Kaarthic Manicham Throu. Poa Manikcam vs Pavitra Shrinivasan

CNR No : HCBM010146422026

2026:BHC-AS:43322
901-WP-4020-2026 .doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 4020 OF 2026
Kaarthic Manickam through P.O.A.
Manickam Arumgam Chettiar …Petitioner
V/s.
Pavitra Srinivasan ...Respondent
Mr. Rohan Cama a/w Ms. Gayatri Gokhale & Ms. Zainba Abdi,
Advocate for the Petitioner.
Mr. Vinay V. Nair a/w Ms. Riddhi P. Tendulkar & Mr. Venkatesh
Jairam, Advocate for the Respondent.

CORAM : N.R. BORKAR, J.
DATE : 30.09.2026.

ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. This petition takes exception to the order dated
nd
07.03.2026 passed by the 2 Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division,
Panvel, below Exh. 22 in H.M.P. No. 273 of 2024.
2. The respondent/wife herein has filed the petition for
divorce under Section 13(i)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act (“the
nd
Act”) against the petitioner/husband before the 2 Joint Civil Judge
Senior Division, Panvel.
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nd
3. By the impugned order, the learned 2 Joint Civil Judge,
Senior Division, has rejected the application filed by the
petitioner/husband taking exception to the jurisdiction of the said
Court to entertain the said petition.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and
the learned counsel for the respondent.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
petitioner and respondent are currently working in the United
States of America. It is submitted that both of them have been
residing there since 2014. It is submitted that the petitioner and
the respondent never resided at Panvel, let alone last resided
together there. It is further submitted that Section 19(iiia) of the
Act also would not apply to the present case, as on the date of
presentation of the petition the respondent was not residing at
Panvel. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the
submission that the word “resides” in Section 19 of the Act must
mean the actual place of residence and not a legal or constructive
residence, and that it certainly does not connote the place of
origin, has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
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1
in Jeewanti Pandey Vs. Kishan Chandra Pandey .
6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the
respondent submits that the respondent is willing to come back to
India and settle in India, but because of the restraining order
passed by the Court in America, she is not in a position to come
back. It is submitted that the respondent was residing at Panvel
with her parents before she moved to the United States of
America. It is submitted that Panvel is, therefore, her permanent
residence and just because she is working in the United States of
America, clause (iiia) cannot be interpreted to her detriment so as
to say that she is not residing at Panvel. The learned counsel for
the respondent submits that Section 19(iiia) of the Act should be
given a purposive interpretation. In support of the said
submissions, the learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of
the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in R. Sridharan Vs.
2
The Presiding Officer, Principal Family Court, Chennai .
7. The learned counsel submits that a similar objection to
territorial jurisdiction was taken in respect of the proceedings filed
1 (1981) 4 SCC 517
2 W.A. No. 1181 of 2009, decided on 09.07.2010
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by the respondent under the provisions of the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“the D.V. Act”), and
that this Court held that the Court at Panvel has jurisdiction to
entertain the said proceedings. It is submitted that the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has dismissed a Special Leave Petition against the
said order.
8. Section 19 (iiia) of the Act, reads thus:
19. Court to which petition shall be “
presented — Every petition under this Act shall
be presented to the District Court within the local
limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction
……..
(iiia) in case the wife is the petitioner,
where she is residing on the date of
presentation of the petition, or….. ”
9. Clauses (iiia) requires that the petitioner be residing
within the local limits of the Court on the date of presentation of
the petition.
10. In Jeewanti Pandey (supra) , the husband had
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presented a petition for nullity of marriage under Section 12 of the
Act before the District Court, Almora, alleging that the parties
were residents of village Bagyan, which lay within the jurisdiction
of that Court. The wife had left her parental village before the
marriage and had been living in Delhi, where the marriage was
solemnised and where the parties last resided together. The
District Court and the High Court nevertheless upheld jurisdiction,
on the footing that the parties were originally residents of the
village Bagyan and that the wife’s presence in Delhi was only a
temporary visit. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while interpreting the
word “residence” in Section 19 and setting aside that view
observed thus:
“8. In arriving at that conclusion, the High Court
was obviously influenced by the fact that the
parties never had any permanent residence.
While it is true that mere casual or temporary
visits do not constitute “residence” within the
meaning of clause (ii) of Section 19 of the Act, it
cannot be said that the parties came to Delhi on
a temporary sojourn for a day or two. The
appellant’s case is that she had left her parental
home at Village Bagyan as her father did not
consent to the marriage. If that be so, the
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irresistible conclusion is that she came to reside
with the respondent at Delhi. It was frankly
conceded before us that the finding of the High
Court that she should be so regarded as having
her residence at Village Bagyan in the district of
Pithoragarh is based on no evidence. It is agreed
on all hands that ever since the marriage, the
appellant has been residing with her uncle Basant
Kumar at Lajwanti Garden, New Delhi.
10. It is common ground that the marriage was
solemnised on January 24, 1976 at New Delhi.
The fact that the parties last resided together at
the residence of the appellant’s uncle Basant
Kumar at Lajwanti Garden, New Delhi is not in
dispute. It is, therefore, clear that, the conditions
laid down in clauses (i) and (iii) of Section 19 of
the Act are not present to invest the Court of the
District Judge, Almora to entertain the petition for
annulment of marriage filed by the respondent
under Section 12 of the Act.
11. The question that arises is whether the
learned District Judge was invested with
jurisdiction by reason of clause (ii) of Section 19
of the Act i.e. whether, at the time of
presentation of the petition, the appellant was a
resident of Village Bagyan within the territorial
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jurisdiction of the Court of District Judge.
12. In order to give jurisdiction on the ground of
“residence”, something more than a temporary
stay is required. It must be more or less of a
permanent character, and of such a nature that
the court in which the respondent is sued, is his
natural forum. …”
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held as follows:
“… in the context of clause (ii) of Section 19 of
the Act, the word “resides” must mean the actual
place of residence and not a legal or constructive
residence; it certainly does not connote the place
of origin. The word “resides” is a flexible one and
has many shades of meaning, but it must take its
colour and content from the context in which it
appears and cannot be read in isolation. It follows
that it was the actual residence of the appellant,
at the commencement of the proceedings, that
had to be considered for determining whether the
District Judge, Almora, had jurisdiction, or not.
That being so, the High Court was clearly in error
in upholding the finding of the learned District
Judge that he had jurisdiction to entertain and try
the petition for annulment of marriage filed by
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the respondent under Section 12 of the Act.”
12. The submission of the learned counsel for the
respondent that Panvel is “permanent residence”, of respondent
because she lived there with her parents before she moved to the
United States of America, is in substance a submission that her
place of origin is her place of residence. That is the approach
which the Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected in Jeewanti Pandey
(supra). Clause (iiia) speaks of the place where the wife “is
residing on the date of presentation of the petition”. It does not
speak of the place where she once lived, or where her parents
live, or which she regards as her permanent address.
13. The respondent further states that she is willing to
return to India but cannot do so because of a restraining order
passed by the Court in America. However, this will not make her a
resident of Panvel for the purpose Section 19 (iiia). In Smt. Aditya
3
Rastogi Vs. Anubhav Varma , the Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court was concerned with a wife residing in
Australia who had instituted divorce proceedings in India. It was
3 2023:AHC:205480-DB
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held thus:
“The term ‘residing’ though not defined under the
Act, it clearly denotes more than a casual visit to
a place falling within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Court where a divorce proceeding may be
instituted. Once it is admitted to the appellant
that she is continuing to reside in Australia
though under force of circumstance, it has to be
maintained in law that she is not residing within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Family Court,
Moradabad.”
14. There is no doubt that Section 19(iiia) is a beneficial
provision and it’s purpose is to enable the wife to approach the
Court of the place where she is “actually residing”. However, the
words of the statute cannot be enlarged so as to cover a place in
which the wife is not residing. To read “residing” as including a
parental home in which the wife is not living would go against the
text of the clause and decision in Jeewanti Pandey (supra) .
15. Thus it will have to be held that the Court at Panvel
had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The order
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impugned, therefore, cannot be allowed to stand. In the result, the
following order is passed.
O R D E R
i) The petition is allowed.
ii) The order impugned is set aside.
iii) The petition filed by the respondent shall be
returned to her for presentation to the proper
Court.
16. The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
[N.R.BORKAR, J.]
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