STATE vs KANSARI BEHERA

THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLLP No.40 of 2012

CNR No. ODHC010034132012
(In the matter of an application under Section 378 (1) & (3) of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 )

State of Orissa Petitioner
…….

-Versus-
Kansari Behera Opposite Party
…….

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sangram Das, SC (Vigilance)

For the Opposite Party : None

CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 17.09.2026 : Date of Judgment: 31.10.2026

S.S. Mishra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment
of acquittal dated 18.04.2011 passed by the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Berhampur, Ganjam in T.R. No.39 of 2001 arising out of
Berhampur Vigilance P.S. Case No.36 dated 03.11.1999, whereby the

learned trial Court acquitted the opposite party of the charge under
Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988.
2. Heard Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel (Vigilance) for
the petitioner.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that one Radhika Pradhan, wife
of late Mathura Pradhan, submitted a report before the Vigilance Police
Station on 02.11.1999 alleging that her husband, who had been working
as a Peon in the Orissa Secretariat, had died while in service. According
to the informant, on 28.09.1999 she had submitted applications before
the Tahasildar, G. Udayagiri for obtaining a legal heir certificate for
herself and caste, residential and income certificates for her daughter
Sundari Pradhan. The said applications were forwarded to the office of
the opposite party, who was then working as Revenue Inspector, Paburia.
It was further alleged that the opposite party demanded a sum
of Rs.1,000/- from the informant as illegal gratification for submitting
the requisite reports. According to the informant, on 29.09.1999 she paid
Rs.300/- to the opposite party, but he demanded the balance amount of

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Rs.700/- and stated that unless the remaining amount was paid, the
reports would not be submitted. The informant further alleged that on
02.11.1999 she approached the opposite party and requested him to send
the reports, but he declined to do so and insisted upon payment of the
balance amount.
4. It was the further case of the prosecution that the informant
thereafter arranged Rs.700/- and approached the Vigilance authorities.
On receipt of the report at about 4.15 p.m. on 02.11.1999, the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Berhampur, who was camping at
Phulbani, took steps for laying a trap. Independent Government
witnesses were called and the usual demonstration regarding the
chemical reaction of the treated currency notes was allegedly conducted.
The informant was instructed to hand over the chemically treated
Government Currency notes to the opposite party only on demand. The
accompanying/overhearing witnesses were also instructed to observe the
transaction.
5. On 03.11.1999, the Vigilance party proceeded to the office of the
opposite party and the trap was laid. According to the prosecution, after

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the transaction, the tainted currency notes were recovered from the
possession of the opposite party and were seized along with other
documents under a seizure list. A detection report was thereafter
prepared. Investigation was undertaken and, after obtaining sanction for
prosecution, charge-sheet was submitted against the opposite party for
commission of an offence punishable under Section 13(2) read with
Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
6. In support of its case, the prosecution examined eleven witnesses.
Four witnesses were Vigilance Police personnel, four were Government
witnesses associated with the trap proceedings, one was the informant
and two were Clerks of the office of the Tahasildar, G. Udayagiri and
Phulbani. The prosecution also relied upon a series of documentary
exhibits and material objects, including the seized currency notes and
bottles relating to the chemical test. The defence examined no witness.
The defence of the opposite party was one of complete denial.
7. Upon appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court principally
relied upon the evidence of P.W.3, who did not support the prosecution
version regarding acceptance of the bribe amount, the non-examination

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of Inspector, (Vigilance) S.N. Behera, the alleged deficiencies in
investigation, and the defence plea that the informant had failed to
furnish supporting documents for issuance of the certificates. The trial
Court also referred to the statement of the Investigating Officer that he
had not ascertained the actual caste of the informant or her deceased
husband and had not investigated whether she had land or a house within
the concerned Tahasil area. The Court found the explanation of the
opposite party that the money had been thrust upon him and that he had
pushed it away to be probable. It accordingly held that acceptance of the
bribe had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and that mere proof
of demand would not be sufficient for conviction. The opposite party
was consequently acquitted under Section 248(1) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and directed to be set at liberty. The relevant part of
the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“ 8. In this case, the acceptance of bribe has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Mere demand of
bribe though proved will not carry any punishment
nor a conviction can be based on that. Therefore, on
the entire appreciation of the record, it is found that
the prosecution is not able to prove the case against
the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and as such
the accused is found not guilty U/s. 13(2) read with

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Sec. 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 and is acquitted U/s. 248(1) Cr.P.C. and set
him at liberty. His bail bond is cancelled. ”


8. The learned counsel for the petitioner-State submitted that the
impugned judgment suffers from a manifest misappreciation of
evidence. It was contended that the decoy (P.W.8) consistently proved
the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, and her testimony
stood corroborated by P.W.9, the Trap Laying Officer, P.W.1 and
P.W.4, the independent official witnesses, as well as P.Ws.10 and 11,
the Investigating Officers. It was argued that the learned Special Judge
erroneously discarded reliable prosecution evidence merely because
P.W.3 turned hostile, ignoring the settled principle that conviction can
rest upon the credible testimony of the complainant and police officials
notwithstanding hostility of trap witnesses.
9. He further submitted that the trial Court committed factual and
legal errors in holding that the contradiction in P.W.3's evidence had not
been proved through the Investigating Officer. The petitioner contended
that P.W.3's previous statement was duly confronted to P.W.10, K.
Venkata Rao, who had recorded it during investigation, rendering the

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finding to the contrary unsustainable. It was lastly argued that the
learned trial Court proceeded on an erroneous premise that the Revenue
Inspector was required to issue the caste certificate, whereas his duty
was only to submit an enquiry report to the Tahasildar, and his failure to
submit the report facilitated the continued demand for the balance bribe
amount of Rs.700/-.
10. This Court has carefully examined the judgment passed by the
learned trial Court, the reasons assigned therein, and the evidence
adduced by both the prosecution and the defence during trial. This
Court has also considered the grounds urged in the present appeal
and heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-State at
length.
11. Before interfering with an order of acquittal, this Court is also
required to bear in mind the well-settled principles governing an
appeal against acquittal. In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v.
State of Karnataka & Ors. , reported in 2026 INSC 67 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has reiterated that where two reasonable conclusions

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are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial
Court. It has further been held that if the view taken by the trial
Court is a possible view based on the evidence available on record,
the appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal merely
because another view is also possible. Interference is warranted only
when the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is
based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where
compelling and substantial reasons exist showing that the acquittal is
clearly unreasonable. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this
Court, it can be said that if two reasonable
conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the
Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible. The following principles have to be kept in
mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the
appeals against an order of acquittal:
(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;

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(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission
to consider the material evidence on record;
(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when
there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing
so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a
compelling reason for interference.
(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a
possible view which could have been taken on the basis of
the evidence on record;
(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion
was possible.
”

Equally, in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka , reported in
2024 INSC 104 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
presumption of innocence, which every accused enjoys during trial, gets
strengthened and concretized once the trial culminates in an order of
acquittal. Consequently, while exercising appellate jurisdiction against
an acquittal, a higher threshold is required to rebut such reinforced
presumption. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are
manifestly unsustainable or perverse, the appellate Court ought to
exercise great restraint in upsetting the acquittal. It was held thus:-

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“24. We may firstly discuss the position of law
regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal
appeal. For, that is the foundation of this
challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven
guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of
the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the
case ends in acquittal. The presumption of
innocence gets concretized when the case ends in
acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on
appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that
the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets
strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to

rebut the same in appeal.”

12. The appellate jurisdiction against an order of acquittal is,
therefore, not intended to facilitate a fresh substitution of the opinion of
the trial Court merely because a different view on the evidence is
conceivable. As reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulasareddi
@ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra) , the
appellate Court must first satisfy itself that the judgment of acquittal is
vitiated by patent perversity, misreading or non-consideration of material
evidence, or is so unreasonable that no prudent person could have
arrived at such a conclusion. Equally, as held in Mallappa & Ors. v.
State of Karnataka (supra) , the reinforced presumption of innocence

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following an acquittal places a higher threshold upon the appellate Court
before upsetting the findings recorded by the trial Court. Thus, unless the
conclusions reached by the trial Court are wholly unsustainable on the
evidence available on record, judicial restraint rather than substitution of
views remains the governing principle in an appeal against acquittal.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this Court
finds that the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court cannot
be said to be either perverse or wholly unreasonable. Merely because
another view may also be possible, the same cannot furnish a ground to
reverse the acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
13. At this distant point in time, the absence of compelling and
substantial reasons warranting interference, reversal of the acquittal
would itself occasion serious prejudice and would be a travesty of
justice. At this belated stage, presumption of innocence prevailed in
favour of the opposite party for more than 12 years, as he was acquitted
by the Court below. Reversing such presumption at this stage would not
only be harsh, but it would be against the cardinal principle of

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reformatory criminal jurisprudence. This Court, therefore, finds no legal
or factual justification to unsettle the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal
passed by the learned trial Court. In view of the aforementioned, this
Court is not inclined to grant leave against the judgment of acquittal
impugned herein.
14. Accordingly, the CRLLP stands dismissed.

(S.S. Mishra)
Judge

The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
ST
Dated the 31 October, 2026/Ashok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB
MOHAPATRA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 05-Nov-2026 19:59:15

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