or State ought not to be
e
dismissed or removed by an aut
thority subordinate to the one by
y
which he was appointed. It is furth
her specified that a person shall be
e
dismissed or removed or reduced
in rank after an inquiry supplying
g
the charges if any against him an
d giving a reasonable opportunity
y
of being heard in respect of those
e charges. The applicability of the
e
said clause is restricted in a situat
tion wherein his conduct led to his
s
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CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(26)
conviction of criminal charges or
r where the authority empowered
d
who dismissed, removed or red
duced in rank records reason in
n
writing upon satisfaction that it i
is not ‘reasonably practicable’ to
o
hold an enquiry against him. In
addition, where such power has
s
been exercised by the President o
or the Governor it may be in the
e
interest of security of the State or
r if not expedient to hold such an
n
enquiry, then exceptional power u
under clause (c) of second proviso
o
to Article 311 ought to be exercised
d.
41. In case such a decision inv
voking the extraordinary power is
s
taken by the competent authority
in light of the judgment Tulsiram
m
Patel (Supra) within the param
meter as discussed, the scope of
f
j
judicial review is available to the
Constitutional Courts wherein the
e
reasons as assigned for satisfa
action of the authority must be
e
reasonable, valid, justified and
d in writing. In addition, the
e
satisfaction as recorded must be
the objective satisfaction on the
e
basis of material brought on record
rd which ordinarily the disciplinary
y
authority may take as a prudent p
person. Otherwise, dispensing with
h
the enquiry is not permissible in la
aw. In the present case, Section 21
of the 1978 Act confers power
r of punishment and Section 22
2
p
prescribes the procedure for a
awarding such punishment. The
e
p
procedure as contemplated has
been elaborated under the 1980
0
Rules. In the present case, in our
r view, the power exercised by the
e
authority is completely without
application of mind, thus, the
e
question of recording of satisfact
tion as affirmed by the appellate
e
authority, the CAT and the High C
Court does not arise. Therefore, we
e
can hold that the order dispensin
ng with the regular procedure of
f
inquiry is arbitrary and conseque
ently the order of dismissal of the
e
appellant is liable to be quashed a
and the orders of the CAT and the
e
High Court affirming the said dism
missal order stand set aside.”
Applying the aforesaid princip
13.
ples to the facts of the present
t
case, it emer
rges that the petitioner was dism
missed from service, vide order
r
dated 06.08.2
2021 (Annexure P-1) i.e. on th
e same very day on which FIR
R
No.126 date
d 06.08.2021 was registered a
gainst him. The main ground
d
recorded in
the dismissal order is that
the petitioner was allegedly
y
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CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(27)
while travelling in a white col
apprehended
oured Scorpio vehicle in which
h
350 kgs. of p
poppy-husk was recovered and
that his alleged involvement in
n
narcotics-rela
ated activities had tarnished the
e image of the police force. The
e
competent a
authority thereafter recorded
that it was not reasonably
y
practicable to
o hold a departmental enquiry ag
gainst the petitioner.
14.
A careful perusal of the impugn
ned order, however, reveals that
t
no specific
circumstances have been point
ted out to demonstrate why a
a
regular depa
artmental enquiry could not rea
asonably have been conducted
d
against the p
petitioner. There is neither any
reference to a specific witness
s
having been
threatened or intimidated by t
the petitioner, nor any material
l
indicating th
hat he had attempted to tamper
with the evidence. Further, no
o
other circum
mstance has been pointed out
that could have rendered the
e
holding of a
regular departmental enquiry n
not reasonably practicable. The
e
dismissal or
rder proceeds on the seriousne
ess of the allegations and the
e
apprehension
n that the petitioner’s retention
in service might be detrimental
l
to the interes
sts of the State and the general pu
ublic. These considerations may
y
have a beari
ing upon the nature of the all
legations or the desirability of
f
initiating dis
sciplinary proceedings, but the s
same do not, in the absence of
f
any further
material, satisfy the requirem
ment for dispensing with such
h
proceedings.
15.
The assertion of the respon
ndents that the witnesses in
n
departmental
l proceedings against serving po
olice personnel may be reluctant
t
to depose fre
eely and that the petitioner migh
ht influence the witnesses, is not
t
supported by
y any specific instance. The me
ere fact that the petitioner was a
a
member of th
he police force cannot lead to a
a presumption that the witnesses
s
would not de
epose freely against him or that
the departmental enquiry could
d
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CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(28)
ucted fairly. The respondents we
not be condu
ere required to record in writing
g
the circumst
tances which rendered the hold
ding of a regular departmental
l
enquiry not
reasonably practicable. Howev
ver, no such material has been
n
dispensing with the enquiry.
brought to th
he notice of this Court to justify d
16.
The impugned order further
records that the competent
t
authority ha
ad examined all aspects of th
he matter and had applied its
s
independent
mind. However, a mere recital t
that the authority has applied its
s
mind cannot
be made basis to exercise the ex
xtraordinary power under Article
e
311(2)(b) of
the Constitution of India. The re
easons recorded must disclose a
a
rational nexu
us between the circumstances pre
evailing at the relevant time and
d
the conclusi
on that holding a departmenta
al enquiry was not reasonably
y
practicable. I
In the present case, the impugn
ned order does not disclose any
y
such nexus.
17.
Furthermore, the petitioner h
ad preferred an appeal dated
d
07.08.2021 (
(Annexure P-6) against the orde
er of dismissal. However, when
n
the appeal
remained undecided for near
rly four years, the petitioner
r
approached t
this Court by filing CWP-1469
8-2025, which was disposed of
f
vide order d
dated 21.05.2025 (Annexure P
P-9), with liberty to avail the
e
remedies ag
gainst the order passed by the
e Director General of Police.
.
However, a p
perusal of the order dated 19.0
06.2025 (Annexure P-5) reveals
s
that the petit
tioner’s appeal was still not exa
amined on merits, but the same
e
was consigne
ed to the office on the ground th
hat the appeal had been received
d
before passin
ng of the final order by the appel
late authority and that a revision
n
petition could
d be filed only thereafter. As su
uch, the aforesaid order does not
t
constitute a
decision on the merits of the
e petitioner’s challenge to his
s
dismissal. T
The said order neither examines
the legality of dispensing with
h
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CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(29)
ental enquiry nor addresses the g
the departme
grounds raised by the petitioner
r
regarding the
e invocation of Article 311(2)(b)
) of the Constitution of India by
y
the competen
nt authority. The petitioner canno
ot be denied consideration of his
s
appeal on m
erits, particularly when the sam
me had remained pending for an
n
inordinately
long period of approximately 4 y
years and this Court had already
y
directed its e
xpeditious consideration.
18.
The petitioner had joined the Pu
unjab Police on 07.11.1989 and
d
had rendered
d more than 31 years of service b
before his dismissal from service
e
on 06.08.202
21. Rule 16.2(1) of the Punjab P
Police Rules, 1934 stipulates the
e
circumstance
es in which the punishment o
of dismissal may be imposed,
,
including the
e requirement that dismissal be
reserved for the gravest acts of
f
misconduct
or for the cumulative eff
ffect of misconduct proving
g
incorrigibility
y and complete unfitness for
police service. The length of
f
service rende
ered by the petitioner and his
service record were, therefore,
,
relevant cons
siderations while examining the
e legality of the extreme penalty
y
imposed upo
on him. However, neither
the order of dismissal dated
d
06.08.2021
(Annexure P-1) nor the appe
ellate order dated 19.06.2025
5
(Annexure P
-5) consigning the petitioner’s a
appeal reflects any consideration
n
of the length
h of service rendered by the petit
tioner, his past service record or
r
his claim to p
pension, as specifically mandate
ed under Rule 16.2 of the Punjab
b
Police Rules,
, 1934.
19.
In view of the above discussion,
, this Court is of the opinion that
t
the impugne
ed order dated 06.08.2021 (An
nnexure P-1) suffers from non-
-
compliance w
with the mandatory requiremen
nts of Article 311(2)(b) of the
e
Constitution
of India. The order dated
d 19.06.2025 (Annexure P-5)
)
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CWP-19823-2026 (
(O&M)
(30)
his appeal to the office withou
consigning h
ut adjudication on merits, also
o
cannot be sus
stained.
20.
Consequently, the present petitio
on is allowed. The order/s dated
d
06.08.2021 (
(Annexure P-1) and 19.06.202
25 (Annexure P-5) are hereby
y
quashed. Th
he respondents are directed to re
einstate the petitioner in service
e
with all cons
equential benefits.
21.
However, the setting aside of the
e impugned orders and direction
n
for reinstatem
ment shall be without prejudice t
to the right of the respondents to
o
take recourse
e in accordance with law. The re
espondents shall be free either to
o
conduct depa
artmental inquiry after followin
ng due procedure prescribed by
y
Punjab Polic
e Rules or take appropriate decis
sion after conclusion of criminal
l
proceedings.
02.11.2026
Vimal
(NAMIT KUMAR)
JUDGE
Yes/No
Yes/No
Whether speaking/reasoned:
Whether reportable:
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authenticity of this order/judgment.