RAH RUHELA vs STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
- Court
- Uttarakhand High Court
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HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SRI MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI
AND
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHASH UPADHYAY
Writ Petition (PIL)No.149 of 2026
th
4 NOVEMBER, 2026
Raj Ruhela --Petitioner
Versus
State of Uttarakhand and another --Respondents
Counsel for the petitioner : Mr. M.C. Pant and Mr. Rakshit Joshi,
learned counsel
Counsel for the State/respondent no.1 : Mr. Amarendra Pratap Singh, learned
Additional Advocate General.
Counsel for respondent no.2 : Mr. Rahul Consul, learned counsel.
The Court made the following:
(per Hon’ble The Acting Chief Justice Sri Manoj Kumar Tiwari)
JUDGMENT:
By means of this writ petition, petitioner has
sought the following reliefs:-
“a) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction
quashing the impugned RFP dated 11.09.2026 titled
"Request for Proposal for Laboratory Services
(Annexure P 8, Page No.139) under Free Diagnostic
Services Initiative FDSI NHM Uttarakhand", bearing
Tender Reference Number NHMUK/FEDSI/2026-
27/2858 and Tender ID 2026_NHMUK_100033_1, to
the extent the same contains arbitrary.
unreasonable, disproportionate and unduly restrictive
pre-qualification, eligibility, financial security and
evaluation conditions;
b) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other
appropriate direction commanding the Respondents
to reframe the tender conditions in a fair,
transparent, proportionate and competition-friendly
manner consistent with Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution of India;
c) Declare that the requirements and conditions
stipulated under the impugned RFP, upon judicial
review, to be arbitrary, irrational, disproportionate
and unnecessarily restrictive, without a rational
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nexus to the procurement's legitimate objectives and
are unconstitutional and unenforceable to that
extent;
d) Stay the finalization of the bid, letter of award,
execution or further processing of the impugned
tender pursuant to the RFP dated 11.09.2026,
pending disposal of the present petition;
e) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction
calling for the records pertaining to the impugned
Request for Proposal titled "Request for Proposal for
Laboratory Services under Free Diagnostic Services
Initiative FDSI NHM Uttarakhand" ( "RFP" ), bearing
Tender Reference Number: NHMUK/FEDSI/2026-
27/2858 and Tender ID: 2026_NHMUK_100033_1;
to produce the complete tender record, including file
notings, approval notes, evaluation criteria,
comparative statement, pre-bid queries, responses,
and all amendments / corrigenda before this Hon'ble
Court;
f) Direct the Respondents to reconsider the amounts
prescribed under the Earnest Money Deposit and
Performance Bank Guarantee requirements under the
impugned RFP and to rationalise and reduce the
same to levels, so as to eliminate under financial
barriers, promote wider participation of eligible
bidders and ensure a fair, transparent and
competitive bidding process in furtherance of the
public interest;
g) Direct the Respondents to reconsider the blanket
prohibition on joint ventures provided under the
impugned RFP and to promote wider participation of
competent and eligible bidders in the bidding
process;
h) Direct the Respondents to reconsider the
requirement of engagement of the bidder for at least
10 years in direct clinical pathology / laboratory
diagnostic testing through bidder-operated
laboratories and reduce the same to reasonable
levels to promote participation of competent bidders
who possess substantial but comparatively shorter
experience;
i) Direct the Respondents to reconsider the
requirement of the bidder operating and managing
full-scope clinical pathology laboratories in at least
10 government hospitals / institutions during the last
3 completed financial years and reduce the same to
reasonable levels to promote participation of
completed bidders who possess substantial
experience in government healthcare projects but
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have not operated laboratories in 10 separate
government institutions within the specified period;
j) Direct the Respondents to reconsider the
requirement of the bidder directly owning / operating
one or more clinical pathology laboratories with valid
NABL accreditation for at least 8 out of the last 10
years preceding the Bid Due Date and also have
experience of getting at least 5 government labs
NABL, accredited and reduce the same to reasonable
levels so as to eliminate a further unnecessary,
arbitrary and restrictive layer of eligibility of the
bidders;
k) Direct the Respondents to reconsider the
requirement of the bidder having minimum INR 100
Crore average overall annual turnover during the last
3 completed financial years under the impugned RFP
and to rationalise and reduce the same to reasonable
levels, so as to eliminate undue financial entry
barriers and promote wider participation of eligible
and competent bidders in furtherance of the public
interest:
L) Pass any such other order(s) as this Hon'ble Court
may deem fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the present case.”
2. Learned counsel appearing for respondent
no.2 / National Health Mission submits that PIL would
not be maintainable for the reliefs sought in the writ
petition. He submits that only a person, who is
aggrieved by conditions of tender, can question the
eligibility condition. He relies on a Division Bench
Judgment of Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court rendered in
case of Gyanesh Kumar Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan
[2026:RJ-JP:43698-DB]. Paragraph nos.11 to 20 of the
said judgment are reproduced hereunder:-
“11. The question whether a stranger may, by way
of a PIL, challenge a purely commercial contract is
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no longer res integra. In Villianur Iyarkkai
2
Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
" 113. As far as second preliminary objection
regard-ing locus standi of the appellant to
challenge the award of the contract for the
development of the Pondicherry Port to
Respondent 11 is concerned, this Court finds
that the contract assailed in the writ petitions
is purely commercial in nature. Neither the
parties, which had participated in the process
of selection of the consult-ant/developer nor
one of those, which had expressed desire to
develop the Pondicherry Port but was not se-
lected, has come forward to challenge the
selection procedure adopted by the
Government of Pondicherry or the selection of
Respondent 11 as developer of the
Pondicherry Port.
114. The question of locus standi in the
matter of awarding the contract has been
considered by this Court in BALCO Employees'
Union v. Union of India [(2002) 2 SCC 333].
This Court, after review of law on the point,
has made following observations in para 88 of
the judgment: (SCC p. 381)
"88. It will be seen that whenever the
Court has interfered and given directions
while entertaining PIL it has mainly been
where there has been an element of
violation of Article 21 or of human rights
or where the litigation has been initiated
for the benefit of the poor and the
underprivileged who are un-able to come
to court due to some disadvant-age. In
those cases also it is the legal rights which
are secured by the courts. We may,
however, add that public interest litigation
was not meant to be a weapon to
challenge the financial or economic
decisions which are taken by the
Government in exercise of their
administrative power. No doubt a person
per-sonally aggrieved by any such
decision, which he regards as illegal, can
impugn the same in a court of law, but, a
public interest litigation at the behest of a
stranger ought not to be entertained. Such
a litigation can-not per se be on behalf of
the poor and the downtrodden, unless the
court is satisfied. that there has been
violation of Article 21 and the persons
adversely affected are unable to approach
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the court."
From the passage quoted above it is clear that
the only ground on which a person can
maintain a PIL is where. there has been an
element of violation of Article 21 or human
rights or where the litigation has been
initiated for the benefit of the poor and the
underprivileged who are unable to come to
the court due to some disadvant-age."
12. In Rajeev Suri v. Delhi Development
3
Authority , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered
the locus standi of a third party to challenge a
commercial transaction and the scope of judicial
review in such matters. The Court observed as
under:
"547. It is relevant to note that the question
of locus in considering an argument of this
nature cannot be sidelined. For, such
arguments call upon the Court to expand the
contours of its jurisdiction to venture into
strictly private commercial matters. A litigant,
not being a party to the transaction, cannot be
heard in ordinary circumstances. What needs
to be established is substantial and
demonstrable public interest on the basis of a
concrete factual position. The jurisprudence
evolved by this Court in such matters looks for
substantial public interest, to be shown on the
basis of violation of Part III or arbitrariness in
Government action. In the absence thereof, it
becomes the duty of the Court to preserve
free commercial relations. Law has a
substantial interest in preserving the freedom
of contract.
548. As long as there is fair play in
Government action, it is no one's concern to
assail a commercial transaction by levelling
vague and unsubstantiated allegations. The
genesis of a public interest litigation lies in
public interest; and public interest lies in
vindicating the rights of those who lack the
wherewithal to reach the Court to remedy
injustice against them. The tool of public
interest litigation or "social interest litigation",
as it is more appropriately called, was devised
to open the doors of the constitutional courts
for remedying glaring injustices against
humans, that is, for securing constitutional
rights. It was never meant to transform the
constitutional court as a superlative authority
over day-to-day governance. Judicial time is
not meant for undertaking a roving enquiry or
to adjudicate upon unsubstantiated flaws or
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shortcoming in policy matters of Government
of the day and politicise the same to appease
the dissenting group of citizens - be it in the
guise of civil society or a political outfit."
13. In The Travancore Devaswom Board v.
4
Ayyappa Spices & Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme
Court while dealing with a PIL arising out of a
tender, reiterated that the Courts must exercise
restraint where public interest jurisdiction is invoked
in contractual and tender matters, and that such a
petition ought not to be entertained unless the
decision under challenge is shown to be arbitrary,
irrational, unreasonable, malafide or illegal.
14. Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Uflex Ltd. Vs.
5
Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors. , observed
that commercial tender matters involve an element
of commercial competitiveness, and that
constitutional courts are not appellate authorities to
scrutinise as to whom the tender should be
awarded, hence the tendering authority is the best
judge of its requirements. Hon'ble Supreme Court
observed as under:-
"42. We must begin by noticing that we are
examining the case, as already stated above,
on the parameters discussed at the inception.
In commercial tender matters of commercial
there is obviously an aspect competitiveness.
For every succeeding party who gets a tender
there may be a couple or more parties who
are not awarded the tender as there can be
only one L-1. The question is should the
judicial process be resorted to for downplaying
the freedom which a tendering party has,
merely because it is a State or a public
authority, making the said process even more
cumbersome. We have already noted that
element of transparency is always required in
such tenders because of the nature of
economic activity carried on by the State, but
the contours under which they are to be
examined are restricted as set out in Tata
Cellular and other cases. The objective is not
to make the Court an appellate authority for
scrutinizing as to whom the tender should be
awarded. Economics must be permitted to
play its role for which the tendering authority
knows best as to what is suited in terms of
technology and price for them."
15. In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur
6
Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the owner or employer of a
project, having authored the tender documents, is
the best person to understand and appreciate its
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requirements, and that constitutional courts must
defer to such understanding unless malafides or
perversity is shown. The same. principle applies to
the formulation of eligibility conditions, as the
procuring entity is best placed to determine the
qualifications re-quired for the work. Further, in
Silppi Constructions Contract-ors v. Union of
7
India , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that,
while arbitrariness, irrationality, malafides or bias
warrant Judicial interference, the Court must
exercise restraint in contrac-tual matters and should
not interfere merely because another view. is
possible.
16. Role of constitutional courts in reviewing
tender processes again came up for consideration
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of VC
8
& MD CIDCO Vs. Shishir Realty Pvt. Ltd. ,
wherein it was observed as under :-
“27. Being governed under "rule of law" every
action of the State or its instrumentality while
exercising its executive powers must met the
aforesaid requirements. While recognising the
existing principle of freedom to enter or not to
enter into contracts by the state and its
Instrumentalities, the manner, method and
motive behind the aforesaid decision can be
subjected to judicial review on the touchstone
of equality, fairness, proportionality and
natural justice. The decision of the executive
must strike a balance with the alleged
violation with that of the penalty imposed.
28. This Court, in many of its orders reviewing
tender conditions, has vouched for providing
sufficient discretion and independence to
administrative authorities so as to enable
them to perform their duties in the interest of
the public. Further, the observation of judicial
restraint while reviewing such contracts is a
continuing trend which can be seen in a
catena of cases. The power of judicial review
accorded to Constitutional Court of India and
its jurisdiction is supervisory."
30. In this context, this court in Tata Cellular
v. Union of India, observed certain principles
elucidated as under (SCC pp.687-88, para 94)
“94. The principles deducible from the above are:
(1) The modern trend points to judicial
restraint in administrative action,
(2) The court does not sit as a court of
appeal but merely reviews the manner in
which the decision was made.
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(3) The court does not have the expertise
to correct the administrative decision. If a
review of the administrative decision is
permitted it will be substituting its own
decision, without the necessary expertise
which itself may be fallible.
(4) The terms of the invitation to tender
cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because
the invitation to tender is in the realm of
contract. Normally speaking, the decision
to accept the tender or award the contract
is reached by process of negotiations
through several tiers. More often than not,
such decisions are made qualitatively by
experts.
(5) The Government must have freedom of
contract. In other words, a fair play in the
joints is a necessary concomitant for an
administrative body functioning in an
administrative sphere or quasi-
administrative sphere. However, the
decision must not only be tested by the
application of Wednesbury principle of
reasonableness (including its other facts
pointed out above) but must be free from
arbitrariness not affected by bias or
actuated by mala fides.
(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy
administrative burden on the
administration and lead to increased and
unbudgeted expenditure."
31. These principles acquire importance as the
efficacy of commercial activities in the public
sector increases greatly. It appears that public
interest litigation has opened a large window
to entertain any tender, regardless of scale,
which are now sought to be challenged as a
matter of routine. Such disruption could
hardly have been the objective of expanding
the need of Constitutional Review. Close
scrutiny of minute details, contrary to the
view of the tendering authority, makes
execution of contracts in the public sector a
cumbersome exercise. Often, it is the case
that parties entertain the idea of a long-
drawn-out litigation at the very threshold
itself. The purpose of imbibing the spirit of
competition in a process such as that of the
bidding process, is lost in this meandering
exercise and delays suffered due to pending
litigation. This causes great disadvantage to
the government and public sector in general.
This Court, in appropriate cases while
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interpreting the contract, can restrict the
review mechanism by not inuring to the
interpretation so provided by third parties or
parties competing for the tender, unless the
impugned. interpretation is shown to be gross
abuse of law. The object of judicial review
cannot be that in every contract where some
parties lose out, a second opportunity is
provided to such parties to pick holes so as to
disqualify successful parties, on grounds which
even the party floating the tender find to be
without merit. With this brief background on
the standard of judicial review, we may
analyze the case at hand."
17. The principles emerging from the aforesaid
judgments are Cool that judicial review under Article
226 examines the legality and fairness of the
decision-making process, and not the merits of the
decision. The tendering authority is entitled to frame
eligibility conditions according to the nature and
requirements of the work, provided they are not
arbitrary, discriminatory, malafide or contrary to
law. A tender cannot be interfered with merely
because its conditions have been modified, or
because different conditions could have been
prescribed.
18. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the matter
of N.G. Projects Limited (supra), while dealing
with the construction of road for the exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, has held that construction of road is an
infrastructure project and keeping in view the intent
of the legislature that infrastructure projects should
not be stayed, observed in para 21 as under:
“21. Since the construction of road is an
infrastructure project and keeping in view the
intent of the legislature that infrastructure
projects should not be stayed, the High Court
would have been well advised to hold its hand
to stay the construction of the infrastructure
project. Such provision should be kept in view
even by the Writ Court while exercising its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India."
19. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is
quite vivid that in the instant case the JDA has come
out with a specific reply that comprehensive traffic
survey and Passenger Car Unit peak-hour volume
analysis conducted by M/s Thought Consultants
Jaipur Pvt. Ltd., established the absolute necessity
for the unidirectional alignment from Sarathi Marg
towards Susheelpura to resolve grade-level cross-
weaving congestion at the Purani Chungi Triangle.
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The decision has been taken to construct the
underpass, for which the administrative and
technical approval was granted by the Public Works
Committee on 13.11.2025, which constitutes valid
binding statutory sanction under the provisions of
Section 16 of the Act of 1982. As such, the decision
of the JDA to construct the underpass at the
impugned place is well considered executive policy
decision of the JDA and in view of the decision of
the Supreme Court in the matter of N.G. Projects
Limited (supra) and in view of Section 41(ha) of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963, it would be
inappropriate to exercise the jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India as no
material has been brought on record to show that
such a construction is contrary to the public
interest.
20. Similarly, in the matter of Jagdish Mandal Vs.
9
State of Orissa & Ors. ", the Supreme Court has
held that the Constitutional Courts should not
interfere with technical evaluations, if the executive
action is bona fide and in the public interest.”
3. Per contra, Mr. M.C. Pant, learned counsel for
petitioner has, however, submitted that petitioner has a
fundamental duty under Article 51A(h) & (i), which
reads as under:-
“(h) to develop the scientific temper, humanism and
the spirit of inquiry and reform;
(i) to safeguard public property and to abjure
violence;”
4. He has also relied upon judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court rendered in the case of Vinishma
Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr .
SLP(C) No.24075 of 2025 & connected petitions dated
06.10.2025 and submits that writ petition would be
maintainable. Paragraph no.20 of the said judgment is
reproduced hereunder:-
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“20. Such a restriction, therefore, cannot be justified
as reasonable within the meaning of 19(6) of the
Constitution of India. The State while it enjoys the
freedom to prescribe the conditions in the tender,
cannot exercise that power in a manner that
infringes upon constitutional guarantees, by closing
the market to outsiders without just cause. The
doctrine of level playing field requires that gates of
competition be opened to all who are equally placed.
The impugned tender condition excludes the
competent and experienced suppliers, who may have
executed contracts of far greater magnitude in other
States or for the Central Government departments,
from participating in the tender and has the impact
of promoting cartelisation. The impugned condition
operates as a closed door to outsiders and restricts
the wider participation of bidders and restricts
competition. The impugned tender condition,
therefore, is violative of Article 14 and also offends
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.”
5. We are not impressed by the submissions
made by learned counsel for the petitioner. The
judgment rendered in the case of Vinishma
Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is distinguishable on
facts, as there, the tender condition excluded bidders
from other States from participating in the tender
process. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Directorate of Education & others Vs. Educomp
Datamatics Ltd. & others reported as (2004) 4 SCC 19
has held that terms of the invitation to tender are not
open to judicial scrutiny, as the same are in the realm
of contract. Para 12 of the said judgment is reproduced
below:-
“12. It has clearly been held in these decisions that
the terms of the invitation to tender are not open to
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judicial scrutiny, the same being in the realm of
contract. That the Government must have a free
hand in setting the terms of the tender. It must have
reasonable play in its joints as a necessary
concomitant for an administrative body in an
administrative sphere. The courts would interfere
with the administrative policy decision only if it is
arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or actuated by
bias. It is entitled to pragmatic adjustments which
may be called for by the particular circumstances.
The courts cannot strike down the terms of the
tender prescribed by the Government because it
feels that some other terms in the tender would have
been fair, wiser or logical. The courts can interfere
only if the policy decision is arbitrary, discriminatory
or mala fide.”
6. Law is well settled that employer is entitled to
formulate the conditions of eligibility, or terms of tender
notice, having regard to its requirement and the nature
of work which is proposed to be undertaken.
7. Writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
__________________________________
MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI, A.C.J.
___________________________
SUBHASH UPADHYAY, J.
Dt: 04.11.2026
SS/ PP
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